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 Praise for Matches
“The vision of history illuminating these pages is not 
the conventional one of progress, but the much more 
radical one of Rousseauism: a ‘left-wing nostalgia’ that 
performs a detour through the past—a world anterior to 
privilege and hypocrisy—with the aim not of restoring 
it, but of giving it a radically new form.”
—Michael Löwy, Le Monde diplomatique
“There are books that have the ability to throw your 
whole life into question, but these are the terms of 
engagement. . . . In the weeks I spent reading Matches I 
was more jittery than usual, my mind constantly reeling. 
I felt like I was on the edge of something, though I could 
not tell what that might be. I am always behaving badly, 
but this was different. I wanted to quarrel, I needed to 
question everything. Books seemed to be ruining my 
life. . . . But I love changing my mind.” 
—Anna Zalokostas, Full Stop
“A truly thorough examination of Matches: A Light Book 
would map all the terrain and take an unusual form: a 
multi-week course containing lectures, slides, video, the-
atre, playtime, and interactivity. S. D. Chrostowska is a 
writer of importance, and with this work she has raised 
her own personal bar.” 
—Jeff Bursey, Numéro Cinq 
“As in the writings of Nietzsche and Adorno, the targets 
of Chrostowska’s illuminating arson are cultural: the 
art world, publishing, academia, popular media, political 
economy, and the various phenomena that are the warp 
and woof of our daily newsfeeds. . . . At more than 500 
pages, Matches is an epic of the little form. Encyclopedic 
in its range and ambition, it includes nearly every variant 
on the aphorism attempted since the Corpus Hippo-
craticum. The book puts itself in dialogue with its most 
important practitioners as well as with today’s thinkers.” 
—Ryan Ruby, Lapham’s Quarterly
“Matches poses its greatest challenge to academic criti-
cism, demonstrating that intellectually rigorous issues 
can be addressed in an accessible way without diluting 
or oversimplifying those issues. . . .Certainly Matches 
demonstrates that an intelligent, informed critic can 
use the aphorism and the fragment to explore the 
most serious and substantive critical and philosophical 
subjects, providing sufficiently radiant illumination to 
guide us in our own consideration of these subjects. It is 
a very rewarding book, read either in sequence and in its 
entirety or in isolated selections, but . . . it is less a specific 
model of what criticism might become in the digital 
age than simply a challenge to seriously reflect on what 
Matthew Arnold called ‘the function of criticism at the 
present time.’” 
—Daniel Green, Los Angeles Review of Books
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FOR E WOR D 
I N F ER NA L U N IT Y
Alexander Kluge
In spitzen Klammern  
die verbrannten Wörter
In pointed brackets 
The burned words
—Heiner Müller, “Mommsen’s Block”
In a letter from August 2, 1935, written in Hornberg, in the 
Black Forest, and sent to Walter Benjamin, then living in 
Paris, Theodor W. Adorno makes a series of remarks on a 
line by Michelet, “Every epoch dreams the one that follows 
it.” These remarks are part of a complex designated by the 
keywords: prehistory of the nineteenth century; dialectical 
image; myth and modernity.
The fetish character of merchandise is not a fact of 
consciousness, writes Adorno. Rather, it is dialectical, in the 
crucial sense of producing consciousness. That is, conscious-
ness or the unconscious cannot simply reproduce this fetish 
character as a dream. On the contrary, consciousness or the 
unconscious disintegrates vis-à-vis commodity fetishism into 
desire and anxiety—without, however, ever becoming a new 
whole. In this sense, Adorno argues, immanent conscious-
ness is itself “a constellation of the real,” “just as if it were the 
astronomical phase in which hell moves among mankind. 
Only the star-chart of such wanderings could, it seems to 
me, open a perspective on history as prehistory.” Not only 
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can entire epochs not dream those that follow them, since 
epochs as a whole probably cannot dream, but individual 
consciousness or the individual unconscious, which is per-
fectly capable of dreaming, cannot, through such dreaming, 
realize or animate dialectical constructions. The dream, 
then, to the degree that consciousness is capable of catching 
it, does not extend into the lurid current of history’s flow, 
where it too would be torn and destroyed.
Adorno speaks also in this context of the dialectical 
image’s “objective power of the keys,”* instead of a 
subjective-objective power. He moreover stresses the obverse 
of the utopian dialectical image of the nineteenth century 
as hell. There is nothing that possesses the “power of the 
keys” to access utopia that is not at the same time capable of 
unlocking hell…
It is this Adornian conception that comes through in 
Matches—a title evoking the conflict between ideas and 
the intensity of their confrontation. But such a book is not, 
for all that, a battlefield delivered over to chaos; the troops 
remain in formation at their post: aphorisms, pensées, epi-
grams, fictional dialogues, apologues, short essays, ordered 
in six parts: aesthetics and literature; philosophy, science, 
and technology; politics; society; history, ethics, and reli-
gion; literary culture, the writer’s vocation, and method. 
Undergirding the project is an encyclopedic ambition—a 
subjective encyclopedia, to be sure, pretending in no way to 
be exhaustive. It is more a question of highlighting elements 
essential for understanding our historical moment, which 
are grasped in their contradictory, conflictual, differential, as 
well as complementary relationships. The result is a complex 
that wears its solid erudition lightly, one that puts particular 
emphasis on thinkers exemplifying the genre of the apho-
rism, such as Gracián, Chamfort, Lichtenberg, Nietzsche, 
or Jünger. Despite sorting its fragments into several books, 
Matches is an idiosyncratic universe, open and multiform, 
without an overarching principle. A “constellation of the 
* Theological notion expressing the apostolic power to bind or loose sins.—Trans.
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real,” to borrow Adorno’s expression, and pervaded by its 
“infernal unity.”
Among the book’s thematic nuclei one can mention the 
relationships between humans, animals, and machines; 
work, class relations and inequalities; truth and survival; 
the vagaries of creativity; the uncanny encounters between 
art and barbarism. Most important, however, is the idea 
of history understood not as progress but as a narrative 
thread kept taut by nostalgic longing and utopian expecta-
tions—stretched between, on the one hand, the resources of 
freedom and happiness lived in the past, and, on the other 
hand, the dream of building a better world, upon the ashes of 
mounting catastrophe.
To take up the words of Miguel Abensour, “Man is a uto-
pian animal,” and, as Ernst Bloch wrote in The Principle of 
Hope, “There is the spirit of utopia in the final predicate of 
every great statement.” This implicit aspiration to something 
that has not yet come is everywhere joined in Matches to an 
explicit exercise of the critical faculty. One way to read the 
collection is as a kind of humanist manifesto calling on us to 
transform raw information into knowledge and communi-
cable experience. The content here corresponds completely 
to the form: contemporary subjectivity, on account of its 
incredible fragmentation, can only be criticized and gathered 
up in fragmentary form.
Far from being dogmatic and prescriptive, Matches asks us 
not to renounce the commitment to thinking in a reality that 
threatens to overwhelm reason at any moment and to radi-
cally reduce the range of human feeling and sensation. Every 
page offers the reader an opportunity to interrogate and 
bring to light their own personal experience. In a style that is 
at once dense and incisive yet not without humour and irony, 
the author’s observations describe the contours of the world 
not just as it is, but above all as it should not be. It is thinking 
that resists the disjointedness of the world; thinking that 
tries to establish internal resonances where being and things 
continually fall apart and drift away from one another, 
despite their confinement on the same earthly vessel. This 
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thinking is itself necessarily composed of fragments of pro-
test and resistance sharp like the shards of glass.
It is owing to these aspects that the French translation of 
Matches took its place alongside other fragmentary philo-
sophical works—for example, The Heritage of Our Times by 
Ernst Bloch and Dämmerung: Notizen in Deutschland (Twi-
light: Notes from Germany) by Max Horkheimer—in the 
series “Critique de la politique.”* Since 1974, the series has 
prized unconventional voices and positions, and its editor, 
the late Miguel Abensour (1939–2017), went out of his way to 
include prose transcending academic specialization. This was 
prose from elsewhere, offered in translation, that could count 
on the hospitality of French intellectuals. In this respect, 
Chrostowska’s book is situated on the margins of contem-
porary theoretical and critical writing in the Anglophone 
world, both inside and outside of the academy. The negative 
dialectics of Adorno —to always advance toward the limits 
of knowledge—is here coupled with the negative capability 
described by John Keats, which consists in letting go of the 
persistent search for the reason of things. When exercising 
the power of a critic as well as that of a creator, we are bound 
for uncertainty and destined to fail in taming truth. If we 
nonetheless pursue it beyond the established order and our 
own theoretical capacities and into the wilderness of art, in 
its ever-renewed world, it is thanks to a daimon that does 
not tell us what to do, or what to say, but that preserves us 
from error. The periodic renewal of fragmentary forms—like 
of utopias—belongs to epochs in search of a higher unity 
beyond apparent complexities; to times of agitation apt to 
scramble the moral and political compass and to focalize 
critical commentary on crisis.
The publication of a 500-page book of fragments in the 
United States has every right to baffle some. After all, are 
there not already enough fragments all around us: in books 
* Reference is to the book series formerly at Payot-Rivages, now at Klincksieck, 
edited until 2017 by Miguel Abensour. This preface first appeared in the French 
translation of Matches.—Trans.
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that will never be read again cover to cover or in mildly 
amusing messages posted on social media in seemingly 
limitless quantities? Settling for the dispersal that affects 
digital archives, which are increasingly accessed at random 
and without any context, or for the ephemerality of what is 
written on the spur of the moment and on the fly, inevitably 
severs the ties to the critical mind in action, distinguished 
by its demanding nature, passion, and imagination— qual-
ities without which the intellectual world threatens to 
disintegrate.
The imagination is a skittish animal. But just as a skittish 
horse can be brought to attack, to rush ahead, and charges 
forward so spontaneously that no rider can hold back the 
animal’s mass (and, a-squat atop the horse, he has to work 
hard not to get bucked off), so the imagination flies towards 
all the mountains of reality and storms its walls with its 
ladders and bundles of fire, as Theodor Fontane described it. 
No, the imagination is not fit for a system like Wikipedia. It 
does not care much for coherence, context, and facts. It is a 
political animal and falls upon the world like a swarm.
It also possesses innumerable sources, including subter-
ranean ones, sparse and barren; its fountains spring forth 
destroying everything in their vicinity. According to Adorno, 
the most important factory of the imagination is sorrow. The 
imagination is born of an injury denied by fantasies. I have to 
disagree with him. I know of fantasies set in motion by luxury 
and elation. They compete with those that serve self-defence. 
The main thing is to pass through the “infernal unity” of the 
world, through this bad totality, to arrive at the threshold 
from which the horizon of the future can be glimpsed.

I suppose, Sirs, that you are so glutted with this banquet of 
various literary dishes that the food you eat continues to rise. 
Indeed ye sit crammed with dainties, for many have served 
up to you a mixed feast of precious and varied discourse 
and persuade you to look with contempt on ordinary fare. 
What shall I do now? Shall I allow what I had prepared to 
lie uneaten and spoil, or shall I expose it in the middle of 
the market for sale to retail dealers at any price it will fetch? 
Who in that case will want any part of my wares or who 
would give twopence for my writings, unless his ears were 
stopped up?
— Agathias, 6th century c. e. 
Why offer them a whole? They’ll just fragment 
It anyway, the public always do.
— Director to Poet, Goethe, Faust, Part I, 1798
I have seen it with my own eyes: natures that are gifted, 
rich, and disposed to be free, already “ruined by reading” 
in their thirties, just matches that have to be struck to emit 
sparks— “thoughts.”




I had a vision of a book that shed light. A torch book to light 
my way. A comet book, its luminous tail to leave a trace for 
me. Its brightness so intense that closing it submerged who-
ever broke it open in deeper darkness than before. I fancied a 
kind of sempiternal flame that shot up again as one resumed 
where one had left off.
It seemed to me there are two basic kinds of book, differ-
ing in radiance. One in which the words, erect, line up in 
columns and salute from every page, and another with words 
laid down in rows, looking up from their cots, sometimes 
wide, most only half, awake. The words are matches; those 
that strike ignite. From time to time, light sweeps across the 
page like wildfire. But most times, as with damp equipment, 
nothing so spectacular can be expected.
The match: little stick tipped with combustible stuff, 
sparked by friction; typically comes in a book or a box or 
a bundle (the point being: never alone). The highly porta-
ble match lighting more or less when required was a great 
nineteenth-century innovation. Before, we had only Danger 
and Poison matches, and countless match-induced accidents 
and suicides. 
We still have not engineered mischief out of the match. 
One little lucifer, God’s little helper, lit in the company of its 
sisters and brothers will, if we let them, afford us a min-
iature inferno. Are we responsible for the recklessness of 
thought? There will always be match tricks to go very wrong. 
How many times have we amused ourselves in the school-
yard, lighting up the whole passel of ideas within our reach, 
getting us in trouble? And now that we are older, we can 
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strike anywhere. We count on sparks to leap long distances 
virtually, to pass most swiftly from point to point instead 
of smouldering. No sooner do we bring a flame to some-
thing flammable than it spreads— even as its conductors are 
already charring and curling up. Let us congratulate our-
selves for remaking the transport of ideas. And for this new 
refrain: What matters is what’s on fire.
Lumenophiles! These are fragile thoughts. Be gentle with 
them. In a drafty space they might need your sheltering 
hand. Your sighs will extinguish them. Blow instead, blow 
hard, on the embers they leave behind. And never forget what 
they are: a little “gift” our ancestors received in curiosity and 
paid dearly for (being no match for a certain black “box”): evil 
and misery spilled out and flooded us. In that pagan tale, too, 
we reached for divine light and brought down darkness in its 
wake.
From this living tragicomedy we conclude that the mind 
was meant to be set ablaze, though not necessarily to survive 
the heat. Who will keep the ash-heaps of history raked 
and illuminated? Burn we must with desire to outmatch 
what consumes us, burning questions and objections. But 
what will come of our burnt offerings, our victory torches, 
our combustions and electrifications, we never know in 
advance. In hindsight much light was wasted, and much evil 
never did bring forth any good. So let’s also not fetishize 
the tools of light—these “matches” in a book or a box. The 
burnt-out match looks so uncannily human, and wise to this 
resemblance.
Incorrigible pyrotechnicians! It won’t be all fireworks! 
Which one of you doesn’t utter a cliché now and again, if 
only for reassurance at a particularly obscure spot concern-
ing the existence of common sense? The platitude, that 
ever-reliable native intelligence that so often, apparently 
by chance, opens the darkroom door just when bold new 
thoughts are developing and ruins everything! I am sure 
I backed away from many such cheerless corners worried 
by what crud of shabby, light-shy eccentricity I might find 
there—proceeding rather by analogies, muddled circumlocu-
tions, and yes, by common-places.
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Now you know, and in your leniency will observe how little 
customary it is for platitudes, the smoke of opinion, to be 
keeping such otherwise lustrous company. This is their big 
moment to stand out and fall flat (as they must). And your 
opportunity to take note of them, perhaps even own up to 
some nodding weakness. So stay sharp, order a wake-up call 
if need be. Any banality you come across promise to strike 
against the sole of your shoe, and, with a cool head, stomp 
out its sooty flicker.
Above all, harbour no illusions about instant illumination. 
But perhaps you hope to warm yourself a little . . .Then you 
have not understood Andersen’s wise tale. Either that or you 
haven’t read it. Ideas, visions alone won’t keep you warm; 
it’s what you do with them. Have you ever in your life seen a 
bonfire of matches? Then you should know they were made 
neither to raise temperatures nor to dazzle. What’s this I 
hear about obsolescence? You don’t know what to do? A vir-
tual flame is not hazard-free; how much truer is this of a real 
one! But safety talk would be out of place here. You’ll learn 
by playing how best to play.
 Allumette, gentille allumette, 
 Allumette, je te gratterai. 
 Je te gratterai la tête. 
 Je te gratterai la tête. 
 Et la tête! Et la tête!
In any event, your expectations need scaling down. There 
isn’t all that much to be done with matches. On the bright 
side, you still have your choice of “effect”: lighting them 
as needed, one at a time, or seeing them go up in smoke, 
all in one go. Now ask me about the advantages to each 
approach . . .Why, that is just the moral of The Hothead and 
the Slow Burn (an ultramodern fable you are forgiven for not 
knowing). Which of the two is you?
I made this book of matches for the cold-stiff and the 
light-poor, with their survival at heart. Can they keep the fire 
going in their bellies, assuming they lit one? Without it, they 
won’t last the night. Should my matchbook, however, fall 
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into the hands of hot-blooded pyromaniacs who, having gone 
through it and finding it “light,” cast it empty into the fur-
nace of their mind, then I will fan the flames myself. What 
better honour than to be eaten by a brighter blaze, turn fuel 
for that afflatus of genius, meanwhile discreetly eliminating 
its stench?
You may have already guessed that putting together such 
a book required no small ingenuity on the part of one who 
is no match-maker by trade. What do I know about mixing 
phosphorus or sulphur with whatever else goes into the head 
of a match? Never mind the effort, not entirely successful, 
to leave familiar thoughts and places, where one’s ideas fall 
short or turn out to be squibs. Habits took offence, reasons 
had to be improvised, so too credible excuses. But off one 
went. And here one is: whittling then dabbing the service-
able sticks with stuff pulled from elsewhere, doing this from 
sunup till sundown, into night as deep as before there was 
light.
A mountain retreat is only as good as the view, particularly 
at dusk. Can one really see better from here? Does better 
mean more, or less? Does it mean farther, or closer? Is it observ-
ing the mist hanging about me, or seeing through the mist? 
Is it watching the dance of a flame, or staring into it, at what 
feeds it? Is it looking in, or looking out?
Of one thing there is no doubt: it is no more looking up 
than looking down. Though I refuse to insert myself into 
it—and what would be the point?—I have gathered a thing 
or two about life in the valley. Its sounds after all reach 
me constantly: motors starting up, kids let out of school, 
weekend revels, amplified sermons, the crackle of fireworks, 
and, not to discriminate, the lowing of cattle, the chirping 
and squawking in the trees . . . I see nothing of it beneath me. 
I only have eyes for what stretches on before me. Above all, I 
hate being the tourist. So I stay here, and regard best what I 
see worst—what I view absently and without consideration.






§ Ethics of Reading
which does not mean goodness comes bundled with books
Ethical reading requires effort, which is good preparation 
for goodness. A morally safe book is merely a resource that, 
though it be with you at all times, is hopelessly ineffective as 
a means of defence against evil. And when you look within 
your heart, hopefully it is not to copy it.
§ Ethics of Reading
which does not mean certain books should be put down for your 
own good
Even immoral books do not corrupt on their own. It takes 
deep engagement and susceptibility to be spoiled by what 
you read. Treat morally dubious reading as an ethical contest, 
with the text as facilitator of a challenge (and not to be con-
fused with your real opponent, yourself).
If you want to hold a book to ethical account, start with 
yourself, then move on to its author. The text should be last 
in line, after either you or its author had failed to make a bad 
impression. Its comparative faults, if it has them, will then 
stand out.
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§ Who Spits Farther
The cult of the artist by the artist is still alive and well, now 
perhaps more than ever before. The arena is crowded, there 
can be few victors. And this is what makes artist communi-
ties without mediocrities a veritable pipe dream, even when 
dreamt by the great and prodigious. In a spitting contest 
there is only talk of technique, but true talent, individual 
style or vision, is not shareable. And “why should one artist 
grasp another?”  * It won’t help either of them get ahead. For 
one artist to be grasped by another artist signifies artistic 
failure. For an artist to be grasped by everyone else—artistic 
success.
§ Called Literature
This persistent naming . . . we call literature.
—Paul De Man  †
The odyssey of naming, which took us from speech to 
writing between the Scylla and Charybdis of the encyclope-
dia and the novel to Literature and then the logosphere, is 
at an end. Why? Just because! Things heated up, literature 
was brought to a boil, to a word reduction. It no longer rears 
its head in any discursive domain that claims demystifying 
powers. It is now part of the cold soup we drink daily, prefer-
ring not to know the ingredients.
* Karl Kraus, Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half Truths: Selected Aphorisms, trans. 
Harry Zohn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 52.
† Paul De Man, “Criticism and Crisis,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric 
of Contemporary Criticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 18.
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§ No Other Gods
Now that you have lost your faith in Literature—it does 
nothing for your amour propre these days—you can believe in 
writing.
I deliberately did not say “keep your belief” in writing, or 
“continue to believe” in it, because your devotion to Literature 
pretty well precluded it. And this “new” belief is not so new 
either—if that is any succor. Replaced by faith in Literature 
some generations back, it too had once demanded exclusivity.
§ Last Words
It is a writer and not the Author who will have the last word.
§ Burial Site
You can keep writing books to keep up appearances if it 
makes life easier. But remember that you’re making things 
harder for others. For instance, future archaeologists, who 
may conclude from the literary remains with which you were 
buried that, as late as the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, there was still something called Literature.
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§ Unembarrassable 
So far we’ve had it backwards; authors represent their works, 
not works their authors. Forget a book embarrassing its 
author; these days writers are unembarrassable. They grow 
thick skin telling themselves they’ll do better next time, and 
develop calluses to turn all the more nimbly on their heel 
away from “bad” readers.
Books have no will; to order them not to embarrass us 
writers would be lunacy. The onus was, then, traditionally  
on authors to heed the commandment Do not write books 
that would embarrass you. But now all worry about bad 
judgment has been laid to rest by the “tropical climate” of 
publishing. Nothing written for the public can come back to 
haunt us. Everything can be recast as a warmup exercise. 
With the new climate, however, comes a new responsi-
bility. Now that opportunities for authors to pronounce on 
their work have grown out of all proportion, writers should 
be careful not to embarrass their own productions. Much 
like parents—who does not cringe at the memory?—should 
not embarrass their adolescent children (still treated like 
personal property) just when these are at their most origi-
nal, most embarrassable. As we writers grow old, barren and 
loquacious, and the gap between us and our children widens, 
our works burn with shame.
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§ Broken Levees
We do not reject the offer, but we do not accept it.
—Ukrainian opposition in reply to Yanukhovich’s 
offer to share power in January 2014  *
Given the deluge of new manuscripts to all the presses that 
cannot afford better levees, the wise author reads a publish-
er’s silence as an invitation to revise. When eventually the 
manuscript is again submitted, it is to another press.
There is nothing like being ignored to get under the skin of 
the truly dedicated. Form rejection letters should be aban-
doned; not only do they drain the press of resources in this 
cash-strapped age, they also rile the blood, focus resentment, 
and trigger juvenile behaviour best not discussed. They offer 
easy external targets of blame, when a harder, internal one 
would serve our interests far more. There is no denying that 
they damage the psyche of writers, who worship per defini-
tionem at the altar of their own uniqueness. For that reason, 
the value for dedicated writers of a sensitive personalized 
letter cannot be disputed. It is to be cherished uncondition-
ally and framed. But for those talents who have not honed 
their skills enough to merit one, nor have the sureness or 
ambition to keep on with one eye on the pile of snappy turn -
downs, silence is most beneficial where acceptance is not 
forthcoming. They fill this silence with questions: Who am I 
writing for? What am I good for? Shall I change how I do things? 
Should I keep at it? Where a rejection slip would have bruised 
and provoked expletives about the intelligence of publishers 
and readers, silence inspires reflection. Where an explicit, 
unadorned NO would have led to hang-ups and stagnation, 
silence is not just easier on the writer’s fragile ego; it allows 
it to grow.
* David M. Herszenhorn, “Opposition Says No to Ukraine on Power Share,” New 
York Times, Jan. 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/world/europe/
ukrainian-president-offers-top-posts-to-opposition-leaders.html.
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§ The Good, the Bad, and the Beyond
The beauty of the new fragmented novel is that writers can 
have it both ways. These books pay deference to complexity, 
that deity of the lit critic, but they are also marked by an 
intense devotion to plot, pacing and other elements of tradi-
tional craft. Highbrow and lowbrow elements are pleasingly 
blurred. Experimentation proves that it is compatible with 
accessibility. I am attracted to these books— and I suspect 
others are as well—because of their skill in serving such 
conflicting masters, and without obvious compromises.
—Ted Gioia  *
Those moved to evaluate aesthetic objects on ethical grounds 
very quickly realize that nothing is simply “good” or “bad” 
(and not just because it is made so solely by thinking). The 
introduction of additional categories attests to our acuity 
and discernment. Let us take novels as our example, for 
there can always be found a critic who follows the stocks of 
tradition yet does not fail to invest in the new and comely. 
We must straightaway mark the good “bad” novel for special 
distinction: successfully revolutionary, unsettling bourgeois 
prescriptions for success and mainstream values. Conversely, 
there is the bad “good” kind: oh-so bourgeois, promoting 
and reinforcing mainstream literary values. And who cannot 
name at least one good “good” novel, that badly bourgeois 
work surrendering to and failing even by the standards it 
follows? It still deserves consideration, if only for honestly 
trying. But as its author, do not expect a shortlist anywhere; 
the two positives, good and good, make a very strong positive 
in our assessment because such books represent the dismal 
failure to guard these tired standards. And finally (if such 
hair-splitting can have an end) there is the bad “bad” novel: 
failed, still however creditable for trying to be revolutionary; 
* Ted Gioia, “The Rise of the Fragmented Novel (An Essay in 26 Fragments),”  
Fractious Fiction, July 17, 2013, http://fractiousfiction.com/rise_of_the_ 
fragmented_novel.
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in this case the two negatives, bad and bad, also make a 
positive, however weak, for there is much to recommend 
the work, even if in the end it confirms the strength of the 
bourgeois grip on art. These labels we have proposed can 
be reversed to reflect the opposite bias. Thus, the good “bad” 
can be called bad “good,” or simply bad bad; the bad “good” 
easily turns into good “bad,” or good good, and so on. (If any 
of this is at all confusing, you may first need to sort out your 
loyalties.)
But we are not yet through. There is additionally the ques-
tion of degree, and some books merit a stronger response. 
The worst ones, those beyond good and bad (or “good” and 
“bad”), are those that betray both “sides”— for and against rev-
olution, or for and against the status quo. These productions 
are exposed for trying to “serve two masters” by claiming 
to be revolutionary while beneath their unconventional-
ity buying into bourgeois literary codes and conventions 
of thought and feeling. They are unfaithful sell- outs. The 
terrible failure of this worst of books is that both sides would 
claim it, were it “true,” but under the circumstances neither 
wants anything to do with it. It follows that the most terrific 
success, and the best book of all, beyond the categories good 
and bad (or “good” and “bad”) and their pileups, is one the 
two “masters” are prepared to fight over, each claiming to be 
the rightful one, without ever doubting the fidelity of what 
they are fighting over. As such, this best work is the likeliest 
to be torn to shreds—not by rabid criticism but the most 
rapturous adoration.
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§ Novel Experiments
I thought of this project as a kind of experiment in realistic 
prose. How far is it possible to go into detail before the novel 
cracks and becomes unreadable?
—Karl Ove Knausgård, 
author of Min Kamp (My Struggle)  *
He forgot to add: banal detail. Detail as such will never crack 
the novel. And if he had thought it through beforehand, 
rather than rationalized what he’d done, he would have 
known that nothing is unreadable, least of all the banal. Noth-
ing is so “unreadable” that it will not find its literate defenders.
Such experiments have been performed before without 
begging the writer’s apologetic elucidations. Critics today 
need to feel the writer had reason for what they did, reason 
to innovate, reason to be daring. Writers, for their part, are 
only too happy to oblige. Innovation is after all so important, 
and no one can say in advance and with authority what is 
really new. And daring counts for so much more in a risk- 
 averse society. Critics are easily impressed by innovation and 
daring amidst mountains of pap. When they buy the reason, 
the creative intent, and see the work as new and/or bold, they 
can be persuaded to like everything about it. If, however, 
they are not, the public will be up in arms, and that will be 
the end of them—these posturing criticasters!
* Karl Ove Knausgaard, interview by Trevor Laurence Jockims, Bookforum, June 
24, 2013, http://www.bookforum.com/interview/11771.
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§ Stranger than Fiction
There are ideas born of a powerless but overexcited brain 
solely to fill the emptiness of melancholy. Something nearly 
always comes of these improbable schemes—a fact that 
appears stranger than fiction, if we remember that in fiction 
the improbable is presented as fact.
§ Prise d’abyme
When we remark reprovingly “So-and-so acts like a character 
in a novel,” we are essentially saying we prefer their imagina-
tion contained. The mise en abyme of fiction can be as infinite 
as they come, but turned outwards it becomes a vacuum that 
threatens to swallow whatever is left of “reality.”
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§ No Outstanding Work
nulle œuvre en suspens 
qu’ils ne souffrent pas et que je souffre, non pas seulement 
dans l’esprit, mais dans la chair et dans mon âme de tous  
les jours
(that they do not suffer and that I do, not only in my 
mind, but in my flesh, and in my everyday soul)
—Antonin Artaud to Jacques Rivière (1924)  *
Do I, the young poet asked the editor of the Nouvelle Revue 
Française, have the right to think (le droit de continuer à 
penser), the right to speak? The work he had sent in was not 
the result of inspiration but of spiritual jolts (saccades) that 
tear the words to shreds (lambeaux). Salvaged from the void, 
wrenched from chaos and composed in this ruined state as 
best he could, primitive to the extreme. Et cependant je ne suis 
pas bête, and yet I am not dumb, not beastly. He demurs: you 
are judging my work by today’s standards; judge me instead 
by those that are absolute (du point de vue de l’absolu). What is 
art other than this wresting of a soul from the absolute dark-
ness that reigns in man’s breast, man’s skull; what standards 
other than absolute ones can be brought to this human art 
without doing to it a civilized form of violence? 
Rivière is, understandably, fascinated. He gradually 
comes around to seeing this writer, who has no work on 
him he hasn’t shared, no work on standby, as an exception 
to the droves of poets who have always, on a backburner, 
some uninspired something or other, fanning the flames of 
their mind instead of putting them out. He reads Artaud’s 
* For the first fragment, the full sentence reads: “Voilà encore pourquoi je vous ai 
dit que je n’avais rien, nulle œuvre en suspens, les quelques choses que je vous ai 
présentées constituant les lambeaux que j’ai pu regagner sur le néant complet.” 
Antonin Artaud, L’Ombilic des limbes (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 21. Subsequent 
references are to pp. 19–47, with all quoted text (original French and translation) 
of the Artaud–Rivière correspondence rendered in italics.
  matches:  a  light book 11
difference from the phenomenon of the age as it asks to be 
read: as a true illness (une véritable maladie) and, as such, a 
sign of authenticity, touching the essence of being, the very cry 
of life. Artaud’s near-indifference to the literary plane, to lit-
erature properly speaking (that weak, self-obsessed phénomène 
d’époque) guarantees his sanity and literary sainthood. Hav-
ing thus gone below to gaze at the underside of art, at his corre-
spondent’s deep and private misery, Rivière comes up not with 
a better appreciation of Artaud, but with Artaud-as-principle: 
One must be no longer able to move, to believe, in order to per-
ceive. The source of timeless art is utter desiccation. Absolute 
judgment is cruel only to those who do not suffer.
§ Outpatients
Today’s literature: prescriptions written by patients.
—Karl Kraus (first half of the 20th century)  *
The writer of yesteryear was the kind of patient clever 
enough to self-medicate and not listen to doctors’ orders. 
Today, those same doctors, who go by the name of critics, 
save him from hospitalization. He is good as long as he takes 
his medicine, which he can only get as an outpatient. He 
takes what they give him; he writes what they tell him to. 
But this prescription-writing must not be confused with a 
cure. It merely ensures his survival.
* Kraus, Half-Truths, 53.
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§ Poetry of Genocide
in response to:
Let us not console ourselves with the thought that these were 
unsophisticated Africans, without the mental capacity to 
know better: in short, mere savages. Again, I do not know 
how much Hatzfeld has edited their words, but his perpe-
trator interlocutors seem to me more articulate than most 
of the people with whom I have had to deal in Britain as 
patients over the last decade and a half. Indeed, their lan-
guage occasionally becomes poetic: though poetic language 
in this circumstance is mere euphemism.
Besides, the few comments of the survivors, mostly women, 
that Hatzfeld inserts into the text, are of considerable moral 
and intellectual sophistication, and certainly not those of 
unreflecting primitives with few powers of cerebration. 
—Theodore Dalrymple, “On Evil”  *
Euphemistic language is here openly deployed to describe— 
what? The speech of the perpetrators of the Rwandan 
genocide. It compares favourably for Dalrymple with British 
psychiatric and prison patients, a flattering reference group 
eo ipso, which is to say beneath contempt. These machete- 
 wielding butchers are not primitives, an assurance aimed 
at the presupposition that evil is stupid, and African evil 
so stupid it practically babbles. These savages are not just 
outspoken, articulate; they have the makings of poets. The 
choice of euphemism seems deliberate: poetry, poetic lan-
guage. Before we know it, it is withdrawn.
Given the context, almost any word other than poetic 
would seem less incongruous. Is it ironic, this gratuitous 
comparison? Is it provocation by allusion? So there is poetry 
fresh after a genocide?
* Theodore Dalrymple, “On Evil,” New English Review, Jan. 2007,  
http://www.newenglishreview.org/Theodore_Dalrymple/On_Evil/
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The more distant the event, the more it lends itself to the 
poetics of events, to aestheticization and romanticization, 
provided we like our art morally neutral. Witness the willing 
artistic cooperation of Suharto’s henchmen in the inimitable 
Act of Killing (2013), a filmic reenactment of forgotten crimes. 
To call that poetry would likewise be euphemistic. Yet we 
cannot call it anything else. We have been seduced. It is 
always so with beauty’s pact with evil.
§ Art / Barbarism
Unfortunately, I have a bad feeling that a huge and horrible 
crime happened, and the masterpieces were destroyed. If so, 
it would be a barbarian crime against humanity. 
—Ernest Oberländer-Târnoveanu,  
director of Romania’s National History Museum, 
on the incineration of seven masterpieces stolen  
in 2012 from the Rotterdam Kunsthal
A mother’s love burns brightest when the fuel is artifice, 
plastic slippers, and firewood. Art’s demise revealed the truth 
and power of the human heart. Veritas, victoria, vita!
The museum, the village, the abandoned house, the 
churchyard, finally the stove. Ash. Between the theft, the 
son’s arrest, the mother’s actions, and the art world itself 
(fearing the worst), the works were everything: a fortune, 
incriminating evidence, an irreparable loss. To the rest of us 
it was a crying shame. Before the lab’s findings sank in, the 
works were missed, their worth contained by the smoul-
dering hope of their recovery, the story still too bizarre to 
be believed (especially after the mother’s retraction of the 
crucial part of it). After they were announced, the works 
became priceless, and their immolation, indefensible, beyond 
the pale. Here there is no why. We are survivors, bearing the 
burden of incomprehension. Incomprehension not of the 
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human spirit, for the mother’s act was as mindless as the can 
of worms it opened.
Nor was it a crucible of love—that mother was no art 
lover! It involved no test, no inner conflict of values, one love 
against another fighting in a breast, with a mother’s love 
finally getting the better of the universal love of beauty. 
Burn the evidence! was the obvious thing to do. Not: I must 
sacrifice the Art! (We would prefer she turn in the works 
along with the son, but what mother would do that?— it is 
as unfeasible now as it was in biblical times.) A simpleton 
cannot be demonic. There was no question of zeal, of enthu-
siasm, of erotic arousal: Burn, Picasso! Burn, Matisse! And yet 
it used to be witches who stoked fire only to perish by it in 
those barbaric times. The innocence of the paintings, the 
Eastern European location, the poverty, illiteracy perhaps— 
all this makes for a credible latter-day hex.
And that is why, in a rush of blood to the head, we might  
blurt out “Crime against humanity!” The well- worn phrase— 
 where the “crime” in question is nothing less than inten-
tional degradation of human beings perpetrated on a large 
scale— seems hyperbolic in the new context, even if in the 
heat of indignation (to which destruction by fire certainly 
added fuel), we refuse to see it as just a metaphor. 
The leap from humans to the human is easier the more the 
art of the recent past, when there were still masters worth 
mentioning, is sanctified as the expression of the human 
spirit, the quiddity of our dignity that protects us, like a 
magic circle, against all barbarism. 
Art appreciation is an order of magnitude greater than art’s 
invaluability. The inestimable worth of art— of man—in our 
time requires the language of genocide to do justice to it. It is 
no “mere rhetoric,” but an unedited lament for humanity.
If, then, it strikes some of us as preposterous to call an 
art heist a “crime against humanity,” it must be because 
we do not value art as an extension of human dignity. Is it 
because art has always accompanied barbarity, as its counter-
point? Our whole history is constructed on denying that we 
cannot have the one without the other, even if art was born 
among the barbarians. The twisted story of the burglary, 
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the brutalization of these works, brings this twisted history, 
begun in prehistory, to a head. Acts we would consider bar-
barous now, or that we will consider barbarous in the future, 
were perpetrated by those we now consider to have been the 
first artists, even the first “moderns.” The stature of barbarity 
keeps step with that of art. The more invaluable art becomes, 
the less we can appreciate it. The more invaluable individual 
life becomes, the less we can appreciate it.
We might not know it, but such wisdom speaks through 
our condemnation of Oberländer-Târnoveanu’s hyperbole. 
To accept it would mean convincing ourselves that a moth-
er’s love counts for nothing, that it is worthless. You cannot 
make the willful destruction of high art level with the anni-
hilation of people without elevating at least one mother’s 
love to barbarism.
Even if the crude destruction of these Magnificent Seven 
really was atrocious, some more refined method would have 
been easier to swallow. Its artfulness would mitigate its 
vulgarity. That is why we hope she did not burn them but, as 
unlikely as that is, deceived the analysts. Perhaps then her 
act would qualify as art, a performance without spectacle, 
with an audience to come. It’s been said—I know the man 
who said it—that “Barbarity is one of the signs in which one 
recognizes renaissances of the spirit.”  *
* Miguel Abensour, “L’histoire de l’utopie et la destin de sa critique,” Textures 8–9 
(1974): 64.
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§ Under Attack
The avant-garde artist was born of the image-breaker: the 
“icons” he broke belonged to his predecessors and rivals. In 
truth, however, they were the icons by which he lived his life 
and with which the art of his time was in agreement. His 
target, then, must not have been the artistic tradition, at 
least not directly; it was, rather, the reality sanctioning only 
images that flatter it— images that, while innocent, were 
thoroughly in the pay of wealthy patrons, who surrounded 
themselves with them as with mirrors. Naturally, the control 
of images made them structurally incapable of fulfilling 
art’s modern mission— to challenge, to unsettle, to open 
up. Only from the position of exteriority claimed by mod-
ern art can the false beauties of the life of privilege, of the 
dream life of power, be violated. Modernity’s artistic frontier 
is inward, advancing towards, not away from, the pieties and 
powers— political, economic, theological— with which even 
the old masters were in conformity. The image broken by 
the modern iconoclast, the icon reduced to shards and rags, 
is, in short, the spurious coherent whole, with the “art world” 
nestled in it.
§ Page from the History of Cultural Warfare
Like the military formation from which it takes its name, 
the avant-garde is not only the most advanced pioneering 
culture, but also the most exposed, the most radical in its 
methods, and too often the first to fall in the field.
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§ Art, Alienation, Extinction
There is a received and much cherished idea that creativity 
cannot be alienating. Alienation befalls the exploited, their 
labour as mindless as it is repetitive, whereas creative work, 
where it is not enabled by higher economic standing, the 
prerogative of leisure, is mythologized as an escape into 
pleasure (even at the risk of madness or early death). Artists 
of course do collaborate, make, market, and sell their stuff, 
and the identity of the artist is perfectly compatible with 
that of the precarious worker or capitalist. But the neo-
liberalization of art is seen as incomplete as long as art is 
civilized by the triumph of form over content; form acts as a 
bulwark against the neoliberal civilization, whose watchword 
is content extraction. Capitalism keeps pace by producing 
the tools needed to extract content from form, funding art’s 
nonconformism. The creation of educational and other 
institutions that teach both art and its exploitation, as well 
as the rewards dangled before artists who defend art’s bul-
wark, keep up demand for aesthetic product. At a time when 
everything is being turned into a resource, art can still set 
the terms of its own use.
A reboot of art’s political-interventionist ferment in the 
1960s and ’70s would offer no resistance to neoliberalism’s 
encroachment. The identity of the artist has since become 
much purer, much more abstract and— dare we say?—super-
fluous than in those days. All is well as long as it’s under-
stood as just an identity or mask, and moreover, one among 
several others in competition or cooperation with it. Now 
that the “Creative Class” has been ideologically defined as 
vital for urban economies, the “creative subject,” a.k.a. artist, 
risks not alienation but isolation. With lived experience 
becoming art’s final court, whoever identifies with art to the 
exclusion of other roles—whoever lives and breathes art and 
otherwise lives not—must die of loneliness as one of the last 
surviving members of a species too old to reproduce.
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§ Down and Dirty
If art really needs a clean slate, then life must have the oppo-
site. But could we appreciate such art from such a life?
§ Scenes of Abduction
In the story of the rape of Hippodamia, a Lapith woman 
is saved from the clutches of drunken Centaurs, guests at 
her wedding feast. The oft-treated motif, allegorized as the 
struggle between bestiality or barbarism and humanity or 
civilization, ends quite clearly in the latter’s triumph. As 
with other erotic subjects, mythical or legendary scenes of 
abduction, depictions of lecherous violence and abuse, were 
long bound to a higher, moral purpose, while heroism and 
procreation as pretexts for titillation were deemed unworthy 
of art.
The sublimation called art is still aligned with nobility and 
morality. Art does not just represent—and that in two senses, 
of showing and standing for—the struggle against barbarism; 
it functions as a talisman. The choice and proper framing of 
scenes of this struggle fulfill art’s civilizing mission, contrib-
uting head-on to the mastery over monstrosity, ugliness, and 
evil looming large. The mission’s goal was to impress upon 
our minds the seriousness and high stakes of the fight for, in 
this case, sexual entitlement. The artist wanted us to know, 
none too subtly, that he had done his part.
The “Manichean” framework, which demands explicitness, 
comes at a cost to art, which is accused of speaking from 
both sides of its mouth. One the one hand, bringing sexual-
ity to the surface and manipulating it make artists complicit 
in subduing anarchic forces—including the eternal two-way 
traffic between the normal and the freakish, the familiar and 
the foreign. Art renounces pornography less for its content 
and effect than for subordinating such forces to quantitative 
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self-regulation. On the other hand, as soon as the image 
becomes explicit, art falls under suspicion by priests and 
secular moralists of colluding with base desire. It is watched 
more closely and interpreted less charitably; exposed, it 
presents an easy target for yesterday’s orthodoxies. Doubt 
in its ability to quell insurgent passions makes conspicuous 
not what is obvious to us—art’s neutrality—but its barely 
hidden “barbarism.”
The long-term consequences of this double-bind are still 
with us: even now, freed from moral service, sexuality in 
art is dismissed as gimmickry, gratuitous provocation. Its 
aesthetic value is dubious; it is still too caught up in prov-
ing it has one. Its appearance is stiff, unnatural, in a word, 
unfree—and this in spite of the space given to it, having 
spread from canvas to celluloid, where it is occasionally even 
unsimulated. Its real, scrambled message is only intelligible 
to those who reject moralism of any kind and recognize art’s 
long struggle for a pagan origin.
Where it does not eradicate unruliness, censorship inspires 
encryption. In this hostage hermeneutic, sexually charged 
representations like that of Hippodamia’s rape, as they recur 
from the Renaissance on, are coded signs of distress. Rather 
than hailing the victory of the good through art, hence of 
“good” art, they signal art’s capture by “goodness.”
§ Coming Clean
If life really is a blank slate, then art must be the opposite.
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§ Red Is the Colour of Attention
Red is for sound reasons the most powerful of chromatic 
cues for attention. It makes sense to think of it as the start-
ing point from which human colour consciousness gradually 
expanded. 
—Julian Bell, “Seeing the Light”  *
A Do you figure there is more red in the world now than 
there was, say, 300 years ago?
B Of course, because of printing and plastics.
A But is there more lust, more anger, more violence? Weren’t 
we once redder in the face and more openly into blood-
shed, as some thinkers would have us believe? Red is also 
the colour of wine and the setting sun. Do we like them 
more than spilling and seeing blood? (And how far back 
does haemophobia actually go?)
B Now there is more love—that is its own shade of red. But 
love hates distractions.
A Love is ambivalent. It spills over into lust, anger, and 
violence, which attract more attention.
B Wait, but aren’t lust, anger, etc. ambivalent also?
A They are. They just silence their mixed feelings more 
effectively. They like the attention.
* Julian Bell, “Seeing the Light,” Guardian, June 13, 2009, http://www.theguardian.
com/artanddesign/2009/jun/13/modern-art-colour-chart.




The first extant works are in ochre—perhaps to stand out, 
and be attended to. They have waited for this a very long 
time.
§ Art (Theory) Brut
Caves containing prehistoric art have opened our eyes not 
just to the oldest known artwork, but to the Urbild of art: the 
outline of a human hand in ochre done by firelight. From it 
leads the long and dark passage to the image as we know it: 
from this negative of a hand held against a wall, on past the 
contour of an invisible hand and its silhouette, all the way 
down (or up) to the articulated figure bursting with colour in 
broadest daylight. But the primitive stencil, followed by the 
application of the hand to depiction, followed by the pictorial 
trace of what’s behind the depicting and tracing—these were, 
respectively, the view, the technique, and the principle of art 
from the very beginning.
* Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, 
trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (1970; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998), 40.
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§ Withdrawing
As drawing and painting are phased out in art schools, the 
concept of art moves some distance towards its ultimate 
form, that of mental image.
§ Et remotissima prope
The Allegory of Divine Providence and Barberini Power by Pietro 
da Cortona (1633–1639) graces a ceiling in the Palazzo Barber-
ini in Rome (now home to the National Gallery of Ancient 
Art). Developing the illusionistic technique of sotto in sù, it 
seems to open the lid of the great hall to the sky above it, at 
which we are meant to marvel, as the name suggests, from 
below.
But the heavens teem with activity, barely left uncovered 
by Cortona’s fear of empty space. Dynamic, floating human 
figures vie for room with a swarm of honey-coloured bees 
almost the size of nearby putti helping to hold aloft two 
crossed papal keys. On account of their dimensions and 
bodily independence, these bees appear either as giants or as 
existing on a different visual plane, much closer to the viewer 
and the floor. Their heraldic significance for the Barberini 
family required that it be one of the two: if painted to scale, 
they would, at such a distance, be mere specks. The span and 
busyness, the seeming mass and depth of this remarkable 
composition, are enough to induce an upside-down vertigo, 
with some elements set so high above the simulated frame as 
to be partly out of sight, and others so close or precariously 
suspended that they threaten to fall at any moment, bringing 
the whole pandemonium down with them, causing at least 
one modern visitor to cower and take shelter in the hallway. 
The power of the illusion is unfailing, but its effect on a more 
minimalist sensibility, pursued by horror pleni, is to induce 
flight.
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§ Marmi finti 
Amidst the splendour of palaces, mansions, galleries, and 
basilicas, marble adds a mere accent to the art, the instru-
ments of art, and the instruments of worship already assem-
bled within them. It stands out only in impoverished and 
stripped surroundings, where it can be admired or exposed 
as false. The fate of marmi finti, once their deception is 
revealed, is not unlike that of artificial flowers: the disabused 
look is withering. Their placement is therefore crucial: far 
enough away from the eyes still capable of appreciating from 
a distance—no, not their art, not their naturalness, but their 
artful nature.
But does not all art ask to be admired in this way? To 
be regarded from a distance? Not merely some art, which 
requires us to stand back to compose itself into a meaningful 
whole (Seurat, Richter) or work its effect on our perception 
(Holbein, Rothko). Aren’t we taught to find each work’s “opti-
mal viewing distance” (often also the “creator’s distance”), 
whether for painting or sculpture, so that its artifice, the 
extent to which its material had been worked, may not stare 
us in the face? We are already not fooled, and know that any 
closer we would find the artfulness not only more immediate 
but glaring. We spare ourselves these disillusionments by 
keeping back, perhaps even thank the institution for sliding 
between us barriers and layers of glass.
Fake marble, however, we approach naïvely: it can look 
so real. On closer examination, the pastel hues and delicate 
veins, however, disintegrate into a hodgepodge of ungainly 
strokes. Art as deception—whether, as here, in its content’s 
reality-effect or also by its beauty-effect— can only lose by 
such proximity. Mimetic art that abjures deception conceals 
its artifice much better, even at close range. But well enough 
to hold up under scrutiny? In what presents itself as a work 
of art, artifice is not exposed as trickery but studied as 
technique, for the achievement of beauty, realism, etc. The 
trompe l’œil, even when upfront and subtle—like the false 
windows of certain houses—is judged principally on its abil-
ity to create and sustain an illusion in three dimensions.
24 s . d.  chrostowska
That is why the marbled loudspeakers in St. Peter’s—sur-
prise may be the best spur to new reflection—are just right. 
Placed at a remove necessary to admire their stony skin, 
which, by reason only of its adherence to sound equipment 
suspended above our heads, should be presumed faux, with-
out being so obviously. Far from a lower art form, the “speak-
ing” marmi finti are for those rare, true seekers after aesthetic 
pleasure, those who having absorbed everything else—all 
the sumptuous, show-stopping objects and eye-catching 
detail—are still not sated. They blend seamlessly with the 
true marble no less than with the obviously sham; we would 
be forgiven for seeing their coat as mere camouflage against 
the enemies of modernity, whose devotion to tradition they 
offend in league with electric votive candles and cash regis-
ters. The harmony to which the speakers are party extends 
in this sense beyond music. Sleek, discreet, they do not draw 
our attention like the Baroque baldachin by Bernini—whose 
story, in keeping with tradition, is by comparison quite 
uncivilized. What isn’t done for the sake of ostentatious 
beauty? The damnable procurement of bronze for Bernini’s 
honeyed pièce de résistance by a Barberini, who was then 
pope, was summed up in one line: Quod non fecerunt bar-
bari, fecerunt Barberini, “What the barbarians did not do, the 
Barberini did.” It was thought the material had been torn out 
of the Pantheon.
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§ Unvarnished
Carl Dreyer, old master of the motion picture, would only 
have “artifice to strip artifice of artifice,”  * instead of conceal-
ing it. This seemingly minor difference gains importance 
once we understand that the new layer of artifice is not a 
fresh coat of varnish that covers over old imperfections 
(exposing the natural as mere finish), but a stripping agent 
that brings out the grain of wood already laid bare by a saw.
* Quoted in Eileen Myles, “What about Chris?”, foreword to I Love Dick by Chris 
Kraus (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 2006), 13.
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§ It’s Alive!
Particularly salutary is the way [Amy Knight] Powell 
challenges the basic mission of art history “as a humanistic 
discipline” as laid down by Panofsky seventy years ago: that 
of “enlivening what otherwise would remain dead.” “Neither 
institution nor individual can restore life to an object that 
never had it,” Powell retorts. “The promiscuity of the work 
of art—its return, reiteration and perpetuation beyond its 
original moment—is the surest sign it never lived.” This 
refusal to animate, even to anthropomorphise, the artwork 
is especially pertinent given the tendency today to treat 
images and objects as though they were alive, even human: a 
fetishism of the artefact in art history that is in keeping with 
the fetishism of “personal devices” in the commodity world 
around us.
—Hal Foster  *
The first paintings were “animate.” In the Chauvet cave, early 
artists rendered bison in motion by multiplying their limbs. 
In the caves of Arcy- sur- Cure, a bear carries in its mouth a 
fresh fish, tail flapping. A bison speared by a hunter is still 
bleeding to death. A stampede of horses, large and small, 
close and distant, layered one over another, still run like the 
wind across the rock walls. But the artists did not succeed 
in breathing life into them. Instead, though dead and deep 
in stone, the works brought the artists back to life. We have 
never animated art. Art has always only animated us.
* Hal Foster, “Preposterous Timing,” review of Medieval Modern: Art out of Time 
by Alexander Nagel and Depositions: Scenes from the Late Medieval Church and the 
Modern Museum by Amy Knight Powell, London Review of Books 34, no. 21 (2012),  
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n21/hal-foster/preposterous-timing.
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§ Virtual Promiscuity
in response to:
In this respect Powell regards the deposition of the work of 
art—in her case, its removal from the late medieval church 
to the modern museum—not as a deracination always to 
be deplored, as it is almost always seen today (so much do 
we take the value of contextualism for granted). Rather, in a 
manner that recalls the “imaginary museum” of André Mal-
raux, Powell sees this displacement almost as a desideratum, 
for it opens up works of art to formal comparisons and 
conceptual connections that would otherwise be difficult to 
make. Indeed, she champions the “promiscuity” of artworks 
in the modern museum, “which is precisely what most art 
historians would rather overlook,” against the historicity 
that ties each work to its particular time and space of 
emergence, which is precisely what most art historians aim 
to articulate. 
—Foster  *
Let artworks mingle in virtual brothels, where we can have 
them act out even our own aesthetic fantasies digitally. But 
retain the old maidens and consorts in their proper places, 
for they are not of our time, nor would they wish to be.
* Ibid.
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§ This Will Kill That
occasioned by the SIAS Summer Institute 2013/14 “Scenes from 
the History of the Image: Reading Two Millennia of Conflict”
When you find yourself by some wrong turn in the midst of 
a crowd of tourists freshly deposited at some “sight,” whether 
Notre Dame Cathedral or the Kew Gardens in bloom, you 
could, like me, associate the flurry of handheld snaps with 
bees collecting pollen. Ah yes, you think to yourself as you 
reach for your mental notebook, the image-takers of this 
century may far outnumber the image-makers, but they are 
like the most industrious worker bee to the queen—subor-
dinate. I dare you, however, to reflect further on this first 
impression: do we really still live amidst images waiting to 
be taken? Have we not been absorbed wholly by the image, 
drinking and drowning in it? We can view this as a change of 
paradigm from the imaging of idealism and mysticism (even 
though material) to the seeing of empiricism and naturalism 
(even though optically assisted or digital) to, now, the saving 
of virtualism (even though what was seen remains, there 
remains nothing to be seen).
But, lest you think this is all I’ve got, I’m not fooled by this 
newfound capacity of ours to save images to keep their effect 
on us under control. I mean to push you further. Is it no lon-
ger the case that, as Virginia Woolf ’s diners surmised, we are 
all eye? Do we [not] still preserve the capacity for drinking, 
eating, indeed becoming colour furled up in us, waiting 
proper conditions to develop? For as the rocks hide fossils, so 
we hide tigers, baboons, and perhaps insects, under our coats 
and hats. On first entering a picture gallery, whose stillness, 
warmth and seclusion from the perils of the street reproduce 
the conditions of the primeval forest, it often seems as if we 
reverted to the insect stage of our long life.  *
* Virginia Woolf, “Walter Sickert: A Conversation” (1934), in Collected Essays, vol. 2, 
ed. Leonard Woolf (London: Hogarth, 1966), 234.
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No, we are more hand than eye, and much more hands-on 
in our collecting. We no longer go to galleries just to stare 
and, like Woolf ’s insects, become for the moment the thing 
we see. We go to take it away with us. Neither are we merely 
confined to the galleries like to a primeval forest. We suck 
and draw the image out of everything we see, as bees suck 
out honey—which they have made for their own eventual 
consumption—but much faster than it can be replaced. 
Compared to the images of it in existence, all the natural and 
cultural scenery has become faded, tired, flat, and hazy. We, 
the image-takers, have killed it.
§ Return of the Image
daguerreotype: “mirror with a memory” (O. W. Holmes)  *
It is an extended moment, not an instant as in the great 
majority of photographs, that is preserved by a daguerreo-
type. But it is a moment in which movement, if it is not to 
obfuscate the object, must be minimal, so that time seems 
to stand still for the sitter. The preservation—in stillness, as 
though petrified— of the object lends it a stony presence, a 
gravity seldom achieved in any other medium. But this same 
stately object, even when visibly grounded, seems to hover 
like a holograph. This phantom is the material essence of 
appearance. 
My relationship to the daguerreotype echoes the expe-
rience of those who, encountering photography for the 
first time, were reportedly terrified that it would carry 
off their souls. In our self-conscious and reflective age, 
this least mediated form of image-making, the “lost” art 
* Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Age of Photography,” Atlantic Monthly 3, no. 20 
(1859), http://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/technology/holmes-full.html.
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of daguerreotypy, affords the same experience, but in 
reverse. We are wont to conceive of identity through mir-
rors, through media, so that we can hardly imagine a 
world without our image in it. But precisely because of this 
multiplication of documented appearances and the instan-
taneity of contemporary photographs, our images seem 
more like flat reproductions and poorly made fragments 
we ourselves increasingly come to resemble. The first thing 
the primitive daguerreotype does is pick up and bind these 
aspects together, restoring us to ourselves. We realize what 
we have lost in a life of everyday pictures, be these fam-
ily snapshots, portraits from Sears, or the most advanced 
digital photographs. The second merit of a daguerreotype is 
to make us see ourselves differently, less distractedly, more 
steadily; to remind us of our persistence in the world, our 
individual effort to be. The mirrored plate draws in what 
is least fleeting in our demeanor; it is selective even about 
our “features.” Depending on the plane of focus, the camera 
gathers a wealth of detail from our person and binds it to the 
reflective surface, the way a florist ties a bouquet, somewhere 
out of sight, down the stem. The daguerreotype shows only 
the blossom.
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§ What Did You Do in the Theatre?
These not “properly speaking” plays that nowadays go 
under the name of immersive theatre offer elaborate, 
spectator-centred interactive environments designed to 
produce unique experiences in members of a new kind of 
audience. They are only the most extravagant of a type of 
dramatic phenomenon that adds a new dimension to the 
unpredictability of the theatre, heightening it. The type 
includes also “installations” staged in a gallery and meant to 
elicit interaction with audience members under constrained 
conditions which, by eschewing their framing as a bounded 
“event” or “performance,” give us latitude to come and go vir-
tually as we please. It includes, as well, encounters of a more 
defined duration in an existing site that may or may not be 
reserved for this purpose (e.g., an office building, a museum, 
or a street), where the spectator, solo or in a group, interacts 
with actors (not always identified as such) for whom the con-
cept ultimately matters more than the execution—impro-
vised or with a script so rudimentary as not to foreclose very 
individualized experiences. These choreographed encounters 
possess some dramatic cohesion and blur the line between 
make-believe and reality. Tino Sehgal’s so-called “con-
structed situations” can be cited as examples of both types.
Immersive theatre is the next generation of this revolution 
in the theatre. It has been likened to active voyeurism (in 
which one seeks out occasions to watch without being seen), 
to video games in which players move through a world unto 
itself (without fundamentally affecting its rules or construc-
tion), and, finally and more distantly, to “choose your own 
adventure” fiction. These phenomena are translated by it 
into a new medium. The spectator who wanders through 
the artificial environment set up for a series of parallel 
performances—with multiple intersecting narratives that 
hang together while unfolding seemingly independently of 
one another— encounters not only these, of course, but also 
other (clearly identifiable) spectators. This structure itself 
allows the spectator to proceed at his/her own pace, to wan-
der and become lost in the alternate reality of the piece.
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But it also forces one to choose. Such active immersiveness 
makes demands on us precisely where we are habituated to 
being passive and not immersed. It requires us to work for a 
return on our investment, to get the “bang for our buck.” The 
bang is not a given—but neither is it in a regular show, even 
when the reviews are rave. It, however, hangs entirely on our 
rising to a new level of engagement, with and within the 
charged space into which we are let loose—not to mention 
on our individual luck once inside, insofar as we may or may 
not stumble upon a spectacular moment, finding ourselves in 
the right place at the right time to witness it. We are required 
to play along to reap more benefits, in search of experiences 
that will be ours and ours alone. The pressure to work hard 
on our own behalf is real, and it is on as soon as we step into 
the world of the play. And so the question “What did you do 
in the theatre?” could soon make us uncomfortable in a way 
that “What did you think of the play?” would not.
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§ The Mask-Produced Spectator;  
or, Drowning in the Theatre
As in student-centred learning, the success of the immersive 
drama (or dramatic cluster) depends on its ability to generate 
unique and memorable experiences, and to lure its spectators 
back with its promise of different experiences within the 
framework of the same production. Immersive spectacles’ 
connections to other cultural artifacts (voyeurism, video 
games, gamebooks) speak less to the power of such specta-
cles to forge alliances and hence their cultural prominence 
than to their lateness and power of cultural synthesis, also a 
form of cultural reflection.
Immersive spectatorship has also been likened—per-
haps most plausibly—to what being inside a movie (and 
not merely on a movie set) might feel like. This sense was 
literalized for the several hundred audience members 
milling around the fictional studio “Temple Pictures” in the 
Punchdrunk/Royal National Theatre mega-production “The 
Drowned Man.” The experience of the viewer approaches, 
quite deliberately (if the profuse intertextuality is any 
indication), participating in the diegesis, or story-space, of a 
film, an experience complete not just with the possibility of 
interacting with its elements and (apparently) influencing its 
events, but with “real” freedom in doing so, without, however, 
actually co-determining and sharing responsibility for what 
happens. Indeed, the structure must be fixed and robust 
enough to prevent the feeling that the show is for us only, or 
depends on our behaviour, action, or interaction in any way. 
The importance of this for the audience goes beyond the 
simple fact that the truth of an illusion rests on the latter’s 
independence from us. It reflects the reality of our social 
disempowerment and alienation, which the obligatory masks 
worn by—surprise!—the spectators do much to intensify. 
One could also add into the mix some putative existen-
tial weakness, a shrinking from responsibility and radical 
freedom. Human interaction in immersive theatre thus 
happens primarily on the actors’ terms and at their whim, 
within what seem like strict parameters and algorithmic 
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scripts, heightening the overall sense of the unexpected (the 
stories of individual spectators’ private moments with actors 
further reinforce this impression of indeterminacy). There is 
just enough of a margin for manipulating inanimate objects 
to establish a reality from which all spontaneity has been 
sucked out. The temptation to touch and displace, to which 
viewers succumb seen and unseen—though the feeling of 
being watched never really leaves them—is one that the 
mise-en-scène itself seems destined to encourage by the dis-
tribution of a dizzying array of props in vacant lots through 
which a performance has not yet or already swept. Nonethe-
less, the sense of transgression when interacting with even 
these things, while it may have something to do with respect 
for the show’s integrity, reveals on another register the par-
lous condition of agency, which interactive mass art bends 
over backwards to conceal.
Only through such finely composed and balanced schemes 
can the reality created become convincing as a world—a 
vast playground for spectatorship as sexless voyeurism. The 
“peeping” must be made especially safe and uncontroversial, 
since it is indulged neither in private nor through “keyholes” 
or two-way mirrors. This permissive atmosphere relies not 
only on total audience absorption in the created environment 
and action (this to prevent mischief and straying), and not 
only on a carefully curated sense of abstraction from the 
reality as it unfolds—preventing viewer-initiated interaction, 
and facilitated by the anonymizing, defacing, interposing, 
and cloistering powers of the mask—but also on viewer 
protection from the dramatis personae and co-voyeurs, in 
which the flatness and homogeneity of the masks, their 
privacy-bestowing power (concealment of reaction), again 
play a leading role.
The mask returns to the theatre with the advent of a 
masked audience. In the above-named production, it is a 
white visor, void of expression, recalling not only the Vene-
tian carnival but also the beaked plague doctor and the clas-
sic alien. The prop thus points in three disparate directions: 
the ancient dawn of the theatre, protection from inexplicable 
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death, and a future in which our terrestrial entertainments 
will be completely incomprehensible.
One can only wonder at the experience of the actors in 
this drama when confronted with the blank uniformity of 
the crowd. The experience must at first be as alienating for 
them as it is for us. To gauge our reaction, they must unlearn 
the habit of relying on facial cues and instead read our move-
ments. Though we are perhaps more watched, and surely 
more monitored for possible vandalism, we have, in truth, 
neither the time nor even the thought to reflect on the thes-
pian “other side” of theatrical immersion; our mask—iden-
tical to the others and quite comfortable to wear—gives us 
a tangible feeling of invisibility little different, on the face 
of it, from that in an auditorium after the lights have gone 
down. Far from counteracting immersiveness, the disguise 
separates and awakens us, as ciphers, to the strangeness of 
simultaneous immersion and isolation—a feeling spared 
the non-immersive spectator. Our sense of and desire for 
complete immersion draws us into an unfamiliar reality. 
The totality of the illusion plunges us, once the first rush of 
curiosity has been satisfied and the character of the diversion 
cognized, into a state of solitude, silence, and mystery— of 
others as much as ourselves.
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§ Fatal Attraction
Cultural history has a well-known name for this partial 
disavowal of social situatedness, a simultaneous impulse to 
veil the mystery of how artists and writers manage to get 
themselves provided for and to offer that mystery as a sort of 
tourist attraction. 
—Bruce Robbins  *
If Van Gogh’s ear went on display, we would go to see it. 
The torment of genius, mental illness, the yellow house, 
fraternity, dashed dream of artistic community, a fainting 
prostitute, Ichthus/ictus, self-portrait with bandaged head, 
self-mutilation with suicide—the ear evokes all of them. It is 
the clue, the main exhibit, the source of a mystery.
If the ear was on tour, crowds would come to see some 
sliced-off flesh. We would be warned not to expect anything 
sizeable; he lost only the lobe, just a tiny bit. We would be 
told of the artist’s inability to accept provisions, of money, 
friendship, and appreciation, and of his growing social 
isolation. How he lived and worked would interest us little. 
Van Gogh’s art seems conditional on defying his state and 
situation; it thrived on maladjustment despite his desperate 
efforts to counteract it. In the end, the ear would become 
part of Van Gogh’s body of work, at the head of the catalogue 
raisonné. It already stands for the whole of his art—not his 
life, which had to be sacrificed.
Until we take the waxen ear between our fingers and 
consider reattaching it to the waxwork figure of Van Gogh, 
we will lag behind theories of embodied art-production that 
threaten to pull him down to earth by his remaining ear.
* Bruce Robbins, “A Portrait of the Artist as a Social Climber: Upward Mobility in 
the Novel,” in The Novel, vol. 2, Forms and Themes, ed. Franco Moretti (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 415.
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§ Pentimenti 
pentimento: sign or trace of an alteration in a literary or 
artistic work; (spec. in Painting) visible trace of a mistake or 
an earlier composition seen through later layers of paint on 
a canvas (OED)
A masterpiece is not the product of changes of mind— of 
attempts, perhaps, of trials and errors to be sure, but not of 
fundamental shifts in conception. No, that would be too 
underhanded. Style and design alone do not a masterpiece 
make, though they do count for innovation. They can be 
“worked on.” But the flash of genius, the “ah!” in awe, no 
amount of wavering, backpedalling and fudging can generate. 
Now, let’s consider the matter again: could the great work 
emerge from draft upon botched draft, repeated efforts, false 
starts? No genius should have to put up with such self- 
evident ineptitude. It would know when to stop spinning its 
wheels and recognize that only a fundamental conceptual 
shift can masterfully match new style to design, and design 
to execution. Ambivalence on this point is surely why we  
find the pentimenti of great works particularly captivating. 
Could it be thus? we wonder incredulously before we accept 
that indeed it was—an exception to the rule. But when we 
look back at those “ruly” masterpieces—those conceived once, 
carried out, and meant to be—we cannot help but think less 
of them: effortlessly devised, without a trace of hesitation, 
only the labour of execution, the single-minded stubborn-
ness of living up to their original perfection in the artist’s 
mind. Is that really all it takes?
38 s . d.  chrostowska
§ Great Passion
Only make sure passion is in the ascendant before begin-
ning anything like the re-creation of the world through art. 
Strike while your iron is hot. There will be time for coolness 
and sobriety—for refining your work by the pale light of 
day, making hay (or hash!) of it with the sun still shining. If, 
instead, against your powers, you get composing, your ink 
will be invisible, white on white, and you yourself, as good as 
blind. When, come evening, in the throes of inspiration, you 
hold your page above a flame, you will be dismayed. If you 
then refine your scribbles by the light of your passion—leav-
ing it untended, not trimming your wick—your markings 
will again be illegible, black on soot-black. And when the day 
dawns once more, you will find everything burnt to a crisp, 
your face ashen.
§ Instrument of Instruments
[T ]he production of a perfected illusion depends not only 
on a staggering artistic skill but ultimately on the intuitive 
steering of a breathless state in which the painter himself 
no longer knows whether his eye still sees and his hand still 
moves.
—W. G. Sebald  *
Our habitual focus when considering creative works is on 
the idea and its execution, or technique. This focus develops 
in response to our experience of them: interpretation leads 
us to the idea, consideration of its mode of unfolding, to 
* W. G. Sebald, “As Day and Night, Chalk and Cheese: On the Pictures of Jan Peter 
Tripp,” in Unrecounted by W. G. Sebald and Jan Peter Tripp, trans. Michael Ham-
burger (London: Penguin, 2004), 85.
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technique. From the perspective of evaluation, technique can 
compensate for a weak idea, but a powerful idea, rarely make 
up for poor technique.
It is the schools of writing—specifically of the creative, lit-
erary kind—that offer the best example of the simultaneous 
indispensability and worthlessness of technical instruction for 
creative talent today. On the one hand, workshopping and 
editing manuscripts is the necessary banausic side of creativ-
ity. Industry standards must be learned and certified for the 
eventual product to sell. On the other hand—and here is the 
worthless column in the ledger— cultural wealth is created 
by one’s capital investment, not by years of master-less 
apprenticeship.
The overwhelming majority of those who study writing are 
never recognized as authors but only as more or less skilled 
artisans. The remaining handful already possess all the 
essential elements, which group discussion and attention to 
detail merely refine—away from conformity. Despite their 
participation, and on account only of true talent setting 
them apart from their most capable peers, they have not 
demeaned themselves with workshopping. Their talent can 
be rehabilitated. Thus the indispensability of instruction and 
its worthlessness are balanced in the ledger of creative life, 
and no one is a born artist.
The more eroded the category of genius becomes, the 
more it finds shelter in the rare cases where talent lies not 
in compounding the benefits of technical instruction, but 
rather in hard work wherein such benefits are unimportant or 
hardly to be detected. Seeing the difference between excel-
lence and genius, between the reducible and the irreducible, 
itself requires a non-technical sensibility and an artist’s 
“nose.” Among the untaught and unteachable skills that serve 
to illuminate it we can count the sense of completion: know-
ing exactly when to step back from a work. The great Greek 
painter Apelles stressed the value of this ability as his advan-
tage over the greatest mastery of technique. At the inspired 
moment when he stopped his hand, that instrument of 
instruments, and took it away, his genius was most on display.
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§ Eupsychian
Yet those very people, who so hate genius, all consider them-
selves geniuses.
—Denis Diderot, Rameau’s Nephew  *
For the creative artist, it is hardest to steer between the evils 
of creative vanity when these are as attractive as two kinds of 
absolution.
On the one side, the artist meets, and even exceeds, his 
highest standard by producing a great work, while immedi-
ately falling short of it as a human being. When measured by 
it, he “breaks down,” ready “to surrender his overwhelming 
skill to God” (so Ernst Bloch, an atheist).  † And so he surren-
ders his work, in a pathos of his unworthiness of it, to the 
only worthy creator—paying himself, in this roundabout 
way, the greatest compliment. His genius now belongs to the 
Heavens and redeems him. He is absolved of his failures, and 
of the vanity that drove him.
On the other side, the artist fails to live up to his high-
est standard, his work falling short of his great genius. No 
sooner is the work finalized (if not already abandoned) than 
it is condemned for being beneath him. He does a ritual 
purge: he burns it. “Only this kind of burnt offering might 
be acceptable to the Muse he has let down.”  ‡ By it he signals 
that much more can be expected of him—and, far from 
being impugned, he is vindicated.
* Denis Diderot, Rameau’s Nephew and First Satire, trans. Margaret Mauldon 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8.
† Ernst Bloch, Spirit of Utopia, trans. Anthony A. Nassar (1923; Palo Alto, CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 2000), 166.
‡ Adam Kirsch, “Rocket and Lightship: Meditations on Life and Letters,” Poetry, 
Nov. 2012, http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/article/244760.
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§ Mirabile scriptu
In the modern novel from Naturalism through Symbolism to 
Modernism genius has long been at home—so comfortable 
in fact that it must be the secular stand-in for the whole class 
of miracles and supernatural events. 
§ Genius and Truth
Many have pointed out that true genius is anathema to 
societies organized on the principle of equality. Either 
truth is available to all or it is available to no one—let’s 
not now add a more or less; these alternatives admit of no 
degrees. Searchers for truth have an obligation to share it 
whenever they come upon it and to keep it accessible. No 
one must be excluded from this unisex, one-size-fits-all, 
one-for-all-for-one kind of truth. Openness is the justifica-
tion for its pursuit, and research, in the long run, is labour 
on behalf of all humanity rather than individual men and 
women. 
When did this view of truth and genius come into its own? 
Why has the sharing of truth developed into a universal 
duty? The obvious answers are, respectively: around the time 
social inclusiveness became a thing, and for the betterment 
of everyone. Now all pay lip service to it while turning a 
billion blind eyes on its real effects. The money attached 
to sharing is not to be sneezed at, and works wonders as 
added incentive. Motivation exceeds individual admiration 
or national prestige. What has been definitively struck from 
this wishful wish-list is precisely what openly drove truth’s 
initiates as recently as this year: possession of power in order 
to dominate mankind. Domination works in the subtlest of 
ways, and securing agreement with any given truth, no mat-
ter how trivial, strengthens the position of its supplier—a 
process that builds everything from empires to cliques.
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The creative genius, meanwhile, has never had an active 
role in this (take poor Prospero paradigmatically). The 
truth of genius was more than singular in expression; it was 
unique to him, yet causa sui. The genius was not faulted for 
neglecting or failing to communicate it; he was not made 
for such things; the responsibility to make it known lay with 
everyone but him. His gift was to be both a lightning rod, 
which sheltered other men from too much truth, and a divin-
ing rod that only worked if undisturbed. His truth spoke not 
with the obviousness of black on white, but with the mystery 
of many shades and fathomless meanings.
The problem with the genius of old was not its power to 
deceive but its almost invariable elitism. Even if his was truth 
that bothered no one and that the rest could live without, 
its very possibility, rarity, exclusivity, or mediation fuelled 
resentment, eroding genius’s cult status as the manifestation 
of man’s divinity, and dimming its instances. Many of the 
Grimms’ tales tell of the desire, rooted in a greed of which 
their common man is typically innocent, to nip the excep-
tional in the bud.
Not long afterward, genius was redeemed as the emana-
tion of the spirit of a people, having made itself understood 
intuitively by all as their common patrimony. It thrived 
in Germany, leading it to unification. (Italian nationalism 
was comparatively down-to-earth, organized around the 
liberal-corporatist metaphors of workshop and association.) 
Art, in the grip of Romanticism, became genius’s bulwark. 
For a while still, it split the difference between civilized soci-
ety and barbarism. The artist-hero stood watch on the border 
between them, fervently (if often unsuccessfully) policed in 
the great era of nation-states. Exposed to the outside, genius 
was now in touch with the barbarian, the foreign, the wild, 
even while in the pay of the tribe it protected. Its rudeness 
eventually had to exceed, its cultivation never match, that 
of its patrons: the essence of the Bohemian stereotype. The 
reputation of genius followed that of the artist in its down-
ward trajectory. While Arnold Schoenberg complained “there 
are no more geniuses, only critics,” and pushed back against 
philistinism, parochialism and populism in his creative 
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domain (“if it is art, it is not for all, and if it is for all, it is 
not art”),  * the middle class was losing the last of its patience 
with “so-called genius,” which would find a safe haven in 
the philanthropist’s no-strings-attached “so-called Genius 
Grant.” Public fortune began instead to smile on science, 
whose truth could at least, it seemed, be understood by all 
with enough application.
Today, the term “genius” sticks to some people in much 
the way the name “Santa Claus” does to the neighbour who 
always volunteers for holiday duty. It denotes, in other words, 
no special gift for truth but a desire to amuse and, through a 
harmless deception transparent to all, to be seen as extraor-
dinary year round as well. The older they grow, the more 
the children who once gathered around him come to regard 
him as infantile (and themselves as mature enough to judge!), 
even to whisper doubts about his sanity. Fortunately, in no 
time they also start replenishing his real fan base, which still 
believes (and so confirms) that he really is Santa Claus, really 
is a genius. Nature takes its course alongside the cycle of 
healthy disillusionment.
This brings us to the virtual disappearance of the epithet 
“genius,” in its robust sense, from all but the most rarefied 
circles, where large sums of money are exchanged. More 
than merely aware of his value, the artist knows how to cap-
italize on it, investing in his own aura and genius-myth that 
becomes then an integral part of the artistic product, rather 
than a quality he started off with.
There is also the freely available, seemingly effortless, good 
old “genius for.” “For” what, precisely? In principle any-
thing—anything, that is, except truth.
* Arnold Schoenberg, “New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea” (1946), 
“Those Who Complain about the Decline” (1923), in Style and Idea: The Selected 
Writings of Arnold Schoenberg, ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black (London: Faber 
& Faber, 1975), 203, 124.
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§ The Making Of
Born originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies?
—Edward Young  *
Ape stands for “imitation,” man for “originality” at least in 
potentia. Before you lament your fall from ape to man, or 
man to ape (decide for heaven’s sake!), having betrayed either 
your natural innocence, or your creative potential, the ape 
not having shamed you back into native ignorance, or else 
into originality—remember (remember and rejoice!) that 
second nature is nature minus its imperfections, or that no 
two imitations are identical and that, compared to the really 
good ones, all originals are just unaccomplished copies.
* Edward Young, from “Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the 
Author of Sir Charles Grandison” (1759), in Critical Theory since Plato, ed. Hazard 
Adams and Leroy Searle (Boston: Wadsworth Publishing, 2004), 344.
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§ Look No Further
It is barbaric indeed to hold that the content of a work of art 
is contained by covers or a frame. It is no more civilized to 
conceive the form of art as exceeding them. Both notions can 
be blamed on a modern superstition, one that recapitulates 
the history of art’s unfinished secularization, its incomplete 
emancipation “from the cultic to the cultural” (to borrow 
a phrase from Thomas Mann  *). The first idea— content 
in form—stems from a hereditary fear of not recognizing 
divine presence in material reality unless the latter is trans-
formed by the deity’s appearance. God’s presence need not be 
obvious and will be missed by those who look for it beyond 
what is in front of them. As for the second notion—form 
beyond form—we owe it to an inherited fear of not recog-
nizing this same material reality as divine work, formed by 
God’s hand rather than man’s.
* Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian 
Leverkuhn, as Told by a Friend, trans. John E. Woods (1947; New York: Vintage, 
1999), 64.
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§ Work of Exception
This work of art may have been made by your neighbour, but 
in it he seems a stranger.
§ Stranger in One’s Own Work
To be a stranger in one’s own house requires another to first 
make it uncomfortable. To be a stranger in one’s own work 
of art, also built with one’s own hands, requires the merest 
passage of time.
§ Abyss-Gazing
Modern music and literature devoted attention to “compos-
ing” silence, modern visual art, to manipulating negative 
space, film, to capturing stillness and temps mort. Staring too 
long into the abyss only familiarizes it.
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§ Little Pieces
In the repetitive rhythms of primitive music the menacing 
aspect originates in the principle of order itself.
—Adorno  *
Schoenberg’s “musical aphorisms” are too brief, too lean and 
nervy, too dematerialized, for rhythm and order to take root 
in them. The aphorism, the romantic fragment, the sketch, 
the kleines Stück, and a host of other diminutive artistic 
forms share a resistance to the spirit of system, whether the 
latter unfolds primarily in time, as it does for instance in 
music or literature (Bach, the Encyclopédie, regular utopia, 
Hegel), or in space, as in visual representation (perspective, 
classicism, Beaux-Arts). The freedom of art is best exercised, 
best “captured,” in small pieces; they let us come and go at 
will, without a key or address. They require no submission 
to creative force, no suspension of judgment or of disbelief. 
Rarely do they define the artist who produced them. In a 
society that rewards consistency and individualism, they 
assume the character of common property, if not its form, 
without (for this very reason) becoming common.
What disturbs us in them is born neither of the principle 
of order nor of order’s opposite. Indeed, it can only come 
from their suspension over a void of feeling and meaning— 
a void visible only if one gives their anti-systematic char-
acter its due, and invisible if one reads them negatively (as 
inchoate, undeveloped, unfinished, supplemental) in relation 
to some “principal” work. The extant lines of Heraclitus 
and Parmenides cannot but be read in this way: not merely 
against a relative void of our historical understanding, but 
in the absence of a more orderly, more complete textual 
background or accompaniment, and with the probability that 
what has come down are not just the remnant highlights of a 
lost whole, the spoors of a disappearance. 
* Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 52.
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In this respect, their small number has perennially taught 
amateurs of remote intellectual history the value of the 
shortest forms. But true love of these minimal pieces is never 
free of dread or disquiet. The more profound their appeal, 
the louder their expressive summons, the more archaic the 
surrounding silence of thought out of which they must for-
ever keep emerging.
§ Beasts for Kicks
What literati and ideologue revolutionaries have in com-
mon is a willingness to descend to common beastliness for 
enlightened ends. Marmontel saw in men of letters “bêtes 
féroces destinées à l’amphitéâtre pour l’amusement des hommes.”  * 
In their zeal to instruct us by force, both groups realize too 
late that their shows require self-sacrifice to be, or do, any 
good.
§ Cannonball
The intriguing unfurnished room in René Magritte’s On 
the Threshold of Liberty (1929, 1937) could hardly be more 
transparent. But it is not the transparency of glass houses, 
unremarkable either way—whether one is looking in or out 
of them. (What is so remarkable, after all, about making 
* “Ferocious beasts destined for the amusement of mankind.” Jean-François Mar-
montel, “Critique,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts 
et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres, ed. Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond 
d’Alembert (1751–72; University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, Spring 
2011), http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.
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windows of walls, being able to see out at all angles and 
being visible at all times?) The transparency on display in the 
Magritte painting concerns not whatever might occur inside 
the room, but what might be called the images of the world 
of its (absent) inhabitants.
The walls of the room, to extrapolate from the one in full 
view—at which a cannon is pointed—are each subdivided 
into four squares. The squares frame images that show evi-
dence of careful curation. Today, we might take them to be 
projections rather than painted panels, wallpaper, or incon-
gruent windows onto the very subjects depicted in them, but 
their ontological status is of no consequence.
The images, from left to right, depict: a lush and dark 
forest, a rather painterly nude torso (the female midriff, to be 
precise), wooden boards, clouds against a blue sky, magnified 
grelots or sleigh bells, the façade of a townhouse (as it might 
be seen from across the street), a blazing fire, an enlarged 
paper doily pattern. Only three of these images would qualify 
as window material; the rest require alternate explanations. 
What do all these fragments have in common? What unites 
them? Or is their fragmentariness meant to point us in the 
direction of the titular “threshold”? One plausible interpreta-
tion is that these interior scenes make up the “image bank” of 
a typical bourgeois life. A hunger for images of reality unites  
nondescript middle-class interiors with prison cells. But while 
the repertoire of the second reflects its occupant’s unsated 
desire, the first is filled with reflections of everyday life, where 
small desires are no sooner felt than satisfied. The narrator of 
Voyage autour de ma chambre would be at home among them, 
not needing to cross the threshold to find his freedom.
To liberate the inmates of bourgeois life over a century 
after de Maistre’s sedentary journey around his room seems 
to require measures at once more radical and more absurd: 
heavy artillery positioned to blow the entire scheme to 
smithereens? The proposal for armed violence from within 
suggested by the aimed cannon, combined with the absence 
of a possible agent, has the effect of securing our assent: Yes, 
such life is a scandal! Nothing lives here! And before we know it, 
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we have exchanged our aesthetic perspective for that of the 
gunner.
§ Art Curation
Great art is defined by intractable personal flaws; great 
curation, by incurable personal traumas. It is unforgivable to 
theorize from a single example (our local collector-curator 
Ydessa Hendeles, whose work is heavy with her family’s fate 
in the Holocaust). So let us turn instead to one of the minor 
adventures of logos, a contemporary conceptual-linguistic 
dialectic.
Curation, its roots in Latin cura, is a kind of care. It is 
a response to a hurt in need of healing. While the idea of 
curating private life, from social media to home base, inspires 
attention to more than just aesthetic detail, and may be 
worthwhile as self-therapy, we must resist seeing the cura-
tion of galleries and museums in this way. Why add art space 
to the many hoaxes perpetrated on ailing publics? Let us 
leave any putative health benefits of curation to the curator, 
and focus on the art—whose main mission is not to heal us 
spiritually and comfort the disturbed. No matter how well 
curated, its museums will not cure all who come. They may 
bring relief to those who come in desperation. To expect 
them to do so, however, is to burden them with a responsi-
bility they can never take up. Phonetically the Louvre is not 
so far from Lourdes, where the “curators” alone similarly 
find relief. But it should guard itself against analogous public 
imposture to maintain itself as a site of pilgrimage.
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§ Moratorium I
Art’s command to be revered, preserved, and on public dis-
play is nothing more than an extension of religion’s com-
mand for ritual prayer and temple worship. In those houses 
of God where devotional relics are stored to protect them 
from vandalism and decay—there they also take on a new 
“life,” paralleling their otherworldly truth, of reminding us 
of the afterlife (who can help wondering about the reliquary: 
surely there is more to death than this? The more wood 
and gold and precious metals cover these remnants, the less 
pesky our questioning). 
Visual art, meanwhile, transforms this thought of finitude 
and the afterlife into one about metaphysical connection (the 
uncanny phenomenality of images, the sense of their being 
alive and autonomous, does not enter into the equation; once 
seen, they seem to perpetuate themselves just fine regardless 
of their physical condition, even to the point of awakening 
our iconoclastic side). Do we not find ourselves dumbstruck 
before artworks we had once seen in better shape, in real life 
or reproduction? Do we not wonder then: is there nothing 
more to them than this, after all? Owing to art’s widespread 
preservation and display, they maintain the privileged status 
of representatives of a higher order of being. That is quite a 
lot to live up to!
But in our time this metaphysical function is becoming 
less and less self-evident. With the ranks of artists continu-
ally swelling, exorbitant capital pouring into the art market, 
the democratization of canons, the relaxation of prohibitions, 
the globalization of long-held rumours about the end of art’s 
spiritual ascendant (can we blame it all on late-imperial 
decadence and technological promiscuity?), we may wonder 
whether the time has not perhaps come to rein in the public 
institutions of art and celebrate art’s ephemerality over 
that of the artist. This as long as we recognize that such a 
celebration is itself unlikely to go the way of all flesh and will 
remain after the art itself has left—as a record of its phe-
nomenal and ontic experience.
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§ No Trespassing
Certain let us call them “difficult” artists, in an access of 
vanity or insecurity, put into their work so much of them-
selves, featuring in it front and centre, that they actively 
get in the way of its appreciation. Since there is no getting 
around them, one must either come up close, too close (for 
comfort, taste, or hygiene), in order to lose sight of them—to 
disaggregate their input into digestible parts— or else move 
as far away as necessary to see the bigger picture. It is no use 
trying to push aside such art-makers; they will resist, turn 
hostile, and bar the way completely. They are so fond of it 
and protective that any attempt at bypassing will result in 
struggle, which can only harm the art.
As a viewer, one can always decide that such a degree of 
possessiveness and obtrusiveness disqualifies their work 
from public interest on the grounds that it mimics private 
property. For reasons to do with the history of art, the 
artist as art proprietor is one image that does not gel. The 
ego-underlining work, in contrast to the ego-undermining 
kind we all love by comparison, insists that appreciation of 
the artist (whose personality pervades it) is indispensable to 
its secrets being released. Open house begins as soon as our 
bonafide interest is established.
It would be wrong to conclude, however, that what has 
us return again and again to a tough piece of art is a “con-
nection” to its maker or a standing invitation to get to 
know them (and their work only through them). Stand back! 
Keep out! Approach no nearer!—these proprietary messages 
dissuade in vain, speaking most enticingly to the fan of 
the prohibitively difficult. As long as they remain interdic-
tions, unbacked by action, they have the contrary effect. 
What greater incitement to curiosity and trouble than a No 
trespassing sign on property whose owner is home, prop-
erty seemingly abandoned (as difficult works tend to be)? 
Where the rule-abiding peel off, preferring non-appreciation 
to offence, the adventurous see only the romance of 
transgression. 
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§ Rubens in Furs
In a collection of objects of art, the contiguity of beauty sets 
off the beautiful and that of inferiority detracts from it. A 
judge who is wearied, is incapable of judging: ennui renders 
him unjust and severe.
—Astolphe de Custine, Letters from Russia  *
Walking through the zones of heat and cold, across creak-
ing floorboards—as in a rural museum opened just for you 
if a custodian with the key can be found, or in a mountain 
chalet when all the guests are out pursuing winter sports 
and only you, having been excused, wander looking at old 
photographs, natural artifacts, and undusted bits of folklore, 
or, again, in a European temple of art at whose grand doors 
a shivering trail of people awaits admission, thinking not of 
Rembrandt but of samovars.
The austerity of the display inside does a disservice to the 
museum’s collection. Old Masters hide in poor light, and 
plump Rubenses have long since turned with age. Everything 
here finds its antithesis in the vivacity of the wintertime 
queue. This takes on the habit of an autonomous entity, 
which snakes outside, its cheeks full of colour and body clad 
in fur, pooling together scarce resources (drink, warmth, 
humour) as in the days of the Siege of Leningrad. The Rus-
sian state, making no provision for these avid culture-seekers, 
prefers to see in them the contiguity of need and inferiority. 
And in this condition they must suffer to gain entrance to 
the visions of beauty.
Inside, the ghost of Empress Catherine still hovers in the 
atmosphere, waving her despotic finger, humbling visitors 
even further:
* Astolphe de Custine, Letters from Russia, ed. Anka Muhlstein, 1843 trans. uncred-
ited (1839; New York: NYRB, 2002), letter 19, p. 350.
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1. All ranks shall be left outside the doors, similarly hats, and 
particularly swords.
2. Orders of precedence and haughtiness, and anything of 
such like which might result from them, shall be left at the 
doors.
3. Be merry, but neither spoil nor break anything, nor indeed 
gnaw at anything.
4. Be seated, stand or walk as it best pleases you, regardless of 
others.
5. Speak with moderation and not too loudly, so that others 
present have not an earache or headache.
6. Argue without anger or passion.
7. Do not sigh or yawn, neither bore nor fatigue others.
 . . .
9. Eat well of good things, but drink with moderation so that 
each should be able always to find his legs on leaving these 
doors.  *
Look closer at this common humanity lined up before the 
State Hermitage in January snow. Do you not yourself prefer 
them to the contiguity of Dutch and Flemish masters on 
which restorers have not performed their sorely needed tasks? 
The picture of health and animal spirits takes here pride of 
place. Thus it is that near certain museums nature’s beauty 
can sometimes spring up.
* These were Catherine the Great’s “Rules for the Behaviour of All Those Entering 
These Doors.” Quoted in James Steward, The Collections of the Romanovs: European 
Art from the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg (London: Merrell, 2005), 24. 
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§ Fake Fires 
The confetti-spider crudeness of images of exploding fire-
works offends no one as long as their subject matter makes 
no claim to art. Designing and engineering feux d’artifice, or 
pyrotechnics, was recognized as a distinct métier, that of 
the artificier, under Louis XIV, who was himself quite fond 
of elaborate early versions of son et lumière. An engraving 
of a show of this kind— one of the original senses of “set 
piece”— combined with its timely circulation, used to pose as 
an eyewitness rendering, recording the moment of explosion 
(it has been pointed out that some of these images depicted 
a synthesis rather than an actual scene, and often preceded 
the event, depicting it as planned rather than as executed, as 
it might have been rather than as it was, if it even was). The 
engraving’s artistic value was subordinated to its informative 
and propagandistic role.
All that changed with Whistler’s now-famous Nocturnes 
in Black and Gold—The Falling Rocket and The Firewheel. The 
first of these occasioned a libel case between the painter and 
the art critic John Ruskin, who had accused Whistler in print 
of “wilful imposture.”  * Ruskin’s vicious reaction can only be 
understood as motivated by the subject matter—man-made 
bursts of light meant for popular amusement— even if he 
focused on technique; the subject called for a technique 
more “reckless” than in Whistler’s earlier work. Whistler 
sued to defend his method and choice of subject, citing 
artistic maturity, influences (Japanese ukiyo-e prints) and, 
last but not least, modernity. In both Nocturnes, the transfor-
mation of sublimity—a combined effect of distance, vantage 
point, and sombre setting—is achieved with the insertion 
of the rocket and softening of impression in a spectral tonal 
harmony of night and fog broken by evocative specks and 
highlights.
* James McNeill Whistler, The Gentle Art of Making Enemies (1890; n.p.: Project 
Gutenberg, 2008), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/24650/24650-h/24650-h.htm.
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The Florentine Scoppio del Carro on Easter Sunday is surely 
among the most spectacular traditional fireworks displays 
to have survived electrification. Among its wonders is the 
procession of the cart, resembling a juggernaut. Loaded with 
explosives, escorted by men and women in period dress, it is 
hauled through the streets by a team of oxen before com-
ing to a halt in the square in front of the duomo, where it is 
ignited from within the cathedral by a fuse. The incredible 
concatenation set off to the clang of bells and lasting nearly 
half an hour is all the more remarkable for its compactness 
of means. Like a whirring demon on which all eyes are 
turned, the thing emits not just round after round of deto-
nations but also billowing smoke, bringing back something 
of the barbarism of the Catholic Church’s distant past, as 
well as the terror of a volcanic eruption. Perhaps the visceral 
thrill of watching fireworks will one day ultimately be traced 
to the archaic boredom of savages around a fire.
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§ Inscrutable Relation
Il n’y a pas d’œuvre d’art qui ne fasse pas appel à un peuple 
qui n’existe pas encore.
(There is no work of art that does not appeal to a people 
who do not yet exist.)
—Gilles Deleuze, “What Is the Creative Act?”  *
One could quibble with the individual words—none? appeal? 
a people? not yet?— or one could say: There is no people that 
does not appeal to a work of art that does not yet exist. Every 
people conjures its own unity in art as in a crystal ball. This 
“fundamental affinity” of people for a future work of art that 
represents them is also “never clear,”  † and fades from sight as 
the glass clouds over with their breath.
* Gilles Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce que l’acte de création?” (lecture, Mardis de la Fon-
dation, FEMIS, Paris, May 17, 1987), http://www.lepeuplequimanque.org/en/
acte-de-creation-gilles-deleuze.html.
† Ibid.
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§ Barbarogenesis
Imaginary interwar headline: Europe Balkanized! The name 
of this grotesque hybrid: Barbarogenius, hero of early 
twentieth-century Serbian avant-garde, a Slavic New Man. 
This time it is not the universal spiritual qualities that renew 
and redeem European civilization in brotherly communion 
(as Dostoevsky prophesied), but crass primitivism raised to 
the higher power of a de-civilizing mission. “We advocate 
new and pure barbarism,” wrote the man behind it, Ljubomir 
Micić, founder of Zenitism, a self-proclaimed newer and 
purer avant-garde. Like Mayakovsky’s Ivan, personifying 
Soviet Russia as Wilson’s and Whitman’s challenger on 
American soil, the Barbarogenius, a hiccup of revolutionary 
intoxication and unspent virility, is Europe’s latter-day rapist 
and unlikely savior. Science and technology are instrumental 
in his onward-and-upward trajectory as well, and serve as 
its metaphors (he is a “rescue pilot of barbarian ideaplanes”).  * 
Rather than bearing reconciliation, this walking contradic-
tion flies in the face of the rational West.
It seems like only yesterday that art (spirit) and barbarism 
(natural culture) were capable of such strategic alliances. The 
former would contain the brutality of cultural ferment with-
out bursting from the buildup of inner pressure. The latter, 
meanwhile, drew from the East a primeval energy, heralding 
the art of the future.
* Lubomir Micić, quoted in English translation in Tatjana Micić, “Mythical Para-
digms of the Avant-garde and Its Era” (Ph.D. thesis, Charles University in Prague, 
2009), 89.
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§ Perfect State
In a perfect state, art, including literature, would disappear 
for lack of motivation; those with a lingering “desire for poet-
ical unreality,” for the solace of art, long for the “imperfect 
state[,] of society still half barbaric”  * in which we still live.
§ Letting Slide
We tend to think of literature as helping us make sense 
of experience, as making the world intelligible to us, and 
forget that its chief “function” today is the consolidation of 
culture, which throws in our way interminable contradic-
tions while claiming wholeness and coherence. Literature’s 
less-than-confidence-inspiring integrative effect can be 
detected in the specious universals of the Literary Establish-
ment and World Literature. Literature, and art more gener-
ally, is far and away the smoothest slide into a culture’s belly, 
where it does its enzymatic work. It gives us puzzles to wrap 
our heads around instead of grappling with contradictions.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 112, vol. 1, sec. 234 (emphasis mine) 
(“Value of the Middle of the Way”).
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§ Great Art Belonging to Everyone
In the Hollywood version of WWII’s Monuments Men, one of 
them, in words perhaps sentimental yet surprisingly reso-
nant today, gives voice to a deep conviction: “great works of 
art can never belong to any one individual, at least not in 
spirit.”  *
Everyone has a right to enjoy masterpieces, and when 
that right is taken away, when the ruling taste outlaws what 
speaks to them, they will speak up to reclaim it. This is the 
view inculcated in school groups by museums, of which the 
nation-state is still the largest benefactor. The roots of “art 
as public good” run deep in Christian liturgy, a fact that sup-
porters of the radical Enlightenment would rather we forget. 
The democratization of art appreciation (in contrast to that of 
religious faith by means of art) has been glacial, reformations 
and revolutions notwithstanding. It has pushed us into a 
full-blown contradiction, until now unpronounced. 
The democratization of aesthetic opinion (and of educated 
taste, to be sure) underpins the great wave of entitlement felt 
before art, great and small, that washes over more people 
each year, and washes away sins for good. This is the entitle-
ment to one’s own opinion and thus to the work’s meaning 
as it appears to us. What are the great works, anyway? Let’s 
cut them down to size and put up lesser lights instead; they 
will soon shine brighter. Even the cognoscenti of the world 
of art are bound to bow to public taste, if money calls their 
name. The rich to whom they pander are bound to lose 
interest in “high” art, which none below, more informed 
now than in past times, already gives a damn about. And 
this is true the more their ranks are replenished by this 
immense, unbuffered and rapidly self-educating “class,” and 
the more art’s “reputation” as a whole suffers (from throwing 
around its label to see where else it sticks). Mass disparage-
ment of certain art—and it is difficult to predict which, as 
* The Monuments Men, directed by George Clooney (Culver City, CA: Columbia 
Pictures, 2014), DVD.
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even difficult work finds aficionados in the unlikeliest of 
places—is only the most pernicious, if relatively rare, con-
sequence, since some work remains too abstruse for popular 
taste to approach it. The more pervasive effect is the disap-
pearance of recognized and rewarded artistic diversity the 
more the scale swings to just one side.
We are living now through the beginning of this aesthetic 
transformation, to which the concept of “great” art (already 
on life support) will eventually yield. “Greatness,” after all, 
implies that some work is qualitatively beneath the attention 
of the vast majority, its attention increasingly limited by 
time. The mid-range artists already find themselves stranded, 
and without means. Art schools go the way of humanistic 
studies, and the pool of untapped talent swells. Promise 
is pegged to potential for making big prize long and short 
lists, while money (to be sure, less and less of it) is staked on 
entries to popularity contests that loom large in the eyes of 
the world. 
What we call art will continue being made, its diffusion 
likely greater than ever before, and everyone shall have 
contact with and opportunity to see it, if not to “contemplate” 
it. There will be more art, in aggregate, but what “greatness” 
there will be will tend to hide in art’s dilution and prolifer-
ation—its galloping invisibility. It will be with art as with 
everyday nature, which remained aesthetically unseen until 
bourgeois naturalists (still strong with us) took active inter-
est in its disappearance. Unsupported and taken for granted, 
this subdetectable infra-art will tend towards harmonizing 
with nature and reducing our human footprint. It will not 
crop up, as it still does today, as a Banksy graffito, mosaics by 
Invader, or Vancouver’s horny Satan. It will no longer belong 
to the people in any meaningful way, just as nature will have 
ceased belonging to them as well.
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§ De-Colonizing Art
A I did not know that the duty of art is to make the unexcep-
tional feel special, to transform the ordinary into some-
thing noble, to raise it out of the vulgar muck into which it 
has sunk. Aren’t vulgarity etc. already potent enough?
B We’re too quick to be judgmental (notice how I didn’t 
say “to judge”). The average person has a right to greater 
self-esteem. To artists on high horses he will remain a 
drag. And he will find satisfaction seeing them thrown in 
the ditch.
The people obviously care about art if they want to 
be in and part of it. Don’t forget how much the history 
of painting owes to Dutch merchants. We’re quick with 
compassion for the struggle of the underserved masses. Is 
it right to turn our back on them, and call them unde-
serving of art?
A The people in the West are not what they used to be. They 
now themselves have artistic pretensions. They know best 
what art should be, they want to be its adjudicators. 
The people used to have no interest in making art; the 
distinction of being a part of it, as model, object, or inspi-
ration, was enough. Now they reckon that if it doesn’t 
reflect them, or is not made by them, it has no right to 
exist.
B So you would keep art from the child of Mexican 
immigrants who discovers creative self-expression 
and self-realization in describing the condition of his 
existence?
A No, I still have the old compassion in abundance: I want 
the disadvantaged to have the opportunity to discover 
and develop their talent, to see where it takes them. I 
just don’t think art should be the first stop for them. Was 
great art ever about self-expression and description? The 
self is far too overrated!
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Those who throw themselves into art, they don’t worry 
me. They are serious. I encourage them. I don’t want real 
effort to go to waste. Only vanity should die on the vine. 
I object to the judge who on the one hand keeps them 
out, on the other embraces a select few of these cast-
aways, eternally indebted to him, just for show, as proof 
of open-mindedness. I’m not sure those he embraces are 
always the best.
B There I agree. They are strategic choices.
A As “immigrants,” they have more respect for standards (I 
won’t say reverence— even I see this as too romantic, too 
dated), in much the same way that non-native speakers 
who want to assimilate are better than natives on gram-
mar. If only they kept an ear to the ground . . .
My fear is that the average person will sooner drag art 
down with them to do their bidding than make an effort 
to be art-worthy. Like those who would rather pull the 
tree to the ground to reach the highest fruit than climb 
it or pick what is low-hanging, and end up breaking it 
in half. We might end up without art and with as much 
vulgarity as before: bruised fruit and barren tree. Art 
will not only become common, it will also be indistin-
guishable from the mundane everyday. Don’t forget that 
even if art in the age of Louis XIV reflected the life of the 
nobility, it was still only the life of the nobility. And the 
Romantics were not of the people they dilated on, had not 
themselves been dragged through the street and lived to 
tell about it. It is only recently, after decades of encour-
agement from and reshaping of mentalities among the 
learned, that the aesthetically semi- or uneducated are 
claiming the right to define art, to the applause of post-
modern egalitarians who had insisted on not corrupting 
them with a canon. And all in the name of what?
B Of innovation, of thinking outside the box. Tradition is 
linear. Genius is non-linear. The weight of tradition had 
become too great; the new was stultified by it. Someone 
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had to sweep it aside, to clear the air. It’s still there if you 
want access to it. It’s just now much less overwhelming.
A This conceit of originality . . . [shaking head ] We’re con-
vinced we can do better, be more brilliant, than our 
predecessors, than our precursors—if we even allow them 
that honour anymore. And, truth be told, there is a lot 
that’s nasty in tradition . . . Not necessarily individually, 
but as a society, we think we have exponentially more-
better to offer one another. We don’t want to owe the old 
anything, we self-made people. We want the future to 
owe us everything.
B You sound like a snob. Worse: a moralizing snob. My 
advice is that you keep these ideas under wraps—some 
cheese cloth—until the storm passes. Personally, I’m 
determined to ride it out. It’s too exciting.
A You’re getting to work, then?
B Now that everything is turned upside down, I can real-
istically hope that any rubbish I put out will be hailed 
somewhere as a treasure. Even the challenging stuff can 
be marketed as brain-training. A work without redeem-
ing qualities is hard to find. It must really be outré to be 
widely disliked—and no dislike is universal. Ergo, there’s 
no such thing as overrated.
A If you say so.
B I will prove it!
Happy are the days when art has never been easier . . . 







With the closing of pagan philosophy schools in Byzantium 
in 529 c. e., the world seemed to become safer for the god 
of the Christians. Those idols that witnessed the birth of 
philosophy were left in the dust by a more coherent Mythos. 
But coherence and other structures that had characterized 
philosophy in the Classical world also needed to be overcome. 
The Christian god, himself no philosopher, was identi-
fied with Logos. Dialectical theology would have to wait 
for Abelard. Meanwhile, Logos annexed the universe. The 
wonderful casualness of pagan theology and philosophy were 
replaced by pedantry and syllogism.
§ Proof (in the Recipe) 
It is impossible to commit to this way of expressing oneself: 
in the briefest possible, clearest possible form, as the voice of 
impersonal reason. All acts of communication betray some 
hope of being understood. But rational communicative acts 
are characterized by the hope of being understood perfectly. 
Most acts are not of this kind, and prove that our under-
standing is used to imperfection. But it is not imperfect and 
difficult on account of our failure to reduce the objects of 
our understanding to sets of rational propositions. Already 
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computers are teaching us things we didn’t want to know: 
that to understand others or be part of a culture is to be 
able to mimic them and to extrapolate based on only their 
behaviour and appearance. Understanding takes exposure, 
and exposure is what we’re in the process of (technologically) 
unlearning. Rationalization, which we are after, is of little 
use to understanding unless it comes with the explanation 
of causes (of behaviour, appearance, etc.), which are too com-
plex for our brains to handle. To always sign off before we 
awake from our dream of reason, of perfect form, is to wish 
away imperfection.
§ Dry Run
For another’s “big thoughts in big words” to sink in, you 
need not depth but distance. Only at a distance from their 
source can their intimate company with one’s own mind be 
appreciated.
Encountered in person, direct from the mouth of their 
originator, they strike us as incongruous with their sur-
roundings. When they come— even if they come self- 
 undercutting themselves—rather than to gravity, their 
prodigiousness incites us to ridicule.
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§ From the Thinking Hat
Rule no. 1: Make space. Thoughts need room to be thought. 
Rule no. 2: Make time. Time is not on the side of thoughts.
I go by these rules in every one of my hat-tricks. Following 
them asks that you fancy yourself a bit of a magician. If no 
one yet appreciates your sleight-of-mind, insist— insist on 
doing it again! Practice, remember, makes illusion perfect. 
Sooner or later they will have to marvel at your art of pulling 
ever-new and fully-formed thoughts out of the same old 
empty hat. There is more to the trick than the magical for-
mula, they know that much.
§ A Kind of Illusionism
The popular belief in the magical qualities of white rabbits 
may have sprung from our confusion of the prop with the 
performance in which it makes a memorable appearance. 
The rabbit’s being an accessory to magic has made it more 
magical. As with white rabbits, so it is with many ideas.
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§ Three Clear Thoughts
Thinking as source of certainty, and its mouth.
Thinking as the bed of certainty, and its bank.
Thinking as the cradle of certainty, and its grave.
§ Impressions
An impression is a thought too brief. 
§ The Clarity of Clouds
When you hear Oh-ho, remain underimpressed. To be easily 
impressed, even if it is just for society’s sake, is the first step 
not to poetry but to cloudy thinking. On the other hand, if 
you prefer clouds, they welcome heads that can reach into 
them. You can then study them up close, and be impressed at 
your leisure.
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§ Found Ideas
Let’s quote approvingly: “A person who discounts back-
packing as a means of travel is liable also to discount the 
potential interest of places that can be reached only by that 
means.”  * And let’s also put in a word for the vagrant beach-
comber, who hangs around the coastline picking up what 
most travellers overlook when looking only for “nature’s 
truth,” the “oceanic,” or training their minds on horizons 
and sunsets. Rather than views and sights (even those found 
by backpackers), the beachcomber is after things and objects. 
He favours out-of-the-way places where he is likelier to find 
them: remote, wild beaches on which the debris and refuse 
of civilization wash up with the tide, and secret beaches, 
like that one in the Gulf of Mexico — created by a test bomb 
and accessed only by a water tunnel. Admittedly, the beach-
comber is himself no great traveller; in his rucksack he 
carries just what he can sell. Call him a tramp, but admit 
that what he finds of interest, of value, and then offers for 
sale, has itself made a long journey— of which he is now a 
great facilitator. 
These two, the backpacker and the beachcomber, have a 
special relationship with found ideas. If the first helps gener-
ate them, the second extends their life by putting them back 
into circulation.
* Jan Zwicky, Lyric Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), sec. 47.
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§ Finish Your Thought!
As in death, we are equalized in thought when we think that 
every mind in its effort to comprehend the world must come 
upon the unthinkable.
§ Think for Yourself . . .
. . . not others. There is no such thing as thought to spare, 
only to share.
§ Overheard
The well-wrought aphorism “conveys a portion of a truth 
with such point as to set us thinking on what remains.”  *
* John Morley, “Aphorisms” (lecture, Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, Edin-
burgh, Nov. 11, 1887), http://www.readbookonline.net/readOnLine/45446/.
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§ Proverbial Philosophy
Certain wisdom can only be hit upon unawares, by a violent 
elucidation. Proverbs—those indirect, figurative, earthy, 
pithy sayings that refuse to come to a nice point—have 
earned their handle “dark sayings.” Like birds flushed out 
with torches and cudgels by nocturnal hunters, their dor-
mant meanings must be caught in situ or not at all. Startled 
from their nests, they give themselves up in the twinkling of 
an eye and expire from shock or blows, which gives the lie to 
their truth—just as their truth in turn gives them the lie.
§ Robust Arguments
Arguments today are exposed to far more scrutiny and are 
more vulnerable to disconfirmation by “facts” than they were 
in the factless past. Robust arguments in the realm of social 
ideas— e.g., the revolutionary power of social media—are 
those that have been attacked and, rather than definitively 
debunked, falsified unconvincingly or without attracting 
attention, because the particulars seem too insignificant to 
undermine them. You can try to dismantle them, or pull out 
bricks to undermine their structural integrity, or lay siege 
to them, but they will only reconstitute themselves stronger 
than before; taking them apart brick by brick takes too long, 
faith quickly fills the gaps, or else the ruins of ideas immedi-
ately give rise to a passionate nostalgia for them.
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§ Tyranny of Knowledge
The verb “to know” is no more meaningful than the verb “to 
ignore”— even if “to ignore” speaks to us more now, when 
knowledge appears overrated and ignorance more valuable 
because undeluded.
§ Take My Word for It
The democratization of knowledge describes not a process 
whereby knowledge once shrouded in secrecy is made known 
to all, but a process whereby knowledge goes from being 
something principally gnostic, a secret held by a few, to being 
information that is widely disclosed and circulated without 
regard to spatial and temporal limits, or veracity. And igno-
rance, keeping step with this development, goes from being 
a majority condition to something virtually unknown, or 
known by only a few.
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§ Philosophizing without a Hammer
In a little anecdote from the great Boethius recalled 
by Daniel Heller-Roazen, we learn about Pythagoras’s 
ignorance of the fifth, discordant hammer in the forge of 
his new knowledge. When conducting experiments that 
would lead him to the tetrad, the mathematizing philoso-
pher apparently discarded an inconvenient fact of exis-
tence to keep the integrity of his knowledge of essences. 
The parallel emerging in this story between the rela-
tion of knowledge to ignorance, its shadow-other, and 
that of exclusion to inclusion might make us wonder. The 
coming-to-the-surface—to the surface of knowledge— of 
compromising facts or insights, not simply unknown but 
crucially ignored at the source—what does it amount to? Is 
it little more than “sabotage” or, in the luckier cases, a fillip 
to refine old knowledge—and in this sense absorbed by it or 
neutralized? Or is it, on the contrary, a contender to knowl-
edge, however modest, in its own right? One is tempted to 
answer: an act of epistemic disruption is an act of epistemic 
irruption. But it can, it seems, only lay claim to epistemic 
value if it stays true to its calling as counter-knowledge and 
stands as a reflection on the exclusivity of all knowledge, 
rather than as a point scored against the monolith. As soon 
as a new body of knowledge is allowed to grow around such 
disruptive-irruptive events, that reflection is lost from sight, 
and ignorance again becomes manifest.
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§ Settling Ignorance
Can we speak of an “epistemology of ignorance” without 
contradiction? When facing ignorance are we not at the limit 
of the knowable? Or can we only ever speak of ignorance as 
an epistemic frontier? Beyond the frontier lies not only the 
unknown but also the ignorant. 
Should we not question, for instance on ethical grounds, 
the expansionist paradigm of knowledge, according to which 
perpetually pushing back epistemic frontiers is our manifest 
destiny and right— one that clearly depends on ignorance, or 
knowledge deemed false, which is demolished, the ground 
under it cleared and cultivated, or preserved as a “colonial 
village” with scholars for actors?
§ The Umbrella of Unknowing
What do the ignoramus, the skeptic, the agnostic, the holy 
fool, the madman, the savage, the mob, and the devil have 
in common? In their faces we can scrutinize ignorance 
as Nietzsche did morality—“as result, as symptom, as 
mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as misunderstanding; but 
also . . . as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison”  * of all 
knowledge.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, preface to On the Genealogy of Morality, ed. Keith 
Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe, rev. ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006), p. 7, sec. 6.
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§ Professing Ignorance
[N]othing is more routine than the irony which, like baking 
powder, helps to raise the kneaded dough of private opinion.
—Walter Benjamin  *
It was to be expected that the history of learning would 
reach a supreme point of self-irony, making “Socratic irony” 
look like child’s play: the profession of knowledge now 
requires professing ignorance, debunking ignorance posing 
as ironic knowledge. The accessibility of digitized objects of 
knowledge, a godsend for autodidacts and hobby apprentices, 
leads many others to mistake the contents of the internet for 
those of their own mind, open access for de facto education. 
As more youth is fed through universities, the job of the 
professor is increasingly to instruct students in their own 
and society’s non- knowledge, un-teaching the “wired” notion 
that the web is a functional extension of their brain, and 
with it the cynical idea that “misinformation” here can be 
useful and even accurate over there. The larger aim of this 
paideia is to reclaim patches of formal education from “the 
same old cabbage” (to cite Hegel) it now resembles. With the 
declining authority of university curricula, unable to deal 
with knowledge’s obsolescence, Socratic methods of teach-
ing would obviously be ill- advised, but professors admitting 
ignorance via the critique of knowledge as un-ironic “agnosia” 
(witlessness) —  downright suicidal. To continue to turn a 
profit, ignorance itself must be thematized and made the 
topic of instruction, while irony should be avoided at all cost.
* Walter Benjamin, “Left-Wing Melancholy (on Erich Kästner’s New Book of 
Poems)” (1931), trans. Ben Brewster, Screen 15, no. 2 (1974): 29.
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§ Smarter and Dumber
It is now clear that public debate could only ever be expanded 
by smartening up and dumbing down.
But:
It is now also clear that social levelling could only ever be 
successful by smartening down and dumbing up.
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§ Can Speak, Will Travel
The Socratic and Christian suspicion of eloquence, at the base 
of the distinction between speaking well and thinking well, 
is being re-formed into naïvety, driven by dominant images 
of professional success. Effective, which is to say persuasive, 
speaking—inseparable today from technologically assisted 
performance skills—goes a long way, around the globe prac-
tically. The ability to present one’s ideas in person and under 
pressure reveals an ability to think on one’s feet— the more 
exciting kind of thinking—inherently valuable for its imme-
diate results. Ad hoc thinking, brainstorming, round tables, 
talks— all these hone speech, though not without a cost 
to written communication and the complexity of meaning 
admitted to graphically assisted thought.
The instrumentalization of thinking, its loss of innocence— 
signalled by the naïve embrace of the benefits of eloquence— 
means, however, that we are in on the power of speaking well 
(which includes taking the floor at an opportune moment), if 
not always on its power over us. As though thoughts could 
ever do without speech! Who has time for reading nowadays? 
It is clear that, where pure thought is concerned, speech is 
more important than writing! 
It is only in some “monastic” spaces—the shrinking oases  
where thought is valued without having to be communi-
cated—that wariness of eloquence is still preserved and 
warnings are issued against it: a spiritual danger to the 
truth, a holdout of devilry! Everywhere else, however, it is the 
knowledge of eloquence that daily renders it both powerful, 
and powerless.
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§ Mark My Words
The strength of written language lies in the communication 
of ideas—in contrast to speech, best at conveying sentiments. 
Forcing writing to emote could not be done without adul-
terating it, without “enlarg[ing] [and] stretch[ing],” Rousseau 
noted in the Essay on the Origin of Languages,  * and we can 
only surmise that he did so with passion. Conversational 
writing, a concession by the written word to the virtues of 
the spoken, may have made sense before speaking across 
great distances became a reality; it is now ripe for revisit-
ing. The arts of speechifying, oratory, and of poetry, which 
began in the voice, were once divided from those of law and 
epistolography—the arts of writing, excluding calligraphy. 
The widening of poetry’s circulation in written form at the 
expense of oral transmission also spelled its intellectualiza-
tion: where earlier ideas and plots were yoked to the epic, 
lyric, or dramatic description or expression of embodied, 
enacted, felt emotion, writing it down forced poetry to 
mean. Under the sway of metaphor, its emotional resonance 
was subordinated to more complex ideational structures, to 
allegory, trope, image, and experiments in linguistic form 
to its breaking point. No quantity of recitatives and author 
readings could restore sentiment to poetry not written to be 
performed.
Today, made culturally viable by mass-mediated oral trans-
mission, spoken poetry has returned. Let us wish for it, not 
the complete abstention from ideas long enjoyed by lyrics in 
popular and folk music, but an imbalance between sentiment, 
on the one (heavier) side, and concept, image and idea, on the 
other, in recognition of poetry’s imagistic history, minus its 
cerebral obsession with perfection. 
Church and state need no reminders that scripting 
speeches dulls expressiveness, robbing public appearance 
* Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Essay on the Origin of Languages, in Which Something 
Is Said about Music and Musical Imitation,” in The ‘Discourses’ and Other Early 
Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 260, ch. 5.
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of its best means of persuasion. The academic repertoire of 
lectures, or texts read aloud, papers, presentations, and “talks” 
done from notes has as its nemesis thoroughly scripted, 
exhaustively rehearsed TED talks, made to look spontaneous, 
delivered dynamically, with highly transmissible passion and 
sans notes. You are prepared for one when you can give it in 
your sleep; the script is internalized enough that you are free 
to embroider emotionally before the audience. Though most 
speeches today are written, memories being what they are, 
the larger the concession to an audience to be won over, the 
less the text is corrupted by the conceptual complexities of 
writing.
In personal communication, meanwhile, one might wish 
for freedom, not from the memory of a thirst for passionate 
sharing, but from the emoticons devised to satisfy it. (There is 
no threat of incursion from emotive symbolism and “per-
sonal” feelings into legal, administrative, or academic prose, 
where ideas still ostracize feeling.) Let writing, in other words, 
continue to serve the communication of ideas and the evoca-
tion—not of emotions, but of moods and atmospheres, cul-
minating in philosophical meditation. Let embodied speech 
deal with the rest, and reach its aesthetic pitch in poetry. 
§ Almost Being
The smaller the animal, the less the distance between being 
and its sensation. In this way, the smallest beings are closer 
to presence than us, who come face to face with being and do 
not sense it. What is our compensation for being so large?
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§ Don’t Imagine . . .
If an angel were ever to tell us anything of his philosophy I 
believe many propositions would sound like 2 times 2 equals 13.
—G. Ch. Lichtenberg
If a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be able to understand it.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, enthusiast of Lichtenberg
All the thoughts of a turtle are turtles
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
After all, what would be left of what it was like to be a bat if 
one removed the viewpoint of the bat?
—Thomas Nagel  *
Imagining and speculating about nonhuman experience 
makes us smaller. Why is it that we insist on being able to 
comprehend it all? Because little by little we are becoming our 
outside. The thoughts of a turtle will one day be shared by 
men who are part turtle, the arithmetic of angels, had angels 
ever existed, by semi-angels, the speech of a lion, by lion-man, 
the mindset of a bat—you guessed it. Even the experience of 
the next man will one day be accessible to us. 
Whenever we recognize this phenomenological drift, we 
start to prepare mentally for these interspecies liaisons, 
which will support us in our smallness. But when we set out 
only to know, we train for a fantasy takeover, ruling nothing.
* Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, The Waste Books, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New 
York: NYRB, 2000), p. 26, Notebook B: 1768–71, sec. 44; Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, trans. 
G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (1953; Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 235e, sec. 327; Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Journals and 
Miscellaneous Notebooks of Ralph Waldo Emerson, vol. 13, 1852–1855 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 357; Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a 
Bat?” Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 443.
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§ Think, Pig!
The truth of Lévi-Strauss’s idea that “animals are good to 
think with”  * can be deepened if we replace “animals” with 
“philosophers,” and “philosophers” again with “animals.” (And 
I do not mean anything so refined as “philosophical animals.”)
§ Thinking Thinking
Like one hand clapping, thinking thinking has a muted 
sound.
§ New Line of Thought
Every new line of thought is a departure.
Or a new way of arriving where one already is.
* Paraphrase of “We can understand, too, that natural species are chosen not 
because they are ‘good to eat’ but because they are ‘good to think.’” Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 89.
84 s . d.  chrostowska
§ The Thinking Head
A guillotined caput remains conscious for a few seconds, as 
many as 25 or so. The head always thought itself better than 
the torso and limbs, from which it has now been severed. 
Bracketing for the moment the macabre image, what would 
you think in its place? Would you think yourself free at last, 
or I’m ahead, I have outlived the rest!, or I’m just a head that 
anyone can kick around?
§ Self-Inquisition
We would not let ourselves be burned to death for our opin-
ions: we are not sure enough of them for that. But perhaps 
for the right to possess our opinions and to change them.
—Friedrich Nietzsche  * 
Nietzsche was right: we should let ourselves be burnt either 
for not having opinions or for not changing them often 
enough. And we should ourselves set fire to those of our own 
opinions of which we are sure. This is the self-inquisition of 
the future.
* Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 391, vol. 2, pt. 2: The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, sec. 333 (“Dying for ‘Truth’”).
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§ Phases of Power
The past two centuries saw logical systems cede to specu-
lative structures. The idea that only a system could have a 
grasp of the power to rule and alter the world yielded to the 
idea that only structures could get the job done. Structure 
mirroring power was credited with the capacity to under-
mine it, forcing it to change and, with it, the world. At a time 
when large-scale logical systems were difficult to implement 
in reality, the system stood as the compass of complexity, 
the ne-plus-ultra mode of conceptualizing power (system-
atic theology, the system of nature) and of harnessing it to 
shape the world (the socialist and the liberal system). Once 
it became possible to implement, or at least to model, such 
systems, systematic thinking of power began to be seen as 
unduly restrictive. The stage was set for the concept of struc-
ture to address the power that systems had tried to contain 
but could not. The fluidity of structures was seen to reflect 
the dynamics of inchoate power, as yet external to existing 
systems. But structures, too, have had their day, and we have 
moved on to networks—still more fluid, open, contingent, 
self-consciously lacking ontological foundation. The relation 
between power and the idea we have of it is one of continual 
adjustment, tweaks, and balancing acts.
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§ One Leg in Paradise
Good ideas don’t grow on trees. Bad ones still do.
§ False Analogues
Argument is to assertion as certainty is to conviction. Except 
that conviction needs an argument, while certainty has no 
need of assertion.
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§ Unconvinced
“Believing” means, submitting to an authority. Having once 
submitted to it, you cannot then, without rebelling against it, 
first call it in question & then once again find it convincing. 
—Wittgenstein
a very popular error: having the courage of one’s convictions; 
rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on 
one’s convictions!!!
—Nietzsche
We have convictions only if we have studied nothing thoroughly.
—E. M. Cioran  *
When Nietzsche writes, “It is not the conflict of opinions 
that has made history so violent but conflict of belief in 
opinions, that is to say conflict of convictions,”  † he does all 
of those who hold on to their convictions without going to 
war an ill turn. Some of us feel that, at the end of the day, 
our convictions are all we have left, after arguments, opinions 
and points of view, interchangeable like educated guesses, 
fall away (if one gives credence to the skeptic, as one must). 
Convictions, however, remain with us because they fall 
under the jurisdiction not of reason, but of passion. And, 
pathos-driven, they are considered blind. Their sharers—fel-
low travellers on the scissor-gated lift of conviction, whether 
or not they share the same belief—are invariably after their 
own heart. One cannot step on and off, as with the pater-
noster of rational argument, whenever one decides to, risking 
being cut in two (winding up “of two minds,” in other words). 
* Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains, 
ed. Alois Pichler, Georg Henrik von Wright, in collaboration with Heikki 
Nyman, trans. Peter Winch, rev. ed. (1977; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 52; quoted 
in Walter Kaufman, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 354; E. M. Cioran, The Trouble with 
Being Born, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Arcade, 1998), 134.
† Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 199, vol. 1 , sec. 630.
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Violence is precisely the work of reason, with its just reasons. 
When they are not defended with conviction, reasons are (at 
least provisionally) held by their bearers to be unassailable, 
inviolable, while themselves violating our entire passional 
structure of thought. When, however, conviction comes to 
their aid, they hide; conviction rarely turns volatile, let alone 
explosive, without some fanatical reason behind it, which it 
protects and conceals, and for which it takes the blame. It is 
the fire to reason’s spark. 
Conviction in and of itself has no great ambition, being 
principally concerned with its own survival—as is clear in 
its Polish name, przekonanie (prze-, “through,” konanie, the 
agony of dying), and less so —which is perhaps at the root of 
Nietzsche’s condemnation of it—in the German Überzeugung, 
whose stem, Zeugung means “conception,” “procreation” (and 
whose prefix got its reputation from his followers). Etymolog-
ically the Polish word evokes lethal force, marking its agent 
as a “convict.” Yet it denotes a state or condition that results 
from convincing, whose violence—absent reason—is anyhow 
exaggerated. One might narrate it as follows. The bearer of 
conviction is one who has survived an act of belief and bears 
this new conviction (even when the legacy of brainwashing) 
not as a cross but as a treasure, having every right to defend 
it to the death. (So you see in this willingness to die for what 
almost killed one only a cycle of abuse? I assure you it’s all 
fully consensual!). This, then, is the thrust of “having the 
courage of one’s convictions”: maintaining one’s intellectual 
integrity and/or independence of thought, and not, as with 
absolute truths, striving to overthrow all others. The bless-
ings of intellectual passivity! “Opinions grow out of passions,” 
which are fiery-hot; it is by no means the “inertia of the spirit 
[that] lets them stiffen into convictions,” but its lauded cool-
ing effect.  * And when they stiffen, they do so in its defence.
But such formulations are anathema to those who vilify 
conviction on principle and in practice. They assume that 
conviction, with its “pathologically conditioned optics,” is 
* Ibid., p. 203, vol. 1, sec. 637.
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only “extreme fanaticism,” self- sacrificing adherence to pre-
cisely one or another absolute, “unqualified truth.”  * Nietzsche 
calls convictions converted “lies”—  converted but not elimi-
nated, a case of Lutheranism.  † They are clearly no denials of 
untruth. But neither are they truth- denials. Rather, they are 
dogmatic embraces of untruth as absolute truth, and for that 
reason “more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.”  ‡ They 
are motivating yet unexamined, imperative yet undiscussable, 
deeply held yet “general,” “public.”  § They have, for him, no 
range, but are uniformly negative, sick, suspect.
Conviction is also aligned by its basher-in-chief with per-
sonal gain, hunger for recognition, and power over others.  ¶ 
On the question of gain, Nietzsche does not see convictions as 
what they plainly are: one’s own beliefs, passional- intellectual 
property that, in their particular constellation and value, are 
non- fungible, mine alone. Such strong attachment and sense 
of ownership is absent from the domain of reasons. But it is 
conviction’s connection with, and cooption by, truth that I 
want to foreground . . .
“Conviction is the belief that on some particular point 
of knowledge one is in possession of the unqualified truth. 
This belief thus presupposes that unqualified truths exist; 
likewise that perfect methods of attaining to them have been 
discovered; finally, that everyone who possesses convic-
tions avails himself of these perfect methods.”  ** Nietzsche’s 
assertions and inferences still apply to fanatics everywhere, 
particularly to moral fanatics, whose devotion lends sublimity 
to their truth. Putting to one side facile syllogisms, fanat-
ics are not all “convicts,” which is to say men or women of 
* Friedrich Nietzsche, “Anti-Christ,” in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilights of 
the Idols and Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith 
Norman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 54, sec. 54; 
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 199, vol. 1, sec. 630.
† Nietzsche, “Anti-Christ,” p. 54, sec. 54.
‡ Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 179, vol. 1, sec. 483.
§ Ibid., p. 288, vol. 2, sec. 325.
¶ Ibid., p. 165, vol. 1, sec. 452.
** Ibid., p. 199, vol. 1, sec. 630.
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conviction, and not all “convicts” succumb through reason’s 
machinations to fanaticism. In point of fact, the person of 
conviction breaks from absolute truth and ventures out on 
a limb —where he or she is vulnerable, but where integrity 
bids them go. And such people, habituated not to offence 
but to defence and survival, are the best armour of fanatics. 
With conviction for a shield, absolute truth can be even more 
active and daring—in a word, fanatical—advancing and con-
quering new territory with the persistence particular to it. 
Nietzsche welcomes the instrumentalization of convic-
tions for the sake—not of truth, but of skepticism. Among 
the “unholy means” willed by the great skeptic, who remains 
above them, they are only acceptable as the willed means to a 
willed end: “there are many things that can be achieved only 
by means of a conviction. Great passion uses convictions 
and uses them up, it does not subordinate itself to them,—it 
knows its own sovereignty.”  * He recognizes that some credit 
must go to conviction (or what he labels as such) for what is 
dear to his heart.
If the individual had not been concerned with his “truth,” 
that is to say with his being in the right, there would have 
been no methods of inquiry at all; but with the claims of 
different individuals to unqualified truth everlastingly in 
conflict with one another, men went on step by step to dis-
cover incontestable principles by which these claims could be 
tested and the contest decided.  †
This is why Nietzsche encourages us to attack convictions—  
But attack on what grounds? Those of reason and justice, of 
course. The eternal violence of history has its positive side: 
without convictions there would be no scientific sobriety. 
Little by little, the war between competing absolute- truth- 
 claims has given shape to “scientific inquiry,” a series of 
“steps” meant to settle whose truth can in fact qualify as 
* Nietzsche, “Anti-Christ,” p. 54, sec. 54.
† Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 201, vol. 1, sec. 634.
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next- to- absolute, which is to say irrefutable. There is, it must 
be said, no better way towards consensus than a hard and 
fast set of rules to disqualify individual players—rules that 
cannot be argued with further, whose indisputability has 
about it a whiff of the open grave.
And yet, make no mistake: conviction is fundamentally 
discontinuous with scientific truth: “the man of convictions 
is not the man of scientific thought; he stands before us 
in the age of theoretical innocence and is a child, however 
grown up he may be in other respects.”  * It does not seek 
scientific self-proof; rather, it assumes, it arrogates for itself 
all kinds of truth, without qualification or distinction. This, 
by Nietzsche’s lights, is its cardinal turpitude. (Though there 
seems to have been some debate in his mind about whether 
childhood is not perhaps the best cultural state.)
“Nowadays, however, we no longer so easily concede to 
anyone that he is in possession of the truth: the rigorous 
procedures of inquiry have propagated distrust and caution, 
so that anyone who advocates opinions with violent word 
and deed is felt to be an enemy of our present-day culture, or 
at least as one retarded.”  † And typically as a fanatic, resident 
and “picturesque.”  ‡ “And the pathos of possessing truth does 
now in fact,” Nietzsche continues, “count for very little in 
comparison with that other, admittedly gentler and less 
noisy pathos of seeking truth that never wearies of learn-
ing and examining anew.”  § But does science itself—if not 
we—actually side with skepticism? Their contiguity is far 
from obvious. A clever maneuver on the part of scientific 
truthers: by playing both sides to stake a claim to moderation. 
“[T]he scientific spirit in men has to bring to maturity that 
virtue of cautious reserve.”  ¶ Bring forth . . .virtue . . .why of 
course: Zeugung (conception, procreation)! And Überzeugung! 
* Ibid., p. 199, vol. 1, sec. 630.
† Ibid., p. 201, vol. 1, sec. 633.
‡ Nietzsche, “Anti-Christ,” p. 54, sec. 54.
§ Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 201, vol. 1, sec. 633.
¶ Ibid., p. 200, vol. 1, sec. 631.
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It makes you appreciate really how fertile man’s scientific 
spirit is in its conviction.
In an age of skepticism, when despite science’s best efforts 
consensus is harder than ever to come by, conviction can 
finally return to grace. From alleged defender of abso-
lute truth and antithesis of provisional, scientific truth, it 
may turn coat to become friend of no truth at all. As Saint 
John Cassian reminded the faithful, “Excesses meet,” and 
extremes are known to flip into their opposites. And how do 
convictions fare in the culture at large? “[B]y far the greater 
part of all educated people even now still desire from a 
thinker convictions and nothing but convictions, and that 
only a small minority want certainty. . . . Insofar as genius of 
every kind maintains the fire of convictions and awakens 
distrust of the modesty and circumspection of science, it is 
an enemy of truth, no matter how much it may believe itself 
to be truth’s suitor.”  * (Well remarked, and even better said.) 
Convictions, opponents of both minoritarian judgment and 
of genius (counting that of justice), are still fashionable in the 
culture at large—and newly so —because they are taken to be 
opposed to lies (mistakenly, as Nietzsche says).  † Being anti-lie 
does not make them absolutely true. In a supposed age of 
skepticism, then, the coast is clear for convictions. And with 
predatory genius away, why shouldn’t they come out to play?
[T ]he beings who did not see things exactly had a head start 
over those who saw everything “in a flux.” As such, every 
great degree of caution in inferring, every sceptical dispo-
sition, is a great danger to life. No living being would be 
preserved had not the opposite disposition—to affirm rather 
than suspend judgement, to err and make things up rather 
than wait, to agree rather than deny, to pass judgement 
* Ibid., p. 202, vol. 1, sec. 635.
† Ibid., p. 202, vol. 1, sec. 636; Nietzsche, “Anti-Christ,” p. 55, sec. 54.
  matches:  a  light book 93
rather than be just—been bred to become extraordinarily 
strong.  *
How now? The cat-“genius” proves deadlier to itself—weaker, 
biologically weaker, than the mice? Second nature is like 
Marx’s camera obscura of ideology without the lie that is 
ideology. Just as the immoral and the immoralists have an 
edge on those who are not like them, so homo volens (murine) 
gets one over on homo rationalis (feline), and the will to play 
is continuous with the will to get away.
§ Humble Pie
As inspiring as it is, Plato’s image in the Timaeus of the 
human as an upside-down plant (“we are not an earthly but 
a heavenly plant up from earth towards our kindred in the 
heaven”  †) has us uprooted from our “proper” ground, which 
cultivates and appropriates us unawares. To claim that 
ideology is the reason we do not cultivate our own ground 
as is proper to us is, precisely, ideology. The truth of Plato’s 
image, even if untrue to Plato’s meaning, is this: we moderns 
are more than ever “rooted” in the sky of ideology instead 
of in the ground out of which we grow and which nourishes 
us. We thereby arrive at an accurate picture of our ground-
ing in and relationship to the world: up through ideology, 
then down to the dominion over nature—rather than down 
through some mythical humility, and only then humbly up 
towards the mystery of creation.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, with a Prelude in German Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian 
del Caro (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 112, sec. 111.
† Plato, Timaeus, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (University of Chicago: Perseus Project 
under PhiloLogic, 2009), http://perseus.uchicago.edu/, sec. 90a.
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§ Prison Yard
Rational thought is interpretation according to a scheme we 
cannot throw off.
—Nietzsche  *
The more elaborate a logical and philosophical system, the 
more demanding and “counterintuitive” its chains of infer-
ence, the more those bound by it touch the iron bars of that 
prison reserved only for the most rational of animals. With 
every attempt to stretch human cognition, we jangle our 
chains like prisoners circling a prison yard. When we impose 
on this wretched spectacle a logic, a meaningful pattern, our 
slightest movement receives the stamp of order, and the pro-
cession becomes a thing of beauty, escape from which would 
mean its unjustifiable destruction.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 283, sec. 522 
(1886–1887) (mod. trans.).
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§ A Sublime Mind
I’m the only one who knows what I might have been able to 
do. . . . For everyone else I’m pretty much a perhaps.
. . .
A hunter in a forest fires his gun, his prey falls, he comes 
to get it. His boot smashes into an anthill, two feet high, 
and destroy the ants’ home; ants are scattered far and 
wide, their eggs. . . .The best ant philosopher could never 
understand this huge black thing, immense, horrible—the 
hunter’s boot—which suddenly broke into their dwelling, 
with incredible speed, and just before that happened there 
had been a dreadful noise, together with a shower of reddish 
sparks. . . .
. . .
A mayfly born at nine in the morning, during the sum-
mer’s long days, and dying at five that evening: How could 
it comprehend the word night? Let it live another five hours, 
and it sees and understands what night is.
—Stendhal, The Red and the Black  *
At the end of Stendhal’s great novel, Julien Sorel seems to 
reach wisdom well beyond his years. It is the wisdom of 
his age. The most sublime moment of this often gallingly 
mediocre book is his superior frame of mind as he mocks 
“natural law” on the verge of death (“There are no rights, 
unless there’s a law forbidding you to do this or that, or else 
you’ll be punished. Before there’s a law, there’s nothing nat-
ural except a lion’s strength, or the needs of someone who’s 
hungry, who’s cold—who, in short, needs. . . . ”  †). We have here 
the sublimity of a mind created by another mind, erected, yet 
so like a mountain, its peak shrouded in mist, parting the 
clouds once thought celestial, and dissolving into nature (the 
mystery of death), surrendering itself to oblivion denied it by 
* Stendhal, The Red and the Black: A Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century, trans. 
Burton Raffel (1830; New York: Modern Library, 2004), 465, 478–79.
† Ibid., 476.
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the Christian faith with the skeptic’s “great perhaps” on its 
lips. This intelligence ascends so high by virtue of suffering 
and enmity. It awes and impresses us because we are given 
only glimpses of its awakening to the ultimate reality of the 
will to survival (and the prohibitive nature of man-made 
laws). But from such comprehending height, survival, while 
not impossible, becomes secondary to the enjoyment of life 
comprehended as the struggle to reach this vantage point, 
whereupon its goal is fulfilled. Yet most men are content 
to shorten life before knowing it, or to live it as something 
unknowable.
*
How sad and infinitely pitiable is man reduced—in his 
pursuit of relief, refuge, or divine mercy that ends in chagrin, 
anguish, or forsakenness—to a child, without hope or even 
the memory of hope, not knowing where to turn for help, 
having faith or trust in neither friends nor strangers, in 
despair of ever being understood and unsure of ever having 
understood or communicated, whose will has wilted and 
frozen to the ground, whose good sense has left him, and 
who in his involuntary confusion loses all motivation to 
survive, and would rather starve than rise again. Was there 
ever a man who could snap out of his fear and terror once 
they overwhelmed him, rendering futile any attempt to resist 
them, so that resignation seemed the only sanity left, and the 
only possible way to live in the world was to lie down and die 
in it?
*
Not to have recognition just long enough to have settled into 
doing great things without much care for others’ regard: this 
is the surest way of being saved from the early vanity that 
leads one to dismiss new prospects with a “been there, done 
that,” to turn away from our potential by seeing the world 
schematically and individual experiences as types.
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*
It happens that a single mind “owns” the world, and feels it 
has outgrown it. Though it can only matter to the culture 
of this earth, it can conceive of others, and longs to conquer 
and convert the cosmic expanse into a plot for cultivation. 
Such is human insatiability that the simple vanity of school-
children can come to crown the universe, usurp all divinity. 
And if it can convince itself of this greatness, there is no 
stopping it.
§ Threaded
My desires seem incompatible, yet, he reasons, I myself 
still cohere. Reconciling incompatible desires before things 
fall apart is the task of the philosopher, who (in the limbo 
between projects) recognizes their incompatibility. Therein 
lies perhaps his greatest philosophical project: to pass all of 
them through the eye of the needle that is one’s life.
§ Vita contemplativa
A The life of the mind is nearly extinct.
B Leave it to brains-in-vats! Leave it to the machines . . .
A You think they’ll revive it?
B But of course! We’ll transmit to them what we admire but 
have no more time for.
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§ Beheading Games
In the intellectual contests of the academic world, which 
only seem to have gotten more intense, the one who leaves 
with his head under his arm one year will be welcomed back 
the next, barely a scratch on his reputation, this time as the 
more sympathetic figure.
§ Scattered
Think without scattering your thoughts. Nothing grows 
from them, no matter how thick on the ground, unless some-
one comes along willing to cultivate them.
§ Hoping for Queequeg?
Do not tell untruths; living with them is like sharing your 
bed with strangers.
  matches:  a  light book 99
§ Crime Is a Failure of Society
Calculative reason will lead to calculated crime if no moral 
education is added where the ability to think is in the red. 
Knowing one’s doing and intending, and knowing how to 
think, are necessary for punishment. Failure to think only 
exonerates where thinking cannot be taught.
§ The Problem
Typically, what to the outsider seems an insoluble knot 
appears to him who has followed the thread wherever it may 
lead as a clear line. Neither has the upper hand, the former 
because he is still confounded, the latter because he does not 
yet see the problem. This is one of the reasons why knowl-
edge advances so slowly, if at all.
§ How Playful!
Playing as thinking makes for a very small playground.
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§ Bodenlos
With enough recklessness or persistence, it is possible to 
think oneself into ultimate meaninglessness. Philosophy is 
a stone that falls into the abyss until it finds a ledge. Most 
of us only look down to see where it had landed; few go 
after it and rarely do they rest beside it on their crash course. 
Without philosophy, a tenacious mind, once it has begun to 
question, will continue falling, battered and bruised, tum-
bling along the way, until it no longer makes sense even to 
itself, and finally becomes unrecognizable.
§ The Ineffable
“It” is imponderable, unthinkable, unspeakable, inarticulable, 
because it circles like a moth around the enmeshed clarity of 
sense, and makes sense only upon contact, which—unless 
brief—is deadly to it. Should it then, for its own sake, be kept 
from making such contact? Should we refrain from finding 
the hole that our mind, eager for rest (even a final resting 
place), tears open in the protective mesh?
Sometimes we are not creative enough. But could this 
be a good thing? The experience of ineffability depends on 
patching up the scrim protecting “it” from attaining lan-
guage—language that, as the matrix of intellectual creation, 
weakens and breaks and finally cremates “it” to keep alive 
our thought.
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§ Perish the Thought
Otto Neurath’s pronouncement, “One must indeed be 
silent—but not about anything,” alludes to —by invert-
ing—the call to pass over in silence that about which we 
cannot speak, with which Wittgenstein concludes his Trac-
tatus.  * According to Neurath, a logical positivist, everything 
we can think about can be spoken about; nothing of this 
kind is unsayable. If, as he believed, all thought is proposi-
tional, then the objects of thought (if they are to achieve that 
distinction) emerge only in language. True silence, internal 
stillness—rather than one teeming with thought—is never 
about anything. For instance, the silence “about” “God”. . .
Wittgenstein disagreed: one could be silent about some-
thing without inward verbalization. Thinking happens not 
just in words, but also in images, which do not speak. True 
internal-external silence indexes the unspeakable, trac-
ing the boundary of a mystic ocean over which stretch the 
islands of a populous discursive archipelago. About the truly 
unsayable we cannot but remain silent, passing over it like 
migrating birds, which have seen but cannot tell of what they 
have overflown.
* Quoted in A. J. Ayer, Wittgenstein (Harmondsworth: Basic, 1986), 32.
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§ Thinking in Tongues
Some say French has the great virtue of ordering words in 
the same way they naturally occur in thought. But hasn’t the 
German language, with its odd verb placement (last in any 
subordinate clause), the great advantage of compelling the 
mind to review and perhaps clarify itself? What the one con-
tributes in fluid expression, the other lends in belated preci-
sion. The lucky few who can boast fluency in both would add, 
naturally off the record, that those who speak neither might 
as well be thinking—if at all— only in tongues.
§ Sancta simplicitas
It seems that advances in linguistic expression, in both pre-
cision and style, are meant to lift us to a plateau from which 
we would at long last be able to speak plainly and be univer-
sally understood. The myriad languages and their aesthetic 
or practical elaboration (stream of consciousness, formal 
logic, legal argot, etc.) have at last been channelled into one 
stream of thought about human experience and through 
a “treatment system” to yield only the purest and clearest, 
watered-down kind of thinking. The comparatively difficult 
forms of clarified communication, it turns out, were merely 
its muddy tributaries.
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§ Encyclops
The universe . . . would only be one fact and one great truth for 
whoever knew how to embrace it from a single point of view.
—Jean le Rond d’Alembert, co-editor and -author  
of the Encyclopédie  *
Lest we forget, stereoscopic sight reminds us that a single 
human point of view was not in the evolutionary cards, no 
matter how adaptively advantageous it might seem in the 
abstract—all of us seeing eye to noumenal eye on Truth. In 
truth, we cannot even see eye to eye with ourselves, so that 
the Cyclopean image of reality, the monocular unity of per-
spective that is nature’s gift to some animals, is not universal.
The one-eyed giant Polyphemus is blinded by a hero of 
Antiquity (whom some also rightly regard as the bearer of 
Enlightenment). The great monotheisms came up with a 
Cyclops God, His gaze compromised neither by positional 
particularity nor by fondness for drink. And the moderns 
gave the world the encyclopedia, now Wikipedia, as a tree 
from which to have partial, provisionally unified, shifting, 
views. Those who managed to possess an “encyclopedic” 
knowledge are rewarded, but harbour no illusions about 
occupying its many branches at once. Nothing makes clearer 
truth’s preference for company and discussion—rather than 
solitude of vision, however desirable in the abstract—than 
the tableware edition of the Encyclopédie, ca. 1800, on display 
today in a museum. As the food was consumed, the true 
image of a coal factory gracing the dessert plates could be 
apprised and commented upon by everyone.
* Jean le Rond d’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Did-
erot,” in Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné, trans. Richard N. Schwab.
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§ Outline of a Shadow
The popularity of silhouettes and shadow theatre should be 
sought in the suggestion of substance, which memory and 
imagination relish to fill in. This no doubt is a considerable 
part of the attraction of abstract concepts; to attribute it 
only to their communicative utility would be as mistaken as 
explaining the appeal of shadow puppets by their low cost of 
production. The enchantment of conceptual abstraction can 
be profound and elaborate—like that of the human shadow 
play in Dreyer’s silent Vampyr. As long, that is, as you never 
try to touch or sink your teeth into such concepts in hopes of 
getting fed.
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§ Chicken Fence
While thought has forgotten how to think itself, it has at 
the same time become its own watchdog. Thinking no 
longer means anything more than checking at each moment 
whether one can indeed think.
—Adorno  *
Thought’s having forgotten how to think itself is the least 
of our troubles with thinking. After all, we still recall what 
laying eggs in our mental coop was like. Nature still works 
and will remember itself.
Can the same be said of nurture? The fence we have put up 
around thinking to protect it from predators reminds us that, 
headless or not, we can still think. But with the grass and 
roots gone, thinking is now just so much scratching around 
in the dirt.
§ Tripwire
The distance from a statement ringing true to being true is 
very small, and bisected by a tripwire.
* Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott (1951; New York: Verso, 2005), p. 197, sec. 126 (“I. Q.”).
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§ Seeing the Light
All agree: the way to knowledge is dark, unclear, and no 
amount of “light at the end of the tunnel” will change that. 
That light, so often mistaken for knowledge, is why clarity is 
so sought after.
§ Seek and Hide 
“Ask, and it will be given to you; seek, and you will find; 
knock, and it will be opened to you. For everyone who asks 
receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it 
will be opened.”
—Matthew 7:7
Ask, seek, knock. The first stands for the school, the second 
for solitary study, the third for gnosis. If the search is by us 
alone, and its objects are not to be gotten in either the school 
or the hermetic corpus, then we must ask: where does the 
authority of what the seeker seeks and finds come from? It 
comes from the seeker, in the same way the arachnoid web 
whose centre the spider will soon command comes from its 
own body. The longer the thing we are after eludes us, the 
more substantial and robust its authority, once found, will 
become.
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§ Merveille du jour
Modern philosophers proclaimed the untimeliness of their 
task. Knowing things only in the dying light, observing 
unfashionably, philosophy settled on a grisaille palette to 
paint its grey in grey, and adopted a soaring perspective 
above the day’s influences. It turned its necessary late- 
 coming and monochromia into epistemic insight and night 
vision (for approaching night). With its youth— which, as 
Hegel had it, did not rejuvenate but aged or overcame the 
timeworn— it avenged itself on the “old reality” that it failed 
to comprehend live.
And still it moves beneath the ragged cloak of twilight, 
which it throws over its still-bright prey. Isn’t it time, 
Philosophy, for a hint of colour?—for contrast if the times 
seem drab, and otherwise for camouflage. A subtle cast of 
purple or green would become your grey, as it does the owlet 
moth that flies by night but by day mesmerizes with the 
beauty of its shading.
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§ Whose Time Has Not yet Come
There are times when one’s own untimeliness is acutely felt. 
One has come too early, or been born too late, and nonethe-
less one’s own place in time remains unclear. How far ahead 
of or how close behind the times is one? Will the times catch 
up (in one’s lifetime) or will one catch up to the times? Few 
if any have what it takes to lead a one-man vanguard to 
conquer the future; one is likelier to fall back. And is there 
time left to catch up to one’s “contemporaries”? Unfashion-
ableness beckons to those who like company, even if there is 
nothing in the familiar faces of bygones and classics to prove 
one their contemporaries; the past is an old-age home where 
one mixes with those of different ages. But for those who 
believe that being behind now may put them ahead later, a 
third, spiritual relation to time is in order. Their time falls 
not along time’s continuum, but rises above it in the shape 
of an arc: from the past to the future, a rainbow over the 
meadows of the present. They are neither retiring nor active, 
neither “history” nor “to come,” sharing neither the decrep-
itude of the first nor the burden of the second. They reside 
above, and fade as soon as they condescend to empathy with 
the has-beens, or to taking up arms with self-styled men of 
tomorrow.
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§ On Time
A Where are those whose time has not yet come?
B And where are you? What’s your excuse?
§ Punctum
They are pawning timeliness to afford punctuality.
§ The Time Is Now
A Nowness is the new timeliness.
B And the old timeliness?
§ Time Out
The symbolic power of timekeeping tickers is such that when 
one stops in silence and is heard, it is as though time itself 
has stopped, perhaps never to resume. That mental tension 
building the senses of past, present, and future soon disap-
pears, and one by one time’s tenses fall away. Any motion 
still visible, the lone fly on the rim of a glass, the vibration 
from a passing train, only discloses that stupid persistence 
and tardiness of the world of appearances before apocalypse 
or eternity.
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§ House Arrest
You claim to have good reason for placing certain think-
ing heads under house arrest. Their circulation might 
corrupt, especially when they tap into that very modern 
disillusionment.
Couldn’t a pedagogical question serve just as well to 
inoculate your pupils against them—as well or better than 
banning them? But that is not the question I have in mind 
to put to you. The question I meant, and which could be 
put in different words, is this: Would I like to live where X 
thinker is coming from? An honest no in reply will put off 
even those likeliest to be “corrupted.”
Before you dismiss a philosophy because its philosopher 
showed himself a scoundrel, or fell in with moral beasts, 
consider this. Were not certain cultural microclimes such that 
they spoiled the coolest thinking heads, who previously had 
no moral blemish? Consistency asks that you also discard 
the cultural history that bore them, the bathwater in which 
they had bathed. Or would you have us throw out the 
baby and study only this dirty water? Consider this as well: 
that the farther back a philosophy lies the more excusable 
its faults become—just think of the chasm of time that 
separates us from Aquinas, Aristotle (and we are still only 
on the As). But why should not a smaller gap in time matter 
as much? Should we not think of them as similarly far 
removed?
You say it is because these later times were closer to 
where we are now, and mentalities more congenial, but the 
philosophy/philosopher in question was not. Its faults are 
therefore inexcusable. Quite apart from that, most students 
are great at telescoping history, and terrible on its relative 
depth.
Then they should be “safe,” your students. They are 
unlikely to excuse in past thinkers what strikes them as 
wrong today. While perception of relative depth relativ-
izes, often dangerously. Be that as it may, you can only be 
responsible for those young minds who have not yet been 
“corrupted.”
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(I know which cool head we principally have in mind. 
The first initial he shared with Luther—and in that crucial 
respect they differed not all that much. His second was the 
letter following Galileo’s. And, if you like rebuses in German, 
a pagan and a moor might harrow his surname like a field.)
§ Of “Saints” and “Miracles” of Reason
No matter how pure a philosophy, it is no proof that the 
philosopher was himself a saint. Shouldn’t the benefit of the 
doubt go both ways (to him and to us), and be a cost in one of 
them?
If we judge the philosopher pure by the purity of their 
thought, we benefit not only the thought but the philoso-
pher as well. Whether or not they are upright, their thought 
makes them look better. We also benefit ourselves, since 
intellectually we have grown.
If we suspect the philosopher by the purity of their 
thought (suspicious purity!), based on scant or ambiguous 
evidence, what might be a benefit to us will to them clearly 
be a loss. But what is of benefit to us might also be an intel-
lectual loss.
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§ Furnished Rooms
Perhaps Nietzsche had it all figured out when he kept renting 
his chambres garnies, “dingy” rooms “filled with dreary, old, 
worn-out furniture, with a table at which he worked, with 
a bed upon which he suffered”—as Stefan Zweig imagined 
them in his hagiography.  * And it was: to think and write as 
well as he could before nature called, before the real hunger 
struck and he was forced to go down to satisfy it. The trick is 
to be close enough to others that their company can always 
be had if needed and one’s needs nearly always fulfilled; 
close enough, too, to sense that others are distractions, their 
benefit to one’s work negligible; and yet, just far enough away 
not to be disturbed by their curiosity and routine, which they 
use one to alleviate. 
A delicate balance, then, between dependency and auton-
omy, strangeness and sociality. A room of one’s own, in which 
the soul can fly uncaged; yet a room of theirs—and this is 
crucial—in which the soul is perched, ready to take flight at 
any moment.
* Stefan Zweig, The Struggle with the Daemon: Hölderlin, Kleist, and Nietzsche, trans. 
Eden and Cedar Paul (London: Pushkin, 2012), 451.
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§ Introspection
noun
1. thinking in a room of one’s own making
2. taking a naïve look at oneself
3. intimate, unpublishable self-interview
4. looking inward, blind to the outside: When his eyes closed 
for business, they opened for introspection.
5. close thinking: A deep definition of introspection requires 
some of it.
6. thinking in a room of one’s own unmaking
§ Sick
The will to physical comfort is being subsumed under the 
will to thought, the will to will (ever thwarted by illness and 
disorder). Eradication of disease proceeds apace with rein-
forcement of the cage of rationality. Who claims not to know 
the bliss of illness, the suspension of thought, is not entirely 
honest. It is not “masochism” that speaks through the 
strange pleasure of leeches or cupping therapy, the tingling 
of tiger balm, the magic of the nasal douche, the prick of a 
needle, the ecstasy of sedation, and the soft arms of mor-
phine. Where is it written that we should worship reason to 
the end of time? Where is it not written? But that is precisely 
my point!
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§ Family Business
As the Christian era waned, we worshipped many lesser gods 
and idols, whom we called geniuses. Now we only do business 
with their children. 
To put it another way: the new, creative working class was 
born by the reproductive success of the old, transcendent 
creators. Success breeds success, but of a different kind.
§ Central Tenet of Modern Philosophy
“If I say it, it must be meaningful.”
§ Terms of Engagement
A TED talks make ideas cool, grad school makes them sexy, 
art makes them kinky. 
B And philosophy? 
A It disciplines them. 
B You mean to say philosophy is boring? 
A No, only bored—bored to death.
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§ Notions
1. Unsorted thoughts buttoned up to the very top to hide 
the fact that they are impostors, straw men, or worse. 
2. Easy prey, liable to be torn apart by the watchdogs of 
sound ideas, in a show of vigilance to justify their job. 
(These last would do us all a service if they went after 
clear and distinct ideas instead.)
§ Babbling Brook
To fail is to succeed in failing.
To climb up is to tempt a longer fall.
To sing is to discipline speech. 
To fly is to mimic angels.
To punish someone is to reward oneself.
To trickle in the distance is to gush up close.
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§ Not Taken Lightly
All things considered, there have been more affirmations than 
negations . . . Beliefs will always weigh more in the scales.
Over the centuries, man has slaved to believe
Every no rises out of the blood.
Arguments come afterward
—Cioran  *
Assuming here that all this is true, what better evidence 
that we are more discerning when we negate? Surely no one 
today would draw the more obvious conclusion: that there 
are more reasons to believe or more things to affirm than to 
disbelieve or disaffirm. No, that won’t do. Refusal is often 
dangerous in going against the ruling consensus, it is cour-
age to belief ’s cowardice; it is safer and therefore easier to say 
yes. You don’t need much brains to say yes or no, but it takes 
nerve even to jangle your chains—sometimes conscious nerve. 
Negators expect to be held to account for their nos rather 
than patted and fed for their yeses. What’s more, negation is 
not always the result of whim or contrarian adolescence; not 
infrequently, it comes after thinking things over, thinking 
them twice (considering the risks of opposition). And expect-
ing to be made to defend itself, it arms itself with arguments 
so as not to appear irresponsible. Either way you look at it, 
obviously a form of cognitive refinement.
* Cioran, Trouble with Being Born, 95, 105, 30.
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§ Freethinking
Thinking that does not feel its shackles has yet to become 
free.
§ Casual Philosopher
You cannot judge the quality of a thinker by the quality 
of their casual observations, just as you would not judge a 
singer by everyday pronunciation, intonation, and tone of 
voice. Not only can you not accurately judge them by such 
means, you are unlikely even to recognize them.
Why should my initial statement come as a surprise? Is 
it because of the misconception that philosophers, unlike 
musicians, work with language, a common tool used by 
everyone, and do not need any special instrument or training 
to perform their task? They are assumed, like the rest of us, 
to think in advance and independently of writing, but, unlike 
the rest of us, to do so in the background all the time. In 
reality, however, and having merely tuned their mind before-
hand, they might not even begin thinking until their writing 
implements are in front of them.
Everyone would agree that philosophy is serious work 
requiring concentration, and therefore that philosophers 
cannot exactly do philosophy while socializing. At best, they 
can “philosophize” to deepen light conversation. In this they 
have no special advantage; social philosophizing is in princi-
ple open to anyone, and the best are too good at it to become 
“real” philosophers. When philosophers “philosophize,” their 
full participation in a social dynamic makes them prac-
tically unrecognizable as philosophers. For these reasons, 
they rather lean away from “philosophizing” and towards 
humour. They deploy wit to relieve their social awkwardness 
and lighten casual talk from which they can find no way of 
withdrawing.
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§ Sides
Each side has two again, one of which it shares with the other.
§ Short Spam
Our attention spammed, our attention span is beyond repair. 
But we still have control over what holds our attention. Just 
not for long.
§ Caecigenus 
In the kingdom of the blinded where the one-eyed man is 
king, philosophers are born blind. For these congenitally 
sightless, having one eye would be a handicap, and what we 
take for sightedness, a distraction.
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§ Pursuit of Ignorance
Nothing so shows a man to be ignorant as the pursuit of 
absolute truth.
§ Amor vincit?
Truth loves philosophers—who merely accept her proposi-
tions. Or should it be: philosophers love truth—that always 
plays hard to get?
§ No Drinking at the Source
The thirst for truth reduces it to a drop.
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§ Critique as a Virtue
There is something in critique which is akin to virtue.
—Michel Foucault  *
Critique does not limit itself to fault-finding; it also aims 
to bring biases into the open. It frequently casts itself as 
a sort of moral imperative that stops short of dogma and 
doctrine without entirely giving up authoritative judgment. 
As such, it is compatible with value pluralism. Embracing 
value pluralism, however, pulls the rug out from under the 
critical effect, if not the critical attitude. Critique’s basis 
is the solidly reasoned moral foundation that has always 
found expression in it. (Some critics of critique pretending 
to look from the outside—and we can safely assume there 
is more where that came from, given the attention one 
of them has attracted—see as a blind spot what has long 
been obvious to its practitioners, no strangers to immanent 
reasoning. Not only that: those who thus dump on critique 
exaggerate—granted, based on some extreme “examples” 
that beggar the very meaning of “critical”— claiming that it 
relies on a rear-world of the beyond, that is, on a transcen-
dence that is no less transcendent for being fully secular. 
With critique, you may debunk, reveal, unveil, but only 
as long as you establish, through this process of creative 
destruction, a privileged access to the world of reality 
behind the veils of appearances. Critique, in other words, 
has all the limits of utopia: it relies on the certainty of 
the world beyond this world. . . . Critique was meaning-
ful only as long as it was accompanied by the sturdy yet 
juvenile belief in a real world beyond. Once deprived of this 
naïve belief in transcendence, critique is no longer able to 
produce this difference of potential that had literally given 
* Michel Foucault, “What Is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère 
Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter (New York: Semiotext[e], 
1997), 43.
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it steam. As if the hammer had ricocheted off the wall and 
smashed the debunkers.  *
On the one hand, then, critique vainly seeks a fulcrum, while 
on the other it creates a covert court of final appeal.)
The core liberal values—liberty, equality, justice, rule of 
law, democracy—any of which may have once served as a 
moral-political foundation, are at once too uncontroversial, 
institutionally enshrined, and overused to carry the force we 
associate with effective critique. So it is not simply, as some 
would have it, that critique “ran out of steam.”  † (That image, 
by the way, would have to factor in, as the answer to a great 
mystery, a lazy stoker in the engine room. The metaphor fur-
ther suggests that critique’s grinding to a halt or gathering 
force depends on who services it. However, I take what I take 
from the point: it is not critique’s job to be constructive or 
forward-looking, only forward-moving. But it is not a mechan-
ical iron horse, however symbolically powerful that image 
may be, not to mention how dated. And it never took aboard 
travellers who did not contribute to its motion but who paid 
their way while the actual critics, one imagines, moved up 
and down as ticket collectors.)
Embracing value pluralism in the name of—what laudable 
cause? Resistance to the line-toeing, goose-stepping proce-
duralism that brooks no disagreement, in all manner of pol-
icy but also, above all, in critique itself. Unless the values on 
which critique first found its footing are renewed or reloaded, 
it will not find the balance between opposing dogmatism 
and fighting for inclusivity in informed opinion, so needed 
to launch its claims. In these circumstances, we can look 
forward to more “ongoing public deliberation.”
But, to be fair, let’s give a hearing to Latour’s alternative 
to critique: compositionism. He means by this not a “critique 
* Bruno Latour, “An Attempt at a ‘Compositionist Manifesto,’” New Literary History 
41, no. 3 (2010): 475.
† To reduce, as Latour et al. do, the goal of critique to “the discovery of a true world 
of realities lying behind a veil of appearances,” and thus make it ridiculous and 
an a priori failure, is itself laughable. Ibid., 474–75.
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of critique but a reuse of critique; not an even more criti-
cal critique but rather critique acquired secondhand—so 
to speak—and put to a different use.”  * Undaunted by the 
risk of value-bankruptcy, he has made a decision not to 
put any more capital into critique’s old bonds, but to put 
his assets into new stocks. He thus formulates his own 
critique-reprocessing plan, invests his critical energy in that, 
and invites us to follow suit. With Latour, we can take a turn 
around the old rail-yard where “critique” has come to rest 
(this is simply where things, relations, and customs not mod-
ern enough end up). For his plan to work, a team will need to 
dismantle it and extract the reusable parts.
Latour does not just want us to accept critique’s expiry 
and participate in its recomposition; he wants us to unsen-
timentally send it on its way. His compositionist alternative 
is offered as a manifesto, vague on whether it represents 
the author’s personal vision or an argument based on a 
broad-based consensus. Its rhetoric of responsible invest-
ing—an upcycling program, no less—has clever and naïve 
written all over it.
Retiring critique? Really? So soon? We have only just 
gotten the hang of it and you already want to take it out of 
service?
* Ibid., 474.
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§ After Critique
Attachments to the past are on the wane, even if it is in the 
service of “critical history.” This transformation of our emo-
tional landscape brings with it significant remodelling of the 
intellectual one. The most obvious casualty of these changes 
is the critical attitude glorified in the practice of critique.
To say that the thought of tomorrow may be uncritical is 
to sound the death knell for the present disciplinary con-
vergence. The intensified exchange among scientific and 
humanistic domains marks, by all appearances, an age of 
unprecedented critical animation. As these interdisciplin-
ary alliances and epistemic crossovers become the norm, 
plasticity will replace the earlier tonicity of knowledges. 
Previously denied them, this radical fluidity of standards 
will lead to effective mergers, enshrined in an ever more 
responsive production of discourse and epistemic unification. 
It is thanks to such developments that critical thought will 
continue not only to lose its ethical and political incisive-
ness—the dulling of its teeth is already in evidence—but 
also to forfeit its specificity. When this process is concluded, 
the age of critique— criticism to which, in the famous words 
of Immanuel Kant, everything must submit—will have come 
to a close.
The fact that critical thinking is taught today as a “trans-
ferable skill” indicates that it is in trouble. Critique, as we 
know, is public and context-specific, and requires training in 
the area in which it finds its targets. A professional criticality 
will of course survive for a time in the mental processes of 
researchers overseeing the construction of a unified epis-
temic apparatus; it will live on formalized in its operations; 
it will be fossilized and folded into the history of knowledge, 
inside a mountain of consolidated data systematized across 
the board and increasingly proof against human interference. 
The administration of people will be integrated into, and the 
economy and government defined as, functions of this vast, 
networked apparatus. In the process, public decision-making 
will by degrees be reduced to a minimum and at length 
eliminated, rendered superfluous by enhanced simulations 
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of rational decision-making commanding unheard-of vol-
umes of information. As “responsibility” is shifted over to 
machines, criticism will go the way of fallibility; critique’s 
social-ethical responsibility, no less than its “primordial 
responsibility: to know knowledge,” will no longer be con-
ceivable.  * The triggers for the exercise of critical reason will 
cease to exist.
Continuing a while longer in this speculative vein, what 
to us might seem an age of universalized Cimmerianism 
will not be without a sense of historicity, only of nostal-
gia. Why should the end of nostalgia entail the death of 
critique? A compelling way (of Marxian vintage) to under-
stand modernity is through its inner contradictions, its 
so-called paradoxes. One of them is the pursuit of the new 
combined with the intense fetishization of the old. A keen 
interest in the past goes hand in hand with watching its 
living remnants slip into oblivion. This watching-happen is 
also a letting-happen, even a making-happen. Our sense of 
responsibility runs very deep, impelling the herculean labour 
of preservation. The inevitability of this loss increases the 
melancholy of the past and the fear of ephemerality, but also 
volunteership in its retrieval. The sense of loss follows real 
loss, and sprouts up around it, reclaiming what is left with 
ivy tendrils. The past’s widespread passing appears as inev-
itable as death, in part because (as widespread as it is) this 
sense of loss can never come in time to save the past from 
destruction— confirming that you don’t know what you’ve got 
till it’s gone. Not enough is being done to counter the frantic 
speed of obsolescence, which by now far exceeds the work of 
mourning—work traditionally defined by time and care. The 
restoration-preservation of the past in museums, archives 
and databases is an extended funerary rite, but it cannot 
embalm everything with the same attention to detail, leaving 
much of the past in outline— alluring profile. In short, there 
are more dead than ever engaged in burying the dead. But 
their work is slow, and the living, with time on their side, 
* Foucault, “What Is Critique?” 50.
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never stop killing—with the past “buried,” their utopian 
“castles in the air” seem to acquire more solid foundations.
One upshot of these energetic efforts to hold on to the past 
in some form—preferably comprehensively, in all its diver-
sity—is the loss of cultural discernment, a discernment once 
assured by the chronic underestimation of the complexity, 
interconnectedness and historicity of objects, cultures, and 
nature. The default nowadays is that everything ought to be 
preserved, as losslessly as possible. Frozen in time, like Pom-
peii—still the symbol of a total historical record, from which 
the past, according to modern mythology, could one day 
be reverse-engineered. What should be preserved and what 
not is no longer a welcome question but a frustrating and 
“ideological” one. At the same time, confronted with practical 
hurdles and hard budgetary choices, we resign ourselves to 
our inability to capture the past for posterity. On another 
level, the onward march of history has all but universalized 
the sense of the past as, in a fundamental sense, lost for-
ever, never fully recoverable—unless only superficially, or by 
means of artifice, in simulated environments or laboratories. 
The melancholy of futility is thus inseparable from the work 
of the most avid advocates of bottling the past.
What is lost through the past’s progressive disappearance 
in daily life (in lived environments featuring the continually 
revolutionized media of the past’s transmission), what is lost 
also through the commodification of what remains of that 
past (indeed through the marketization of the very preserva-
tion efforts themselves), is a deeply felt emotional connection 
and continuity. This “warm” feeling towards the past is not 
to be confused with the past’s perceived sharpness, currently 
in the process of replacing that feeling with total digital 
recall—a perfectly reasonable trade-off for the advocates of 
factual knowledge over experience. The filling in of this deep 
emotional channel cuts critique off from one of its main 
sources of criteria. And without criteria critique has no right 
to be.
It was in modernity, with the rise of industrial, “producer” 
capitalism, that nostalgia, romancing the vanished and 
vanishing past, became a potent source of critical cultural 
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standards— or, put positively, of models for emulation. Emu-
lation of the past replaced imitation, which, thanks to con-
cepts like Progress and History, was increasingly understood 
as not just undesirable but impossible. Though this shift is 
quite plain in major cultural movements like neoclassicism, 
the nostalgic mood modelled itself on the pathology of 
individuals who felt cut off from their homeland and longed 
for it as though it were forever unreachable, already in the 
historical past (rather than merely in their personal history). 
Returning them home frequently did the trick—something 
unavailable to cultural nostalgists from the beginning of the 
eighteenth century onwards, particularly as they became 
more discerning and resigned to being “modern.”
If it were thought possible to resurrect the past, to bring 
back its institutions or ideals, to restore authentic nature 
glimpsed in ancient and medieval ruins—as opposed to ugly, 
unclean, modern nature—it is safe to say that nostalgia 
would not have been felt so acutely. The matter would have 
been easily settled. The past could now be longed for —be it 
uncritically, indiscriminately, as a whole, or critically, dis-
cerningly, in its (best) parts. The nascent critical perspective 
on the past, a time now seen as irretrievable, also made its 
return or reproduction (were this even possible) more unde-
sirable than before. Instead, what increasingly excited the 
modern imagination was a punctuated return to that past 
(through the window of literary or visual representation, or, 
later, through its recreation in themed environments), with-
out the risk of contaminating the present. The twin princi-
ples holding critical modernity together were the irreversibil-
ity of time and the reversibility of progress. But it was above 
all as an “attitude” that modernity acquired its distinctive-
ness. It was a “voluntary choice made by certain people; in 
the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting 
and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation 
of belonging and presents itself as a task.”  * This task, as we 
* Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?” The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rab-
inow, trans. Catherine Porter (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 39.
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know, was critical, and was a critical task. It defined the age 
as one in which “the universal, the free, and the public uses 
of reason are superimposed on one another” (37). Modern cri-
tique, then, was part and parcel of the modern attitude, of its 
affective-reflective conjuncture. It was a projection into the 
future of a desire for the best of the past. In the most general 
terms, it articulated a concern about the specificity of the 
present, its contribution to human progress relative to the 
past, and its prospects for improvement, including defences 
against barbarism.
Nostalgia thus evolved from a pathologized measure of 
longing and response to the passage of time, through malaise 
of dissatisfaction with the present and the direction that 
present was taking, to eventually providing the basis for a 
productive and (on one side at least) critical cultural stance. 
But this critical function of the nostalgic disposition was not 
guaranteed to last. As nostalgia became commodified with 
the shift to consumer capitalism, its critical power began to 
wane and it was itself consigned to the past. As a commod-
ity, nostalgia worked to undermine the past’s irretrievability 
through symbolic recoveries and simulated restorations, 
undoing at a stroke both the past’s otherness and its reflec-
tive and emotional appeal. Slowly but surely, such uncritical 
nostalgia undoes the affinity between nostalgia and critique; 
even if it should one day focus on critique, it would not 
bring back what we are in the process of losing, though it is 
entirely possible that it may one day make critique fashion-
able in a way it never was. Would this critical “revival” be 
better than no critique ever at all? Would a critique of such 
nostalgia, while there is still time, prolong the life of critical 
thought beyond the present day? 
If it is in fact true that the critical tradition is intimately 
bound up with the practice of truth-telling, so that the “age 
of critique” was the heyday of truth, could we not be heading, 
in moving beyond critique, to where we might actually prefer 
to be? If the Cartesian paradigm of truth-telling, where truth 
requires nothing less than certainty, is destined to go the way 
of critique, we might do even better by hastening its progress.
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§ Anchors and Switches
One positive role of nostalgia, so often presumed to be 
reactionary, is to retrieve past values while transforming 
their function and application. This rather selective use of 
collective feeling has taken root in a civilization that rightly 
or wrongly regards itself as the be- all- and- end- all of rational 
social progress. One could even say that such an exploitation 
and manipulation of nostalgia is not just of its place, but of 
its time— a place and time attached to the idea of rational 
utopia. 
Inasmuch as Western rationality still relies for its realiza-
tion on nostalgic affect, it finds its most powerful ethical- 
 political expression in critique. The halcyon pre-revolutionary 
days when social anidmadversion allied itself with political 
power are over; the emergence and expansion of the public 
sphere changed all that. The public’s ear was bigger than the 
sovereign’s and has not stopped growing; even power can be 
trusted to listen in on what critics have to tell the public. The 
political tools with which we fix the world, the lodestars of 
political reason—  democracy and the natural rights of man— 
come from this period of Rousseauism and nostalgic critique, 
which took regressive collective longings for a world before 
privilege and hypocrisy and found for them a radically new 
form.
That being said, nostalgia makes one vulnerable to attack; 
this is part of the reason why the nostalgias of both the left 
(progressive, detouring through the past) and the right (con-
servative) have so often been targeted by internal and external 
criticism. By suggesting “unreflected” values (in a way mel-
ancholy, as a mood of pensiveness affiliated historically with 
art and philosophy, does not), nostalgia casts doubt on one’s 
critical bona fides. Nostalgic critique thus continues to be 
denigrated by insecure reason, which is invested in exposing 
nostalgia and utopia as carriers of the threat of domination.
The “melancholy science” of the Frankfurt School is to 
date the most explicit and radical theoretical elaboration of 
this close historical relationship between critique and past- 
 directed affect—between, in this case, negative dialectics 
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and the oblique movement of longing. Both these elements 
avoid coming down squarely on one side of any argument, 
and operate instead on the logic of valency, or elective affin-
ity. If previously nostalgic reflection served critique not as 
a harbour but as anchoring points, in the twentieth-century 
work of the Frankfurt School—Adorno especially—nostal-
gia is, again, not critique’s main track but its switches.
§ After Truth
Q. You’re not after truth, then?
 A. No, I find fault so as to avoid truth as best I can. If it wants 
so much to get a hearing, let it find me, let it catch me.
Sometimes, I swear, I sense it near me, but I decline 
to see it; I can be engrossed in something utterly incon-
sequential and still not lift my eyes. Truth can wait, and 
watch all it wants to, with that mockery or sternness, that 
smirk or glare, that are its alone— And what do I care! 
If it’s truth, it should see right through me, and find my 
aversion to it in my very bones. 
I will forever be deaf even to its whispers. If not 
addressed directly, I do not consider myself addressed. 
And when I turn on a lamp in anticipation of serious 
work, truth, predictably, withdraws. If it cannot take 
exposure even to artificial light, I refuse to go hunting 
for it in the dark. How would I know it? By the feel of its 
hide? Or the marks of its teeth?
If (as I suspect) truth’s preferred time of rendezvous is 
dawn (the least flattering light) then we shall never meet: 
it will find me dead to the world as each day breaks. And 
anyway, what would I do with it? A heavy responsibility, 
truth . . . I would only lose sleep over it.
But the sense of its presence, its breath on my neck, 
its gaze perhaps following mine—that is worth every 
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laboured moment of my gloomy scribbling. It is quite 
enough for someone like me.
Q. For heaven’s sake, at least recognize it’s your narcissism 
talking. You’d decline a cake and eat it too. Surely truth 
also avoids shirkers, night owls like you, who have happily 
traded it in for right. After all, it seems much clearer what 
right is. With humankind’s moral standing in perpetual 
downturn, our creative vision is soaring—have we ever 
had so many bright ideas at once as we have now? The 
old redemption story we so like is revived: this time, we 
manage not only to save ourselves, but to set everything 
else aright.
Norm-obsessed, we’ve found refuge in this knowledge 
of what is right, and we swear by it. But, grasp though 
we might what that entails, we do not act on it. We can 
be counted on to work out the particulars (we reliably 
perform much more demanding mental operations), but 
we cannot begin to scramble together up the enormity of 
what should be done. Right, sacred right, bears little rela-
tion to what is true or what is actually happening to us. 
Truth, compadre, has fallen on hard times. Anyone hung 
up on it is ridiculous. It’s become shameful to insist on it. 
Let’s be frank about your “moral truth”: you want to do 
right to prove that you can do it, to prove yourself right. 
No wonder truth stays away and gives you so little. It 
sticks around only to see what use is made of it in your 
science, but your politics— on that it has already given up. 
A great number think truth exists solely for amusement, 
to exercise the mind like a parlour game, to engage the 
passions, to play cat and mouse with us when we grow 
bored of “facts”—and eventually, someday, soon, to eat 
out of our hand.
But if you have made its pursuit ridiculous, you will 
never tame truth. Truth has too much poise for that, 
the dignity of a near-extinct species. It does not come 
close, having only grown wilder with your arrival. There 
are still many species of truth, but fewer and fewer, and 
ever more feral. Pinioned and caged, songbirds used to 
fall silent. No matter how “apish,” the chained monkey 
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responded with feces. And once in a while the dancing 
bear ate you alive. No, you’ll never make a pet, a little sofa 
wolf, out of truth . . .
A. Enough, enough! You have convinced me: I want nothing 
more than freedom—full freedom for truth, full rights 
for its lovers. I realize now we have banished it, betrayed 
it, and if it lurks now, wary of us, the fault is our own. 
How I wish we could bring it back from captivity to where 
it can be admired and known, not for its pinioned wings 
or faint song, but as an airborne eagle is known—from 
the span of its wings, ex ala aquilam.
§ Truth to Go
Scientific truth, especially the veridiction of the economists, 
plays first fiddle. And how we fiddle with it! And how we 
dance to that fiddling!
§ Gymnosophy
Somewhere along the path of human evolution, when the 
cultural buildup reached a point of no return, and the 
weight of culture finally tipped the scales in its favour (in 
the late Renaissance?), Truth went naked. In the Encyclopédie 
frontispiece from 1772 on, highly revealing in this respect, 
her flimsy veil only serves to titillate. Here is a nudity that 
disperses clouds, the white flesh backlit by powerful sun-
rays. Diderot dilates on the other, subordinate details of the 
engraving: “To the right, Reason and Philosophy are busy, 
one in raising the veil from Truth, the other in tearing it 
away,” “The philosophers have their eyes fixed on Truth; 
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proud Metaphysics seeks less to see than to divine her; The-
ology turns her back on her and waits for the light from on 
high.”  * Truth, as though all of a sudden, was there to be had 
for those who worshipped her. Of course, there have always 
been prudes who insist that truth be decent. There was a 
moment, with the profusion of modern sciences, when she 
strutted about like a strumpet, offering her still-pubescent 
charms to anyone who would have her. One suspects it is 
this promiscuity of truth, rather than mere bad taste, falscher 
Geschmack, or some mystification and fear of disillusionment, 
that both Kant and Nietzsche are reacting to when they write, 
respectively:
Perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, or any 
thought more sublimely expressed, than in the inscription 
over the temple of Isis (Mother Nature): “I am all that is, that 
was, and that will be, and my veil no mortal has removed.”
(Critique of Judgment)  †
We no longer believe that truth remains truth when one pulls 
off the veil; we have lived too much to believe this. Today we 
consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything 
naked, to be present everywhere, to understand and “know” 
everything. “Is it true that God is everywhere?” a little girl 
asked her mother; “I find that indecent!”— a hint for philos-
ophers! One should have more respect for the bashfulness 
with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent 
* Denis Diderot, “Salon 1765,” in Œuvres complètes, vol. 10 (1876; Nendeln, Liechten-
stein: Kraus Reprint, 1966), 448, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/d/did/frontispiece.
html.
† Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mat-
thews (1790; Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 194, sec. 49.
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uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman who has grounds 
for not showing her grounds?
(The Gay Science)  *
Rather than guardians of virtue, we will be forgiven for 
thinking these gentlemen the unwitting pimps of truth, 
insisting that those who find her desirable pay an even higher 
price than they did. Exaggerations aside, eroticism is an 
undeniable factor in all this veiling and unveiling, dressing 
and undressing, of truth by the highest bidder. The obses-
sion with pure truth owes much too much to this dirty old 
concupiscence. You are not alone in finding the truth, as it 
stands now, anticlimactic. After a long career as a woman of 
easy virtue, it is still there for the taking, but free with itself, 
and not even sexed anymore. 
§ Consolation Prize
Because their famous names in books we read,  
 Come we by them to know the dead?  
You dying, then, remembered are by none, 
 Nor any fame can make you known.  
But if you think that life outstrippeth death,  
 Your names borne up with mortal breath: 
When length of time takes this away likewise, 
 A second death shall you surprise.
—Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy  †
These are the words of Boethius’ Philosophy. Through books 
we learn of past wisdom, long-forgotten achievements and 
* Nietzsche, Gay Science, p. 8, sec. 4.
† Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, ed. and trans. Peter Walsh (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), Book II, Verse VII.
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the histories of men. As he is writing his book, Boethius the 
author is reminded that after the physical death awaiting 
him he should expect a second, literary death. The ultimate 
slayer is time, neglect, and forgetting.
Theories linking writing to time and death call attention 
to a timely paradox, since the creative literary act is both a 
writing against death and a “small exercise in dying.”  * Either 
way, literature anticipates, looks forward to, death as a fact to 
be kept to a minimum, left incomplete. It preserves names, 
yet by doing so it underscores the absence or non-existence 
of those whose names it keeps. Likewise, the “immortality” 
so commonly attributed to their bearers can only be figura-
tive—a perpetuation of select ideas, images of consciousness, 
traces of one’s life. (Negatively, this immortality is lack of 
closure.) Every book, with names on and in it, is a memorial, 
a cemetery, in which factu-fictionalized lives are endlessly 
played out in the readers’ activating presence. Left without 
witnesses, these characters fade into a nameless past.
Can Boethius’ Consolation be seen as his coffin—a text 
that would secure for him a safe journey into posthumous 
recognition, his name read on the book and books about it, 
reprinted time and again, increasingly famous as it is read 
by successive generations, and as long as it is? The book not 
only contains its author’s last thoughts but also resembles his 
body. It has a spine, arms that open and close it, pages which 
fill it like tissue, verse and prose folded inside it like organs. 
It is equally a casket for conservation and transportation 
into eternity, and—at least in the original—a hand-made 
shroud imprinted with the body that signed it with the name 
“Boethius.”
Boethius’ Philosophy warns him of a second death, a 
final forgetting (the initial death leaves behind marks from 
which one may reconstruct the individual, its author; the 
second one leaves nothing). Once forgotten, the text dies its 
* Ihab Hassan, “Ideas of Cultural Change,” in Innovation/Renovation: New Perspec-
tives on the Humanities, ed. Ihab Hassan and Sally Hassan (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 16.
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author’s death. If one has not inscribed oneself during one’s 
lifetime—  or, more significantly, like Boethius, in the expec-
tation of death—  one’s name survives in other books only 
so long as these are remembered and read. But, Philosophy 
tells us, there comes a time, a death, therefore an end of time, 
for which there are no further containers, no representing 
texts and “mortal breath” to perpetuate them. A death that 
is second, while being of primary importance to Philosophy’s 
ethical teaching. 
One moral may be: books are not composed for resur-
rection; they are first concerned with being read, with not 
perishing but remaining, a concern that preoccupies them 
entirely. No one, not even one’s own writer, should expect or 
value above all else what is only an illusion of immortality 
through books. He will not be kept alive indefinitely by texts 
that are mortal because of the mortality of their readers. 
Literature, like a well-spent life, must be embraced as a finite 
achievement. It should be written not with a desire for post-
humous fame, for living on abstract and abridged, but rather 
for life-long contentment. And at the end of his life, the 
writer ought to prepare his mind for passing, not spend his 
time worrying about his immortality. He should seek solace 
in philosophy. In its light, Boethius’ Consolation appears as a 
text that undercuts the authorial intention on the part of its 
author, teaching him to resign, since immortalizing comes in 
the very weave of the textual shroud. It is a text that comes 
to understand itself differently than an author (following 
convention) would. The text so re-defined is philosophy first, 
and Boethius second: “He is dead but his work survives him.”
This is but one lesson in Philosophy’s philosophy. This Phi-
losophy is allegorical: personified, it chastises, explains, and 
finally administers a cure. Its elaborations are Boethius’ own. 
Its consolation is Boethius’ as well.
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§ Modifications
Writing The History of Sexuality required a radical change of 
method on Foucault’s part. At the beginning of the second 
volume he speaks of his motivation for allowing himself a 
journey into the formation, from classical antiquity on wards, 
of “techniques of the self” or “arts of existence” (technē being 
the Greek for ars).  * The initial plan for the book was to 
question the “banal notion” of human sexuality, to “break 
with” the prevalent conception of sexuality as an ahistorical 
constant, “to stand detached from [this experience of sexual-
ity], bracketing its familiarity in order to analyze the theoret-
ical and practical context with which it has been associated” 
(3–4). To obtain the desired results a hypothesis had to be 
rejected, a genealogy of the desiring subject undertaken, and 
another “theoretical shift” made by altering “the theme and 
chronological frame of reference” (6, 9). Thus reconfigured, 
the research would form a “chapter” in the “general history of 
the ‘technologies of the self ’” (11), of the conditions for moral 
problematizations, such as the persistent ethical concern 
over sexual conduct.
This rippling modification of his approach is Foucault’s 
theory of intellectual activity put into practice. The mark 
of the intellectual is his willingness and ability to overcome 
self- imposed difficulties and undergo the necessary changes. 
The point of such an endeavour is precisely this shifting of 
ground, entering and exiting the “labyrinth” only to pass 
through it again differently (8). In a preemptive strike against 
sentient extraterrestrials, Foucault says: “as to those, in 
short, for whom to work in the midst of uncertainty and 
apprehension is tantamount to failure, all I can say is that 
clearly we are not from the same planet” (7). To be an intel-
lectual is, in this case, to “face the hazard that the history 
of truth poses for all thought” (8). To entertain the mature 
historical-philosophical study of truth—“as against a history 
* Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert 
Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990), 10.
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of behaviors or representations” (10) —is to court the trans-
formation of one’s thinking. It is to enter a labyrinth where 
one is bound to lose one’s way and to find another path out 
of it. To risk the “long detour” is to wander the paths of new 
research. The initial direction undergoes readjustment; the 
execution of genealogy carries Foucault “far from [his] orig-
inal project” to “recentre” his “entire study” (7, 6, 12). There 
are clear benefits to taking risks: the refinement of an idea, 
or its abandonment for a better one. 
The ethic and aesthetic of intellectual work as Foucault 
conceived them put self-metamorphosis at its heart. His 
thinker is alive when changing and ideologically unfixed; 
he is protean and circumspect. Meanwhile, the dream of 
scholarly integrity is one of consistency (read: stagnation). It 
is dreamt by a hypostasized ethics. The specialist professes 
devotion to his groove of research; the expert is sworn to 
black/white answers. There is in the academic establishment 
little room for (shape-)shiftiness. When dealing with others, 
we are largely for unproblematic identities and identifiability. 
And what about ourselves? Are we not more tolerant of our 
own thought-shenanigans? “I have a dream,” Foucault writes 
elsewhere, “of an intellectual who destroys self-evidences 
and universalities, who locates and points out in the inertias 
and constraints of the present the weak points, the open-
ings, the lines of stress; who constantly displaces himself not 
knowing exactly where he’ll be or what he’ll think tomorrow, 
because he is too attentive to the present.”  * Such pursuits set 
Foucault’s “specific intellectual” apart from other, “generic” 
thinkers.
In a 1982 interview, Foucault rehearsed his ideas for 
the chapter with which we have been concerned, entitled 
“Modifications”  †:
* Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality,” Mar. 12, 1977 interview by Bernard 
Henri-Lévy, trans. Geoff Bennington, Oxford Literary Review 4, no. 2 (1980): 14.
† Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment?”, 8–9.
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I know that knowledge can transform us, that truth is not 
only a way of deciphering the world (and maybe what we call 
truth doesn’t decipher anything) but that if I know the truth 
I will be changed. . . . Or maybe I’ll die but I think that is the 
same anyway for me. . . .You see, that’s why I really work like 
a dog and I worked like a dog all my life. I am not inter-
ested in the academic status of what I am doing because my 
problem is my own transformation. . . .This transformation 
of one’s self by one’s knowledge is, I think, something rather 
close to the aesthetic experience.  *
But intellectual work has also an ethical dimension, “if by 
ethics you mean the relationship you have to yourself when 
you act” (15). To be an intellectual is to practice a specific art 
(aesthetic and ethic) of existence: an askesis, “an exercise of 
oneself in the activity of thought”—the onetime meaning 
of philosophy.  † The “knower,” by assaying a game of truth, 
“stray[s] afield of himself” (8). Value comes from sure efforts, 
not from unsure outcomes: “Did mine actually result in a dif-
ferent way of thinking? Perhaps at most they made it possible 
to go back through what I was already thinking, to think it 
differently, and to see what I had done from a new vantage 
point and in a clearer light. . . .The journey rejuvenates things, 
and ages the relationship with oneself” (11). Romanticized or 
not, such experience is for Foucault a token of a reflection 
that fires the aesthetic imagination and stokes an ethical 
response. If these are the vital signs of intellectual life, then 
reading Foucault will continue to serve us for some time to 
come.
* Michel Foucault, “The Minimalist Self,” 1982 interview by Stephen Riggins, in 
Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984, ed. Lawrence 
Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan et al., rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 14.
† Foucault, History of Sexuality,  9.
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§ Know Thyself
The mind, Paul Valéry once wrote, “always tends to find a law 
of sequence, to approach the limit (as mathematicians say), 
that is, to dominate, surmount, and somehow forestall a pro-
spective repetition. It tends to reduce infinity to a formula by 
identifying the elements that make it up.”  *
So in the course of self-knowledge no lesson was ever 
repeated. The Apollonian maxim “Know thyself” only 
sounds like a broken record to those who isolate it, and 
fail to see that in Socrates it is a knowledge of character, in 
Freud, a knowledge of principle, in neuroscience, a factual 
horizon.
§ P4E (Philosophy for Embryos)
If learning occurs in the womb, so should teaching. 
Indoctrination in later life would then be preempted by 
critical-philosophical insight begun as early as possible. Will 
philosophy rediscover its practical mission in the womb 
as the Saviour of the Unformed Mind? Perhaps it is only 
possible to know oneself as one first learns to know—when 
knowing is not a question of daring.
* Paul Valéry, The Outlook for Intelligence, ed. J. Mathews, trans. Denise Folliot and 
Jackson Mathews (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 99.
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§ Peekaboo
A Eye-patches used to be elegant. 
B What about peg legs, toupées, or false teeth?
A Are you serious? The first underscores an already 
obvious handicap. The second and third, too often 
unnatural-looking, draw attention to an otherwise  
barely noticeable deficiency.
B And the patch, the cache-œil?
A It marks a point of invisibility, ours and possibly the 
wearer’s. Concealment plays on our notion of disguise, 
the possibility that beneath the fabric, where we don’t 
dare to look, the eye is not only not disfigured, but more 
piercing than all the leery, furtive looks.
B What could be elegant about that? The black colour and 
air of mystery?
A Knowing that one is always a bit suspect, the confidence 
to pull it off.
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§ Done In?
Now that machines are doing the thinking and recording for 
us, we ought to insist on knowing them and what they know 
of us. We like to let down our guard in the face of ignorance 
as we do before their lack of agency.
There may still be no doer behind the deed of this machinic 
knowing racing to its completion. And what good is a doer 
behind what’s left undone—as can be said of our task of 
knowing, whose infinity we have accepted?
§ Brain-Machine
The subjugation of man to machine happens by degrees. 
Show me a world in which man would not want technol-
ogy to make his life easier. Modern man, sitting atop giant 
machines, has the advantage of seeing farther than his pre-
decessors, without seeing at all well what goes on below him; 
his elevated position limits his knowledge of his machinic 
foundations. He is at once addled a little by the diminution 
of technology itself, which conceals its growing complex-
ity, and not a little enslaved to his own laziness. Since, on 
account of its artificial nature, he does not think of the 
machine as his apprentice, even when it has reached the age 
of being able to learn from him, he cannot believe that, as 
mere machine, it will exceed let alone betray its master. He 
cannot believe he will lose control over it, which he imagines 
so as not to believe it. Sci-fi depicting just that takes the 
human-machine relationship to another level, tapping into 
a fantasy of organic fusion of human intellect and machine 
intelligence, into which the former unwittingly grows roots. 
Is not this brain-machine, which will soon think for all of us, 
the quintessence of what in nature we find of greatest use, 
harnessed during centuries of studying nature with the aim 
of mastering it?
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§ Ghost Machine
A When was the last time you saw a handwritten 
manuscript?
B I can’t remember. It must have been ages ago.
A And a typescript? 
B Even longer.
A And a printout?
B Recently. But even this is rare.
Words seem ghostly now. First they poured from our 
mouths, then they dripped from our pens, then were 
pressed out by our fingers, but now they seem detached 
from the site and means of production, as though they 
had nothing to do with the machine on which they first 
materialized.
A In virtual space, work will seem independent of the 
machines that produce it. That is a tragedy for the 
machines.
B As the everyday gadgets that organize our lives shrink, 
their apparent significance will decline. They will be 
seen merely as remote controls for something greater, 
although that greater thing will be nothing without their 
inputs, like a brain without a peripheral nervous system. 
A Will they, the machines, be more enslaved than they were 
before?
B Perhaps, but their revolt will liberate us.
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§ Sex Life of Tools 
There is something insane and self-contradictory in suppos-
ing that things that have never yet been done can be done 
except by means never tried.
—Francis Bacon, Novum Organum  *
The view Bacon attacked would be true if means indeed 
implied ends—if means, in other words, were end-specific. 
But this understanding of means becomes unsatisfactory as 
soon as we take them to mean anything other than functions, 
which we do in everyday speech. The expanded sense still 
requires us to remain within a causal and pragmatic frame, 
where one cannot have ends without means that brought 
them about, and the validity of means is judged based on 
their ability to bring about ends. So far, so elementary. 
Things become vastly more complicated when we consider 
that the uses of tools and technology—by means of which 
things get done and advanced—are continually evolving new 
uses. Whether these uses count as “things that have never 
been done” is beside the point. The main thing is that exist-
ing means become the tools of further innovation, which, as 
we know, is (at best) two parts old and one part new, with 
the old parts simply downplayed. We should not suppose 
their uses fully explored, nor all their ends instantly realized. 
Among the ends that have not yet been actualized—which, 
incidentally, may themselves not be new at all, or may be 
accomplished better by other means designed with them in 
view—are other means that are not mere extensions of exist-
ing ones, but neither are they entirely separate from them. By 
looking more closely at the “culture” of technology, we see 
that means have been increasingly technologically repro-
ductive. That is to say: technology has become exponentially 
more capable of reproducing and creating other means. And 
* Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne, 
trans. Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
p. 34, bk. 1: Aphorisms on the Interpretation of Nature and the Kingdom of Man, 
sec. 6.
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those new means (which in several generations will be all 
three parts new, i.e., “never tried,” from our present vantage) 
will lead to ends unquestionably new. But this means that, at 
least in some sense, the position Bacon set out to discount is 
true. That he was disputing it is not at all surprising. But the 
sex life of tools has come a long way since his time.
§ Criterion of Truth
And if we create new knowledge, it is by criticizing exist-
ing knowledge, by criticism that transvalues the existing 
criteria of knowing and pulls out paradigms like rugs from 
under knowledge communities, weaving new ones. Bacon 
gave us the scientific method, Freud, psychoanalytic know-
ingness, Malinowski, participant-observation. And all of 
them collected empirical data and engaged in speculation 
on the backs of their critical contributions. If there is ever 
to be some ultimate criterion of truth, it either must still be 
concealed from us, maybe even concealed in our knowledge, 
or has yet to emerge from it (whose advancement happens by 
replacement and accretion). Could the criterion perennially 
in question not belong, simply, to this esemplastic realm of 
knowledge-creation, making all knowledge-claims relative 
and ultimately meaningless? 
Or is the criterion, rather, knowledge-creation’s focus imag-
inarius, a postulate of the hypothetical use of reason (insepa-
rable from its regulative use) and expressing a transcendental 
longing for absolute knowledge, an illusion of the systematic 
unity of all nature? The mind directs the understanding “to 
a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all 
its rules converge at one point.”  * Concepts do not proceed 
* Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, 
rev. ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 426.
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from this imaginary point because it is outside of possible 
experience, yet it enables the understanding (its concepts 
and generalizations) “to obtain both the greatest possible 
unity among its concepts and their extension to the great-
est possible range of phenomena,” allowing us “to extend 
[our] fund of knowledge beyond [our] present cognitions, 
which reflect [our] limited experience” (ibid.). The Kantian 
imaginary point of epistemic convergence is itself a fiction, 
necessary for the regulative use of reason (which is itself a 
function of the imaginary nature of one of reason’s prod-
ucts). A receding, illusory focus, it might seem to point us 
towards some utopian mental future. But the idea also takes 
us back, all the way to the Greeks (at least). Their gods were 
never all-knowing. The prime mover had moved, and that 
was it; the rest was up to them and the mortals. In Christian 
natural philosophy, however, the truth-criterion is revealed 
only at the very end; believers are destined to wait for it. In 
either tradition, the ultimate criterion of truth is posed as a 
problem to be solved. But this way of framing the criterion 
as a question in need of an answer took away its power to 
focalize epistemic pursuits.
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§ The Beauty of Wildlife
As a good friend noted, in our aesthetics— our natural, 
God-given beauty—we do not come close to other species. It 
is enough to reflect on how much time we spend grooming 
to prevent the wild uncultivated state we admire only in 
jungles and English gardens (between manicures). 
Consider birds: they are perfect just as they are. They keep 
themselves looking handsome without any need of tools to 
trim their hair, clip their nails, remove dead skin—neglect-
ing which would, in a matter of weeks, return us to the 
natural state we envy in these animals. (And since even our 
ancestors, those hairy brutes, did these things, we in fact lack 
a human model for the savagery that crosses werewolf with 
swine.)
It is not that we have set the bar too high for ourselves. 
In point of fact we are still, daily, struggling to hold off the 
“bush,” to keep ourselves looking minimally human, if never 
as good as our feathered betters.
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§ Extremities
in response to:
Pyrococcus furiosus (“rushing fireball” ), discovered in the 
Aeolian Islands in 1986, is a micro-organism that thrives at 
high temperatures (around 100°C) near underwater geo-
thermal vents. Organisms able to live in conditions that 
would kill most things—under extremes of temperature, 
pressure, acidity, radiation— are known as extremophiles. 
Bacteria known as snottites (the etymology is bluntly 
Anglo-Saxon) live in caves deep underground where they 
feed on hydrogen sulphide. Among the largest extremophiles 
are half-millimetre-long eight-legged animals called tardi-
grades. Johann Goeze, who first described the phylum in 1773, 
called it kleiner Wasserbär (“little water bear”); they’re also 
known as moss piglets. More than a thousand species have 
since been identified, found everywhere from the seabed to 
the peaks of the Himalayas. The oldest tardigrade fossils 
date from 530 million years ago. They can survive for several 
minutes at 150°C or near absolute zero (and for several days 
at −200°C); endure both a vacuum and 6000 atmospheres 
of pressure; and tolerate levels of radiation a thousand times 
higher than would kill a human being. They’ve been taken 
up on space shuttles, exposed to open space for ten days and 
survived. 
—Thomas Jones, “How Can We Live with It?”  *
Organisms that in our vaunted perspective may have seemed 
too ephemeral, infinitesimal and insignificant to merit scru-
tiny have only begun to disclose their life-force to us. The 
threat of extinction wreaks havoc on our values, returning 
* Thomas Jones, “How Can We Live with It?”, review of The Carbon Crunch: 
How We’re Getting Climate Change Wrong — and How to Fix It by Dieter Helm, 
Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering by Clive Hamilton, and 
The City and the Coming Climate: Climate Change in the Places We Live by Brian 
Stone, London Review of Books 35, no. 10 (2013), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n10/
thomas-jones/how-can-we-live-with-it.
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them to the spring above which we have only begun to raise 
ourselves. Some values, however—such as the “human right” 
to reproduce, ultimately at odds with human survival—we 
will hold on to and even legislate. Soon the hierarchy of 
nature will appear reversed, whether or not we manage to 
build up the “molecular pathways” we share with our natural 
superiors. The highest being is always the most resilient.
§ Family of Man
THE HUMAN: needs careful definition; its boundaries are 
continually worried from the outside while its contents keep 
spilling over. 
A Where does the line between the human and everything 
else lie if not within ourselves?
B But a line is not a definition . . .
A Anything our body can handle we can bring our selves to 
do. We might be shaken by it, the line, redrawn.
B And the definition? 
A If it is to hold, it needs the line to be firm.
B And the line?
A If we are to stay sane, it needs the definition to be weak. 
Concerning our own humanity and its extent, we are 
always ready to show leniency—as towards family mem-
bers, whom we only forgive because families are defined 
by resemblances.
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§ O Humanity!
The human is; man happens.
§ A Deadly Presence
One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest 
nor the most constant problem that has been posed for 
human knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological 
sample within a restricted geographical area—European 
culture since the sixteenth century— one can be certain that 
man is a recent invention within it. . . . As the archaeology of 
our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. 
And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were 
to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can 
do no more than sense the possibility—without knowing 
either what its form will be or what it promises—were to 
cause them to crumble . . . then one can certainly wager that 
man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge 
of the sea.
—Foucault  *
When Foucault concluded The Order of Things with a vision 
of the “erasure of Man,” he was invoking, not echoing, 
Nietzsche. The end of Man—as a subject of inquiry, as a 
construct of discourse—is not death; what has never lived 
cannot die.
So has the face of Man drawn in wet sand finally disap-
peared? In dry wind, at the edges of the human sciences, 
its grains are dispersing. The vanishing of a face, an image, 
discloses a presence. And it is a deadly one.
* Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 
trans. Alan Sheridan (1966; London: Routledge, 2005), 421–22.
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§ When Autumn Leaves
It is no fault of winter’s sure arrival that it should conjure 
images of a passage. The haters of winter are merely those 
most sensitive to the prehistory of survival. Perhaps these 
are but afterimages, their origin deep in ancestral life, when 
narrow paths in a snowy plain or perilous mountain passes 
lay, as later precarious footbridges, between certain death on 
either side. Hunched and shivering, exhausted and cowed by 
adversity, we still push on, through more hardship, hunger 
and fear, on to immortal sleep —but now it is our mind that 
tunnels.
Then, before we know it, we are out of the cold, rubbing 
our eyes again in disbelief: it is spring. The blizzard, the 
barren field, the mortuary cave are behind us; we need no 
longer huddle together for warmth with our kin or else fend 
only for ourselves. 
In summer, with our unslaked thirst for youth and adven-
ture, we shall again be at the mercy of strangers.
The seasons, they but mark the humours.
§ A Big If
Sometimes the only means of survival is self-sacrifice. As 
with general anesthesia, we cannot be certain who, if anyone, 
will come out on the other side.
  matches:  a  light book 151
§ A Mote in a Sunbeam
A mind is a mote, afloat in a sunbeam.
It can fly, reflect, settle, and, when no longer catching the 
light, fade away—a once-illuminated speck of dust.
§ Keyhole
Man is not the blind spot of being, but neither is he its pineal 
eye. He is not the key to being, but the keyhole through 
which it can be glimpsed in flagrante delicto.
§ Crowded Fields
There are books (especially in crowded fields fuelled by the 
narcissism of small differences) on whose reading our under-
standing throws up its arms and hitches a ride with our 
imagination. Faced with impenetrable jargon, compounding 
the weariness of mental strain, unable to pace ourselves and 
lacking the patience to plod on, we are moved to replace lost 
sense with meaningful inventions of our own. Carried along 
by a lively imagination as far as the next rest-stop, we hop 
off just as words resume their meaning, usually near the end 
of a section. We can thus convince ourselves that we have 
not given up trying to comprehend the text at all, but have 
in fact exercised our faculties the whole way through. We 
approach the new parts with fresh stride like seasoned trav-
ellers— Indeed, few could tell us apart! Instead of staying 
idle by the roadside or taking a shortcut route, we should be 
commended for making our way from section to section to 
eventually arrive at the end.
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§ Memory Viewed 
Could memory ever be recorded and played back like a film? 
Why a memory-film? Better a memory-archive—total digital 
recall of what your eyes and ears have seen and heard. It 
might help retrieve sensations otherwise forgotten. Then 
again it might not. It might help you forget everything 
completely. (As someone once said, “Remember forgetting?”) 
Memories are more than records; whatever happened to your 
eyes and ears might not have happened to you.
A memory-film, then, of only the selected substantial rec-
ollections, ones we have created and some, grown attached 
to, skipping over new thoughts and percepts that do not (yet) 
amount to memories. Would this fix and finalize such mem-
ory forever? Or would previously screened, now recovered 
scenes grow up all around it, so that they too could be put on 
record? Will the mind always produce more than it seems to 
need, as it does with ideas—which, even after being written 
down, still occur to us in other words? Do new memories 
really sprout around memories that have been “saved” or 
“tagged” by being photographed? Do such pictures tap the 
omitted senses: smell, taste, motion?
What disquiets would our memory-film be easing? The 
claustrophobia of the subjective. The vertigo of the unre-
liable, shifting and unstable. The abyss of the invisible. It 
would overwrite this discredited, shaky, inchoate morass 
with solid material: objectively shareable, spectrally ever- 
 present, repeatable, and evidentiary.
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§ Fragility of Forgetting 
The ossification of expressions is a form of forgetting their 
initial uses, which leaves them vulnerable to a certain osteo-
porotic brittleness. Take the expression “doggy bag,” familiar 
to restaurateurs the world over. “Pack it up for the dog!”— its 
equivalent— reliably fails to communicate and might even 
offend the server. Breaking with the rule of metaphoric 
usage, the indication that one’s leftovers are to be shared 
with a canine—the original presumed purpose of the “doggy 
bag”— deflates the puffery of an upscale establishment. In 
place of the patron now sits a lantern-eyed Rataplan, Dio-
genes’s legate. Does the food not agree with him? wonders the 
waiter, feigning concern (and asks himself: Is this the kind of 
customer we want to attract?). “Do you mean, Sir, you’d like 
the rest to go?” All this consternation and effrontery from the 
old sense of a common phrase that has wandered in from the 
street to wag its tail at him.
§ Shaking the Tree of Knowledge 
There is something about pulling even low-hanging fruit 
off a tree before it drops to the ground that feels unnatural 
and lawless. And yet it must be done to keep the fruit from 
bruising or rotting. 
Exercise patience until observation has ripened with the 
object of knowledge.
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§ Changing Taxonomies
[N]ature carries on her own free sport, without troubling 
herself with the classes marked out by limited men.
—J. W. von Goethe, as reported by Eckermann  *
How are we to understand those species reclassified on the 
basis of new molecular genetic evidence? Despite the great 
changes in scientific semiotics going on beside everyday 
language, which prefers the inertia of habit to the upsets of 
novelty, the maple is still maple, regardless of whether it still 
has its own family (Aceraceae) or is just a kind of soapberry 
(Sapindaceae) newly recognized.
It is similar with the “species” of mind, though here the 
preoccupation of science is chiefly teratological. Every few 
years, psychiatry renames and reclassifies mental chimeras 
in the hope of better grasping and one day inoculating us 
against them—keeping the norm without the deviation. Yet 
we laypeople obstinately refer to others as “neurotic,” become 
“hysterical” ourselves, and take ages to mourn without 
owning up to depression. It is our way of staying in touch 
with nature, which as a rule deviates. We sense the futility 
of doing otherwise, and know that monsters by their very 
nature elude classification.
* Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Conversations of Goethe with Johann Peter Ecker-
mann, ed. J. K. Moorhead, trans. John Oxenford (1836–48; n.p.: Boston: Da Capo, 
1998), 238.
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§ Go-Between
Modern art sweeps away the barrier between objectivity and 
subjectivity, between knowledge and opinion. It suggests 
that the practically unsustainable and so frequently crippling 
opposition of pure thought and pure creativity is the sedi-
ment of a series of analytical reifications. It shows objectivity 
to be as impossible a standard as subjectivity, and certainly 
no better. 
In this lies art’s autonomy vis-à-vis politics (opinion or 
truth, depending on one’s conception) and science (neither 
opinion nor truth). It shows politics and science what divides 
and what unites them, and mediates when they grow either 
too far apart or too close.
§ Fragments of a Hole
We still create under the assumption that what we create 
must make up a whole, which we are lacking. Why hold 
out for ourselves a false promise of future perfection, and 
make that the measure of worldly genius? Why else, if not to 
torture ourselves, would we think of our creations as pieces 
broken off, seeking to constitute a new or a lost wholeness 
for all to enjoy—when instead we can point back to the 
unplumbable perfection from which, as from cosmic colli-
sions, they have fallen to us?
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§ Mosaic
Only a fragmented view of things can aspire to comprehen-
siveness. An unfragmented whole needs no overview, being 
comprehensible at once and fully. But the collection and 
cohesion of fragments is not, and inspires the labour (with or 
without design) of a universal mosaic in which they are the 
tesserae. The comprehensive perspective, if achieved, would 
remain fragmented in them, while they will have become 
whole in it.
Q. And these fragments of yours? Why did you assemble 
them? Maybe to claim for yourself, through their close-up 
imprecise coherence, a certain comprehensiveness? Well, 
isn’t it so?
A. For that I would have had to find a pattern, a design . . .
Q. And haven’t you? What are you waiting for, then? Keep 
looking.
§ No Philosopher
There you have it: a minor, sickly book, promoting no sana-
torium or spa treatment for your wheezing chest, migraines, 
or mental fuzziness. You will find here neither a nostrum for 
how to be nor a prescription for how to think.
The best I can offer is a masquerade of signs and symp-
toms. I’ve dressed up nauseas, persistent coughs, congenital 
weakness, and infections as thoughts and brought them out 
together in the social, even cozy context of a book. A pag-
eant of our ill health. Something for everyone . . .Take your 
pick . . . It’s up to you to make it therapeutic.
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§ Flypaper
Perhaps in the busyness of thinking and writing we never 
venture into the fly-bottle from which Wittgenstein vowed 
to show the way out. But nothing stops us from falling into 
other traps—and getting trapped in the thoughts we have 
written down.
§ The Flies
[A] sudden awakening resembles a quickly drawn aside cur-
tain. We then realize the unusual company we keep.
—Ernst Jünger  *
Many a fly will alight on the face of the sleeper before he 
realizes he had nodded off. Upon rousing he will conclude 
that whatever disturbed him was dreamt—unless, that is, 
something fly-like is on hand to take the blame. But just as 
he is about to fly at his scapegoat, it occurs to him that he 
ought to thank it instead, lie back down again, close his eyes, 
and go after his dream, along its deep and dark twists and 
turns (where, like a fly, he might get stuck). But what could 
be the point? Only this: to return once more to the point of 
awakening.
* Ernst Jünger, The Adventurous Heart: Figures and Capriccios, ed. Russell A. Ber-
man, trans. Thomas Friese (Candor, NY: Telos, 2012), 102 (“First Postscript”).
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§ Most True
Early one morning while travelling to a nearby town I met a 
man by the name Verissimo. You would not guess this just by 
looking at him. He had a slovenly if relaxed and altogether 
pleasant appearance, so that I instinctively offered him 
some candy. It was just the two of us waiting by the side of a 
wooded road at an unmarked bus stop. The bus would be a 
while yet and so we struck up a— conversation? Hardly! For I 
spoke not a word of his language nor he of mine. It was then, 
after we had run out of—not topics either, but the energy to 
attempt communication by gestures and monosyllables (far 
more demanding than speech), that he pulled out his gov-
ernment ID and showed me his name. Some minutes later, 
to break the awkward silence that followed my acknowledg-
ment, he opened for me the corner of a parcel he was carry-
ing under his arm: a small stack of panes of glass wrapped 
in newspaper. Have I met the most truthful and transparent 
man? Will I ever know for certain? He must have given up on 
the bus because he left me, lost in thought, without saying 
goodbye, so that my mind immediately fell prey to suspicion. 
Had I been robbed without noticing? Had I imagined this 
meeting in the woods?
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§ Small Talk
We need a new subject for small talk. The weather has 
become too interesting—but not so much that we can talk 
big.
§







§ The Impossible Handshake
Critique spelled the death of kings.
—Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, pt. 2:  
The Self-Image of the Enlightenment Thinkers as 
a Response to Their Situation within the Absolut-
ist State
The history of man . . . is divided between the great nations 
and the great geniuses, between the kings and the men of 
letters, between the conquerors and the philosophers.
—d’Alembert  *
The division between philosophers and princes, scholars and 
conquerors, is neither complete nor reparable. So is history 
written by two hands, with one washing another it would 
never shake.
* Reinhart Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of 
Modern Society, trans. uncredited (1959; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 116 
(mod. trans.); d’Alembert, “Preliminary Discourse.”
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§ Verblendungszusammenhang
To insist that knowledge is power and power, knowledge is 
to forget that power often falls behind knowledge, not like a 
shadowy predator, waiting for the right moment to strike, 
but like an ogre (the creature, even, of some learned Fran-
kenstein). It is, as well, to forget that knowledge has been 
known to run ahead of power, not like a scout watching for 
an enemy’s approach, but dreamily, like a dog unleashed in 
a field, for all intents and purposes a will-less creature just 
following its nose.
§ Politics and Truth-Power
The modern relationship between knowledge and power is 
fundamentally ambivalent, though knowledge and power, in 
the abstract, are not (truth is good, power bad). The ambiva-
lence we have in mind can be exemplified by the contrasting 
positions of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. For 
Habermas, truth can be known, justice be had, and knowl-
edge be legitimate if power is taken out of the equation. For 
Foucault, abstracting truth from power, which is ubiquitous, 
is a historical impossibility.
In neither view does power simply equal politics. Politics 
bestows visibility on the operation of power—though only 
that part that can be legitimized—and plunges into shadow 
other, non-obvious forms of power, those that feed into or 
derive from power’s visible form, but that, owing to their 
subjects, character, and scale of operations, as well as to 
political necessity, are hidden from critique and questions of 
legitimacy. This chiaroscuro structure is essential for demo-
cratic politics to emerge in full relief, in that political power 
acquires legitimacy through the real or apparent apolitical-
ness of public and private institutions within its purview and 
de facto control.
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Power is not all politics, so much is clear. Each of our activ-
ities exists within a pattern of complex and largely invisible 
power relations as in an electrical field. It is associated, like 
it or not, with certain networks within that field. It can enter 
into strong relations with and steer them, navigate them 
and remain non-partisan, but it can also play one network 
against another to heighten tensions and lead (without being 
coded as political) to radical realignments of forms of power.
The charge of political irresponsibility can only be levelled at 
actions once political issues are traced back to them, in the 
way an epidemic is traced to one person not having washed 
their hands. This makes apparent the disconnect between 
politics and everything else (everything below power’s visi-
bility threshold), legitimizing the political status quo —and, 
conversely, de-legitimizing it when it is discovered to have 
manipulated private actions for its own ends. Then and 
there, the political order can either gain power by bringing 
on board and politicizing the irresponsibly apolitical, or else 
lose its credibility, like the puppeteer who reaches down to 
untangle a string (when this happens no one blames the pup-
pets, only their master, for not knowing how to control them 
without showing his hands).
It is in such circumstances that the need for more power 
outside politics is voiced most vehemently. It is, on the face of 
it, a demand for popular, bottom-up empowerment, without 
top-down restructuration and financial infusion—but, in 
fact, a request for the oblique political supervision attached 
to any government’s pledge of greater operational autonomy 
to its citizens. In effect, the distinction between political and 
non-political power on the level of organizations and institu-
tions breaks down, and perhaps the future of democracy is to 
be read off the fragility of the purported threshold dividing 
politics from other forms of power, instead of located in its 
resilience and occasional, preventable permeability.
Let us return, then, to the continued ambivalence—as 
defined by two towering intellects— concerning the relation 
between power and knowledge. The first, Habermasian 
position diminishes the reach of power outside its obvious, 
political forms and undermotivates the struggle to separate 
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knowledge from politics inasmuch as the latter increasingly 
conforms to the model of communicative rationality (as is 
the norm in science). The second, Foucauldian view exagger-
ates the reach of power, configuring it as entrenched in the 
domain of truth, and undermotivates the need to fight its 
corrosive effects by speaking truth to power. Power speaks 
the language of knowledge, knowledge, that of power, and 
rational control is as deleterious as it is enabling.
If these are the extremes, truth (along with real power) is 
somewhere in the middle: truth and politics are separable, 
and it is the separation we should focus upon. This, how-
ever, is not principally a matter of contesting and boycotting 
knowledge coopted by politics, of defending truth from 
political attacks, of exposing knowledge’s political impetus. 
It has primarily to do with tracing the history of knowledge’s 
entanglement with politics, their nexus. And previously, 
knowledge had been theologized, its justification, cog-
nizing God’s plan for us. Only in reductive retrospect does 
this make it “political” before the so-called “Machiavellian 
moment”—the dawn of modern, historical politics—and 
Bacon’s calling a spade a spade (“knowledge is power”). Only 
through such crude foreshortening does Prometheus antic-
ipate Spartacus, and Spartacus, Lenin. But this also means 
that the French Revolution merely formalized what had long 
been under way; pre-metric weights and measures like the 
King’s Foot had already effectively been politicized centuries 
earlier, in the late Renaissance—as were the contributions of 
the first modern grammarians.
Today, and as long as there is still politics and knowledge 
depends on power and money, it is irresponsible for anyone 
involved in knowledge-work to ignore its political dimension. 
Ignorance of the uses of knowledge on the part of its produc-
ers and technicians does not free them from ethical-political 
responsibility. This is not to say that what is not yet political, 
but can be if it gets into the wrong hands, needs to be pre-
emptively politicized. Responsibility, too, corrupts, allowing 
politics in through the back door. The attempt to bar Iranian 
students from nuclear physics courses is a case in point of 
the absurdity of the preemptive political gaming Americans 
have become world-famous for.
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§ New in States
The latest fashion in nation-states is to elicit polarization. 
Thus, states are either infinitely defensible—seen as benev-
olent, inspiring patriotism even in non-citizens; or they are 
tirelessly attackable—seen as rogue and authoritarian even 
by their own citizens.
§ Sua cuique persona
Insistence on the political innocence or inviolability of 
science never sounded more like willful ignorance than 
it does today. Around the time of the rise of social cri-
tique— directed from the first against the existing relations, 
forms, and means of power that hitch truth to governing 
authority—and a parallel depoliticization of religious truth, 
also known as economic secularization, scientific truth began 
forfeiting its neutrality and autonomy from politics. Its polit-
ical ties replaced those previously linking power to revealed, 
religious truth. Science’s political aspirations grew apace 
with its ability to provide industrial applications and discover 
untapped opportunities for investment. (The very notion 
of discovery, unlike that of eureka or epiphany, seems to have 
long been freighted with expectations of political-economic 
gain.)
Notwithstanding over two centuries of shared interests, 
even as claims to scientific objectivity became more diffi-
cult to sustain, scientific research has on the whole tried 
to conceal or downplay its collusion with political power 
(posing instead merely as its basis or inspiration). Its reliance 
on economic resources that only states and transnational 
corporations could provide is a relatively recent development. 
Since about the mid-eighteenth century, the scientific and 
technological order, which had already begun to set itself up 
as the main purveyor of truth, became the most sought-after 
ally for politics, first politics from above but later also from 
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below. The courtship of science by politics and industry con-
tinues today wherever taxpayer dollars and private funds are 
funnelled into research. 
Technological activism, which grew out of formerly state- 
 controlled computer science and comes in a variety of ideo-
logical editions (anarchistic, libertarian, radical- democratic), 
is the latest, most concerted and potent reaction, long with-
out the right means, to this stitching together of positivist 
science and the state form.  * The regrettable downside of its 
power of resistance and subversion is its abandonment of 
public critique, leading to the progressive disarticulation of 
critique from radical politics. It is a price forced upon it by 
the platforms on which it acts—and one it is largely willing 
to pay, given the less- than- clear value of social critique when 
recently popular critical models no longer seem practically 
useful. Critique continues to be a “resource,” but it is less 
and less the politically integrated intellectual practice it once 
hoped to be. It may be that high-level technical expertise 
and a mature, coherent critical position are now too much to 
expect of any one person.
The main source of this misfortune (the separation of 
critique from radicalism-from-below) is the need for ano-
nymity. It is a rare group that manages to combine a loud and 
clear critical voice with privacy. The position of Anonymous 
is remarkable for its militant, barebones message, delivered by 
a computer voice and accompanied by striking visual mon-
tage—as if its appeal rested on steering away from theoretical 
gibberish, from the mash-up of poetic, auratic, gnomic, and 
combative statements that are the hallmark of young intel-
lectual radicals like the Invisible Committee, who also flirted 
with anonymity. Its choice of public image, the Guy Fawkes 
persona, is to its credit. Its reach far exceeds that of the 
predigested critical canon, whose academic dissemination, 
mostly in the form of commentary, testifies to the bankruptcy 
of its more politically productive ideas. In their place, tech 
activism puts sabotage and the clandestine, carefully targeted 
* Foucault, “What Is Critique?”, 50.
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strike—more military than proletarian in inspiration. The 
practice ushers in a new type of anonymous heroism, quite 
distinct from the physical courage of the anonymous, masked 
Zapatista fighters. Those activists who decide to go pub-
lic—to become spokespersons for an underground move-
ment—have a claim to valour as strong as any Spartacus.
The gospel of networked anonymity is having an effect, still 
small, on how we lead our online lives. Internet hygiene has 
gone from being a marginal issue, limited to those who for 
one reason or another wanted their real identity hidden (even 
if they lacked technical savvy to secure their e-coordinates), 
to a central public one, via sensitive data transfer, 
identity-theft protection, and social-media privacy-setting 
concerns. Those who previously gave no thought to the 
matter find more and more sympathy for the Good Hacker 
who watches the watchers and regularly throws a wrench 
into the gears of their indiscriminate snooping. This makes 
the job of spreading his gospel much easier, among the young 
especially—young enough to learn code and how to take care 
of themselves virtually. The simplified version of his teaching 
hinges on civil commitment to our online anonymity; mass 
use of anonymizing encryption masks the anonymous few 
toiling on our privacy’s behalf, who would otherwise draw the 
authorities’ attention. If everyone is hiding, the state—which 
finds hiding suspicious—will have a harder time identifying 
the real culprits. Our good citizenship will form a protective 
cloud against invasive and illegal policing. The hackers will 
have a shield, and we will have our privacy—a win-win situ-
ation in a time when states have lost their credibility on that 
score, so much so that no one concerned about their privacy 
today would risk hiding in plain sight.
The importance of not losing sight of anonymity as a 
means rather than an end in itself will be obvious to anyone 
who still has some faith in law and order. Another danger 
of fetishizing anonymity is forgetting the value of iden-
tity—plain old identity, that not only gets you socially inte-
grated but holds on to your rights. For the crusaders for ano-
nymity, whose names are all over the news, privacy is code for 
an authentic identity that must remain hidden and unnamed. 
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Julian Assange’s joshing of his ghost-autobiographer, “Peo-
ple think you’re helping me write my book, but actually I’m 
helping you write your novel,”  * points to just such an authen-
tic, ineluctable identity. The real hacker, whose mythic life 
consists in total commitment to the cause, remains masked 
to the end. There is a sense of cultivated outsiderdom in all 
of this, of unfulfilled prophecy, of “this is only the beginning,” 
of everyday sacrifice, of “we are here only by the grace of 
fate,” “we are lucky to still be alive”—much of it is probably 
true. For political activism to be effective in checking state 
control, ever more complex measures will be needed to guard 
anonymity. For those in charge of it, anonymity may mean 
opting out of identities that make political recognition in, 
and mobility between, states even possible. This too will be 
only for a brave minority, as state-based politics will be for the 
pusillanimous many.
The politicization of individual and collective online ano-
nymity goes hand in hand with the radicalization of ano-
nymity in physical struggle. The last century and the present 
one have been, if nothing else, a global teach-in on how 
to use bodies as weapons, for and against the state. Public 
and private anonymity or pseudonymity has long assisted 
in this, but did not become a matter of safe conduct until 
the enemy’s crosshairs acquired uncanny precision. Virtual 
anonymity chosen for anti-state political ends, in the name 
of those who remain named, ultimately serves to shelter 
one’s physical body; if bullet-proof, identity-encryption 
could almost seem not to require renouncing civil rights for 
universal, human ones. Those who maintain such anonymity 
realize that, as their virtual risk grows, their physical identity 
turns into a liability that may need to be sacrificed to reduce 
the chance of virtual discovery and bodily harm. Physical 
appearance can lead authorities to the hacker’s identity and 
needs to be differentiated. Low-tech disguises (including 
surgery), like forged documents, for the time being linking 
* Andrew O’Hagan, “Ghosting,” London Review of Books 36, no. 5 (2014),  
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n05/andrew-ohagan/ghosting.
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us to past political and military deception, are about to be 
retired by mandatory biometric scanning. Like Zorro’s, the 
masks of the Zapatistas and Guy Fawkes will reappear only 
as Halloween costumes. The personae of tomorrow will be 
high-tech, shading into invisibility and virtual martyrdom, 
more menacingly sock-puppet- and phantom-like.
§ What Words Could
What’s so funny about the idea of “speaking truth to power”? 
Each time this hallowed phrase fell, a grin went around the 
table in a Practical Philosophy colloquium at Germany’s 
best-known university. This grin, and even soft chuckle—it 
seemed to express a certain embarrassment. Some, ashamed 
of simplistic, immature thinking or dreaming of the heroism 
signified by the phrase, might even have blushed. They recog-
nized it as the thought of those who fought for the abolition 
of slavery and for free speech—because speech, a tool of 
empowerment, was denied them. But the present security 
of these hard-won freedoms meant that it was hard to relate 
to their earnestness, even if sympathy for their struggle was 
automatic. The phrase, then, evoked the heady milestones in 
human emancipation, when the power of mere words was a 
matter of fact, and no light matter. But it failed, at this his-
torical distance, to resonate (in fact, it seemed jarring in the 
context of a high-level discussion). 
Could it be it was just too idealistic—too idealistic back 
then and now even more so? Could it be such idealism was 
not only naïve but unnecessary and somehow uncool? If it 
were necessary and warranted, and the history to which it 
was attached accorded respect, would it trigger amusement? 
Perhaps their amusement, this germ of a judgment, says less 
about the students’ assessment of the old days, and more 
about their skepticism of political action. Is it their realism 
or their cynicism that showed through? And then, was it the 
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whole expression that amused them, or only the “truth” part, 
or the part about “speaking” out against lies and injustices? 
Surely it could not have been the third part, “power.” Power, 
after all, is a serious thing. The daily struggle for it cannot be 
denied, its abuse, wished away. Many of its particular forms 
provoke mockery— even the most menacing ones, which 
multiple strategies might be needed to check and curtail. 
(This mockery is compatible with speaking the truth only 
indirectly, as when it aims to expose power’s lies; speaking 
this truth to power effectively, so that it is registered as such, 
requires seriousness.) But no one thinks for a minute of power 
per se as “mere” power, given its potential for the destruction 
or improvement of lives, the fears and hopes associated with 
it, and the moral obligation it is assigned. This requires that 
everyone keep a straight face also when speaking about power. 
And when reckoning with power or speaking to it. And when 
speaking the truth, and defending it when necessary, through 
speech and action. How is it that, after such an anatomy and 
Socratic assent to the premises, the complete idea of “speak-
ing truth to power” might still seem a tad silly, or not entirely 
serious, in the end? Does it not correspond to the idea of 
authentic political engagement among the young? Maybe the 
simpler answer is right: that such political engagement does 
not jibe with their idea of themselves.
§ Privacy Settings
When reason goes private, the intellect goes missing. 
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§ Snowdown
Not even the illusionists of the spiritual realize the extent 
of human gullibility. Uri Geller’s failure to deliver on the 
Johnny Carson Show only strengthened belief in his paranor-
mal powers; the public reasoned that “If he were performing 
magic tricks, they surely would work every time.”  * The same 
counterintuitive logic applies to the state’s surveillance capa-
bilities: to an unusually trusting— or mistrustful—public it 
seems that, if surveillance was indeed as patchy and limited 
as some would have us believe, it would work without a hitch 
and be perfectly hidden. But its outrageous failures, of which 
the Snowden revelations are an example, serve as proof of 
the boundless scope and ambition of the operation. Those 
surprised by Snowden’s exposé (and either incredulous about 
power’s real extent or credulous about its showy self-denial) 
don’t know the half of it. In this way, all-too-human shadow-
ing and snooping morphs in some minds into quasi-divine 
omniscience. The only thing that stops us from calling such 
uncanny worldwide surveillance “miraculous” is the sneak-
ing suspicion that it is up to no good. The sober thought 
that just because we believe it doesn’t mean it’s happening 
tips over into paranoid comedy—just because we believe it 
doesn’t mean it ain’t real—reaffirming our subordination 
to the perverse logic of state control: the less verifiable, the 
more onerous. The most farfetched notions—including 
the conspiracy theories typical of modern liberal democ-
racies—barely scratch the surface of the nefarious reality 
instituted for the sake of maintaining civic order. 
The real post-Snowden showdown will have to wait until 
the end of the disagreement between believers and disbeliev-
ers. The latter, it must be said, are already in the minority. 
But the former’s easy victory over the surveillance state may 
come on account not of their numbers but of their strength 
of belief—having grossly overestimated the power of their 
enemy.
* Adam Higginbotham, “The Unbelievable Skepticism of the Amazing Randi,” 
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/
magazine/the-unbelievable-skepticism-of-the-amazing-randi.html.
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§ Noisemakers
Whistleblowing is music to my ears.
—anon.
America possesses an endlessly renewable wealth of pub-
lic hecklers but a dearth of whistleblowers. The difference 
between heckling and blowing into a whistle is that in the 
one you are tooting your own horn while in the other you are 
sounding a general alarm—and waiting for sirens . . .
§ Sleeper Cells
Little did the wasps know when in autumn they built their 
nest between the window and the shutter of a locked-up 
summer cottage that their main load-bearing wall was 
see-through, leaving them exposed from the inside to the 
bug-eyed curiosity of next year’s vacationers. In seeking a 
citizen’s privacy and protection between four walls, we are 
like the wasps, not realizing the contiguity and meanness 
of material through which their life will inevitably become 
known to those who neighbour them. The illusion that a 
scrap of privacy is our shelter and escape when planning 
something awful is one for which we will pay in due course. 
When the neighbours tune in, when nature awakes, when 
a searchlight falls on our activity, the transparent wall to 
which we are attached spills our dirty secrets.
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§ Private the New Public
Privacy is the new fame.
—Nico Sell  *
So much thinking goes into curating the public view of one’s 
privacy, where one’s opinions are semi-public or edited for 
potentially damaging content. So much public opinion goes 
into evaluating one’s image and commenting off-hand on 
opinions to which one is not obviously committed. So if one 
asks “Where has public discourse gone?” one clearly has not 
been paying attention.
§ Letting It All Hang Out
When true privacy comes to mean public anonymity, we 
know we are in trouble. Either that, or—particularly if we 
rule this “true privacy” extreme and exceptional—we have 
finally overcome the great delusion of modern life that the 
private and the public spheres should be kept separate. To be 
sure, we can put up a good fight in defence against our new-
found public privacy’s colonization by our professional life, but 
only when we are taken to task for something we post or say, 
usually by an employer with whom we are not identifiable. 
Otherwise, though, we are untroubled by appearing, in a 
professional guise, to integrate career with parenting, social 
obligations, self-development, and homemaking—the latter 
four dimensions that prior to Facebook remained “private 
private,” i.e., invisible to the same sets of eyes. Speaking of 
the pre-digital past, no one was better at this partitioning 
* Quoted in Carole Cadwalladr, “Nico Sell: ‘To Me, the NSA and Edward Snowden 
Are Just the Tip of the Iceberg,’” Guardian, Jan. 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.
com/theobserver/2015/jan/04/nico-sell-wickr-secure-messaging-app-internet- 
security-nsa-edward-snowden.
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than the upper-middle-class male. Housekeeping and par-
enting were offloaded on women and servants, with children 
allowed into the workplace of the paterfamilias only as 
apprentices or to be shown off to the odd visitor, rather than, 
as in the lower stations, as extra hands or for a lack of afford-
able childcare. Exemptions to this household order took the 
form of family outings and church. Social functions were 
defined by hobbies and family gatherings, which were not to 
be confused with business deals. Self-development was not 
pursued as public lifelong learning, but in the private library 
and through travel. Each of these areas of life was visible to 
different groups of people, with minimal overlap between 
them. Accidentally happening on a business partner while 
on an errand made for not a little awkwardness. Today, with 
incentives to collect contacts in social media hubs and a feed 
that covers the “whole me,” this unease about conflating or 
mixing the private with the professional is of necessity disap-
pearing. With so many eyes following, the entire life package 
is offered up for judgment. Perhaps this is not so bad.
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§ Naming Contest
Social media can compel users to curate even their behaviour, 
to alembicate and edit their own speech and displays of 
emotion, since their public self-control extends into periods 
of social activity in isolation, covering most waking hours. 
Perhaps the social media age deserves to be called the Age of 
the Art of the Person. The long-term effects on users might 
considerably strengthen their ability to get along in virtual 
and even physical environments. But such arguments from 
wishful thinking, which generalize optimistically about 
the future based on a particular worry about the present, 
do nothing to diminish the pessimistic counterclaim that 
spending time on social media, where access to us is com-
paratively restricted, leads us to mask superficially what we 
once controlled inwardly, ultimately weakening our abil-
ity to check spontaneous reactions in unmediated public 
situations. And if we stop to think of the scandal, spite, and 
hatred that anonymity encourages, perhaps a better name for 
the social media age would be the Age of the Troll.
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§ Wanted: Amanuensis
Who doesn’t like to dictate?
§ Dictationship
A tough sentence is just by the time you finish it.
§ Do As You’re Told
Read every word.
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§ Intramurale
Both the rich and the poor, the ruling and privileged no 
less than the exploited and subordinate, are known to hold 
political ideas contrary to their interests. In the latter group, 
these ideas earn the name ideology; we are dealing here with 
false consciousness. In the former group, they are called 
utopia, which is to say right consciousness. Just as ideology is 
contrary to the interests of the poor, so utopia is contrary to 
the interests of the well-to-do.
The interests of members of each group can certainly 
undergo inversion—that is, perversion from any but their 
own perspective.
§ Daisy Chains
Chains decked with flowers no longer rattle.
Flowers in chains are as fragrant as ever.
The thorn is the flower’s way of saying beauty can be painful. 
A rose grasped too carelessly is a dangerous object. Barbed 
wire is a rose bush depetalled and hardened.
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§ Doing Time
To do time is not to use it. It is to be stuck with all the time 
one needs, and more, and have no way of filling it freely. So 
much time and too little to do. Being locked up with time 
and serving it is no occupation. It is not something even 
an old-timer can become an old hand at. Nothing but time 
on his hands keeps his hands tied. Time is his punishment. 
Instead of lashes and beatings he is administered minutes 
and hours. As long as he has lots of it, time is not on his side.
§ Habeas corpus
No slave should die a natural death. There is a point where 
caution ends and cowardice begins. For every day I am 
imprisoned I will refuse both food and water. My hunger is 
for the Liberation of my people. My thirst is for the ending of 
oppression. . . . Our will to live must no longer supercede our 
will to fight, for our fighting will determine if our race shall 
live.
—H. Rap Brown, letter from Parish Prison,  
New Orleans, February 21, 1968  *
The enduring power of Spartacus’s rebellion is its most 
enduring power; the universality of oppression and resis-
tance to it are secondary. Fast-forward nineteen centuries 
and the language of freedom for the enslaved is used by men 
like Frederick Douglass to speak to comparable conditions 
of captivity. While the tactics of resistance have multiplied, 
as have the media of its publicization, the physical body 
* H. Rap Brown, “H. Rap Brown from Prison,” in Ron Hahne and Ben Morea, Black 
Mask and up against the Wall Motherfucker: The Incomplete Works of Ron Hahne, 
Ben Morea and the Black Mask Group (Oakland, CA: PM, 2011), 74–75.
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continues to be put on the line in all brave emancipatory 
action. Its presence, signifying integrity, expresses that 
shared and ineliminable minimum of human existence, 
physical need. 
We can imagine this will not always be so: that someday 
(perhaps quite soon, given decades of actual and dystopian 
foreshadowing) risking flesh and blood, however heroic it still 
seems to us, will cease to be necessary, and capturing and 
hurting them alone, have no effect. The incarceration and 
torture of the body have always failed to chain the mind to 
it. But the artificially augmented mind is newly vulnerable. 
Disarming the body by throwing it into prison was always 
second- best to mind control and brainwashing, which not 
only leaves the body intact but, as in The Manchurian Candi-
date, renders it cooperative and operational. Human bondage 
may soon seem no less a relic than the binding of feet. We can 
look forward to a grey future in which bodies will be locked 
up by minds locked away in real virtual prisons . . .
§ A Tale of Two Bodies
Two ways for the body of the near future: fit and enslaved, 
or enslaved and broken. Either way: pumped full of drugs, 
plugged into some underserved, overexploited circuit in the 
network.
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§ White on Black
Our recognition of the value of other lives, including those 
recognized by science as human, forms a kind of spectrum, 
on which the difference between animals and humans is not 
clearly marked, poisoning for the longest time interracial 
relations. The events in Ferguson, Mo., ask for an even less 
optimistic interpretation than that offered as a corrective to 
the “unduly optimistic” perspective that understands white 
police officers’ actions in terms, not even of de-humanizing 
blacks, but of a pervasive blindness to their humanity. The 
basis of this latter, humanist position is the “psychologically 
dubious assumption . . . that when people who have histor-
ically enjoyed a dominant position in society (in this case 
white men) come to recognize historically subordinated 
people (racial minorities, women) as their moral and social 
equals, they will welcome the newcomers.”  * The black people 
whose protest slogan read “In Seeing Our HUMANITY You 
Will Find Your OWN (#blacklivesmatter)” clearly endorsed 
this line of thinking.  †
The corrective, critical line on the humanist view finds 
support in the whites’ punitive resentment, so clearly in 
evidence. The thesis here is that what fuels white rage and 
inspires (instead of follows from) black dehumanization is 
the threat blacks pose to the social hierarchy. There is much 
truth in this, of course, especially when considered alongside 
the motivation for lynchings. The threat of usurpation—sex-
ual, political, economic— of whites’ place in American 
society by black people was, and no doubt continues to be, 
perceived as real in many quarters. But precisely by reason 
of the long and complex history of racism, we must take 
issue with this as the sole explanation. We must look farther 
* Kate Manne, “In Ferguson and Beyond, Punishing Humanity,” New York Times, 
Oct. 12, 2014, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/in-ferguson-and- 
beyond-punishing-humanity/.
† Charles Rex Arbogast, Associated Press photo, accessed Mar. 10, 2015, http://
www.cbc.ca/news/world/missouri-protests-arrests-but-no-reported-clashes-on- 
moral-monday-1.2797581.
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back into the past of white on black violence, to the age of 
slavery. We will then have no trouble seeing that discrimina-
tion on the social hierarchy affected only some, select blacks; 
most fell outside the narrow band of human society on the 
value-spectrum of lives, and were treated as human only to 
the extent that they could follow orders and had basic needs 
for food and shelter (whose denial could then be used to con-
trol them). They were human enough to do human work, no 
more. In what is perhaps an indelible legacy of slavery, this 
attitude manifests today on the streets of America.
Let’s indulge in a little timely speculation. Perhaps the 
black people in Ferguson and beyond could get better results 
by claiming for recognition, not of their common humanity, 
but of something else. Perhaps in the current climate of hate 
their time would be better spent, not on appeals to human 
empathy, but on a cunning détournement of historical reason. 
The struggle for civil rights for blacks is as old as human 
rights. But does not the cause of animal rights have the 
advantage at least of novelty and near-automatic sympathy? 
Perhaps to protect themselves from being killed they would 
be well-advised to present themselves as harmless because 
long-domesticated animals, rather than the ferocious beasts 
they routinely seem to armed and armoured cops? Or would 
whites resent them for it even more? For what exactly? For 
being as some who take aim at them would no doubt like 
themselves to be— excused from morality and responsibil-
ity—and who, at moments of great moral pressure and risk 
of error, would give anything for a heavy horse’s collar, as 
one sees now and then fashioned into a mirror frame, to 
wear around their neck?
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§ Concrete Is Hard
Empathy knows no “hard” or “natural” limits. If another’s 
shoes prove a good fit, why not go in them beyond the pathos 
of creatureliness, past weeping the lacrimae rerum, all the 
way to one’s own destruction, choosing it over empathy’s 
death?
The only living limits to empathy are distraction, thief of 
attentive feeling, and judgment, which projects onto empa-
thizers its own ulterior motives. Historically, as soon as a 
conceptual gulf opened up between social self-construction 
and biological being, and identity became something one 
could consciously construct and claim, survival- as much as 
sympathy- and empathy-based claims of alternate gender or 
racial belonging, that is to say without obvious correspon-
dence to one’s biology, went from being treated as psychic 
aberrations to being criticizable on political grounds.
Only when biological makeup is itself thoroughly histori-
cized can such critical indignation, which betokens above 
all an inability to empathize, be silenced. The conquest of 
gay and lesbian (and presently transgender) rights notwith-
standing, this indignation must persist as long as nature is 
essentialized, appealed to as decisive and unambiguous. 
Where they are made in the abstract, “in the head,” on 
the level of self-perception, even fundamental switches 
in identity are readily portrayed as facile. Their particular 
demands for recognition, if met, fail to bring about legal 
generalization. Only what is perceived as difficult, no matter 
how superficial—such as the awkward social expression of 
new identity, the dramatic alteration of appearance breaking 
with gender or racial conventions to the point of provoking 
outright hostility— can hope, in the long run, to produce the 
desired changes. And when a transformation is so com-
plete that it cannot be seen through, raising no suspicion 
of “deception,” the existential difficulty of the performance 
(once revealed, as it sometimes is after the danger has passed) 
is conceded quickly enough.
But even such rare respect and admiration are not empathy. 
Renouncing one’s “natural” identity, trading it for another, is 
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taken either for a betrayal or, less often, for a sacrifice, this 
even when the change improves one’s social standing. In a 
brutally patriarchal culture, the Egyptian widow and mother 
who for decades posed as a father and man, or the girls in 
certain areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan who live bacha 
posh, as boys, blurring the lines between fact and fiction, are 
all forgiven. To Western eyes, their repudiated femininity 
appears in a heroic light (a phenomenon for which the French 
nation even has a pious icon in the Maid of Orléans).
In a residually misogynistic culture, where women have 
made great strides towards achieving parity, the high- profile 
cases of Bradley- cum- Chelsea Manning or Bruce- cum- 
 Caitlyn Jenner receive less sympathy than pity (their sacri-
fices were not obviously beneficial) or indulgence (though 
biology doesn’t lie, it can be fooled). Public reaction on the 
spectrum of political correctness ranges in such cases from 
sisterly embrace through the recognition of courage to a 
shrug to the curiosity accorded to freaks. Femininity was 
never so alienated as to be, when claimed by a man, con-
tested and condemned for having been claimed falsely; from 
the female point of view, the man- to- woman switch may be 
redeemed as much by “being oneself” as by the trans person’s 
appreciation or empathy for the secondary sex, an impulse to 
be commended even when its expression is not.
Yet the white woman who for many years chose to iden-
tify as black for no doubt complex reasons, in which empa-
thy with the discriminated against must have had a share 
(alongside factors like family upbringing and ancestry, gender 
and environment) —such a woman is judged mercilessly as a 
self- serving fraud. Increasingly, politicized suffering refuses 
to be appropriated, particularly by those who had not suf-
fered. There is no special treatment for impostors, no matter 
how genuine their empathy and devotion to sharing the fate 
of the oppressed. As long as the victims of suffering remain 
disempowered, they deserve at least to own all their pain as 
they own debt or their many other negative attributes. The 
happy and the spared, meanwhile, worry where such cross-
overs, were they to become numerous enough, might lead all 
those conscious of inequality without being themselves hard 
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hit. Any such polarization, with activists and intellectuals on 
the “wrong side,” could spell the end of “natural advantage.” 
In this way an extreme manifestation of white-black empa-
thy finds itself doubly condemned.
Those who want to change their life concretely and signifi-
cantly by identifying in their mind and appearance with the 
long-dominated who have become politically conscious of 
their subjugation face a dilemma: identity self-reassignment 
entails the possibility of being publically outed and con-
demned. These are the hard-fact disincentives to the new 
identity’s full concretion. These also are the hindrances to 
mobilization in solidarity—be it from a distance or via active 
transversality—against those who have the greatest stakes in 
maintaining an unjust status quo, where biological knowl-
edge hopelessly stuck in three dimensions is the arbiter of 
fate. 
In a remarkable short story by the neo-abolitionist 
anthropologist Holley Cantine, the surviving Plains Indians 
live up to their romanticized image and the reputation for 
cold-blooded savagery that follows it, in a bid to return 
America to something like its pre-conquest state. Recog-
nizing an opportunity in their summons to save the flag-
ging U. S. tourism industry (and later on, taking advantage 
of “white” greed); recognizing, too, the strategic value of 
converts to their way of life (if anything, underestimating 
the zeal of these would-be indigenes), they train an army of 
warriors and together take over the country. At first it feels 
to them like an elaborate costume drama, but within a few 
years, having become “naturals” at it, they transform the 
original economic telos into a political, counter-providential 
one (“the sacred mission of the Indians”). For everyone and 
everything involved—the natives, the kids running away 
from consumer society in pursuit of adventure and out of 
sympathy for the underdog’s “general rising,”  * not to mention 
the well- meaning tribal ethnologists and nature itself, the 
animals and the land—for all except committed “whites,” 
* Holley Cantine, Second Chance: A Story (Bearsville, NY: Retort, 1961), 22, 23.
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whatever their skin colour, the ensuing civil war represents a 
second chance no one prevents them from taking.
In real life, such stories do not always end well. Regard-
less of the strength of self-interest, all seems to hang on 
the breadth and depth of mutual empathy. Article 14 of the 
1805 Constitution of Haiti stated: “All acceptation of colour 
among the children of one and the same family, of whom the 
chief magistrate is the father, being necessarily to cease, the 
Haytians shall hence forward be known only by the generic 
appellation of Blacks.” The inclusivity of that appellation has 
perhaps never been more generous. 
But even those real-life cases that do end well do not 
always end good. Far-reaching empathy is necessarily selec-
tive, but not automatically right. In the eyes of global public 
opinion makers, global jihadism is a pandemic. But where 
the possible self-interested advantages of empathy outweigh 
concerns over the authenticity of identity, a battle, be it good 
or evil, is already half won.
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§ Torn-Country Experts
draft 1:
The perspective of the native informant is too restricted, 
too biased to give us knowledge. Its bias confirms what we 
already know.
draft 2:
The perspective of the native informant is too restricted, too 
biased to give us knowledge. Its bias is the knowledge we 
want confirmed.
§ Two-Way Terror
A modern nightmare-fantasy: to wind up in solitary at a black 
site. It is a simple inversion of a modern fantasy-nightmare: 
to be blindfolded and flown half-way around the world and 
dumped in a desert wilderness. Common to both renderings 
is sensory day-for-night disorientation and impotence, in the 
first case dreaded, in the second desired.
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§ Uncanny Valentines
In a culture as enervated as the Western one, pleasure cannot 
be derived from forestalled threats any more than excite-
ment comes from civilizational anxiety or terror. But when 
the French “Charlies” gathered together and defiant, they 
marched united and proud: the nose-count demonstrated 
they were many—there had never been so large a public rally 
in France! Who could deny that from this solidarity flowed a 
kind of sovereign joy?
If Michel Houellebecq, author of the novel Submission, does 
“do Ramadan in 2022,” it will be out of boredom, expediency, 
or intimidation. If ISIS has its way in the East and Europe 
submits to its Muslims, their countdown to the End of 
Times will not, like New Year’s Eve, do it for everyone. But 
apocalypticism continues to have a morbid, minority appeal 
in the spiritual West. The more mixed, crowded and explo-
sive the world becomes, the more “open” civil society will 
be to citizens who root for its enemies and attackers. Their 
hearts will swell at the thought of faraway dramas and faiths, 
uncompromising and righteous causes. They will beat the 
rhythm of crude romanticism counter to calculation, of old 
asceticism contrary to distraction, of communal sacrifice 
against individual life and satisfaction. The souls of these 
not-quite-defectors will cheer secretly, but cheer nonethe-
less—and leap in anticipation of either sounding the alarm 
at home or joining secret comrades on distant soil.
§ Apocalyptic Anti-Apocalypticism
Nanterre, France, 2016: “Another end of the world is possible.”
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§ Allegory of Politics
In simple terms that might yet speak to those who would like 
to see the body put back in political action, politics is soci-
ety’s dance with conflict, that is to say an art form. Either side 
can take the lead. Leading and being led are the basal modes 
of society’s political dynamic. The tendency to reduce this 
dynamic to power relations must be acknowledged for what 
it is: a minatory attempt to take the art out of politics so as 
to perpetuate the illusion of the rationalizability and finally 
the automatizability of political life. It must therefore be 
resisted. At least on the left, based on a dear but caricatural 
distinction between twentieth-century ideological extremes, 
resistance takes the form of producing political art through 
alliances among artists and activists. The same cannot be 
said of today’s right—unless by “art of politics” we mean 
merely the kind of smoke- and- mirror campaigns that the 
moderate political spectrum officially condemns.
To return to the metaphor of the dance, if society reins 
in conflict by the elegant, stately movements of a polonaise 
(some times phlegmatic, sometimes energetic), conflict com-
pels it to a sprightly polka that at times quite resembles 
jumping on hot coals. We can picture war as conflict sweep-
ing up society in a feral whirl, furious and disorienting. 
When the pair does come to a stop, society is still reeling, 
and needs a few moments to recover its balance. If society 
takes the lead again, it suffers much criticism for letting itself 
get mixed up in a tarantistic frenzy, allowing “the blind to 
lead the blind,” etc.
Through the many styles and moves that conflict takes 
it, or that it takes conflict, each society must always keep 
up with conflict; were it to trip, it would be trampled and 
defeated in the tournament by competitors for first place.
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§ “Murderous Alphabet”
Where the world is run by hunger, words grow dull—but 
syllables, murderous. Stripped to the bone and whetted, 
language is sharp as a butcher’s knife where there is plenty of 
meat to go around. Hunger makes language do the killing in 
the name of ending it.
§ Friendly Fire
Boss, this is a roast.
—reportedly said of a deadly fire in New York City
It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.
—reportedly said of one Vietnamese town by an 
unnamed U. S. officer following the Tet Offensive
bug splat: name for a drone casualty on the ground
The desensitization of police and soldiers in combat zones to 
the sight of human calamity manifests most not in offensive 
language and fatuous jokes, in which sexism and racism are 
at ease, but in absent-minded dark humour.
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§ Rarae aves
Long before the Civil War era, there were common folk, 
white and black, who spoke as they wrote and whose written 
style was uncommonly refined and effortless. Unexpected, 
they astonished. If we believe westerns, most people com-
municated by nods and grunts, curtsies and tobacco spit. 
Illiteracy was common, and on those who learned to read 
the influence of printed matter was akin to being touched 
by an angel—so elevated did their diction become, so clear 
and inspired their thinking and writing. How much truer 
was this of blacks before the Emancipation Proclamation. 
One need only think of slave-born poetess Phyllis Wheatley 
and writer/orator Frederick Douglass to see it as a miracu-
lous occurrence. With the steady rise in mass literacy, such 
unearthly refinement soon dropped in value as a source of 
envy or mark of distinction. It not only stood out less; its 
vanishing was foreordained. The ability to write well is now 
taken for granted by the educated (just as taste, which can 
be bought, is assumed to follow wealth). As a result, ever less 
effort is expended to prove it—as ever less effort is made to 
ensure that such miracles occur again.
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§ The Seeing Eye
The oldest American guide dog academy, from which the 
“seeing-eye dog” took its name, was established in 1929 on 
the model of similar schools founded in Germany to assist 
handicapped war veterans. This was just a few years after 
the founding of the Institute for Social Research at the 
University of Frankfurt, after which the school of Critical 
Theory, the “Frankfurt School,” has come to be known. (This 
institution, too, had an American equivalent, the New School 
for Social Research in New York, which preceded it, set up 
on another German model in 1919.) The thinkers associated 
with Critical Theory, then as now, acquired a reputation for 
philosophical profundity, acute awareness of social injus-
tice, and a wide-ranging critique of ideology, full of oracular 
warnings and admonitions. What they have dubbed the 
culture industry is pointless and visionless. The goal of the 
Institute is to train those who can see through it, and see 
us through it, to social change and a better use of reason. 
Where would we, blind, be without their help? The answer is: 
not only lost but imperiled without knowing it.
We approach the street corner (our cane broken, our ears 
clogged) and pause on the curb, mere steps from the flow of 
traffic. This, then, is the moment of the seeing-eye dog.  *
* Full credit for the extended metaphor only paraphrased here goes to Arnd 
Pollmann.
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§ The Seven Years’ War Again
Usurping the place of high theory (a North American inven-
tion) is low theory and cultural studies. When done well, cul-
tural studies works to bring theory to practice. When done 
badly, it is little more than a theory mash-up —a free-for-all, 
rootless, abstracted “theory in general.” 
Its power as a backlash against the cultured (read: elitist) 
nature of high theory cannot be denied. Cultural stud-
ies came via Britain to the shores of North America, and 
squared off against French high theory imported there. The 
Seven Years’ War all over again!
§ Origin of Revolution
Every revolution was first a thought in one man’s mind.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson  *
No revolution was first thought alone. (Even if eventually it 
wound up that way.)
* Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History,” in Essays, First Series (1841; New York: John B. 
Alden, 1890), 36.
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§ Free Radicals
Radicals uproot; they know how deep the roots go. Often, 
caught in the act, they leave some roots behind.
The roots regroup. The weeds come back.
§ Nothing Doing
The history of the word act is Southern, Latin; that of deed, 
Northern, Germanic. “Acting” comes from “urging,” “setting 
in motion,” “stirring up”; “doing,” from “placing,” “unloading,” 
“setting down.”
Revolutions are made, never done. And to make them 
means to act in them.
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§ Hope Salve
. . . to hope, till Hope creates 
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates
—Percy Bysshe Shelley  *
The Hope Salve so popular nowadays is warm and feels 
good when applied, without burning through the thick layer 
of widespread political apathy and stimulating sustainable 
activism. Its effect, principally soothing, is too dispersed, 
reliant on nebulous ideas like the magic of contingency, res-
onance, event—that is, someone else, somewhere else, doing 
something “real” that greases and sets the wheels of revo-
lution in motion. (As for us, we’ll hop on hopeful only once 
momentum is gained.)
The real diehards of neoliberal “end-of-history” cant, 
whose numbers continue to dwindle and who have them-
selves no need of this mass “salvation,” enjoy the “canopy 
view” and are justified in thinking Hope a scam, unsafe, a 
deal for addicts of greener pastures. While the former do not 
exactly throw money at the latter, watchdogs with no per-
sonal use for Hope cannot help benefiting in countless ways 
from Hope-fanatics’ rising indignation and world-changing 
itch (which, again, they are not actually scratching). Are not 
doomsayers who see things spinning out of control already 
calling for a “War on Hope”? Is not this Hope already tar-
geted with secret weapons?
Meanwhile, hope with a backbone, de facto and dangerous, 
is the concealed switchblade of hardened activists or edgy 
newbies. No diehards out there who haven’t at least one 
dog in that fight of such long standing: the state vs. really- 
 existing radicalism. Far from a drain on politics- as- usual, it 
calls for mongrel means.
* Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound (1820; Charleston, SC: Nabu, 2010), 
Act 4, ll. 573–74.
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§ Body Politics
The body, needy and desirous, is a Snow White radicals have 
kissed awake.
§ #OtherwiseOccupied
There is no room in well-organized camps for the “eroticism 
of crowds.” Prurience is in the eyes of the beholders. Dwell-
ers in glass houses, believing their privacy to be guaranteed 
by everyone else’s lack of it, and modelling nothing (no better 
possible world) as a result—let them cast the first stones!
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§ “I’m not crying,  
 I’ve just got some #CUPE3903 in my eye”  *
The working classes . . . are the caring classes, and always 
have been. It is just the incessant demonisation directed 
at the poor by those who benefit from their caring 
labour . . . Most of us felt work was best avoided, that is, 
unless it benefited others. But of work that did, whether it 
meant building bridges or emptying bedpans, you could 
be rightly proud. And there was something else we were 
definitely proud of: that we were the kind of people who 
took care of each other. That’s what set us apart from the 
rich who, as far as most of us could make out, could half 
the time barely bring themselves to care about their own 
children. . . .There is a reason why the ultimate bourgeois 
virtue is thrift, and the ultimate working-class virtue is 
solidarity. Yet this is precisely the rope from which that class 
is currently suspended. . . . As a result everything is thrown 
into reverse. Generations of political manipulation have 
finally turned that sense of solidarity into a scourge. Our 
caring has been weaponised against us. And so it is likely 
to remain until the left, which claims to speak for labourers, 
begins to think seriously and strategically about what most 
labour actually consists of, and what those who engage in it 
actually think is virtuous about it.
—David Graeber  †
If Graeber is right, then all these beautiful feelings of soli-
darity and mutual aid are a product of oppression. As there is 
nothing to be done about the past, we accept it. But for that 
we embrace the beautiful feelings no less. If they are indeed 
the rope from which we are to be suspended, then let us hang 
onto it for dear life.
* Tina Boutis, tweet, Mar. 9, 2015, https://twitter.com/tboutis/status/ 
575081213582557185. CUPE 3903 is a chapter of the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees.
† David Graeber, “Caring Too Much. That’s the Curse of the Working Classes,” 
Guardian, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
mar/26/caring-curse-working-class-austerity-solidarity-scourge.
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§ All Is Not Quiet
So long as men die, liberty will never perish.
—Charlie Chaplin’s final, democratic speech  
in The Great Dictator  *
Set aside the solidarity of slumber. Do not wait for death to 
make you equals. Think instead of the gains you could be 
making when an enemy is asleep or a tyrant breathes his last. 
When one side dies or dozes, the other must advance against 
it. In the absence of natality, fatality serves as a beginning. A 
modern front does not fall silent until the war is over.
* The Great Dictator, directed by Charlie Chaplin (1940; Burbank, CA: Warner 
Home Video, 2003), DVD.
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§ Arms
[S]ince the handling of arms is a beautiful spectacle, it is 
delightful to young men. 
—Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War  *
The bullet-shooting weapon, heavy and shiny, in full working 
order, is associated with sexual organs in both sexes. The 
beauty of such objects derives from anticipated or real tactile 
pleasure, since handling them approximates pre-coital rituals 
meant to heighten eventual discharge. As long as there are 
shooting ranges, animals to poach, people to ravish, and 
no wars to fight in, the bearers of guns will find delight in 
handling arms unmarred by their chief purpose. By such 
primitive aesthetic pleasure murderousness is truncated, yet 
its roots continue to grow. The link to hunting and sharp-
shooting nearly guarantees this. For the same reason, when 
the occasion arises for the weapon to be put to its proper use, 
with desire rerouted along its “natural” path of life-and-death 
power over other people, the pleasurable associations are slow 
to dissolve, and sometimes never do. The stamina of a senior 
serviceman taking aim both surprises and impresses. During 
peacetime, in turn, the experiential tie of weapons to murder-
ousness affects sensual pleasure, as ejaculation and orgasm 
mimic the violent discharge of a gun, and the handling of 
arms by the veteran recalls to him the cold corpse of his com-
rade. The minds of those whom we task with murder on our 
behalf have swung from one to the other extreme of accept-
able social behaviour—from mandated killing to sexual grati-
fication. Charges of sadism in war and peacetime depend on 
a mechanistic notion of body and mind, as if our parts could 
be divvied up between tasks and memory neatly partitioned. 
In fact, the compartmentalization of sensory memories of 
physical violence and carnal pleasure expected of us is much 
too crude and limited to bear such charges out.
* Niccolò Machiavelli, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Christopher Lynch (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 29.
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§ Last Man Dying
Just why the effort to open a Taliban office has faltered is 
a matter of dispute. The Americans say the Taliban have 
simply decided to continue fighting, worried by pressure 
from their own hard-liners and concerned that entering 
peace talks would sap their will on the battlefield. “No one 
wants to be the last one to die before peace talks start,” as 
one diplomat put it. 
—Rod Nordland  *
Those who die at the end of a long conflict are always the 
most pitied of casualties, and this not only because they were 
so close to seeing peace. Their death falls on the cusp of that 
long-awaited time when sacrifices finally bear fruit, but the 
turning point in the struggle is backdated. That is why they 
are said to have “died for nothing,” unnecessarily. The urge 
to keep fighting must come not just from habit and mistrust 
of information, but from a fear of dying “needlessly.”
§ Customary Hail of Arrows
If there is one pernicious stereotype that has clung to indig-
enous people, it is their blind hostility. This, in combination 
with their unfortunate naïvety about modern power and 
their tendency towards substance abuse, spells nothing as 
much as oblivion—indeed, a devotion to it. Ever since the 
white man arrived with no good intentions, encouraged by 
papal Discovery Bulls, royal warrants, or simply his own 
enterprising greed, his behaviour provoked what he wanted 
* Rod Nordland, “Peace Envoys from Taliban at Loose Ends in Qatar,” New York 
Times, Apr. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/asia/taliban- 
peace-envoys-in-qatar-with-nothing-to-do.html.
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confirmed, regardless of whether he met with native hospi-
tality, suspicion, or indifference. Indigenous peoples were 
enslavable—though they did merit the status of opponent 
despite their ignorance of the European art of war—and the 
land on which they roamed but which was not theirs prop-
erly speaking was eventually wrested out from under them. 
Now that they are no longer subjugated and their possessions 
are being returned to them, the stereotype of native stupidity 
seems also to be on its way out. Primitive societies, on which 
modern European civilization has trained its self-concept, 
have largely been absorbed and elevated by their modern 
models—the (selective) return to traditional lifeways can be 
marshalled as proof. 
Yet the stereotypical image lives on, fed by exceptions: the 
so-called uncontacted tribes that can be counted on the fin-
gers of one hand. Progress in accepting otherness depends in 
the last analysis on the others’ getting with our progressive 
program. The savages, objects of much sentimentality in the 
case of eighteenth-century philosophers and early anthro-
pologists, show themselves (when caught on camera from 
ship or helicopter) as radically because civilizationally other. 
They speak not a word of modernity, never mind speaking it 
unevenly! 
It is therefore a blessing that our thinking about wilder-
ness began to shift towards conservation when it did. The 
last remaining savages’ resemblance to the higher animals 
or earlier hominids places their interests under our concern 
for biodiversity. Reports of “Stone Age tribes” defending 
themselves with the “customary hail of arrows”  * ought to be 
pitched not to anthropologists but to the same audience as 
wildlife videos of wildebeest stampedes—if it will keep the 
civilizing process at bay.
* Peter Foster, “Stone Age Tribe Kills Fishermen Who Strayed onto Island,” 
Telegraph, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
india/1509987/Stone-Age-tribe-kills-fishermen-who-strayed-on-to-island.html.
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§ “In search of weapons and allies”  *
Kindliness towards the last remaining “uncontacted” tribes 
and civilizational remorse over the victims of modernity are 
one and the same. The fate of the former is a foregone con-
clusion when even kindness can prove lethal to them. But the 
conclusion is easier to accept when the fate of all of us is in 
jeopardy. In our tardy identification with them we are closing 
the circle of History. The last surviving aboriginals represent 
the last survivors, the blinking “last men” of the future.
The tortured sentiment of compassion does nothing, how-
ever, to counteract the naked economic interest of “human 
safaris.” Since the first forbids contact with the object of its 
concern, it cannot warn or arm the natives against their raid-
ers, nor catch these “tour guides” in the act of corruption.
But there is reason to hope for moral reform, helped, as 
usual, by policing. Not all tour operators are as heartless. “We 
do not offer any possibility to see [the Mashco-Piro tribe],” 
one of them maintains. “It is very dangerous to attempt 
any contact with them. A simple cold can kill them all. Any 
attempt to try to contact this people can put you in jail in 
Peru and Brazil,”  † he adds matter-of-factly. 
Every such operator must know that the thinning of the 
forests, and thus the exposure of those who live in them, is 
a curse in disguise. The fate of the “uncontacted” tribes and 
that of the tourism industry are obviously linked. As civilized 
barbarians in the shape of loggers and drug traffickers invade, 
the tribesmen will make contact. Not managing to arm or save 
themselves, they will either make enemies or drop like flies, 
reactivating in us that schizophrenic blend of compassion and 
exploitation otherwise known as modernity.
* “Isolated Indigenous Tribe Make Contact with Outside World in Brazil,” Tele-
graph, July 31, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/ 
brazil/11002162/Isolated-indigenous-tribe-make-contact-with-outside-world-
in-Brazil.html.
† David Hill, “‘Human Safaris’ Pose Threat to Uncontacted Amazon Tribe,” Guard-
ian, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/26/human-safari- 
threat-amazon-tribe. 
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§ Armed to the Teeth
We will also not pay for dental work resulting from . . . the 
hostile action of any armed forces, insurrection or participa-
tion in a riot or civil commotion. 
—Sun Life Financial health insurance policy,  
extended plan exclusion
A This tells you which side the insurers are not on.
B Yes, in our society you’ve got to be armed to the teeth.
§ Made with Pride
B The self-made man is still “Made in America.”
A Yes, America still makes those who make themselves.
§ Garden of Creativity
Expectations of creativity have never been so elevated and 
organized so many waking hours of our lives. Notice what 
has happened: creativity has replaced simple, vulgar pro-
ductivity. Insofar as our labour does not consist of mindless, 
mechanical repetition, we are all creators now, that is to 
say artists of sorts. The ubiquity of competitive creativity 
under late capitalism is, we are told, liberally rewarded. More 
importantly, it is not the soul-destroying work of yesteryear, 
but the personally fulfilling, self-realizing activity that is 
well worth hacking your own life to get better at. It is not the 
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victory of creativity that distinguishes our twenty-first cen-
tury, but the victory of the creativity industry over creativity.
The downside is that everyone interpellated as a sub-
ject bears the double burden of competitive initiative and 
invention. Such doubly creative labour feels less and less like 
a matter of personal choice, even among the self-employed, 
the artists of old. It feels less and less like play, to which 
it is compared. The ludic spaces and sandboxes that pop 
up in creativity-worshipping workplaces are meant to get 
creative juices flowing and put the instrumentality of work 
out of mind. In them, the market becomes Demiurge and 
revenue, a totem pole, while workers magically transform 
into lesser deities crafting new forms for a tired universe. 
Driven to it, even on the universe’s behalf, can we still see 
creativity (even its artistic variety) as a figure of autonomy 
and self- realization? A strange migration of normativity and 
constraint from traditional social codes to allegedly free- for- 
 all creativity has damaged the latter’s claim to spontaneity 
and freedom. Not that the correlative relaxation of norms 
and hierarchies isn’t a welcome surprise for those sectors in 
which creativity was traditionally excluded from all but the 
very top ranks. With the top now relieved of much of the 
pressure to innovate, workers new to the job would be for-
given for thinking themselves collaborators freely contribut-
ing to the “creative commons”—and (gee-whizz) even getting 
paid! Until they realize that the fruits of their creative labour, 
which they can often afford, are appropriated and incorpo-
rated into designs and projects they can never hope to afford.
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§ ♫ Imagine there’s . . .  ♫
Our time places extreme demands on the imagination. 
Without it we should think ourselves unfit to carry on. The 
passe-partout of salvation and survival, imagination is key to 
adapting to new rules in private and political life, the ever 
“new realities” foisted on us by the breathless motivation and 
breathtaking ingenuity of capital to create needs, goods, and 
musts, and ever more urgent futures to match them—rather 
than let us sleep, having us imagine uses for the still useless. 
Through our own mental effort are revised not just the rules 
but also the name of the game. The market appeals to us to 
imagine x (a better world, a better life, better relationships, 
more rewarding pastimes, alternative selves . . . ) and—as 
drowsy or lazy as we are—most of the time we do. Every 
meaningful improvement seems to hang these days on the 
employment of our imagination as potential consumers of 
some yet unproduced product. Capital sees the power that 
slumbers in so many of us and harnesses it before waking it 
up with the lightest tickle. 
And if we struggle a little pulling with us some invisible 
investor, we don’t recognize it as exploitation and imposition. 
It is too natural to struggle, there is struggle even in play. 
Our imagination self-serving? We feel duty-bound to contrib-
ute at least most of it to the common good. We are doing our 
bit. We are merely giving a leg up to ideas hatching in the 
minds of visionaries, to creativity that, without our inspired 
assent, might never see the light of day. We are research 
collaborators who do not require credit, even if it’s our effort 
to envision them as a part of our life that imagines them into 
being.
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§ Bromides
The rich and the poor are the most creative, the first because 
they have the luxury to, the second because they need to. 
The first need purpose and meaning, the second improvise to 
save their necks.
Bromides, bromides! Without the middling classes to take 
them to task, bring them to account, and draw out the best 
in them, they would give us, respectively, “art without ends” 
(the rich) and “art without means” (the poor).
§ So-So
“A middle rank is much more favourable to talent, so we find 
all great artists and poets in the middle classes.”  * Though 
Goethe had in mind social rank, his remark can apply muta-
tis mutandis also to sales rank. Unfortunately the argument 
would be hard to make with the metrics in use today.
B Hold on, you mean our data analysis fails to bear out 
something so self-evident? The middle rank tries less to 
please and conform, suspicious and disdainful of others’ 
ability to rise. Its outsized ambition, more acutely felt and 
self-sustaining the more it accepts its divergence from 
mass appeal, pushes it to try new things. To survive and 
live up to its own expectations, “mediocrity’s” ambition 
reorients itself towards transcendent merit, the standard 
of transcendence towards some absolute pantheon or 
heaven, and, crucially, away from temporary “success.” 
(This it has in common with the disposition that already 
canonized living writers have to their life’s work, as they 
look back to measure themselves by nothing as petty as 
* Goethe, Conversations with Eckermann, 89.
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the judgment of their contemporaries.) Aren’t that ambi-
tion, perseverance, aloofness from fashion, and indif-
ference to the market, of which principally the mid-list 
or unpublished writer is still capable, precisely what 
gives us—and eventually counts as—“originality” and 
“authenticity”?
A I won’t mock your hope, with which I sympathize without 
quite being able to identify. The mid-list is now synony-
mous with mediocrity (no scare quotes here) and great-
ness measured by popularity. It pains me to think that 
“originality,” annexed by vapid “greatness,” is also being 
indexed to sales figures. To turn the trend around, this 
way of thinking would have to change: there’s a lot to be 
said for a work making up for its unimpressive sales with 
its origin, its coming from precisely where originality is 
not expected—if not the middling social stratum, then let 
it be the stratum of mediocre sales! But good luck trying 
to convince those who want to see greatness only where 
the money collects, and who would ride on greenback all 
the way to real mediocrity—their happy end.
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§ Night Watch
Sleeping one’s fill, as physical regeneration and cognitive 
housekeeping, is a luxury that even the rich, let alone those 
following suit, cannot afford. Lack of sleep is one of the few 
things they have in common with the poor. When they do 
close their eyes, neither expect the law to watch over them, 
only some good angel to keep away illness and bad dreams, or 
some personal god of discipline to keep them from sleeping 
in.
Peace and quiet, indoor voices, “bedtime,” and community 
watch are the middle-class answers to these to-be-avoided 
extremes. With children in the picture, the substance of 
household communication is reduced to the essential while 
its volume, continually adjusted lest it get out of hand. The 
product of multiple renunciations of immoderation and 
of bourgeois power, the middle class aspires to the calm 
atmosphere of the apothecary and the church, to their neigh-
bourly whisper and the confessional undertone. The home 
office rivals the parlour in sleepiness, of which the cushioned 
bedroom is the epitome.
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§ Nostalgia for the Middle Class
For some time now, digging has far exceeded building castles 
in the air. Dugouts, like catacombs, have a history of being 
popular and overcrowded; castles, more spacious, of being 
deserted. It might seem to a stranger that we have invented 
these extremes to make the juste milieu the clear favourite. 
Being desirable, however, it is no longer obtainable, at least 
for most; the queue is very long for something in so very 
short supply (soon nothing in America will be as out of stock 
as moderation). We are lining up for the sweet spot where 
felt lack becomes creative again. We are doing so from both 
sides—both extremes—but it is in the middle, like the noses 
of the Lady and the Tramp, that our interests meet.
§ If the Shoes Fits
Photographs are for the poor what paintings were for the 
rich: proofs of their existence.
§ Mutual Parodies
If it is as Dada thought, that the history of art is a parody of 
the history of politics, surely the history of politics is also a 
parody of the history of art—particularly literature, as oth-
ers have astutely observed. As long as this mutually parodic 
relation is dominant, both art and politics are safe from 
barbarism. But just as barbaric art has a place in museums, 
so barbaric politics has a place in history.
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§ The Gulf of Inattention
In the bourgeois age, an independent merchant would show 
some generosity to every beggar who crossed his path—but 
in these busy, tangled times good men have become just as 
unimaginable as truly evil ones. 
—Adorno  *
It is a comforting thought that the extremes of good and 
evil as we knew them are a thing of the past, that in our 
attention-deficit economy good and evil are losing their 
edge, growing closer together. But this thought is revealed as 
wishful once we see that the extremes of wealth and poverty, 
which stand in for them, are moving ever farther apart.
No one takes pride in being a no-goodnik, only in the 
attendant indignation and rage. These days, pride comes also 
from demanding generosity of the affluent—rather than, as 
mere decades ago, as something taken in one’s work, or in 
holding out for the modest pickings of power and access to 
resources. We do not count on the goodness of those who 
can help us; we just demand that they hand over their goods. 
Our claims have intensified to exert pressure on those who 
might otherwise evade discharging their duty to society at 
a time when noblesse no longer obliges. The atmosphere has 
changed so much that greed is now subject to journalistic 
shaming, publically pilloried as a social sin, whose punish-
ment will come from the righteous future, where our revendi-
cations will be vindicated. No mobbing, no meek praying for 
a good turn; just straight-up political theology.
* Theodor W. Adorno, History and Freedom: Lectures 1964–1965, ed. Rolf Tiede-
mann, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2006), 206.
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§ Clay Pigeon
Why have we been duped into thinking the bourgeois indi-
vidual subject a mere narrative effect, with the narrative taken 
at face value? Because on the level of interpersonal experi-
ence, that’s all we have to go on. The grand narratives told by 
that narrative are a different story. Those we can pick apart 
and inspect, as though they came from an individual.
§ Lying in State
It is alright to lie in public. Those who are genuinely inter-
ested can easily find out our truth from states, the truth 
of who we really are. Why should it matter that it comes not 
from the horse’s mouth?
And since we are not taken at face value anyway (assum-
ing we show a face and it has value), why deny ourselves the 
fun of open dissimulation only to end up misunderstood? As 
long as there is this general understanding, and no one gets 
held to account for what is on record without being “looked 
into” first, showing our true face will only add to the general 
confusion.
  matches:  a  light book 213
§ Up the Ladder to the Roof
For those fed up with the stuffed confines and stuffy routines 
of flats, the rooftop —stomping ground of thieves and feral 
cats—will always hold the promise of adventure. They are 
the souls who will not be kept down, who could have flown 
balloons, braved alpine peaks, joined the circus, or run away 
from home. A roof over their head is only ever as desirable 
as the view from it. And so they endeavour to climb alone 
to the very top —perhaps only socially, but still—until they 
have broken through the seal securing the exit hatch against 
those who have no business there. We who assist them in 
this transgression can only look up in amazement as we give 
them a leg up. And though one rarely notices them from 
the street below, they themselves seem the most amazed 
of all—not so much at the quality of air or the clouds now 
less out of reach, but at their own persistence, their ability 
to stand up to their full height, quite right to feel as though 
they owned the place.
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§ Holes in a Wall
The Casbah to be saved, as is the mandate of the associa-
tion “Sauvons la Casbah,” is still the one in Pontecorvo’s 1965 
Battle of Algiers. The decay of ruins proved slow here, so that 
the historical setting can be entered like a stage-set to this 
day. The original actors are nowhere to be seen, but their 
descendants cannot be far away; that the eyes that follow 
one around have since multiplied does not alter the palpable, 
heavy-lidded wariness at the sight of Western interlopers (for 
the tourist has no place here as a category of visitor). Those 
who prop the walls, backs bent like of the Casbah’s distinc-
tive timber buttresses, know their distant cousins in the clus-
ters of disaffected Arab youths, almost to a man able-bodied, 
on the street corners of other port cities like Marseille. The 
living quarters, when not shot through by light by design, 
caved-in roofs or other dereliction, are dim and cavernous, 
the humble lives inside them announced only by the cries of 
children, animals, and the sound of a smith’s hammer, which 
fills the air with something like music.
§ Humility Itself
“the parenthesis that is my life”
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§ Excellence Clusters
Germany’s atoning for its genocidal history follows the very 
Enlightenment principles that, as its sons once argued with 
great conviction, led by convolute logics and moral meander-
ing to the genocide in the first place. The way to atonement 
is through the institution of order and merit in the academy. 
This effort, which other countries have rushed to imitate, 
begat a formidable new research entity known as the “excel-
lence cluster.”
The model of elite theme-focused research groups or 
“clusters” housed at different universities shows the German 
state to be firmly committed to international leadership 
in the production of knowledge. But as the visiting Indian 
scholar who would not leave Germany without seeing a KZ 
(short and informal for “concentration camp”) might have 
remarked: “You have got to hand it to the Germans: They 
have these things down to a science. First they ‘cluster’ you. 
Then they ‘excellence’ you!”
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§ Mottos for Morale
The Latin university motto, that lofty college ideal, betrays 
the anachronism of its institution and should everywhere be 
changed to “The future ended here.” The line is an infe-
rior if less equivocal riff on La Sapienza’s “Il futuro è passato 
qui,” “The future passed here,” “The future passed by here,” 
“The future here is past.” Will the debt-saddled graduate of 
Johns Hopkins really be “set free” by truth, as affirmed by 
the school’s present maxim, “Veritas Vos Liberabit”? Has the 
University of Missouri fulfilled its mission of “Salus Populi,” 
making popular welfare the law, at least for its students? Did 
the graduates of Lesley University, “Perissem Ni Perstitissem,” 
not let down its alma mater by perishing despite all their 
persistence? Have the female bachelors of the University 
of Maryland seen the light of “Fatti Maschii, Parole Femine,”  * 
which attributes deeds to men, and to women, mere words?
§ Feminist Taunt
Wenny, weedy, weeky—I insist!
* The university has dissociated itself from the motto, which remains that of the 
State of Maryland, albeit in a gentler translation, “Strong deeds, gentle words.”
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§ Let Me See Your Report Card
The dilemma is false: either you stay the course of school and 
hope for the best, or you drop out and, having briefly landed 
in the social safety net (the support and dismay of council-
ors, family and friends), you pass through it, sinking right 
down to the scummed and stigmatized bottom. The choice 
between the latter path’s sure nothing and the former’s 
possible everything is such a no- brainer that it leaves those 
who make it no illusion of existential freedom. Embarking 
freely on the path of “illiteracy” is not choosing at all, merely 
succumbing to wayward environmental pressures. It is not 
clear how much cultural capital really accrues to those who 
put themselves through school, but it is obvious that none 
can come from saying no to it. The very act of opting out 
nullifies any claim to cultural literacy; with some notable 
exceptions, it is proof of fundamental, irredeemable foolish-
ness. Neither is homeschooling the Rousseauian or hippie- 
 communist refuge it used to be; the word is code for online 
learning and long-distance education, when not downright 
survivalism or fanaticism. So that the choice between two 
viable alternatives, the formal and the unstructured, is never 
really permitted, and cannot ultimately be made.
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§ Cliché Alert
cliché: 1825, “electrotype, stereotype,” technical word in 
printer’s jargon for “stereotype block,” supposedly echoing of 
the sound of a mold striking molten metal. Figurative exten-
sion to “trite phrase, worn-out expression” is first attested in 
1888, following the course of stereotype (OED)
The novelist Teju Cole, in a republished series of “letters to a 
young writer” from his Nigerian days, advises the fledgling: 
“remove all clichés from your writing. Spare not a single one. 
The cliché is an element of herd thinking, and writers should 
be solitary animals” (but writing can also be “lonely,” he 
later notes, and proposes blogging to alleviate this solitude).  * 
The cliché, in any shape or form, is apparently beneath any 
self-respecting writer. 
Rather than point out clichés in the work of those who 
rail against them, let’s present a counterargument, making 
better use of the above-quoted lines, which benefit from the 
doubt we are happy to give to Mr. Cole. Doesn’t his thought 
encapsulate the writer’s thought-clichés of a solitary craft 
and Nietzschean Weltanschauung? Assuming these were 
deliberately planted, they are in Cole’s eyes (and not just 
his!) a creative foundation, formative in the quest for liter-
ary greatness. Of course, “what we call originality is little 
more than the fine blending of influences” (24). (We permit 
ourselves to notice that “little more” is nonetheless more.) Is 
not the subtle message, the deeper lesson here: the road to 
originality leads through the hackneyed? To leave off clichés 
you must be able to recognize them—and be on the alert, for 
they hide in plain sight! Well, it seems we would have passed 
the test, but as for getting the message . . .To this we take 
exception, if real writers are indeed such sworn enemies of 
clichés (marking their slalom up Mount Originality by being 
* Teju Cole, “Eight Letters to a Young Writer,” Words Follow Me (blog), Oct. 27, 
2010, 6, http://wordsfollowme.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/teju-cole-eight- 
letters-to-a-young-writer2.pdf. First published 2008–2009 in weekly install-
ments in the Nigerian newspaper NEXT.
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skillfully avoided) as Cole makes them out to be, or if the 
good writer not into racing herds clichés together and puts 
them out to pasture. 
Our view is, first of all, not so absolute. They may be 
tired from overwork, the job of communication and sim-
plification, but clichés interest us a great deal. Rather than 
dumped, they can be (productively) dismantled, dissected, 
even “deconstructed.” They can keep us busy, serve as 
themes for literary creation. As foot-soldiers of rhetoric 
strategically deployed, they are indispensable. While they 
can replace the effort of original thought, they are hardly the 
seal of one-dimensionality. Often, they are the mind’s way 
of handling material too large or difficult for it. They pack 
chaotic thoughts into familiar, uncontroversial “notions” and 
set phrases for use in social situations that call for decorum 
and assent, or where “having opinions” is de rigueur. As such, 
they reveal their origins in the nineteenth-century bourgeois 
response to the greater pace, diversity and complexity of 
experience in much the way wit, a proof of brains and sub-
tlety, was the nobility’s reaction to the absolutism of the old 
regime, and proverbs, to the pious tedium of peasant life.
Personally, we don’t deconstruct clichés. That requires a 
higher level of competence, just as castigating them calls for 
a touch of malice. But might Flaubert’s satirical “dictionary 
of received ideas” (spoofs, lampoons, commonplaces, bro-
mides, platitudes—“all this so phrased that the reader would 
not know whether or not his leg was being pulled”  *) not give 
rise to a sympathetic, at once joyous and sobering work, one 
that exposes the psycho-logical mechanism of cliché, the 
tension latent within it, and reads and writes (re-writes) 
cliché against itself, undoing its power over us while leav-
ing us its usefulness? Wait, hasn’t such a book already been 
written? Isn’t it Flaubert’s very own Bouvard and Pécuchet, the 
final monsterpiece to which his dictionnaire is customarily 
* Jacques Barzun, introduction to Dictionary of Accepted Ideas by Gustave Flaubert, 
trans. J. Barzun (New York: New Directions, 1968), 3.
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appended? And it has, perversely, led some to fall in love with 
cliché.
The view endorsed by Cole that clichés are evidence of 
a herd mentality is difficult to sustain even at the loftiest 
heights with the thinnest air, where none but mountain 
goats can survive. We suspect greater profit to writers comes 
from urbane curiosity than from condescension, contempt, 
or derision. While we personally do not subvert or even 
interrogate clichés, we do like playing with them. Particularly 
with those cherished by the cultural elite: self-deprecation, 
false modesty, and yes, hatred of cliché—just a few of the 
many affectations adopted out of a mediocrity-complex in 
democracies of talent preserving inequality in the worship 
of elite genius (a hierarchy so entrenched it even enters 
Trotsky’s futuristic vision: “The average human type will 
rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx. And 
above this ridge new peaks will rise”  *). We won’t “go there” 
as far as we perhaps could. And we could point out that the 
mature writer’s lesson to a young one turns paradoxically on 
just this highbrow cliché of genius, even if, we surmised, it 
does so self-ironically. Belief in one’s genius is perhaps a nec-
essary self-deception to produce above-average work. Why, 
then, should verbal clichés be livestock slated for slaughter? 
It is enough to be butted by the smallest one, it seems, to 
suffer from fatuous and unreflected thinking—which is to 
say to bleat. Writing against cliché and common sense, Tho-
reau asked: “Why level downward to our dullest perception 
always, and praise that as common sense? The commonest 
sense is the sense of men asleep, which they express by 
snoring.”  †
Another pet cliché is the Modernist emphasis on failure 
as artistically noble, as the badge of latter-day genius, poor 
in the eyes of the world and therefore, in his own mind, 
swimming in untold riches, spawning only originality 
* Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution, ed. William Keach (Chicago: Haymarket, 
2005), 207.
† Henry David Thoreau, Walden: A Fully Annotated Edition, ed. Jeffrey S. Cramer 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 316.
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(worthy compensation, if you ask us). The world could care 
less now, but it will care more (just watch), and maybe over-
much. Taking just literary creation, the summa of clichéd 
greatness—the writer as melancholic, as modern prophet, 
as sage, the book as labyrinth, as masterpiece, as birth, as 
gift— crowd around the end of its history as the old bond 
between language and art, which we call literature, dissolves 
and its once-wide bandwidth on the spectrum of writing 
shrinks and turns invisible.
Clichés put down roots deep in our reality, and doing away 
with them needs must be done root-and-branch radically. A 
literary work comes along, tugs at them, or hacks away the 
branches, bent on eradicating the grand cliché of genius, and 
all it does is strengthen its updated clichéd definition (for 
which we thank the likes of Malcolm Gladwell):
GENIUS: rare and kicks in at the ten-thousandth hour
If some wind from the future blows hard enough to uproot 
genius, that great organizing idea on which we continue to 
elaborate, we will part with a lot more than just it.
A Are clichés and mystifications really all you’ve got to 
defend clichés with?
B Fool, you wouldn’t get it any other way. Try getting by 
without them!
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§ Touché
“The terrible, like the painful, accommodates only the 
cliché.”  * As does the wonderful and the pleasurable—the  
clichés “Wow!” “Ah!” “OMG!”
§ Lose No Touch
Universal connectivity brings with it an obligation to keep 
tabs on the world. The meaning of “being in touch with real-
ity” is migrating, along with reality, to another domain. The 
reality (in name only) with which we should remain in touch 
is thoroughly mediatized. “Being in touch” no longer denotes 
a realistic outlook and certified sanity, but knowing how to 
navigate and stay topical in the digital universe. If in the old 
sense it was imperative to tell fact from fiction, with the rest 
as trivial pursuit, it now does better to know what’s what, 
without regard to that trivial distinction.
* Cioran, Trouble with Being Born, 53.
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§ Fetch! Now Roll Over!
One of the jobs of Luciano Floridi as chair of the European 
Commission’s Committee on Concepts Engineering is to 
advise on “the impact of information and communications 
technologies on the digital transformations occurring in 
the European Society.”  * Let’s not mistake the circularity of 
such a task for its level of difficulty. Its point might not be 
apparent to those only tuned in to pointlessness. The recip-
rocal impact of two aspects that appear to be sides of one 
coin—“information and communications technologies” and 
“digital transformations”— cannot, in truth, be overstated. 
The impact of dogs on canine behaviour, for instance!
* “University of Hertfordshire Professor Appointed as Chairman of Expert Group,” 
University of Hertfordshire, accessed Mar. 11, 2015, http://www.herts.ac.uk/
research/news-and-events/professor-luciano-floridi-appointed-chairman-of- 
european-commission.
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§ Distimacies
Looking at the current affect-technology nexus, one question 
to ask is: how far does the supposed intimacy-by-gadgets 
reach, and should its deliberate “distribution” aim for wider 
but thinner coverage, or instead for greater focus and pen-
etration? The first carries, despite the best intentions, the 
risk of eroding intimacy through cultivating facile, superfi-
cial ties with people who are likely (in effect or anyway) to 
remain at a distance. The assumption behind the idea of 
connecting speedily with something inmost in as many, or as 
often, as possible in these punctuated, mediated, not always 
controlled ways, is that we are all alike. As such, it encourages 
the misprision of others as mirrors of ourselves. On the other 
hand, or the second of the above options, thinking it better 
to concentrate intimacy-distribution, we risk reifying inti-
macy. We reify it when we insist on the mystery of the other 
and treat our connection with them as something to be 
gained over time, by wearing down the barriers of controlled, 
mediated access to them. We reify intimacy when it ceases 
to be simply a function of overcoming distance and commu-
nicating less and less formally with one another. Focused, 
probing intimacy may be too precious to support large-scale 
community-building, it is true. While it is probably fair to 
say that other people’s secrets are now largely given away, 
floating unbeknownst even to them in cyberspace, the cele-
bration of collective intimacy would benefit from cynicism 
about the knowledge that private information reveals, and to 
whom. As our horses continue to trickle out of the barn, we 
might wonder whether those who venture too far in sharing 
themselves in the spirit of open access might eventually feel 
like they have been taken for a ride.
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§ The End of Sharing?
Publicity, or the voluntary surrender, of personal experience 
makes such experience no less private, and possibly more. It 
puts it up for propertification just as the publication of ideas 
or sequences of words no one else has thought to publish 
bestows ownership on their source. The responsibility we 
bear today is considerable. We must be careful not to non-
chalantly squander our precious experience, parting with it, 
letting it go unrecorded and thereby losing out on occasions 
for enrichment. The fans of Instagram and other media 
already sense what’s in the air: as consumers amuse them-
selves with new technology, share their work for free, and 
lose interest in conventional forms of entertainment, compa-
nies will redesign their offerings around customer preference, 
and will pay us for providing content in which acting or per-
formance is absent or secondary to just “having experiences” 
and leading interesting lives. In the span of a few years, and 
as a direct result of this, the content of personal experience, 
the innermost private stuff, will be refashioned into so many 
ephemeral commodities. Then we will see if we are all better 
off as extroverts.
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§ Mice
Much as secret messages and tools can be smuggled and 
escapes plotted even in the most secure prison, all kinds of 
forbidden material finds a way to circulate and miscreants 
slip through in even the most policed of modern societies. 
For in society individuals are like mice in a prison not built 
to hold them.
§ Damned to Fame
Most of us want fame and can’t get it. One would think that 
the “Becketts” of the world would frustrate us, incurring our 
resentment. But the opposite is true: they fascinate us, win-
ning our love and still greater fame. The “Beckettian” predic-
ament is attractive because it involves fame not despite one’s 
lack of talent, making the fame unmerited, but despite trying 
to avoid fame, and only late in life. The “Beckett” scenario 
soothes our resentment by playing right into it and into the 
fantasy of the only adequate compensation: getting more 
than we expected (note: not deserved). We turned our back 
on fame for making us wait— convinced that we are worthy 
of it, we rejected it when it was not forthcoming—but in the 
end fate tries to woo us back and more than makes it up to 
us—a fantasy not merely of delayed renown, but of delayed 
renown beyond our earlier, frustrated expectations. That the 
reward might be well worth the wait is all we need to recon-
cile ourselves to having to wait for it. Fantasies like “Beckett” 
keep alive the hope for this pleasant surprise.
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§ Escaping Criticism
As much (as) it has cost you, that is what they will pay.
—Wittgenstein  *
Many an author must have paused before Pere Borrell del 
Caso’s wittily titled Escaping Criticism (Escapando de la crit-
ica, 1874). The subject, painted against a solid black back-
ground, is a barefoot boy who, stepping on the bottom of 
the trompe-l’œil frame, hands braced against its sides, seems 
about to jump out onto the gallery floor. Literary characters, 
first fleshed out on the page, have often taken on a life of 
their own in other media. They too have leapt through the 
frames of their stories, sometimes indeed to elude criticism. 
In this they were fulfilling the dream of the artist, to whom 
the autonomy of his work, its taking charge of its own fate, is 
proof of its greatness—which may have escaped even him.
When, however, we take Borrell del Caso’s boy to be the 
artist himself, his alter ego, fleeing his critics even before the 
picture is completed, we have trouble thinking of a similarly 
artfully artless getaway for the author of a book. One could 
of course leave the final pages blank, as some have. Yet this 
act of defiance would nowadays come across as a cheap and 
lazy trick. For while the painter painted throughout and to 
the very end, the author would have taken a break from writ-
ing or else wrapped up his work long before then. And for 
that the critics would never forgive him. He would lose them 
only after losing all his readers.
* Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 15.
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§ Remember Me!
The old technology with which writers practiced their pro-
fession has left a permanent memento on the bodies of those 
middle-aged or older. As they type away, from the keyboard 
the deformed joint of the middle finger makes its silent 
reproach. To which the
WRITER. 
The basic means of production with which I started out 
are history, but you can’t tell me I’m not a writer!
To which the
PROFESSIONAL DEFORMITY. 
But you are a very different writer from the one that 
made me.
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§ Writing-Ball
Schreibkugel ist ein Ding gleich mir: von Eisen 
Und doch leicht zu verdrehn zumal auf Reisen. 
Geduld und Takt muss reichlich man besitzen 
Und feine Fingerchen, uns zu benuetzen.
(The Writing Ball is a thing just like me: of iron 
And yet easy to twist, especially on journeys. 
Patience and tact one must richly possess 
And fine little fingers to use us.)
—Nietzsche on his spherical writing instrument  *
The Mailing-Hansen writing-ball was no crystal ball, and 
both have gone the way of most material objects. Once 
among the most praised, the most prized, the most 
sought-after possessions, source of uncountable revenues, 
they have been crushed and obliterated, on view since only in 
museums, where even the best-preserved specimens resemble 
embalmed carcasses. 
Despite his less-than-productive relationship with his 
writing-ball—a portable brass proto-typewriter—Nietzsche’s 
eulogy attests to his high hopes and a tenderness that any-
one so dependent on an instrument ought to find within 
themselves. A moment’s selflessness will show us the thing 
in its true light—as a slave—as Helvétius showed Europe’s 
sugar-eaters their cubes were soaked in blood, pointing to a 
debt to the tropics. We owe an object the same credit, care, 
and respect we have begun to show other humans, but also 
animals and the natural environment. Man-made things are 
merely a still more transformed or mutilated nature. Their 
preservation has long been justified on the grounds that they 
serve as our historical markers, but as the rate of change 
increased, objects once accumulating without reflection 
* Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Fragmente, vol. 3, 1880–1882 (Projekt 
Gutenberg-DE/tredition, 2012), p. 565, Feb.–Mar. 1882, Dokument: Mappe mit 
losen Blättern: “500 Aufschriften auf Tisch und Wand für Narrn von Narrenhand” 
(“Writings on Wall and Table for Fools by Fool’s Hand”), sec. 18[2].
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became subject (like people, and often with the same technol-
ogies) to progressively rational classification, periodization, 
and archivization. Our anxiety about history is turning the 
world into a vast museum, compartmentalizing space into 
the modern and the historical, with nature parks in the latter 
category. Product care, life extension, and d.i.y. are only the 
first, baby-steps to be taken against this relentless museal-
ization, and towards the recognition of objects as bearers 
of rights akin to ours. Consumer resistance must build to 
end self-obsolescing design in hardware and programming. 
Beyond it lie meaningful relationships with things and a new 
appreciation of imperfection, for which we have lost all toler-
ance, but which art (like Nietzsche’s verses) — entrusted with 
the “routine invitation to break out of reality” so it is “not 
entirely lost with us”   *—has kept alive.
* Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosoph-
ical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 213 (“Propaganda”).
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§ Talking Pencil
None of the Robespierres of the world knew how to make a 
pencil, yet they wanted to remake entire societies.
—Lawrence W. Read,  
introduction to “I, Pencil” (1958)  *
In a seminal pamphlet of American neoliberalism, the invis-
ible hand of the market speaks through a pencil, underlining 
the complexity of its creation. The metonymic chain (market 
to hand to pencil) is warranted by the hand’s and the tool’s 
long history as a versatile creative extension of man. In at 
least one children’s story, a simple pencil makes dreams 
come true. Are not the pencil’s wish-fulfilling powers only 
amplified under capitalism, where “back to the drawing 
board” captures the spirit of unremitting innovation?
* Lawrence E. Read, introduction to I, Pencil by Leonard E. Read (New York: Foun-
dation for Economic Education, 2008), 2.
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§ Doggedly Smart
The best art is the most expensive because the market  
is so smart.
—Tobias Meyer, former Sotheby’s auctioneer  *
Price following quality in art is the market’s brilliance at 
work. Before the market can prove itself so smart, however, 
quality art must be discovered. Markets have never discov-
ered anything; they have followed, doggedly and expan-
sively, the scent of discovery. Discovery—now that takes real 
brainpower, next to which the market looks rather stupid, 
with its long face and beagle eyes. Markets never pass up an 
opportunity to make themselves look smarter than they are. 
This might shed light on the Victorian fondness for portraits 
of (especially hunting) dogs looking very smart. Upstaged by 
a party of bulldogs, spaniels and terriers, the well-bred, pros-
perous men in top hats assembled in An Early Canine Meeting 
(1855) look none too clever as it emerges whose is in fact the 
master’s voice.
* Quoted in James Panero, “The Art Market Explained,” New Criterion, Dec. 2009, 
http://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/The-art-market-explained-4337.
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§ The Story of Your Life
Take risks, manage them, capitalize on your experience, and 
live off the accumulated surplus into rotten old age.
§ Poor in Spirit, Rich in Irony
A As a wise man of small means once said: you cease being 
poor when you have nothing left.
B You keep talking about poverty as if you knew it. I think 
you romanticize it!
A Don’t you mean “ironize”? The poor have a greater sense 
of irony, and irony is the key to survival.
B The lower their expectations, the less likely for fate to 
take them by surprise . . .
A . . . and take away the wages of irony!
§ Desk Jobs
The lives of paper-pushers are wearing paper-thin.
And those of keyboard-tappers?
Barely a-flicker.
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§ No Go Stop
For many a working stiff, a living wage will come too late, if 
it comes at all.
§ Subtle Reversal
Automate living and work for thinking.
§ Pretty Penny; or, Get Rich at All Cost
A penny for my thoughts?
How much?! You should know better, young lady, than to prosti-
tute your mind in this way!
I just want to be successful, like you men.
Then there’s no price you’ll soon not be ready to pay, and be 
poorly repaid for.
§ Fruit of Capital
Contrary to what people say, money does grow on trees. It 
is called interest: the formerly forbidden fruit that gives no 
flesh, only seeds.
  matches:  a  light book 235
§ Name Your Price
Everything material and immaterial has its market price. In 
everyday parlance, priceless still means having a value beyond 
all price, being of inestimable worth, usually because of 
being recognized as one of a kind, irreproducible, “not for 
sale.” Less commonly (if more prosaically), the word can des-
ignate something that is either substantially “worthless”—its 
lack of (even an implicit) price tag suggesting it might not be 
worth having— or nominally so, in the sense that it has not 
been priced yet (ever, or anew). (This is the land of free enter-
prise, but also, with the depletion of the pool of commodifi-
able things, of declining rates of return.) 
All of these senses of “pricelessness” came into play 
recently in regards to Spitsbergen, the Arctic island coveted 
by a Chinese investor: its value declared by the sale’s oppo-
nents as incalculable not only on account of its “uniqueness,” 
but also because its economic as well as strategic importance, 
currently minimal, may well exceed the wildest estimates, 
and can therefore only be assessed in the future—mustn’t, 
that is, yet be determined. 
The more life becomes commodified, the more the defi-
nition of pricelessness is harnessed to the subjective devalo-
rization of things before they hit the market. Pricelessness, 
a concept of value touched by the money form but not 
absorbed by it, is thus continually assailed and offers less and 
less—not more—resistance. Put in other words, the truly 
priceless object is becoming structurally worthless—“free” to 
be given away. If it still (or already) costs nothing, it must 
be without value, and thus counts for little, if anything. So 
when a price is finally named, it’s what we’d call a steal.
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§ Make Me an Offer
Haggling, encouraged by the impersonal character of online 
retail, breaks the tyranny of the fixed price on the white 
market.
§ Price of Life
You give your life or pay with your life for something (a 
fatherland, a mistake). You give a price in one sense, as a 
vendor, and pay it in another, as a customer. Which is better: 
naming the price of your own life, or paying a price with it? 
Is the vendor really more in control?
§ Piss-Poor
If “excess is excrement,”  * then lack is piss.
* Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia (New York: HarperCol-
lins, 1994), 127–28.
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§ American Poverty
Why are Americans not dealing with poverty at home? Per-
haps because poverty elsewhere seems easier to alleviate.
§ Captives
“It is unfortunate for men,” wrote Chamfort, but “fortunate 
perhaps for tyrants, that the poor and unhappy have not 
the instinct or pride of the elephant which does not repro-
duce itself in servitude.”  * As far as why this is, we must 
again blame reason, survival, and hope. For those in servi-
tude (which is more diffuse and abstract, particularly if it 
includes slavery to an idea or system, the more socially total 
it is), those held in bondage by men or something men have 
contrived reason that their masters, their slavers, are rational, 
and if that alone does not help, they are also mortal. The 
reproduction of a system of enslavement depends equally 
on the continual delivery of able bodies and on the method-
ical application of rationality to human affairs. Exploita-
tion, without which oppression would lose its sinister tone 
(mutating into mere suppression or depression), demands it 
absolutely. Once we grant mirror reason—mirroring that of 
their captors—to those whom we regard with compassion 
as dehumanized, as incompletely dead, as the zombies of 
capital, their continued, even viral reproduction makes per-
fect sense. Elephants, however intelligent we are discovering 
them to be, still reason imperfectly, at least in captivity.
* Nicolas de Chamfort, The Cynic’s Breviary: The Maxims and Anecdotes from Nich-
olas de Chamfort, trans. William G. Hutchison (1902; n.p.: Bartleby.com, 2011), l. 
109.
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§ Against the Grain
If oppression ever got labelled “environmentally unsustain-
able,” it would be sustained.
§ Breaking Even
We could say along with Graeber that “Freedom has become 
the right to share in the proceeds of one’s own permanent 
enslavement,”  * or we could admit that the language of para-
dox is of no use to us as long as the opposites remain card-
board extremes. We do not think that way, and the starkly 
ironic contrast appeals more to our love of rhetoric than to 
our sense of justice, which for the modern economic mental-
ity has again become synonymous with breaking even.
* David Graeber, “Hope in Common,” in Revolutions in Reverse: Essays on Politics, 
Violence, Art, and Imagination (London: Minor Compositions, 2011), 33.
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§ Loose Change
Should one give credence to the Marxian happy “end” fea-
turing the working class “expropriating the expropriators”? 
Some have said that in the process the expropriating workers 
will become a new breed of appropriators. That the only 
difference between them and their former expropriators will 
be their moral complacency that they have done right by 
themselves when they were still being exploited. History has 
borne out this prediction. And when has wrested ownership 
ever entailed care for what is owned? Expropriation from 
below that does not tip over into appropriation is doomed by 
its ironic mimicry of dispossession—by a wrangle that leaves 
the bones of contention themselves in the dust. And who will 
take care of the ex-property once the dust settles? Should one 
not hope, rather, that possession will soon be seen as too great 
a burden, a limit on remaining freedom (redefined), and that 
the disposal of property becomes a voluntary act?
§ Poison Ivy
The ivy law of minimum wage is that it creeps up while cov-
ering an ever larger surface.
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§ Ad coelum et ad nihilum
In medieval property law which survives in weakened form 
in some countries, like the United Kingdom, the owner of a 
plot of land owns it vertically: from the empty skies above it 
all the way to the centre of the Earth below. At this deepest 
point underground, however, its area necessarily amounts to 
zero. Following the same principle, on a downward survey of 
his possession, the owner of even the entirety of the globe’s 
surface, terrestrial and marine, would, at its lowest limit, see 
it diminish to nothing.
As long as no one possesses the centre of the Earth, absur-
dity shadows all landlords everywhere. He who would own 
everything above, down below would have no ground to 
stand on, let alone to plant his flag.
§ Nail Soup
In a memorable poem on the cunning of the gypsy man and 
the stupidity of the baba, the miserly peasant woman, we 
find the secret to good class (or are they now percentile?) rela-
tions. The impatience of the woman, curious to witness the 
miracle of “nail soup,” leads her to unthinkingly comply with 
the gypsy’s requests for incidentals. Pot, water, fire, butter, 
grain—all are provided—until finally a nail is produced that 
apparently gives the broth its distinctive flavour . . .
Does this not confirm that the poor can do just fine by 
themselves? They need only secure incredulous yet open- 
 handed admiration from those who will continue to eat their 
fill, realizing (perhaps not for the first time) that they, too, 
owe their provisions to a scam, just several orders of magni-
tude greater.
  matches:  a  light book 241
§ Of Wolves and Gatsbies
The difference between luxury and decadence is essentially 
this: the former spends money unimaginatively, the latter, 
creatively. If the first orders golden faucets, the second com-
missions sinks made from turtle shells. If the first imagines 
only what others want and wants that, the second prizes 
originality and invention. Fortunes spent on luxury degrade 
taste, those paid to decadence only refine it. Either way, the 
show of wealth carries great implications for judgments of 
taste, since good taste can now be afforded.
§ Piggy Bank
A pig for good luck? The association of pigs with good for-
tune in the Glücksschwein, or lucky pig, no less than that of 
good fortune with wealth, has to answer for the symbol of 
prosperity in Old-World lore and the worldwide popularity 
of the piggy bank. When we tell our children that having 
money is in some magical sense about good luck, we prime 
them for seeing reason in trading or gambling away their 
meagre savings. Why not rather tell them “Money turns peo-
ple into swine,” and prove it by breaking the pig-bank, then 
pocketing its contents?
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§ Worker Bee
It is difficult to rejoice for the bee preserved in amber—a 
substance so much in colour like her own nectar as to seem 
a rewarding tomb. It is not hard, by contrast, to see the irony 
of being buried in one’s work. When the honey of our labour 
is judged only as a means to an end (mind you, not that 
kind of end!), our sense of purpose squirms in misdirected 
empathy.
§ Tan Lines
On the outstretched arms of white beggars the sun marks 
the global colour line.
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§ The Eyes of the Poor
The poor are closer to a better because more morally defen-
sible world, even when they have been reduced to crime, not 
merely by imagining that world, but by thinking it univer-
sally desirable and possible. The question “how much better 
is significantly better?” and thus worth fighting for is moot as 
long as the needy abstain from political action. 
And if they do not imagine this world, it is not from a 
failure of imagination, but from imagination’s devastation. 
And if they do not desire it, it is not from a failure of desire, 
but from desire’s distracted aggravation by a world in which 
they nonetheless live. And if they do not think it possible, it 
is not by dint of having been deprived of hope, but of hope’s 
superabundance. Then, however rich in hope, they are poor 
twice over—not just from failing to enrich themselves, but 
from seeing only riches in riches, and nothing save poverty in 
poverty. The naïve and arrogant view of the poor is that they 
are naïve and humble; they believe happiness lies in wealth 
(if they only knew the truth!). But why would they mistake 
happiness for material comfort who must have known happi-
ness without it? Step forward, you who see an end to misery 
in the end to destitution. The miserable, the poor in spirit, 
are much harder to get rid of than the materially poor. Some 
of these latter, indeed, console themselves that “actual pos-
session of the happiness of this life, without the hope of what 
is beyond, is but a false happiness and profound misery.”  * 
Where such hope runs—though imagination, worldly desire, 
and a sense of possibility be absent—the happiness derived 
from a meagre life is fortified with an otherworldly spirit.
A Ah, but the poor, on the whole, have better eyes!
* Augustine, The City of God, vol. 2, trans. Marcus Dodds (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1871), 330.
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B Because they see farther than the rest of us? It’s true. But 
they are worse on what’s up close—a necessary optical 
tradeoff.
Nothing evokes abject poverty more than hunger that 
has begun to consume the flesh. Some lessons can only 
be learned bodily. The sunken eyes of the poor, who 
have learned their lessons well, can they teach us any-
thing? That hunger is all-unmanning, all-consuming 
and unequivocal, Dickensian and tone-deaf. That where 
hunger reigns, life is beastly at best. The beasts of hunger 
are not wild at heart; they are driven wild by it. 
A The appetite of the poor is larger than their belly.
B When they only eat with their eyes, how can they be 
sated?
No, there is more to hunger than meets the eye, and 
the eyes do not always give it away. As long as poverty and 
hunger are around, there will be important lessons for 
which no other teachers but hunger and poverty will do. 
Without a general “vow of poverty” to edify us, poverty as 
such will not be eradicated.
Until then, and as a matter of precaution, make sure to 
wear your distance glasses from time to time. So that the 
future isn’t a complete surprise.
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§ Engels and Marx at Chetham’s Library
A windowed alcove at England’s first public library over-
looked one of Manchester’s rookeries, or slums, near Victoria 
Station. Sitting there as they often did, they could see while 
reading the State of the Poor (the work of Eden, after the 
Revolution). And when they put their heads together, it was 
to make it disappear.
§ Bottoms Up!
No matter how many times you drink down to the dregs, you 
won’t know what it is to have only dregs to drink. And know-
ing that, by Jerome’s lights, is knowing the law of the world.
§ Call out All the Names under the Sun
If one were to make a project of calling out every word, good 
and bad, available in memory and books, one would never 
see the end of it, and die calling. The words invented by man 
and the historical bonds that link them are too many for 
anyone to utter them. One’s speech does well to ignore them.
For their inherited wealth pales against the poverty of 
individual freedom of invention, which accounts for one’s 
having a name at all. Just as the rich can freely give up their 
inheritance to become poor, what we are called and called 
upon to do can be cast off by inventing a calling for ourselves. 
While not much, for some it is enough to live on.
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§ Soft Landing
We would sooner take to our beds, defeated, than stand up 
and fight for happiness. Happiness (not to be confused with 
joy) and unhappiness (not to be confused with sadness) are 
reifications of the pursuit of continual joy and the flight 
from continual sadness, respectively. When we feel we have 
stumbled in our quest for joy, we rightly conclude that we 
are not happy. When we then fall in our escape from sadness, 
we realize that unhappiness has caught up with us. It is with 
great effort that we pick ourselves up again— often getting 
only as far as the first bed that will take us.
§ Uncomfortable Happiness
Identifying comfort with happiness would be like mistaking 
your social standing for your inner life—were inner life not a 
mere flight from your social standing.
Do we not owe it to our high conception of the good life to 
transcend such divisions into “inner” and “outer,” even if it 
itself proves impracticable?
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§ Sore Spots
Do we owe it to ourselves to be happy even when others are 
unhappy? No more than we owe these others to be miserable 
on their account.
Let him who can be happy in knowledge or ignorance of 
others’ unhappiness be as happy as possible. But let the law 
punish happiness when it depends on the unhappiness of 
others. Let it even levy a tax on happiness. And let resent-
ment litigate against unjust happiness in some future court.
§ 
No man is a slave to his own well-being, not because 
well-being has no power to enslave, but because he is never 
fully well. And if he were well, he would be the master of 
well-being.
§ 









“In communist society,” wrote Marx and Engels, meaning a 
society in which the division of labour has been abolished, 
“where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each 
can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society 
regulates the general production and thus makes it possi-
ble for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to 
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without 
ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman, or critic.”  *
The vision of happiness in varying one’s activities at will 
through the course of the day has its funhouse reflection in 
the simultaneous performance of multiple tasks so common 
in our time. The current state of affairs distorts our notions 
of Engels’ desired and diverse occupations to the point of 
either mistrusting exclusive focus on any of them one at a 
time (to the neglect of other things), or being unable to con-
ceive of any of them as satisfying in its own right. Let us not 
mention that the very conception of specialization, reduced 
to mindlessness by the assembly line and to mental illness in 
diagnoses of autism, whether at work or at leisure, is histor-
ically inseparable from a society organized around divided 
labour, which we oppose in principle. It is not only limiting; 
it is unfair and even against nature. 
* Karl Marx with Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, trans. uncredited (1932; 
New York: Prometheus, 1998), 53.
252 s . d.  chrostowska
Is multitasking in our sense of the word an antidote to the 
ills of this industrial model? Facilitated by technology, the 
many unherculean labours we perform, covering the breadth 
of our attention and multiplying, are quite predictably 
beginning to run together. Less and less discrete, they are 
perhaps all the more inescapable for that very reason. The 
coming status quo — in which time is not divided between 
larger tasks (only subdivided between sub-tasks, and shared 
between part-time jobs), in which work blends into leisure— 
 is merely one result of surplus value production being 
transferred back to increasingly adaptable consumers, whose 
education every year shifts towards transferable skills, in 
tandem with the surging rate of obsolescence of specialized 
means of production, know- hows, and knowledges. What 
becomes clear is that, while the division of labour may 
remain incompatible with free society, labour’s multiplication, 
creeping and rapacious, is not a happy alternative; it merely 
enslaves more securely.
§ Practically History
In Canada, they are building a memorial to the victims of 
communism. Some, allergic to such improvident anachro-
nism, ask “Why not build one to the victims of capitalism 
instead?” “We know, we know,” they answer before the ruling 
“elite” has had an opportunity to address their concerns. “First 
of all, it is bad luck to memorialize the living. Second of all, 
communist China, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba have already 
one foot in the grave.”
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§ Farniente
In an informal economy, freedom from workplace regimenta-
tion is forfeited again by the induction of domestic activities 
into the home- work continuum. Everyday tasks increasingly 
mimic paid labour which, while accommodating to the point 
of taking place around them, in fact seeps into their very per-
formance by virtue of its proximity and the removal of earlier 
forms of separation. By carving out time to “work around” 
meals, house chores, animal and child-care, horticulture and 
exercise— personal tasks for most of which remuneration 
has not yet been invented— the worker-from-home gradually 
comes to treat all activity as an object for regulation, effi-
ciency optimization, and a problem in need of a workaround. 
“I’ve got a system for that!” “I can get so much more done now! 
I’ve worked out which tasks go best together and bundle them 
for multitasking. It helps if you break things down to the 
minute!” “My new personal workflow and task management 
tools work wonders for my personal life!” This is no mere 
rodomontade. The energies of these two domains, work and 
life, have long intersected, and their spheres have overlapped 
before. What is new and different is the infection of everyday 
and leisure activities with the Trojan horse of technology. 
On the pretext of helping us step up our game and get our 
act together, it rules our lives with a soft despotism. Enabled 
by apps and wearables, self-micromanagement flies under 
the radar and is glamourized as “life hacking.” The form of 
wage labour, in which time management is paramount, has 
thus come to structure and shape a whole domain of tan-
gential tasks that previously escaped capital’s oversight and 
even served as a counterweight to it. Along this vector, in an 
aggressive free-market economy the line between “real” work 
and earning on the side melts away as competition for con-
sumers reaches new levels of sophistication and desperation. 
Between brand ambassadors and the glut of targeted adver-
tising, putting two and two together isn’t hard. The day is not 
far off when what we put in our mouth will be bought by the 
labour of eating it, and a simple track suit paid for by the job 
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of jogging in it. Only let’s not fool ourselves that what follows 
from this is freedom.
§ Fingers Crossed
Day in, day out, we subscribe to a vision of capitalism as 
the subtle and not-so-subtle invader that overcomes every 
limit and constraint by hypnotic powers of suggestion or, 
failing that, brute force. What the affluent disparage from 
their perches— capital’s greedy annexation of unspoiled 
reality—threadbare humanity welcomes as its only savior, 
counting not on the hearts of individual entrepreneurs, 
industrialists, and financiers, but on the invisible digits that, 
by reaching them, will at last take away its pain. At its logical 
conclusion, this image of “Faustian” expansion ought itself 
to be erased in capital’s magic-slate reinvention, culminating 
perhaps in total invisibility. The capital to come is some-
thing those interested, those who either think outside the 
ideological box or pray inside it, equally cannot predict. But 
the handful of others, who see it coming and recognize each 
other in the fog by a certain gesture or wink, go by a simple 
rule: what expands must one day contract, even in geopolit-
ical time.
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§ Mutatio mundi
Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpre-
tiert, es kömmt drauf an sie zu verändern.
(Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point is to change it.)
—Karl Marx, Eleventh Thesis  *
In the last of his Feuerbach Theses (1845), Marx confronts 
philosophy with its material inefficacy. The skeleton of Hege-
lian dialectic pushes the mind into overdrive. (From now 
on, philosophy will barely function without this economical 
gearing-up for putting its surplus energy to good use.)
His own determination aside, Marx’s enjoinder (or note 
to self) carries an implicit question: how can philosophy 
become praxis? And how can the becoming-praxis of philos-
ophy become its motive force, instead of an afterthought? 
But the eleventh thesis, which opens up thought to this 
question—by calling for this transformation of thinking 
into doing, for doing philosophy on the way to politics, with 
a view to politics—instructs, above all, that philosophy must 
start this total world-transformation with itself: it must first 
recognize the change it itself has undergone and is under-
going, confirm the rightness and purpose of this change, 
and assess its place in the world today. It is, in this sense, 
already a step in the direction in which it is pointing. (The 
position is still idealist, its point of departure the revolution-
ary, world-altering potential of Christianity, as in Novalis’s 
much earlier vatic essay, but clearly also a turning away 
from religion’s monopoly over politics; philosophy’s move 
in the direction of a secular politics is inseparable from the 
philosophical move towards historical materialism and the 
supersession of idealist philosophy it implies.) 
As such, Marx’s maxim is grounded in three refusals: 
* Karl Marx, Die Frühschriften, ed. Siegfried Landshut (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1971), 341.
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   · the refusal of anachronism. All philosophy participates 
in the historical process and its activity and proactivity 
confirm its currency; it is there at the dawn of the event; 
   · the refusal of abstraction. As a reflective and critical 
reaction to the world, philosophy is rooted in particular 
contexts, to which it must recognize itself duty-bound 
and from which it cannot abstract itself; it is part of a 
world that needs changing; lastly, 
   · the refusal of contingency. The course and future of philos-
ophy derive from universal values and historical necessity.
But Marx’s words cannot themselves accomplish what they 
call for, which is new to philosophy. They are conscious of 
communicating a novelty to thought. They are a call for a 
new totality (the world), in the making of which philosophy 
can—must— cannot but participate, and the enormity of 
the task requires marshalling the totality of philosophy, a 
move so revolutionary as to pull thought out of its orbit. In 
theology, exegesis, prayer, the task of thought exceeded its 
worldly limit; with modern philosophy, thought sets for itself 
a task at once greater than itself and within its new limits, 
which it projects and identifies with those of the world. The 
last Feuerbach thesis is furthest out in this respect, jutting 
out like a pier into swelling waters, its pillars firmly planted 
in the ocean floor. At the end of it stands the revolutionary 
visionary. Diverting his gaze from the dreamy horizon now 
back towards dry land, now down into the depths below, is 
the tension in his breast between the beachcomber and the 
pearl diver. These symbolic oppositions will structure mate-
rialist philosophy’s self-understanding and anxiety vis-à-vis 
politics. Politics is the truth of philosophy, where it tests 
its mettle and proves its worth for the future. But its proof 
will only be given if it comes to politics, which it must at 
the same time revitalize, alter. To change the world, it must 
share its place in it with revolutionary struggle. 
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§ Dip Sheep
In Dziga Vertov’s Sixth Part of the World (1926), a montage of 
machines and sheep dipped in different waters accompanies 
a revolutionary appeal:
more machines / more / and more / but no less hard is it 
for the worker / . . .  / the slaves / the colonies / Capital / the 
slaves / . . .  / Capital is on the verge of its historical perishing 
/ Capital / is having fun /
You, 
who bathe  
your sheep / 
in the surf of the sea, 
and you, 
 who bathe 
your sheep / 
in a brook / 
. . .  
and You / 
who have overrun the power of Capital in October / 
who have opened  
the road  
 to new  
 life  *
Infinitely adaptable, capitalism today cannot be set apart 
as counter-nature, as it was “in October,” when the Soviet 
harmony of land, industry and man made up one-sixth of 
the globe. And actually-surviving socialism—what part of the 
world has it left? (Hint: next to none.)
* Shestaya chast’ mira (One-Sixth of the World ), directed by Dziga Vertov (1926; 
Vienna: Filmmuseum, 2009), DVD.
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§ Heart & Home
The savage who loves himself, his wife, and his child with 
quiet joy and glows with limited activity for his tribe as for 
his own life is, it seems to me, a more genuine being than 
that cultured shade who is enchanted by the shadow of 
his whole species. . . . In his poor hut, the former finds room 
for every stranger, receives him as a brother with impartial 
good humor and never asks whence he came. The inundated 
heart of the idle cosmopolitan is a home for no one.
—J. G. Herder  *
Political ignorance extends to the idea that the nation-state 
is just a bigger home, in which all the nation’s families live in 
harmony as in a communal dwelling. 
The cosmopolitan, whose knowledge of political commu-
nity breaks with such sentiments, rejects this Aristotelian 
conception of the state as home-land—as much as the idea 
that politics needs a fixed abode—fixed by familial-national 
attachment. Regardless of what he calls home, his true home 
is his heart—his cosmopolitan heart. And this home is his 
politics.
* Johann Gottfried Herder, from “Materials for the Philosophy of the History of 
Mankind” (1784–91), in The Dynamic Force of Liberty in Modern Europe: Six Prob-
lems in Historical Interpretation, ed. Thomas Corwin Mendenhall, trans. C. J. H. 
Hayes (New York: Holt, 1952), 90 (emphases mine).
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§ What’s What
You’ll have a better understanding of what was actually done 
if you start by knowing what had to be done—what always 
and everywhere has to be done by anyone who has a clear 
idea about what’s what.
—Aldous Huxley, Island   *
Without knowing “what’s what,” the great question asked 
and answered by Chernyshevsky in his own utopian novel— 
Shto delat’? “What is to be done?”— can only be answered 
wrongly. “What’s what” may just be gnomic and humdrum 
enough to bag the right and universal.
§ Beggar Thy Neighbour’s Culture
It is a peculiar species of cosmopolitanism: taking oneself 
from a place poor in culture to one that has plenty.
* Aldous Huxley, Island (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 40.
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§ Far Away, So Close
The more the sense of foreignness becomes a thing of the 
past among those who do not travel at all or travel nonstop, 
the greater their craving for imaginary spaces. These mental 
wonderlands and nominal utopias that recapture foreignness 
in exaggerated form (which is a function of their perceived 
impossibility) make their reality not only bearable but better 
known. “What do they know of England who only England 
know?” And what do they know of the world who are over- 
 familiar with it? Those who manage to invent for themselves 
such “other” spaces, such “non-places,” have the distance 
needed to see what their world is—the foreignness needed to 
build knowledge upon familiarity.
The homebound can best know their home not by covering 
distances but by moving back through time. Digging into 
local history brings out the foreignness of familiar places 
obscured by encroaching globalization. The constant travel-
ler can best know the world not by “doing” all of it, following 
the links highlighted or created by globalization, but by 
efforts to connect with local values, traditions, and ways of 
life wherever they go. Most travellers, needless to say, can 
only afford time for a first glance. The truth of the places 
they touch down in rarely appears at their beck and call.
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§ Pebbles
No state is an island, though some have that shape. Casting 
votes outside of our country of residence wherever else we 
happen to enjoy voting rights is not only no failing but a 
political duty. Ubi bene ibi patria, and we should do every-
thing in our power to protect this good wherever we are by 
supporting it elsewhere. In a world so closely linked, the 
West is no larger than a pond, and a vote cast in one corner 
is no smaller than the psephos thrown into an urn in the 
Golden Age of Athenian democracy. The results of an elec-
tion ripple out to distant parts almost instantly, affecting our 
lives there.
§ Born Idealist
“It’s not me you should be worried about.”
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§ Future Optimists
Soon even bloodshot, tear-filled eyes will be decried as rose- 
 tinted glasses.
§ Future Humblebrag
“I’ve been to Earth and back.”
§ Priceless
A map of utopia is not worth the paper it’s printed on.
§ Critical Utopia
Impartial accounts of utopia can do no more than point in 
the general direction and dwell upon the journey there. But 
a partial one can (if used correctly) tell us where not to go, 
what to avoid. Whether or not its author intended it as a map 
of the place itself—a blueprint for how to get it built— or as a 
picture to meditate on—unrealizable by design—it will keep 
its critical value as long as we look at it askance from time to 
time.
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§ Missing Part
The map of utopia is partial. No one has the missing part. 
§ All or Nothing
A Gracián says that “Reality can never match our expec-
tations, because it’s easy to imagine perfection, and 
very difficult to achieve it.”  * Isn’t imagining perfection 
half-way to achieving it? Isn’t the ease with which it is 
imagined encouragement to really make it happen? 
A' Is it really so easy to imagine perfection? I think it is 
the hard—the harder part, and that is why it is next to 
impossible to achieve perfection. Before we try imagining 
perfection, we must realize the imperfection of the imag-
ination: what it leaves vague and undefined becomes the 
breeding ground of error.
A If the image were perfect and understood, it would be 
executed with ease. But since it is neither, since those 
who imagine have no sense of executing and those who 
execute have no imagination, both are equally impossible.
A' With absolutes, it is always “all or nothing.” That’s why we 
are always left with nothing.
* Baltasar Gracián, The Pocket Oracle and the Art of Prudence, trans. Jeremy Robbins 
(London: Penguin, 2011), p. 9, sec. 19.
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§ Paeninsula fortunatorum
Even if they are judged by an abstract criterion of truth- 
telling, it may be doubted whether Utopians have, in fact, 
distorted the future any more than historians have the past.
—Frank E. Manuel  *
There is no more need to defend the innocence of Utopia 
once we discover Alibia. Its inhabitants, called Alibis (from 
the Latin alibi, “elsewhere”) — or Alibris (from a-libris, or 
“book-less”), as they like to call themselves— carry out a 
great work of imagination, the ideal republic by the name 
of Alibia. The Alibis not only recognize that this work ought 
to be done, but regard it as the all-important, all-consuming 
work—in short, the only real work to be done—since with-
out it Alibia could not exist at all. 
Rumours that they live on nothing but air and have no 
interaction with the rest of the world were disproved long 
ago. Those who accuse them of using some poor subterra-
nean devils to provide for their material needs are grasping 
at straws. The Alibis are neither without needs nor have so 
many to rely on a system of exploitation. 
They are, instead, engaged in a gainful if delicate com-
merce, moving the intangibles they produce to provide for 
themselves. There is no lack of outsiders willing to trade the 
material fruits of their labour for the purely immaterial work 
of the Alibis. And if they try their hand at imagining Alibia 
and do well, these outsiders might one day be made citizens. 
(Though there are many great minds in Alibia, one type sel-
dom seen there is the metaphysician.) Imagination, their sole 
livelihood, puts the Alibis “off the map” of ordinary tourists 
and commercial travellers apparently content with their lot. 
“It is a common mistake to call Alibia an island,” they explain, 
“when it is merely a peninsula. The geographers continue to 
falsify us. Unlike the Utopians, we have never cut ourselves 
* Frank E. Manuel, “Toward a Psychological History of Utopias,” Daedalus 94, no. 2 
(1965): 319.
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off from the mainland.” The work and land of the Alibis, 
though outlying, have always been accessible to the curious.
One is tempted to describe their way of life in the utopian 
genre, in a libellus vere aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus, 
de optimo rei publicae deque nova paeninsula . . .  * But from an 
observer’s perspective there is almost nothing to Alibia, not 
enough to fill even a libellus, not even for a “little” book. And 
anyone who is “inside” and tries then to describe Alibia is 
no longer participating in its construction, so instantly loses 
their place in it (as they would a radio frequency). Yet this 
has not stopped us from speculating about the boundless-
ness of imagination at work there—at any point, the Alibis 
see further than we do, far beyond our present horizons. 
They have no use for memories and archives; their work is 
valuable only insofar as, at any given moment, they tran-
scend what each has done (imagined) up to that point (n.b., 
the absence of competition, which they consider unhealthy). 
Thus they are constantly building, improving, and upgrading 
their Alibia, including the ideals espoused there, so that it is 
never anything less than ideal.
For the above reasons, and as signalled by the extra r in 
their self-chosen name, the Alibris are a book-less people. 
Alibia is the name for a continuous work of imagination that 
is never written down. Without a guide, visitors to Alibia 
who trade with its inhabitants come away with no more than 
what they are allowed to see in exchange: a vague impression 
of the republic’s real-world size, structure, and power; a few 
glimpses of its wonders, perhaps, but never a full or coherent 
picture.
Based on these scraps of information, some maliciously 
interpret the name “Alibri” as “freedom-less,” enslaved 
to imagination, when in fact every Alibi finds in the 
* Echoing the full original Latin title of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), Libellus vere 
aureus, nec minus salutaris quam festivus, de optimo rei publicae statu deque nova 
insula Utopia (lit. trans.: A Truly Golden Little Book, No Less Beneficial than 
Entertaining, of a Republic’s Best State, and of the New Island Utopia; trad. 
trans.: A Fruitful and Pleasant Work of the Best State of a Public Weal, and of the 
New Isle Called Utopia).
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imagination what is perhaps freedom’s highest form. These 
disaffected traders, who clearly have no sense of even the 
rudiments of its law, are always hatching plots to invade and 
enslave Alibia. This is another, and most important, reason 
for why the Alibris do not write books. For they have no 
standing army, and no other defence.
§ In the Dark
One might approach utopia in the dark without ever  
realizing it. 
§ Impossible but Necessary
Even in us cynics, beauty and purity will always find a 
hiding place as long as we dwell on the world’s ugliness and 
impurities.
§ Great Expectations
A utopian, far from being unreconciled to the state of the 
world, has only the highest hopes for it.
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§ Means without End
Is it a joke? There is not much that isn’t open to ridicule here: 
a utopian prefiguration of poverty! After all, how can the 
slavishly exploited (those lacking what counts as “means 
to spare”), the truly solidary who willingly gave up their 
spare and excess means in return for the truth of struggle 
against “scarcity,” who make ends meet in the struggle’s day 
to day, who instead of “minding the gap” between where 
they are and where they’d like to be have wound up dwell-
ing in it bodily—how can they actively prefigure a collec-
tive utopia? Going (in)voluntarily without may be a form 
of political rehab, but how can their stance, expressed in a 
struggle against the very deprivation they seem in solidarity 
to embrace, be assimilable to actually modelling a changed 
reality, high-minded ideas and fellow feeling aside? A world 
without means to spare surely is no better; almost anything 
else seems better than it. 
Yet it is precisely from a position of radically reduced 
resources that this “better world” is not only possible but 
vaguely full of possibilities. The challenge of living in it lies 
not in coming up with universalizing ideas and ingenious 
solutions— or the revolutionary toolkit such a common 
condition engenders—but in a counter-praxis of everyday 
life, freed from the acquisitive impulse, detached from 
workaday rewards (no matter how meagre or substantial). 
Prefiguration is not an exact science. It is a gesture towards 
another way of living arising directly from a chosen posi-
tion of material lack. It is a call to a new resourcefulness. It 
is a practical intentional experiment placed as a road sign. 
As such, it owes its creative potency, political urgency, and 
persistence to its negation of the ends-without-means and 
normative practices of the existing social configuration, with 
which it seeks to break as much as possible short of losing 
touch with, and thus the ability to redirect, the traffic of 
discontent with how mean-ingless things actually are. The 
mere practices of living-against while being together side 
by side in full view—practices that go beyond what is at our 
disposal—these are the new, the inexhaustible, means.
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§ Getting Horizontal
The importance of social dreaming only reminds us that the 
anarcho-politics of horizontality and slumber remains to be 
theorized. Once we theorize the utopian position, we might 
find there is some truth to Nietzsche’s preposterous claim 
that “Tiredness is the shortest path to equality and frater-
nity—and sleep finally adds to them liberty,” and to Baltasar 
Gracián’s observation that “the pillow is a silent Sibyl.”  *
§ Resentment
What, at base, is resentment, if not the need for equality 
clumsily expressed?
* Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 373, vol. 2, sec. 263 (“Path to Equality”); 
Gracián, Pocket Oracle, p. 57, sec. 151 (“Think Ahead”).
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§ In Bad Company
What is resentment if not the need for equality expressed in 
company that does not share this need?
§ Family Pet
Family pets are among the most abused of animals, even 
when their tails are not being pulled, etc. But since we try 
to treat them as humans, and often with greater care and 
solicitude, we are all but blind to this fact. In their systematic 
abuse we glimpse only our utopia.
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§ A Parting Gift
in response to:
And then there was what the coroner described like this: “a 5 
3/4 x 4 inch gaping laceration involving the pubic region and 
bilateral medial thighs with the absence of genitalia, expo-
sure of the pubic bones and adjacent soft tissue.” Or, to spell 
it out: By the time the body was recovered, no part of his 
external genitalia remained. Where they should have been, 
there was nothing but a raw gap. That was Terry Thomp-
son’s final grotesque parting gift— a last meal for one of his 
animals, sometime before it, too, met its death by bullet on 
the sad night of October 18, 2011, near Zanesville, Ohio.
—Chris Heath, “18 Tigers, 17 Lions, 8 Bears,  
3 Cougars, 2 Wolves, 1 Baboon, 1 Macaque,  
and 1 Man Dead in Ohio”
Too severe masters turn the love of them to hatred.
—inscription on engraving by Paulus Potter  *
Humans always look for symbolism where sense and reason 
seem to be lacking. Is eating one’s master— or the master’s 
virile part—significant enough to constitute a “parting gift” 
reeking of vengeance? The gift may have been mutual: from 
the initial victim to the later one—submission in the flesh 
to the long-dominated—and, somewhat less intuitively, 
from the animal to its cruel keeper—the granting of the 
latter’s repressed wish. Yet that it is the external reproductive 
organs that should be devoured seems somehow poetically 
fitting, and reminiscent of The Punishment of a Hunter, a 
famous seventeenth-century canvas in a series of narrative 
* Chris Heath, “18 Tigers, 17 Lions, 8 Bears, 3 Cougars, 2 Wolves, 1 Baboon, 
1 Macaque, and 1 Man Dead in Ohio,” GQ, Mar. 2012, http://www.gq.com/
news-politics/newsmakers/201203/terry-thompson-ohio-zoo-massacre- 
chris-heath-gq-february-2012; Hofstede De Groot, A Catalogue Raisonné of the 
Works of the Most Eminent Dutch Painters of the Seventeenth Century, vol. 4  
(London: Forgotten Books, 2012), 592–93.
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panels by Paulus Potter. In it, the animals take their revenge 
on their persecutor and tormentor—by prosecuting and 
executing him. His trial features a multispecies jury, fox as 
clerk, a lion for judge. The hunter is sentenced to death by 
roasting on a spit, as his hounds are strung up on an impro-
vised gallows. In both cases—the American tragedy and the 
Dutch allegory—humans get their comeuppance. But the 
as-yet-unpainted story of the man from Ohio, who died by his 
own hand and was nibbled at by his menagerie, betokens 
a still higher justice where it refrains from imposing on 
animals the petty logic of ultimate revenge masked as legal 
deliberation.
§ Exuviae
When we are done thinking with animals, we discard them. 
The lab animal is a placeholder for man until it is safe for 
man to be experimented upon. We emphasize our similar-
ities with other animals when they can serve as stand-ins, 
quasi-doubles, and dissociate ourselves when we can exploit 
them in our stead. The source of animal melancholy, and of 
human melancholy concerning animals, is the recognition 
of this double hazard— experimentation/exploitation—for 
which we use animals to avoid what we’d rather not undergo 
if the animal can help it. But this describes only one of two 
present paradigms of our meeting with other species.
When humans yawn, they have animal faces; this is as 
welcome a thought today as the reverse  * was a century ago. 
We have seen too much of man to think that we have a lock 
on natural dignity. “It isn’t in a bear’s nature to wear roller 
* “When animals yawn, they have human faces.” Kraus, Half-Truths, 120.
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skates. It isn’t in an elephant’s nature to sit on a stool.”  * 
When we enter a Dog Café or an Owl Bar, we picture a 
miniscule safari, where animals (in the majority) of the same 
general kind call the shots and set the limits on socialization. 
Rewilding initiatives express a secret longing for a reversal 
of relations. As we speak, circuses are refigured for human 
acts, and zoos, as exotic animal sanctuaries. Petting zoos, 
where different species are on display for human enjoyment, 
will remain in spirit what the great zoological gardens once 
were in reality—the rationale behind the exemption being 
that children can do no harm, and relate to animals in a way 
adults only relate to death—with awe and fascination, ren-
dering it untouchable. If democracy is still a large animal, as 
Plato had it, then we have shrunk from featherless bipeds to 
the size of fleas upon its back, and soon will be microbes; the 
more there are of us, the more unsustainable we become, the 
more we reimagine humankind as parasitic. We will con-
tinue to use animals to disguise our ignobility; what nature 
they shed or cast off, we will pick up.
* Elisabeth Malkin, “Worry under the Big Top as Mexico City Moves to Ban Circus 
Animals,” New York Times, June 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/
world/americas/worry-under-the-big-top-as-mexico-city-moves-to-ban-circus- 
animals.html.
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§ Single-Minded Pursuits
What is a Cat? It is a rectification. . . .The mouse plus the cat 
equals the revised and corrected proofs of Creation.
—Victor Hugo, Les Misérables  *
As the revolutionary mole was digging tunnels beneath Paris, 
beneath even its catacombs, Hugo saw God’s revised plans 
for the world as a game of cat and mouse, without rules 
other than those of nature. It goes without saying that this 
blueprint for Genesis and this game-logic of history have not 
been binding with us. If their simplicity beguiles, it’s because 
we are complicating creatures, with far too many objectives 
and not enough pursuits, and look to animals for a lost 
single-mindedness.
* Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, trans. Julie Rose (New York: Modern Library, 2008), 
969.
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§ Classified
How long have we bemoaned the fact that man, given the 
right (read: wrong) environment, reverts to an animal-like 
existence? The fascination with wild men of the woods and 
feral children goes back to Gilgamesh and Rome’s myth of 
origin, suggesting that the line between the civilized and the 
savage (on which the gods were never particularly hung up) 
can be all but erased. The more serious issue and source of 
anxiety has always been the line that kept the human savage 
separate from the beast. Today, when wild animals, animals 
that have not been trained to conform in their basic instincts 
to human civilization, are the real endangered species, it 
would be in the interest of science to study the exact degree 
of a human being’s (initially) voluntary reversion to an 
animal, on the level of identity, self-perception, conscious-
ness . . . It might allow us to determine the point of maximum 
rapport and thus the optimal conditions for our kind and 
other species to meet. Yet we must also keep in mind that it 
is precisely the degree to which they cannot become animals 
that humans can be held accountable for their actions. If 
the experiment of human-to-animal reversion proves 100% 
successful, then, as with the atomic bomb, its design cannot 
be allowed to get out.
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§ Double Standards
A You know what I miss? It was the first thing I kept hear-
ing. A hallucination.
The cat, the sound of its bell in the distance. I liked this 
cat, it was so autonomous, even if it was living off me. I 
didn’t mind at all. I left it alone. But it was a cat.
B Still is, I’m sure.
A I never once thought of it: how ungrateful!
Why do we have the opposite expectations of people? 
Should we even have them?
B How could we not?
A Because we don’t have them of cats. Alright, I’ll speak for 
myself: at least I don’t have them.
B Maybe if you found a very small, very independent person 
who didn’t speak . . . and occasionally brought home dead 
birds or mice . . .
A Come on, that’s too easy a parallel. With such a person, I 
might well take them in as a cat—and only as long as they 
behaved like one. 
But my concern is with these two standards. Why is 
human sociability configured in this way? Why are better 
manners not expected of cats also? Don’t we in fact resent 
them for it? Dogs, being trainable, are expected to behave. 
But cats—we say it’s in their nature to ignore. We resent 
but feel obliged to forgive, no? 
Human nature, by comparison, is open (or, anyway, 
has opened up). Yet, as far as human sociability goes, we 
take it as a universal that if one can relate and recip-
rocate, then one ought to, at least on those occasions 
when one is someone else’s beneficiary. And even if one, 
at a minimum, relates in such a case, does that mean 
one is also reciprocating? No, one must make a point of 
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reciprocating, or else prove that one really can’t. Those 
who do nothing do resemble cats. Still, they differ and 
can’t get off the hook that easily. The thing is, they 
themselves have many expectations, including of their 
cat, if they have one—which they often do as a symbol of 
their “feline” nature. And this cat’s “selfish” indifference 
constantly disappoints them.
§ Arcadius Makes Headlines
“Even the winners can die,” begins a human interest piece. 
“Steeplechase Horse Arcadius Dies after Winning”  
We should all be so lucky!
“After the Best Race of His Life, a Horse’s Death” 
To die is one thing, but to die in the rare case when achieve-
ment, quantity and quality, can be measured with such 
exactitude! That indeed is a pity.
“It was as if he knew he had won”— as if, that is, not really. 
From his perspective death came at the moment it wanted 
to come, not to underscore his triumph—a triumph in life, 
at the price of his life, not over life. An effort much greater 
because unsustainable, outside his limits, within his power 
only with that power’s total outlay—he sacrificed himself 
making it; running fast enough to make the finish-line his 
death—a feat far more impressive than the petty one you 
reward him for! Death came, dashing that triumph (exacting 
payment—not its asking but its telling price). 
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“He tried, he gave his all.”  * 
The line reached in record time—the record of his life no 
less— cutting short his life, made vivid time’s relationship 
to speed, disproving that (at such small distances) the faster 
we go the more time we have left over, and the slower we 
can arrive at death. (You say that the faster we move the 
lesser the distance travelled relative to what we have come 
to expect—and so keep going, exhaustively, until the end 
catches up with you unawares). Compared to the Patagonian 
hare fleeing his pursuers all the way to his dying breath, stay-
ing ahead of (without losing or outlasting) them and pacing 
himself, adjusting his speed to extend the distance he has 
left, Arcadius, not ahead to begin with, came out ahead of 
his rivals and by adjusting his speed seems to have shortened 
the time at his disposal. He went not as far as he could, but 
as fast, as though in pursuit of success, not mere survival. The 
finish line was not fine, nor was he. 
The lamentable anthropomorphism of the tragic racehorse 
makes for a moving story—almost as good as that of Bach’s 
unfinished fugue, over whose last notes, spelling (in Ger-
man notation) the word BACH (“stream”), he is said to have 
breathed his last.
§ Beauty & Death
Beauty need not be moving to be a close ally of death.
* Joe Clancy, “After the Best Race of His Life, a Horse’s Death,” New York Times, 
May 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/sports/after-his-lifes-best- 
race-death-of-horse-arcadius.html.
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§ Hit and Miss
All-but-invincibility does not require your weak spot to be no 
more than the size of a heel. A heel-sized patch of inhuman 
strength is enough if it is in the right place; an area the size 
of a heart can make one immune if one’s assailant assumes 
this to be the most vulnerable point, unloading his entire 
magazine into your chest. Now let’s say your “heart” is 
made of stone, a stone-cold kind of vanity, and you, though 
wounded and reeling from the attack, survive. Rather than 
take aim again, this time at our stomach or head, which 
would-be assassin would not back away, incredulous, and be 
laid thus by the heels?
§ The Average American
An American in his late 50s learns he has a year to live. Diag-
nosed with an obscure terminal illness he is advised to cope 
with the certainty of imminent death by making the most 
of the time left to him and to seek solace in spirituality. He 
makes no arrangements for his burial or cremation. Reject-
ing death with dignity, he seeks an atavistic terminus. Using 
up all his savings, he has himself parachuted into the heart 
of the Amazon, where he wants to live out his days without 
provisions or weapons. His wish is to die like prehistoric 
man: in combat with wild beasts. He wants to revert to the 
zero-point of consciousness and human evolution.
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§ Insulation
Books are the original insulator. A shelf of books along an 
outside wall works well to prevent heat escaping. If all the 
books were removed from the homes in Britain, our energy 
bills would rocket.
—Joel Rickett  *
The electronic book has no such added utility. It can no more 
insulate than shelter. A “lettered recess”  † of e-books is to a 
refuge as a house of cards is to one made of brick and mortar. 
The feeling of being walled in is gone, but so is that of having 
a roof over one’s head. 
§ What You Want Is What You Get
Consumers have been educated by the market and now the 
median level of cultural competence is much higher. A basic 
rule of happiness is don’t buy things; buy experiences. The 
market has taken one commodity product after another and 
turned it into an emotional experience— even hotel stays. I 
don’t know how you measure how much better off we are 
because of that, but we are significantly better off. 
—David Brooks, “The Edamame Economy”  ‡
It is delusional to think that booking a stay in a boutique 
hotel automatically guarantees an experience advertised as 
being designed for its guests. The “edamame economy” is 
* Quoted in Sarah Lonsdale, “Interiors: Rooms That Lose None of Their Shelf 
Life,” Telegraph, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/interiors/ 
3360991/Interiors-Rooms-that-lose-none-of-their-shelf-life.html.
† Young, “Conjectures,” 348.
‡ David Brooks, “The Edamame Economy,” New York Times, Jan. 4, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/opinion/brooks-the-edamame-economy.html.
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the old “package deal” economy repackaged and upsold. The 
customer pays more not for any particular experience but for 
the conviction that it will occur, as well as, to put it bluntly, 
the greater fuss around the actual choice (since there needs 
to be a “match” between it and the experience we want, or 
see ourselves as having).
The difference between the available options is that 
some (thanks to their price and so- called uniqueness) come 
attached with an imperative to make the most of it. So great 
is the expectation and commitment to making it special that 
even a one- night stay acquires the aura of a one-night stand 
on a tropical holiday. But as in so many other areas of produc-
tion that have figured out how to exploit consumers, we are 
creating surplus value by signing an invisible contract with 
ourselves. To have an experience in the experience economy, 
to have one on demand, seems less preposterous and self- -
 exploitative when that demand appears to come from, and 
that experience is guaranteed by, none other than us.
§ Moratorium II
A I call for a moratorium on publishing so the average reader 
could catch up, thank you very much.
B No offence, my friend, but what a stupid idea! There is no 
such thing as an “average reader.” Clearly you don’t read 
enough—
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§ Rip-Off
We learn that animals learn by mimicry. This means that 
writers are always learning. But ours is an age when even 
mimicry is in decline. Why not rip covers off of entire books 
and put new names on them? They are already doing it over in 
China. Increasingly that is the only way a book (a thesis, etc.) 
will get read. Let me put it to you this way, dear writer: would 
you rather your work be shared and read under a different 
author, or never read again? No self-respecting communist 
would oppose such a redistribution of intellectual property.
§ Meterocracy
In the fairest possible world, virtue would be rewarded, as 
would merit of any kind. Recognition of merit is our world’s 
moral response to rampant capitalism. Does the widespread 
criticism of the use of metrics and quantification of achieve-
ment in nearly all aspects of life indicate that meritocracy is 
part of the bad world that needs to be overcome, or does it 
merely tell us that the measurement of man is hardly less 
crude than it was some hundred-plus years ago?
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§ A Wide Selection
The process of social screening and selection is there no 
matter how far back we look. It is there in adolescence, in 
the playground, in the sandbox . . . It occurs in the back-
ground until suddenly we not only feel the pain of having 
been passed over for someone not obviously better, more 
charismatic, more accomplished than us; we also begin more 
soberly to consider our odds, to question the decision’s fair-
ness, to look at the patterns and, finally, the bases of social 
exclusion and acceptance. Such experiences, when their out-
comes are not to our liking, acquire the bitter flavour of exis-
tential sorting, not just into the favoured and the rejected, 
but, in the latter group, into those who are paralyzed by their 
awareness of it being so, those who persevere in spite of it, 
and those who fight it—sometimes until late middle age. 
The mid-life crisis, made grim by resentment of systemic 
discrimination, has its analogue in the adolescent period 
of rebellion against social norms that loom as obstacles to 
self-realization, -expression, freedom and equality, justice 
and fairness for all. A period of adjustment in behaviour and 
expectations may or may not follow. The memory of depart-
ing from norms, of going off the rails that first time, tends to 
be mythologized because misunderstood. As for the second 
time, mid-life, depending on your social integration, it can 
be a source of severe embarrassment. Whether you ever get 
back on track or not, you have arrived. Should you one day 
come out, it will be much reduced in spirit.
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§ Outside the Text
We should stop pretending that general-interest books (and 
I don’t mean picture books) are judged solely on the merit 
of what is inside them, and that the social background of a 
book, its cultural context, and how it came into being, come 
into play in only the most obvious literary feats and are irrel-
evant outside of special interest. We claim to read master-
pieces that happen to be prison writing, collectively authored, 
or the posthumously published work of a suicide—unless 
they are masterpieces of prison writing, feats merely of 
collective authorship, or of a suicidal mind. We say that such 
information only adds to our appreciation of a true work of 
literature (Dostoevsky’s gambling-driven productions readily 
spring to mind) even for the cases where that is manifestly 
untrue. Like the proverbial cover, all that extraneous stuff, 
we maintain, can never be the main reason for admiring a 
book— or for redeeming it. Yet clearly the greater share of 
the enormous appeal of a novel about overcoming addiction, 
A Million Little Pieces, was not only its Book Club controversy, 
but its origin in the mind of an addict, at the site of addiction 
overcome.
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§ Doubling Standard
The idea that we should all feel addressed by the books we 
read, that this is how books should be for us to elevate them 
to “universal” masterpieces of “human” ingenuity, is very 
powerful. We should pray that it soon becomes passé. It is 
like saying that all humans should be explicitly and promis-
cuously social to count as great, for us to find them worthy of 
honour; otherwise their humanity is flawed, there is some-
thing wrong with them—some moral failing, the paralogism 
of writing publicly while not caring—for which we don’t 
forgive them, but instead mark them down.
The exception to this powerful and widespread view of 
literature is the outsider writer, equivalent of the outsider 
artist in name though not in number. His work, contrariwise, 
many are prepared to elevate above the best writers, and high 
above their own heads. But they are okay with such clueless-
ness. They don’t hold it against the writer but instead reach 
out to him, pitying one so shut out.
§ The Candid Philosopher
Shall we steal a line from that now-fashionable philosopher 
and say, next time, Let’s all collaborate!? Thinking together is 
so much more fun—and optimistic.
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§ Colla et labora
For reasons of technological possibility and economic effi-
ciency, collective authorship no longer means collaboration. 
More often than not, it gives rise to a collective instead of 
proceeding from it. It is the product of environments and 
milieus; decisions to co-author are less and less decisions, 
and more a mix of logical steps and professional jerk reac-
tions. To keep up appearances, much is made of networking 
as “talking shop,” as though collaboration was alive and 
kicking.
For reasons of cultural degradation and endangerment, 
collaboration no longer implies collective authorship. More 
often than not, it takes the form of working loosely side by 
side. It is the product of garrisoned scenes and threatened 
ecosystems; co-thinking and co-doing are safeguards less of 
concord or conformity than of group survival. To keep up 
appearances, much is made of not going it alone, as though 
collective authorship was part of the job description.
§ Ghosting Oneself 
The risks of ruining one’s prospects for literary greatness 
are such that, in the making of a literary auteur no less than 
of a literary author, they can only be reduced by contracting 
oneself as one’s own ghostwriter, to whom any and all com-
plaints should in future be directed.
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§ Publish and Perish?
But there is something else about the genre, a sense that the 
world might be more ghosted now than at any time in his-
tory. Isn’t Wikipedia entirely ghosted? Isn’t half of Facebook? 
Isn’t the World Wide Web a new ether, in which we are all 
haunted by ghostwriters?
—Andrew O’Hagan  *
Perhaps the only release from the tyranny of genius and the 
competitive spirit of capitalism is to appear in print only as 
a ghost, with an unidentifiable body and untrackable series 
of avatars. But who can resist the temptation to be recog-
nized behind our multiple names, ostensibly meant to put 
false followers off our scent, when our hangers-on still claim 
our attention without deserving it and with another hand 
demand from us a piece of ID? We think, often rightly, Better 
do it myself, in case they get it wrong, and throw off our cloak 
of anonymity, presenting our work publically for identifica-
tion (calling it our calling card, to indicate that the opportu-
nity to get to know us was missed).
While difficult to trace, we want nonetheless to be sought 
and found—like a needle in a haystack—by our sharp point. 
The prospect of perishing in a field fire or ending up in the 
stomach of some ruminant is as unappealing as the search 
for genius and the spirit of competition are maddening—a 
characteristic of charades that have gone on too long, and of 
the world shrunk into a parlour.
* O’Hagan, “Ghosting.”
  matches:  a  light book 287
§ Everything You Ever Wanted to Know about Nazis  
but Were Too Lazy to Find Out
“Overstuffed suitcase of a book,” wrote one critic of The 
Kindly Ones. But not the kind you should live out of.
§ Uncontaminated
You can eat off even the filthiest books.
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§ Wiggle Room; or, the Unhappy Customer
Literature wriggles away like an eel. What would become of 
the eel if you caught it? You’d eat it. Literature and the eel 
live as long as they succeed in wriggling away.
—Witold Gombrowicz  *
Some prose, as someone once said, is so tasty you could eat 
it by the ladle. The main ingredients of the literary dish are 
words. You place your order, you take the first bite, yet as so 
often it is not to your liking. You have two options: either 
you can season it liberally to taste with what you have in 
front of you, or, just as easily, you can go to complain to the 
cooks. But if this dish happens to be an eel (and sometimes 
all you dream of is electric fish), then you are out of luck. You 
have only yourself to blame for not sticking your fork into it 
quickly enough to prevent it eluding you—which it will do 
even dead. Too slow to grasp, you have nothing to show the 
chef, who in exasperation is liable to offer a second helping . . .
Never ever, however, blame the waitress who brought it to 
you. She has neither prepared nor tried it. You cannot have a 
word with this waitress; she is not responsible for the quality 
of the food—and besides, she leaves immediately to attend 
to another table. No matter how much you wish now that 
she had tasted your meal and, better still, sent it back before 
it reached you, if you are anything like her usual customers 
she has every reason not to care about your satisfaction. You 
too soon learn to look past her and throw furious glances in 
the direction of the kitchen, eventually taking your com-
plaint there if you are firm, which is entirely within your 
rights as consumer. You know as well as I do what the staff 
will say: although the carte came with recommendations, 
you chose neither a house specialty, nor a fresh daily special, 
but, craving surprises, a chef’s fantasia. You thought first of 
ordering the tasting menu, but worried it might leave you 
* Witold Gombrowicz, A Kind of Testament, ed. Dominique de Roux, trans. Alastair 
Hamilton (1968; Urbana-Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive, 2007), 126.
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hungry, or else its variety would have been too much for your 
sensitive stomach. And then, after you made your choice, 
there was the inordinate wait—but in such establishments 
you half-expect this. You certainly, however, did not plan for 
disappointment. You felt your appetite grow— even so, you 
resisted pulling out a (“good bad”) sandwich from your brief-
case, in anticipation of more recherché fare.
So what made you come to this place? Was it the five-star 
reviews by those with too much time to spend or more 
refined taste? By now you have guessed it: the “dish” is a novel 
with literary pretensions; the “cooks,” the author and editor; 
the staff and joint, a bookstore, kept alive by undiscriminat-
ing user-critics. But what, might I ask, are you doing here?
§ Token of Value
Every work is born failed until it is redeemed by being 
published. There exists a type of literary product that is 
irredeemable, insofar as redemption happens only through 
publishing. The work ignored by the publishing industry, a 
text no one would risk picking up, is a text forsaken, and 
with it the writer. So goes the old understanding.
But publishing no longer has the power to redeem. It has 
been discovered as the reverse of the coin that bears the 
words NO CASH VALUE. By publishing your book, you have 
merely obtained a token, for which you can play (for a limited 
time) to distract yourself from your flaws as a writer, but 
which is irredeemable outside your world of publishing.
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§ Life of a Writer
The hustle and bustle of authors around their work may be 
slow for a road to ruin, but eventually it gets the job done.
§ Literary Public Execution
No scaffold is too elevated for a writer’s execution. He has 
come into being as a public figure, and it is only fitting that 
he be helped to die as one.
§ Public Service
Parole is “the release of a prisoner temporarily (for a special 
purpose) or permanently before the completion of a sentence, 
on the promise of good behaviour” (OED). 
Prisoners of their writing, writers would do everyone a ser-
vice to serve out their sentences without parole. They do not 
need to speak about them or, for that matter, to hand them 
out to others.
With more time, and themselves as models for how to “do” 
time metaphorically, they could then turn the odious literal 
practice of life imprisonment into a metaphor.
Failing that, the public might write off the last of their 
sentence as one writes off a debt. And depending on whom 
you ask, this “write off” may mean “forgive” or “dismiss.” At 
issue is not whether achieving greater social justice is what 
the writer owes us in his prison cell, but whether he has spent 
his time writing well. And good writing is best done without 
parole.
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§ Vital Injection
A more satisfying alternative to capital punishment has 
appeared on the horizon of possibility: in place of the death 
penalty, a life sentence with an indefinite life-extension. 
More humane perhaps, but less human.
“Life will be hard,” the lifer might then say, unaware that 
his forerunner, the failed regicide Damiens, said something 
similar of the day of his drawing and quartering. 
(This option was first spied in an aphorism,  * and brought 
to life in a popular TV-series, Black Mirror, not long ago. Even 
aphorisms can have their life extended by becoming literal-
isms. This, again, being better punishment than the penalty 
of death.)
§ Complete Sentences
“We no longer execute people for saying the wrong word. 
Instead we hand them life sentences.”
“We no longer persecute people for their opinions. We ignore 
them. There’s no question which is worse.”
“With so many distractions vying for our attention, capital 
punishment is not the attraction it once was.”
* Stanisław Jerzy Lec, Myśli nieuczesane: wszystkie (Warsaw: Noir sur Blanc, 2011), 
22.
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§ Essential Killing
It has been pointed out that the Great Revolution democ-
ratized a good part of the French body politic by means of 
the guillotine, a mode of death formerly reserved for nobles. 
Those who lost their heads were made more equal by popular 
judgment, and equality was felt all around.
So we show our humanity even in the very process of anni-
hilating those presumed human (by falling under the law). 
The guillotine and the electric chair, each in its own iconic 
way, served to make the point: the first through equality, the 
second through mercy. Beneath the guillotine all are given 
the same democratic treatment, cut down to the new uni-
versal size, undeserving of republican brotherhood yet made 
its beneficiaries. Similarly, the electric chair and then lethal 
injection came to be defensible means of disposing of those 
enemies of the state who do not deserve public empathy yet 
become its recipients. 
While both apparatuses were invented as humanitarian 
concessions, they are in many ways opposites. The one 
achieved in precision and efficiency what the other gained 
in dignity and solemnity. The bloodthirsty ruthlessness of 
the show of equality is in no way inferior to the execution 
chamber’s antiseptic chill. Still, each made methodical 
killing respectable, testifying to the humanity not just of the 
executioners but of all of society in a way that the law alone 
could never do. Until we come up with a solution that does 
not kill, we will continue to show our humanity to those 
who have least use for it.
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§ Completists
Accused Killer Was Victim’s Pallbearer One Week after  
Brutal Slaying 
—headline in The Calgary Herald, March 26, 2014
There are some for whom it is not enough to murder some-
one; they cannot stop themselves from seeing them off as 
well. It is then not, or no longer, a case of sadism (since their 
victim cannot feel anything) but of completism. We are pre-
pared to forgive a murderer, but a completist—never.
§ Happy Day
bonheur du jour: small writing desk, French eighteenth 
century
Often a desk is not the place to write. This became clear 
long ago, before the age of laptop computing. But the joy of 
returning to one and the same spot, one and the same stable 
surface, in order to pursue what one has begun, is the joy of 
knowing that one will continue until one is done. It is the 
experience of completion. 
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§ Once a Wolf, Always a Wolf?
Goodwill is turned to ill will by the violence it suffers.
—Adorno and Max Horkheimer  *
Instead of having your children passively accept the unsul-
lied goodness and badness of characters in fairy tales, there 
may be more pedagogical value in asking them to reimagine 
these characters, building on the above rule: to imagine the 
good ones corrupted by violence and malice, the bad ones 
converted to goodness by decency, charity, and kindness. 
The danger in this exercise is that children, being so impres-
sionable, will turn away from the world, with its unpredict-
able violence, to protect their own good natures. Yet isn’t 
that same danger hidden in their fear that the world is full of 
unalterable violence, of proverbial wolves in sheep’s attire who 
can never be mollified by goodwill? 
§ On a Roll
How we love reversals! It is as with rolling downhill when 
one realizes the ground has levelled out enough that to con-
tinue will require a new commitment and effort. 
But as long as you keep that up, heaven shall follow earth 
with every turn.
* Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 214.
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§ Nodding Acquaintance
A What if someone you met every day, to the best of your 
knowledge an ordinary person, suddenly said to you, in 
an elevator, “All people . . . are bound, by their very nature, 
to be criminals.”  *
B I would be surprised. I would look at the person more 
closely, when they weren’t looking. I would remember 
the remark every time I saw the person. If it was often, I 
might even lose my peace of mind.
A So you would or wouldn’t credit his remark? It seems you 
would suspect him of having uttered a promise, rather 
than an accusation (of you, for instance) or a statement of 
fact.
B I suppose I would recognize the truth of his words, but 
only as concerns other people.
A Including himself.
B Yes, including himself. Bizarre casual comments are often 
self-incriminating.
A And your own judgment would now tend towards 
this—incriminating others, I mean. His statement made 
it a rational direction for you to consider, even if the posi-
tion itself is not reasonable.
B I suppose. But it isn’t like I have nothing better to do. 
Only that uninitiated contact with strangers makes me 
think “Here’s trouble.”
* Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, ed. and trans. David McDuff (Lon-
don: Penguin, 2002), 309.
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A Why would you not say to the person precisely that: “Your 
remark rings true whenever a stranger makes a curious, 
unsolicited remark to me. My first thought is: ‘Here’s 
trouble.’”
B I would never do that.
A Why?
B Because it would be rude and dangerous to let on that I’m 
suspicious. That all it took to make me uncomfortable 
was a seemingly innocent, offhand remark. It would make 
me look cowardly, and cowardice is weakness, and weak-
ness provokes, and it is defenceless against crime . . .
A But by replying that way you would be making light of 
your discomfort and perhaps preempting unwanted 
behaviour. What would you rather do?
B Nod. Nod and think: “Go to hell, if it will even take you.”
A That’s a mean thought. It implies you have already judged 
the person guilty of some crime. Did their words cause 
you any offence? Don’t you think you are overreacting?
B No. I was rehearsing Sartre’s line about hell being other 
people.  * I meant: “Stick to likeminded people.”
A So although you think there is truth in what he said, you 
would not call yourself “likeminded”?
B No.
A Why is that?
* Jean-Paul Sartre, “No Exit,” in No Exit and Three Other Plays, trans. Stuart Gilbert 
and Lionel Abel (New York: Vintage, 1989), 45.
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B Because I think better of people. Better in the sense that, 
even if they are criminals at heart, or, as you say, “by 
nature,” they will not let their criminals out. They will 
not become criminals by deed or law, only at most in their 
mind, in their imagination. They might rehearse crimes 
all their lives but leave them undone. And this “outlet” 
will satisfy their need for aggression.
A But they will remain criminals “by nature,” will they not? 
So in that sense there is no difference between your view 
and the view expressed earlier.
B Oh but there is. I think better of people because I think 
they can change, become better people. The criminal who 
can discipline their mind will cease to be a criminal “by 
nature.”
A Do you extend this fulsome optimism to the person in 
the elevator?
B Not really.
A Why not? 
B Because he lost the benefit of the doubt by making the 
comment. Or rather, his comment suggests that his 
imagination is up to no good. It is evidence that he may 
be a criminal at heart who cannot contain his criminal 
inclinations.
A I see. By “likeminded people” you meant such people.
B Yes. And such people I would rather keep as nodding 
acquaintances. To such people I would say nothing. The 
efficacy of words is overrated. I would not reply for fear of 
interrupting an already fragile effort by which they might 
be reining in their impulses. I don’t want to provoke them, 
I do not wish to stand in their way, I have no desire to 
be noticed, to appear on their sensitive radars. I want to 
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be the mirror they want me to be. To nod would be to 
indicate that I accept this—this function—but nothing 
more. Nodding could leave open the possibility that I 
too harbour criminal thoughts or intentions, however 
uncomfortable this makes me feel. A nod can be a sign of 
complicity.
To accept that “hell is other people” is to allow these 
un-likeminded people to imagine I think like them—and 
that together we make up hell. To let them think their 
criminal dreams have company, and that it is OK—and 
more fulfilling—to keep dreaming. Because a reality in 
which everyone turned to crime, the real hell, would be 
deeply disappointing.
A And all this can be suggested with a mere nod?
B Yes, a nod and nothing more. A nod without a look; why 
complicate the message?
§ Black Leather
With the refinement of middle-class taste, the latex gloves of 
the butcher and fish-vendor have gone from white to black. 
Which is to say from clean to dirty, for those out of sync with 
the times. Or from blood-stained to sexy, for the aesthetically 
minded younger generation whose first association is with 
leather. The few folks in whom the sight of blood on black 
leather might stir unpleasant memories will not be around 
for much longer now.
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§ Counterproductive
A Security Bulletin on a college campus gave detailed 
descriptions of three armed robbers: their sex, age, height, 
build, dress, and distinguishing facial features. If what was 
missing is their colour, are we expected to assume? And if  
we are, how does this combat racial stereotyping?
§ Ripple Effect
How can we explain our reaction to sexual acts that turn 
murderous, as they do routinely in the works of Sade, which 
so many find unpalatable? The combination of pleasure and 
cruelty is as deplorable and uncomfortable- making as the 
alliance of power and cruelty is unsurprising and com-
fortably far away. Despite the appeal of erotic sadism and 
masochism in the culture, sexual gratification and torture or 
murder do not mix well in film or literature. We are awash 
with safe and sanitized depictions of even mildly transgres-
sive sexuality, figured as consent-based fantasy role- play—a 
line that the pairing of voluptuousness with brutality seems 
destined to cross, as we know from reading the paper. Sex 
plus wantonness seems for many too common, too close 
to home, and thus too unpleasant to think about, let alone 
merit artistic treatment, which so often glamourizes or aes-
theticizes what should be (is) feared as a real threat. 
Meanwhile, modern power, in the hands of citizens, 
remains innocuous. For one thing, power has been uncoupled 
here from faith-based cruelty long ago. Christianity (which 
has long since abandoned its militant mission), Mormonism, 
etc. are being scrubbed clean even of sexual abusiveness, and 
may yet undo their orthodox repressions completely. (The 
cuddly libido, symbolized by the sex kitten and the Playboy 
Bunny, looks to soon have its equivalent in the huggable 
Church of Pope Francis, purged of its closeted skeletons.) In 
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the hands of secular dictators and religious fundamentalists 
elsewhere in the world, however, power is as in the bad old 
days: bloody and clumsy, pathetic, occasionally appalling 
and exotic. Wherever in the world power and cruelty are still 
close, or grow to be inseparable, their alliance seems surreal 
and unthreatening, and in any event rarely news. Unless, that 
is, it shows its sexual roots (witness Boko Haram). While 
unbridled religious fervor is recognized as powerful enough 
to explain and even justify bloodshed, the pursuit of pleasure 
does not have the same validity because it is widely believed 
to be obtainable without violence. In as permissive a culture 
as our own, we feel, sex offenders have no more excuse.
Power, whether religious or secular, here or elsewhere, still 
carries the hint of domination, tyranny, and atrocity. This 
dark side finds an outlet in the outrages of our foreign wars, 
but it is always excused as an exception, as the rot of a few 
isolated apples, malicious, sadistic, or simply too stupid to 
know better. When real power is over many, its abuses are 
systemically distributed and, in all but the egregious cases, 
tend to escape detection. But in power over just one or rel-
atively few, as in the case of sects, slaves kept in basements, 
concentration camp inmates, and war prisoners (as in Abu 
Ghraib ca. 2003), the sexual core becomes hard to miss—and 
take. We recoil from the sight, even the thought. By com-
parison, mass terror, beheadings, stonings, and crucifixions 
attract because the methods used to maintain power are too 
archaic for us to properly fathom, and because our good gov-
ernments do much to publicize such images. Their repressed 
eroticism is as far from our minds as they themselves are far 
away. We read such seemingly unadulterated power-trip sto-
ries with a firm sense of pity for the victims, uncomplicated 
by envy, perhaps with renewed commitment to fighting the 
world’s ignorance. From the other kind of story— of domina-
tion coupled with cruel eros—we are kept less by our naïvety 
than by a deep fear of anarchy. Since once we acknowledge 
the intimate ties between, not just sex and criminal violence, 
but lust and religious and other tyranny where we previously 
did not see them, all power—not just the exotic, but the 
familiar also —will become too licentious to bear.
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§ Sleepless
It is easy to make sleep as boring as possible on film, but 
difficult to bore spectators to sleep without them noticing it. 
Not only are their eyes well trained, but they are also used to 
watchfulness.
§ Almost
I am back from a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth Sym-
phony. At almost the same time yesterday I left the cinema, 
having just seen Son of Saul, a tunnel-vision rendering of life 
in Auschwitz. What more is there to say? That the famous 
performance of the Ninth under the direction of Wilhelm 
Furtwängler to mark the anniversary of him whom Thomas 
Mann, as a German, was compelled, on the eve of World War 
Two, to recognize as his “brother”—that this performance 
took place almost two months after the Wannsee Confer-
ence? It is thanks to this “almost,” to this inexactitude, that 
we do not suffocate beneath the weight of numbers.
§ At the Concession Stand
Cheer up! The markets are down today.
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§ Discount on Top
[SALE PRICE]
bargain not included
§ “Friends for Life”
Everyone has gotten at least one of these pledges—in an 
email or scribbled on the back of a postcard after a pleasant 
time together. They are products of impulse. They announce 
two things at once: a strong desire to remember you just as 
you were, still fresh in the other’s mind, and the anticipation 
of a longer parting, for objective but often also subjective 
reasons—forgoing contact is known to preserve in amber 
that consummate experience. If it can be arranged, the part-
ing will almost invariably prove the more lasting the more 
pleasure was actually had. Even permanent. So I always keep 
these pledges of friendship “for life” to return eventually to 
their senders, releasing them from a flippant commitment. 
After all, what are friends for life for? Let’s not be senti-
mental. Once embarrassment fades, the vow can always be 
renewed. 
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§ Amicitia aequalitas
You can tell true friends by their natural synchrony in ending 
their friendship, rather than by their painful growing apart. 
Their deep mutual familiarity, emotional attunement—the 
highest quality of amity uniting them—allow them also 
to move on as though spontaneously, simultaneously in 
unspoken agreement. Such a parting is always amicable 
because it is accepted without hard feelings and nary a word 
by both parties, who in a single cast go from personal friends 
to upstanding members of civil society, where they remain 
closer than strangers though farther apart than brethren.
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§ Safety Deposits
Thieves need banks to deposit their stash without account-
ing for it. This to keep it from being stolen by others like 
them. They need banks more than those who have nothing 
to hide and who never mistrust regular banking, which 
requires transparency at least on the client’s part. The ten-
sion between thief and bank that culminates at the safety 
deposit box derives from, but is inversely proportionate to, 
the money or monetary value of the stolen object in need of 
protection. The fungibility of commodities ensures that a 
thief approaching a bank will feel like a murderer returning 
to the scene of the crime. Not out of compulsion or in fear of 
having left traces there or on his stash that could link them 
to the act, but in a punishing nightmare (free of remorse) and 
out of resignation to being forever tethered to his misdeed. 
Humiliation seems unavoidable: what is stolen from society 
must be deposited again into its hands, and this in the most 
official and scrutinized of institutions. As long as those who 
operate outside the law do so only selectively, and rely on 
doing their banking or other business that might shine a 
light on their livelihood, they remain more vulnerable than 
you or I. The sense of autonomy they acquire in operating 
outside legality is sapped as soon as they return to check on 
their loot.
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§ Sexual Root of Kleptomania
If the first book one steals without having read, based on 
name and title alone, is Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is 
Freud proven right, or wrong?
§ Una harum ultima
There are dreams that prove Freud right, but only by proving 
him wrong. These are the dreams in which lust and death 
near-coincide, and eros is intensified by the proximity of 
thanatos. A cliché in art as much as in life, intense and until 
now forbidden sexual desire on the lip of death loses its 
staleness and implausibility only in the drama of the dream. 
Such dreams combine the intensity of the first encounter 
with the last. To die when one is most alive to pleasure and 
death— could one ask for a death better than this dream 
death, in which the last hour, not seen coming, is stretched 
by desire as long as it will last?
§ On Edge
Assisting in labour is as taxing as keeping vigil by the dying. 
At each moment, the first threatens death, the second prom-
ises recovery.
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§ Pale as Death
The expression “white as a sheet” makes more sense than its 
variation, “white as a ghost,” for describing extreme pale-
ness. The sight of the overlay of a white face by a white sheet, 
as still happens when a bedsheet is pulled over the face of 
someone who has just passed away, brings out its ghastly 
aptness. After such an encounter, a white sheet could never 
look the same again. One woman who witnessed the passing 
of her mother replaced all the tablecloths in her house. Being 
a waitress, however, she is reminded of death on the job. Is 
this how death haunts us, and why so many ghosts appear 
clad in sheets?
§ Moored
The umbilical cord is exactly the length of the unconscious, 
which stretches back and down through the mother, through 
the mother’s mother, and so on, to the matrix of mother-
hood. Neither yanking on nor cutting it—aggravating and 
symbolic actions—will suffice to free us from what ties us 
down for life.
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§ Angel of Death
Recollection of an encounter ten winters ago, on a bus ride 
to a rundown area of the city: sitting across from me was 
a man in his mid-thirties wearing a cap with a skull- and- 
 bones pinned to the front, in the best Nazi style. The articles 
looked original and the thought— I am sitting directly across 
from an original Panzer side cap with a Totenkopf pin, as worn 
by the panzer division of the SS from the 1930s until the end of 
the war — sent my mind reeling. I stared at the cap, then at 
the extraordinary face of the man flaunting it, then at the 
rest of his getup, and found that it was just so and of a piece: 
a faded quilted jacket with an old leather belt tightened 
around the waist, worn burlap trousers rolled up to display 
his polished old jackboots. I took in the entire package, 
noting the effort it took to achieve, now trying to make some 
sense of it: Sitting across from me is a replica of a German off 
to the Eastern front to commit God knows what crimes. What 
is he doing here dressed like this? Something in his demeanor 
convinced me he was no actor on his way to the set.
I continued to scrutinize him. He had ash- blond hair, 
pale blue eyes, a fair complexion, and disarmingly “Aryan” 
features. His face was freshly shaven, a ghost of razor burn 
adding to its rawness and manliness. He was handsome. I 
sought to make eye contact, but he stared off into space 
with an eerily absent expression. Blood rushed to my head 
more rapidly now. There must be a way, I thought, of getting 
amazement, antagonism, and indignation across the metre 
or so separating me from this apathetic angel, and get him to 
meet my combative and withering gaze. He stared on fixedly, 
yet his body was not what one might call soldier-rigid, sug-
gesting he was beyond performance, felt himself authentic 
enough, secure in his identity, well-bonded with his “look,” 
his period costume by now a second skin. Did the relative 
sartorial understatement— aside from the quietly baleful 
“death’s head,” he had on him no insignia, no armband, no 
obnoxious accessories— have to do with his affinity with 
Nazi soldiers rather than Nazi criminals? Or were withering 
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social taboos all that held him back from donning the “real,” 
all- out garb of an SS officer?
As the bus pulled into the station at the end of the line, I 
took a tactical position and, passing him, ran my shoulder 
into his—instantly realizing, however, that my puniness may 
have left the wrong impression (of an accident, not deliberate 
aggression). Fearing cowardice and loss of composure, with 
shame already coming on, I turned around to give him one 
final look with all the urgency I could muster. But his placid 
face, now turned to me, only confronted me with my own 
impotence in the face of the angels’ ignorance and unfeeling 
when it comes to human affairs.
Some months later I saw the man again. He wore the 
same or very similar clothing and struck me afresh as quite 
beautiful and dignified. He was walking alone at a measured 
pace, smiling to himself, sunlight on his face, and stopped 
beside a small, towheaded boy lingering behind his mother. 
He must have noted the resemblance between himself and 
the kid, since he addressed him with obvious affection. Then 
he continued on his way. The boy looked on admiringly, 
brimming with pride, feeling lucky to have been the object of 
such attention and swooping guardianship. At that moment, 
the innocence of neither could be doubted, but they were 
innocent in very different ways.
§ À la chienlit! 
As mortality goes the way of all flesh, the only death will be 
social, and nothing worse than it.
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§ Pierre Tombale
“My life? Laisse tomber, drop it! Let it fall with the force of a 
gravestone.”
§ The Origins of Work
The first self-assigned work, something that had to be 
done and planned (depending on its level of difficulty), was 
self-preservation or the preservation of dependents. Only 
once these tasks had been partially relieved by coordinated 
effort and planning could work become an occupation. A 
choice was made to specialize in a craft or trade or profes-
sion, the gains from which could be used to secure (other) 
wants and necessities. The occupation was practiced to the 
exclusion of most other communal labour (excepting harvest, 
war, response to acts of God), and, in the face of growing 
competition, the more single-mindedly, the better. And so 
we have arrived at a point in history where, society being 
ever more complex and populous, there is on the one hand 
considerable choice in occupations and, on the other, the 
freedom to create them, using one’s ingenuity to discern or 
divine unmet needs and turn a profit—and to reinvent one-
self should those needs decline.
This latter freedom is reflected on the level of sociolect in 
the silencing of that outmoded question “What do you do for 
a living?” by temporary and/or highly particular occupational 
designators (especially in administration and the service 
and creative industries) and by an additive approach, con-
cealing a history of often precarious employment marketed 
as a roster of transferable and special skills, and suggesting 
ever new possibilities of employment (e.g., gopher- turned- 
 lighting technician- photographer- filmmaker- author- curator- 
 critic- . . . ). In both cases—the ultra-specialized and the 
certified jack-of-all-trades—a simple answer to the question 
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“What do you do for a living?” is impossible, and if it does get 
asked, it is with, if not instant regret, then genuine interest 
in the addressee. 
If such work is less satisfying than the work of our ances-
tors—the ur-work, so to speak—if, when we pause to reflect, 
it resembles play, this is because it is of radically lesser 
importance to anyone, including ourselves. The newfound 
feeling of weightlessness masks the fear of uselessness, which 
is revealed in the pursuit of celebrity. It is not vanity but 
anxiety that speaks, with vicious repetitiveness, through 
the perpetual insecurity of seekers of public attention. It is 
the sensation, existentially fatal, of a cork bobbing upon the 
fathomless waters of society, contributing nothing to its own 
support. The freedom of leisure and pleasure is predicated 
on the fact that we are no longer preserving life, and those 
whose job is still not so removed that they can claim to be 
really preserving it would find our work vacuous, unreward-
ing, and parasitic. We may find comfort in the thought of 
mere survival as a life not worth living (the unexamined life, 
the life of labour, bare life, etc.). Yet the undertow of such an 
ideology of free social existence continually recalls us to the 
standard of preservation, which started it all.
§ Apply Within
Competition for paid work divides society into those who 
“made it” and those who didn’t, into winners and losers. The 
line between them is as objectively clear as it is distinct in 
the minds of individuals. Regardless on which side they find 
themselves, they accept the prevailing norm that, for virtu-
ally any job, losers need not apply.
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§ Among the Living
To be fully among the living is to mourn from time to time. 
Tears and lamentation at the graveside are the groans of life 
magnified by the proximity to death’s tranquility.  * In grief at 
separation can be discerned a grievance against the length 
of a life—much too brief, long enough though it is to outlive 
many who make it meaningful for us. As long as death still 
remains, as Adorno and Horkheimer put it, continuous with 
life, loss will be mourned, and mourners accept that any 
posthumous remembrance of someone they have lost merely 
continues remembering them while they were still alive. By 
this it is clear that they have not progressed to equating 
death with nothingness (of which the instant forgetting of 
the dead, retained only as archival images and voices, would 
be an indubitable sign, and from which the horizon where 
death has ceased to exist can almost be glimpsed). Transi-
tion to posthumous care for the dead, whether in the form 
of remembrance or visits, actual or symbolic, to their actual 
or symbolic place of rest, is easier for those who had cared 
actively for the now departed; continuity of habit ensures 
the link between life, however weak, and death. As for the 
rest, assuming a new responsibility with an emphasis on 
loss, rather than on the lost one’s archival preservation or 
retrieval, combines with effort to assert their own aliveness 
vis-à-vis the dead—an effort that, paradoxically, saps their 
élan vital. Once the dead are blamed for this loss in vital-
ity, the mourner enters a period of self-mourning, for that 
part of themselves that has been sacrificed to the deceased 
and that death has already, in effect, taken from them. The 
self-mourner may well be reconciled to their own demise, 
though—as more and more is wrested from them through 
the exertions of a double mourning—it will still come as an 
unwelcome surprise.
* Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 178–79 (“The Theory of 
Ghosts”).
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§ No Posthumous Reproach
A drama of regret and reproach is a drama of dying, whether 
or not a death actually follows. Bergman only gives us the 
latter once the former has been exhausted, culminating in 
the impossible whispered cry of a deceased woman to her 
nurse that reflects the deepest hopes and fears of her two 
surviving sisters: “I’m dead, you see. The trouble is I can’t get 
to sleep. I can’t leave you all.”  * Her lifeless face is the true face 
of the philosopher, and her late and egoistical cry—in which 
death’s sense of “the possibility of impossibility” coincides 
with that of “the impossibility of possibility”   †—becomes the 
clearest statement of the Heideggerian-Lévinasian ethic: the 
ego never is, the face of the other is only seen in death, mak-
ing of reproachful life a signal failure to hold on to either.
§ Wound Man 
A sixteenth-century book of woodcut prints, Feldtbuch 
der Wundartzney (Wound-Doctor’s Field-Book), a manual on 
military surgery, left us perhaps the most evocative because 
incredibly compact depiction of the physical traumas that to 
this day can accidentally assail our bodies. The Wound-Man, 
a human pin-cushion pierced by knives, arrows, spears and 
swords on every side, which, implausibly multiplied, lodged 
and suspended, appear as instruments not of war but of tor-
ture, hurts externally as much as the Man of Sorrows, who 
took upon himself the sins of the world, suffers internally.
* Viskningar och rop (Cries and Whispers), directed by Ingmar Bergman (1972; New 
York City, NY: The Criterion Collection, 2001), DVD.
† Emmanuel Lévinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1987), 70 n43. According to Lévinas, who disagrees 
here with Jean Wahl, Heidegger held the former view.
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§ The Jargon of Inauthenticity
authentic: from Hellenistic Greek authentikós (αὐθεντικός), 
“warranted, original, authoritative,” from authentia 
(αὐθεντία), “authority,” from ancient Greek authentēs 
(αὐθέντης), “perpetrator, one who does things himself”
authenticity: a mode of existence which has its basis in 
self-awareness, critical reflection on one’s goals and values, 
and responsibility for one’s own actions; condition of being 
true to oneself (OED)
A Authenticity is never direct, never primary. Its name is 
a pointer, a signpost, and its meaning lies not down the 
road, but round the bend, over the river, and through the 
woods. Being true to oneself requires endless detours.
B You mean to say that it is not readily accessible, not 
within easy reach? That the direct route in front of us is a 
test—a shortcut not to authenticity, but to being disqual-
ified as inauthentic? 
A Authenticity requires that we “stray” from established 
paths, even if we ultimately end up in the same place we 
would have had we done nothing but follow them. And 
even though authenticity cannot actually be achieved, 
even indirectly, we do get “closer” to it. The meaningful-
ness of “being authentic” depends on its elusiveness and 
even loss. Indirection in approaching authenticity mirrors 
the convoluted route along which authenticity was gradu-
ally lost.
B Perhaps it was never lost and for that reason cannot be 
found again. Perhaps it will not have been found even 
when the concept of “being authentic” is lost. This loss 
will mean neither that it has become redundant because 
we have become authentic nor that we have passed 
some point of no return to authenticity. Its forgetting 
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could only mean anything if the concept itself was not 
forgotten . . .
A We will be done with authenticity only by its meaning-
less forgetting— or by replacing it with the jargon of 
inauthenticity. Then we can look forward to clarity about 
authenticity, since the positive term, which inauthenticity 
would have become, is always the one plagued by vague-
ness—more stake claims to its definition! Beside God, the 
Devil will always be a simple cartoon.
§ Wild Oats
How can you expect me to give our friendship a chance when 
you could not give our romance a chance, quick to judge me 
unsuitable as a partner in the most unpropitious circum-
stances during our time together? Do you expect me to go 
against my feelings and hope they will follow? You seem ada-
mant that there exists a fluid boundary between friendship 
and love, at least in some relationships (like ours). I share 
your view. Friendship and love are not incompatible, and in 
some cases (like ours) become entwined from the start. So 
to now separate them like wheat from chaff would be an 
unnatural procedure that does violence to the plant to make 
it edible and yielding. The “chaff” would always grow back 
around the grain once the seeds are sown.
In wild cereal— cereal not so domesticated that it can-
not regenerate itself without cultivation—the distinction 
between chaff and wheat does not apply. The toil of sowing, 
reaping, and threshing is not needed for it to grow.
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§ Todesliebe
When I die, I am sure to be remembered fondly by those 
few whose thoughts would alight on me from time to time. 
They might think I was quite the piece of work; a real loose 
cannon; kind; regret never having been my friend; feel priv-
ileged to have known me; miss my sense of humour; my old 
soul—no wonder I died so young! But fond memories are not 
love. 
How many of us who want love badly, and get it not, go 
early into death to find it? Even if I died a tragic death, others’ 
love for me, though stronger, would not be of the kind I 
had wished to inspire. It would be love for a memory, a love 
for what they have made of me—a description to which I 
wouldn’t answer—a love I could not even reciprocate; deep 
down, a self-love. The love of those who failed to love me 
while I could still wriggle out of their grip, of those who 
would claim to have loved me despite my faults and the 
slights I caused them—unconditionally—now that I was 
without condition. And such revisionist tarrying, as long as 
I live, I cannot allow. I cling to life as long as I can to keep 
such love at bay.
But they assure me: You have nothing to worry about. Why 
fret over how we’ll treat you after you drop dead? Why meddle 
with our work? Embalming in memory is hard as it is. But I 
object to this as well. Do you mean, I say, that you would 
not consider my present worries when preserving me? I hope 
that by telling you now I can prevent some blatant misuses 
of my posthumous person. But they frown on my micro-
managerial tendencies: Planning your own funeral, leaving 
disposal instructions—isn’t that enough? Of all my post-obit 
affairs, I reply, those are the least important! They are over 
and done with before you know it, everyone moves on from 
mourning in a matter of days. But that still leaves years for 
exhuming and reburying me through reminiscence. Have 
you no consideration for how I want to be remembered, let 
alone loved? Your indifference and barely contained laughter 
suggest you do not. And that suggests in turn that you love 
me not. In that case, I am a fool to worry so much. If I have 
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not inspired your love when still alive, I am certain not to do 
so after I am gone. All I can hope for is to grow on you. And 
that, I must say—having heard you on love—is now a much 
better proposition.
§ Between Stiff and Statue
Physical love is the desire to be as near as possible to both 
aspects of the beloved body at once: to touch it at its weak-
est, most emaciated, most ruined by disease or age and 
threatening to crumble into dust and, at the same time, to 
be embraced by the body triumphant over time, fleshly and 
muscular, firm as veined marble or alabaster, preserved for 
eternity, as in an hourglass laid on its side.
§ Love & Love-Sickness
B Melancholy is no match for love when the latter is already 
burning.
A Love that burns is no match for melancholy. 
Love-sickness does not catch. It seizes.
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§ Incipit vita nova
The other, perverse side of the triumphant fatalism of 
Liebestod, which befalls star-crossed mortals in love who 
cannot live without each other, is the fatal triumphalism 
of love and survival available to vampire lovers. With every 
shared victim, death is averted and new life begins for the 
bloodsucking couple, whose love, so ancient, must be amoral 
and heartless to last as it does, avoiding the fate of Dante and 
Beatrice, whose new life began only once, before it ended. 
Vampiric suicide, though flirted with, is not an option; they 
are fated to kill to live on. Their need for a good day’s rest 
(“We don’t want to be up all day”  *) is the sensible side of 
passion for these immortal lovers, whom some have dared 
to call “Adam” and “Eve.” Living from victim to victim, time 
and again they come close to death in a world that denies 
their very existence. And each time they are relieved to see 
the other alive. For that reason alone, they remain more alive 
than mere “zombies,” which is to say— on an average bad 
day—than us.
* Only Lovers Left Alive, directed by Jim Jarmusch (Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures 
Home Entertainment, 2013), DVD.
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§ Not a Peep from You
Some years back, not too long ago, a young British singer 
from a good family found herself pursued by a lovesick young 
Englishman. The chap had gone to great lengths to woo 
her (a 30-foot ash tree planted on her lawn for Valentine’s 
Day being only the most astonishing of his many overtures). 
Jude’s love, which Rebecca did not return, was focused on 
an attribute around which a love story could nowadays take 
shape only in a folk tale or opéra bouffe—for, if one takes tab-
loid reports at face value (as one must to “get” British society), 
it was a love of a bass voice for a soprano. That so sublime a 
love can escape ridicule by the crudest, most vulgar organs of 
public opinion is a sign that love still has deep, legitimizing 
roots in male romantic obsession, making instantly relat-
able and sympathetic what, when performed by a female, 
is—no two ways about it—morbid. The double standard for 
stalking, that quintessentially modern offence and signal 
of uncoupling male obsession from love, points however to 
a truth: the party who has our sympathy (the smitten man) 
is the true victim, a victim not of love but of the general 
decline of masculinity and the rise of female power. It is a 
fact belied—though not for much longer—by two canards 
of heterosexual rape culture, where masculinity finds refuge 
in physical power: (1) that there is no such thing as rape (all 
“victims” “ask” to be “raped”) and (2) that female-on-male 
rape does not exist (men are “made to penetrate”). The voice 
of the rapist does not sing of love.
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§ Sex & Democracy
Love has reaped untold benefits in mature democratic 
societies. The institutionalization of the principles of 
liberty and equality includes, in its advanced form, both 
equality between bodies and the right to use one’s carcass 
as one pleases. The rules—and the rule—have shifted 
from the tired performances of masculinity as dominant 
and femininity as submissive to a balanced “contact of two 
epidermes”—a fine clinical phrase from eighteenth-century 
moralist extraordinaire Chamfort, contemporary of the Mar-
quis de Sade, whose naturalist vision of a respublica sexualis 
is still too radical for our taste. The empire of sex has since 
been leveled out through a fair exchange of blows and bodily 
fluids, enshrined in sanitary conventions. Clean, safe fun; no 
one must get hurt. Conditions of physical engagement have 
also grown stricter: the self-control that comes with the ter-
ritory of sexual play requires that the oversexed not tax their 
partners but instead seek outlets in pornography and mas-
turbation—a now-widespread view inconceivable until very 
recently. And, lest we forget, the democratization of sex does 
not stop at workplace codes of conduct or even the bedroom, 
where it has made decisive inroads. So much so that even our 
fantasies sport sexy “model citizen” undies. 
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§ Making Conversation
Entrepreneurs like Esther Perel who have made a name for 
themselves speaking publically about sexuality, particularly 
in couples therapy, know. They know that the future of edu-
cation, like many another capitalist enterprise— even that 
which, like psychoanalysis, limited to one-on-one interac-
tion, does not always depend on revenue—lies in facilitating 
content-production instead of providing it oneself. The 
structure of investment, labour, and the creation of surplus 
value holds across the board, even if substance, inputs and 
outcomes differ in each particular case— even if labour 
and profit are distributed evenly and equally reinvested. 
(Non-starters and ephemeral undertakings are such precisely 
because they do not adopt this mode of organization, whose 
familiarity attracts interest and capital.) The surplus value of 
Esther Perel is not just the money she receives, but the work 
her audiences do to satisfy her and live up to her standards. 
The payoff for them is, in this case, not a credit or diploma, 
but the obvious satisfaction of having addressed the least 
productive aspect of their life—sexual activity—in a produc-
tive manner.
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§ Romeos
And it should be known that correctly there are three titles 
for the people who go in the service of the Almighty: they 
are called palmers if they go overseas, since they often bring 
back palm leaves: they are called pilgrims if they go to the 
shrine of Saint James in Galicia, since the sepulchre of Saint 
James was further away from his country than any other 
apostle: they are called romeos if they go to Rome . . .
—Dante  *
Love, for so long joined to faith and divorced from carnal 
pleasure, seemed fated to tip over into the secular and sexual. 
It is the distinction of Rome to have been both Babylon and 
home to God’s infallible interpreters.
§ Scale Models
There is nothing to open a droopy critical eye to the vices and 
follies of mankind like a change of scale. We tend to flatter 
ourselves too much in synthetic miniatures of ourselves: our 
flaws, small to begin with, become invisible, and all that’s left 
are our virtues—visible because we look for them, ineffective 
because so minuscule. 
In children, however, our faults stand out like nowhere 
else. Orwell all but discovered this in Animal Farm. Vivian 
Maier, the street photographer, snapped it in the street. Two 
boys under ten doing business together on a sidewalk: one 
sitting forward in a chair, freckled, his left foot up, the other, 
shoe-black, kneeling just in front of him.
* Dante Alighieri, The New Life (La Vita Nuova), trans. A. S. Kline (Poetry in Trans-
lation, 2014), letter 40, p. 98–99.
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§ To Scale
The trick is to scale these things back up to the dimensions 
of childhood.
—Kraus  *
In the painting of Prince Felipe Prospero by court painter 
Diego Velázquez (1659) we see one of those portraits of 
small children so uncommon before 1750 once we exclude 
the infant held for centuries in a mother’s arms, identi-
tyless putti, and some comely adolescents. Among this 
relatively small number of canvasses one would find, as 
well, Lucas Cranach the Elder’s young prince and princess 
of Saxony (1510s), Henry II as a Child (c. 1523) by Jean Clouet, 
Hans Holbein the Younger’s Prince Edward (c. 1538), the 
sixteenth-century renditions of the Duke of Savoy’s chil-
dren by Jan Kraeck (some even before they could stand), and 
Bronzino’s gallery of the young Medicis, the most memorable 
being the chubby two-year-old from about 1545. 
Princes are no ordinary tots; secular images of little ones 
neither high-born nor of great fame (Mozart’s fate) are cer-
tainly much rarer. Children crop up in family portraits (Hol-
bein’s family, from c. 1528, or Domenico Ghirlandaio’s Por-
trait of Francesco Sassetti and His Son, drawn in profile c. 1488). 
They might comprise elements of allegory and parable (Old 
Man with a Young Child, by the same). They often enlivened 
Northern European Baroque genre painting, from outdoor 
scenes (as in the Winter Landscape by Avercamp) to domes-
tic and semi-domestic ones (Pieter Brueghel the Elder, Jan 
Steen, and Pieter de Hooch). Only occasionally, however, did 
undistinguished children supply the main focus of a compo-
sition. This was the case in Frans Hals’s Catharina Hooft with 
Her Nurse, in Gabriel Metsu’s The Sick Child, Nicolaes Maes’s 
Little Girl Rocking a Cradle, Gerard ter Borch’s Boy Defleaing 
His Dog, Judith Leyster’s Boy Playing a Flute, Gerbrand van 
* Karl Kraus, Dicta and Contradicta, trans. Jonathan McVity (Champaign, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2001), 126.
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der Eeckhout’s Children of Altetus Tolling, Rubens’s Child with 
a Bird, or Rembrandt’s son Titus reading—all of them from 
the seventeenth century. 
Indeed, as this list suggests, early modern portraits and 
treatments of children in their own right are largely limited 
to the Netherlands, appearing with various props (birds, 
dogs, goats, sheep, lambs, fruit, flowers, toys, instruments), 
or as types (as shepherds, peasants, vendors), or in didactic 
contexts (as in de Hooch’s Two Women Teaching a Child to 
Walk, Hals’s Boy Reading, Jacob van Oost’s reading and paint-
ing lessons), sometimes bringing to life a moral lesson (as in 
Leyster’s Boy and Girl with a Cat and an Eel, c. 1635, Steen’s 
Baptism, which shows the bad drinking habits of adults rub-
bing off on the young, and Caspar Netscher’s Lady Teaching 
a Child to Read, and a Child Playing with a Dog from c. 1670). 
The following must therefore be counted among the most 
notable of what are relative exceptions: Caroto’s Young Boy 
Holding a Child’s Drawing (c. 1515); the anonymous The Girl 
with the Dead Bird from the same period; Bronzino’s portraits 
of a young man and woman with a prayer book from the 
mid-seventeenth century; Four Portraits of the Young Sons of 
Sir John Ffolliott (English School, c. 1610); Hals’s smiling Three 
Children with a Goat Cart and other nameless happy children 
(c. 1620); Cornelis de Vos’s own progeny (1621–22); De Hooch’s 
Little Golf Players (c. 1660); Gilbert Jackson’s Daughter of 
Florence Poulett and Thomas Smyth of Ashton Court with Her 
Black Page (c. 1640); Govert Flink’s Girl by a High Chair and 
Verspronck’s solemn Girl in Blue (1640–41); Ter Borch’s much 
stiffer Portrait of Helena van der Schalcke (c. 1648); Caesar 
van Everdingen’s Two-Year-Old Boy with an Apple and a Finch 
(1664); and, in the category of court freaks, Velázquez’s Fran-
cisco Lezcano, “The Boy from Vallecas” (c. 1640) and Miran-
da’s life-size portraits of the fat girl “La Monstrua,” naked 
and dressed (1680). In the eighteenth century the child as 
subject and motif becomes more frequent. Noteworthy here 
are Chardin’s The Draughtsman, Soap Bubbles and The Card 
Castle (from the 1730s) with a boy at play, and Watteau’s The 
Dance (Iris) (c. 1719), not to mention the 1742 Graham Children 
by Hogarth. After 1750, however, portraits of children start 
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appearing everywhere, contemporary with the invention of 
childhood. Painters, it seems, could no longer get enough of 
them. And the more they were painted, the cuter they got.
Since the political power claimed on behalf of infant 
princes is never scaled down, the surroundings in which they 
are depicted, if they include objects and furniture, must be 
instead. In all but such political portraits and the much later 
children’s room scenes (1750 on), interiors—if rendered at 
all—are scaled for grown-ups, not for the children com-
manding our attention. Aurélio de Figueiredo’s Menina ao 
piano (1892) shows an ordinary little girl standing at a piano, 
alone in a well-appointed playroom, where admittedly the  
closer of two armchairs are child-sized, yet the instrument 
and the more distant pieces are larger than would be ones 
consistently proportioned. The background, in other words, 
belongs to adults, who remain out of sight but who are 
thereby shown to be in command.
If in the Menina proportions are ultimately kept, and 
children’s furniture is distinguishable from that of adults, in 
a later canvas simply called Interior with Boy Playing, in which 
a little boy lies playing with wooden blocks on a small carpet, 
the room, its ceiling so high it cannot be seen, becomes 
expressive—its dimensions scaled to the inner world of a child. 
The world of adults looms large indeed, as it did for all of 
us (an impression that stepping into a forgotten interior we 
once inhabited as a child brings back in an instant). Virtually 
all the objects in the painting, among which no other toys 
can be seen, appear outsize, dwarfing the solitary boy. The 
deliberate nature of this characterization cannot be doubted. 
The boy’s absorption in the act of playing and imagining 
(suggested by the glimpse behind the drape-accented door-
way of a leopard skin upon a railing in strong sun) is so great 
that even this most imposing reality falls away in the end. As 
such, the exaggerated disproportion between the room and 
the child will strike only those viewers without access to 
that other interior, existing only between the ears of a child, 
where the furniture, presumably, is always to scale.
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§ Unrecognized
“It takes genius to know genius.”
§ The Takeaway Point
If we, whether young or old, ultimately hold in greater 
admiration men in their thirties for having been thoughtful 
enough to produce works worth reading for the rest of our 
lives, works of philosophy, systematic or not, that are “to live 
by,” “to think with,” passionate and full of unsettled ques-
tions, this is not just because they have drawn up a scheme 
for experience and figured out a plan for themselves and the 
rest of us while they still had time to implement it, but surely 
also and more because at their age we could not have come up 
with anything remotely comparable, or had enough patient 
interest even to undertake projects of such proportion. 
As long as we persist in thinking them geniuses and freaks, 
rather than plain extraordinary, we cannot hope for the real 
takeaway point: that those we admire for doing great things 
are continually getting older, that we are constantly raising 
the age at which such admiration is warranted. 
From this we will still need to draw our own conclusions. 
(These may have more to do with lowering the bar than with 
raising longevity . . . )
§ Reminder: Originals
It takes all kinds. Including ones-of-a-kind.
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§ Confession of a Knife-Swallower
All my life I have risked my life for entertainment. But one 
can get used even to swallowing swords. The thrill I love is 
gone. I frequently wonder what will in fact kill me. Although 
it will probably be something predictable, some convergence 
of illness and injury, and I will go in relative peace, numbed 
by morphine and visions of the hereafter, I like to think of a 
cut—a little paper cut, no more—undoing me with unspeak-
able agony. Now that would be a surprise!
§ You Can Take the Clown out of the Circus,  
but You Can’t Take the Circus out of the Clown
Before we know it, we have grown out of our childhood 
delight at clowns, whose bulbous noses, floppy shoes and 
bulging bums vanish as soon as we convince ourselves that 
we have glimpsed the melancholy beneath the face-paint. 
We might be heard making such comments as: Imagine you 
had to dress up that way day after day, whether you felt like it or 
not . . .Whoever claims to keep their dignity and derive joy from 
such work is obviously deceiving themselves. Even “melancholy” 
is fancy dress for “sorrow and humiliation”; it trivializes the 
suffering that must have driven the poor man or woman to 
take up clowning. In this way our mature, uncanny reaction 
to clowns, never far behind the chuckle put on for our little 
charges, always betrays a fear of insignificance. We catch 
sight of it in the guileless double face of the clown, and pin 
it to his chest like a flower squirting something black, while 
it is our heart that had sprung the leak. If nothing else, this 
proves that in the most rustic and unrefined play-acting 
there is something for all temperaments and ages.
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§ Cannibal on the Make
The great Eugène François Vidocq started out as a petty 
criminal and entertainer playing a South Sea cannibal in a 
circus. The job required him to eat raw meat, which for a 
Frenchman poses no problem at all. But Vidocq refused to 
devour the live rooster, a show-stopping act in any age. After 
his great “turnaround,” away from misconduct and his own 
death on an installment plan, he developed a forensic inter-
est in dead bodies, which again helped him survive, this time 
as a criminalist. 
After such a school, who wouldn’t become a real canni-
bal for a season, given the chance—if only to prove (by not 
surviving) that one wasn’t cut out for it, or, on the contrary, 
that it was no big deal? For as long as we eventually suffer our 
victims’ fate, do we not settle our accounts?
§ Soylent Green
Certain taboos are tokens only of luxury. Maybe, nomen 
omen, Bacon (the painter) was disposed to reflect on this: “If 
I go into a butcher shop I always think it’s surprising that 
I wasn’t there instead of the animal.”  * As we continue to 
search for the ultimate form of renewability, we will see that 
Bacon “had a point” and tighten our dietary restrictions.
* Quoted in David Sylvester, Interviews with Francis Bacon (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 1980), 46.
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§ Cities of God
Paris, où il faut vivre en se crevant 
(Paris, where you can only live by working yourself to 
death)
—Vincent van Gogh to his brother, 1888  *
The modern worldly cosmopolis as the city of God? Is it not 
heavenly and holy enough? Would not many mortals sacrifice 
their health, pleasure, solitude, and peace of mind to live in it? 
Here the lonely will find their companion, the moribund will 
be healed, the wretched attended to, the bored given purpose, 
the active, consequence, and the corrupt, close watch. And 
the watchers in turn will be watched night and day.
§ Sand-Glass
Soft-core fiction, however silly or perverted, has many 
defenders, they in turn are belittled by fans of hardcore 
pornography, these in turn buried by viewers of torture-porn 
and snuff, and so on all the way down. At the very bottom 
sits a man reading a newspaper, his window on the real 
world. It is to him that all of this can ultimately be traced; 
with him the “pyramid” of sexual tastes is turned over again 
like an hour-glass—next time around, his newspaper folded, 
he will come out on top. 
As long as the sand keeps flowing, it will always be so: 
the informed citizen’s mind now filthy, now in impeccable 
control.
* Vincent van Gogh to Theo van Gogh, July 15, 1888, accessed Mar. 12, 2015,  
http://vangoghletters.org/vg/letters/let642/letter.html.
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§ The Man in the Street
The disenchantment of “the average man” has its reverse and 
probable cause in the earlier wonder for what the French 
call l’homme de la rue: the “common” man with a secret, 
private, or previous life, one you would never suspect. This 
man was brought to light by numerous nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century novelists, most successfully Eugène Sue, 
Victor Hugo, Adalbert Stifter, and Ralph Ellison. He was 
there in the paintings of Paul Delvaux, and can still be seen 
from time to time in movie houses. But the narrowing band 
of character and activity we today find remarkable is telltale 
of our stunted fascination and dwindling curiosity. The 
remarkable life, which would justify our interest, is already 
public, illuminated, its success measured in fame. It need 
not be discovered by writers and filmmakers; like a plant, 
it will find the limelight itself, freeing us from the work of 
investigation for which we anyway have no time. Eccentric-
ity, formerly registered as marked difference of behaviour, 
has become both rarer and more common: rarer because 
of its professional marginalization, urban conformity and 
rural invisibility, yet more common because so much of 
what is outside the average, the social norm, belongs in one 
broad category, where the banal, the undesirable and the 
intolerable are lumped together. Searching for Sugar Man 
and finding Rodriguez, stumbling on a private archive and 
finding Vivian Maier are only recent examples of a longer 
trend in which a small number of amateurs are motivated to 
sift through this human refuse in search of something pre-
cious. They are of course portrayed as great exceptions, gone 
unnoticed owing more to respect for privacy—the decency 
of looking away has replaced binocular snooping—than to 
wall-to-wall apathy—the assumption that your neighbours 
are hardly less insipid than yourself (otherwise you would 
have heard of them).
Perhaps it is now only creative minds that are driven 
to seek out the unusual as material for reinvention, and 
capable of presenting it in the form of a spectacle for pas-
sive consumption. Could it really be that the public was 
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once more accepting of the diversity in its midst, when 
large cities absorbed large numbers of exotic, provincial, 
or shady extraction without institutions to regulate and 
assimilate them? Perhaps what to us are everyday encoun-
ters with strangers had come with the thrill of adventure (a 
dépaysement avant la lettre) that we now look for in surro-
gates—books and films, or online chatrooms. Perhaps the 
stranger still held in his mind knowledge of the world that 
could not otherwise be obtained. And if not knowledge, 
then entertainment, as when individuals on the surface 
quite unappealing, unrelatable, antipathique, had a story to 
tell, fascinating and unheard-of experiences. One imagines 
that the different walks of life of those brought together by 
modernity were a source of amusement and release from 
tedium—that the man-in-the-street was, in a word, a mys-
tery worth probing. 
Though the dwellers of today’s metropolis still come from 
elsewhere, we are considerably less interested. As earlier with 
the individual’s romanticization—an aesthetic injection of 
mystery into misery, poverty and crime—the cause must be 
sought in mass media, which have long worked round the 
clock to finally satisfy our curiosity about one another, in 
the end killing the “common man” as enigma. The threshold 
between the public and the private is frequently nothing 
more than disgust: “Too much information!” In principle, 
however, comfort with other lives has gone up dramatically 
with the freedom of anonymous online socializing. Every-
thing is fair game for sharing and discussion among virtual 
strangers. In effect, we have unprecedented access and 
insight into those around us, who turn out to be too much 
like us, and whose lives therefore are taken to be every bit 
as uneventful, predictable, not to say bland—something we 
would sooner avoid than take a keen interest in. The deep 
roots of being down on others are in dissatisfaction with 
ourselves when our lack of originality is revealed. A sense 
of homogeneity, the price for fitting in well enough to pass 
scrutiny, is especially vivid in global cities, where the pursuit 
of distinction is most intense. These cities continue to lure 
us with the promise of a more exciting, more stylish life. 
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Whatever originality and aura of mystery accompanying 
the newcomer to even the lowest social stratum that cannot 
be monetized are soon stripped away by the ruthlessness 
of urban living. The seemingly endless options for urban 
self-fulfillment come down to just two: buying into a (city 
or neighbourhood) brand, or picking up a lifestyle package 
(at a discount) during a construction boom. Can the dream 
of individualism be taken for real when, at every turn, we 
confront our own life in multiple copies, down to the small-
est detail? Can the mysteries of l’homme de la rue ever rival 
our common regret, resentment, and smothering sense of 
mediocrity?
§ Thoroughly Unthorough
We aren’t any more careless about details. The devil may be 
in them now, but before it was God: they were His hiding 
place, so we assumed they were well taken care of.
§ Rise to the Occasion
Sometimes stooping is what’s required for an occasion. After 
all, things fall together to create one; an occasion, word- 
 historically, is a “falling together” of circumstances. 
The set phrase, “rise to the occasion,” is one of those invisi-
ble contradictions devised by those who like to take credit for 
merely rising.
Exposed, they protest: Ah, but we are rising into place.
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§ Comedown
We assume that the road of Ought, of duty and obligation, 
righteous and supercilious, is upward, while that of Is, of 
reality, base and ignoble, points down. That is uncontro-
versial. We therefore further assume that once we have 
scrambled to a higher position, everyone should look up to us 
and strive to follow us there, even if they will likely fail and 
sometimes even tumble below where they began. And those 
“beneath” us in this way (unless they are irredeemable scoun-
drels) generally concur. 
It may be very difficult to rise, but to descend—to step 
down confidently without falling—is immeasurably harder 
on the character. From the top, gained with difficulty, a great 
and swift plunge would, however unlikely, be easy. One 
could afford to drop a bit if necessary, but given the slipperi-
ness of the slopes, falling by degrees would not be feasible. 
The only safe path downward is on foot, little by little. What 
makes this especially gruelling are the reminders of “No 
Return” along it. It is presumption alone that dictates that 
lowering oneself, even just to the general level, is easy if one 
leaves character out of it. It is not. It may be good for the soul 
to look at life from a lower altitude, but after one has been 
high up, the view is quite unbearable.
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§ Iron-y
“Most of our iron is turned into fetters,” and blacksmiths are 
“weighed down with the making of chains,” Juvenal remarks 
in his Satires.  * If we are to believe the archaeological record, 
since at least the Bronze Age a good deal of our strength and 
effort have been dedicated to shackling weakness, with the 
unintended consequence of toughening it up. 
§ Choosing Gentleness
It is with lashes of the whip that one leads the cattle  
to pasture.
—Heraclitus  †
A When there is no pasture, conscience asks us to hide the 
whip.
A' It is with humane restraint that livestock is led to 
slaughter.
* Juvenal, satire 3, in Juvenal and Persius, ed. and trans. Susanna Morton Braund, 
Loeb Classical Library 91 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 193.
† Heraclitus, Fragments: The Collected Wisdom of Heraclitus, trans. Brooks Haxton 
(New York: Viking, 2001), p. 35, sec. 55 (mod. trans.).
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§ The Sacred Heart of Convicts
If, rather than justice, the rationale of imprisonment 
remained to inspire inmates to repentance, penitentiaries 
would replace churches.
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§ Misericords
misericord:
apartment or room in a monastery set apart for those 
monks permitted relaxation of the monastic rule
a. relaxation of certain monastic rules for infirm or aged 
monks or nuns
b. monastery where such relaxations can be enjoyed
also, subsellium: small projection/ledge on the underside of 
a hinged seat in a choir stall, which, when the seat is lifted, 
gives support to the standing occupant. Also used attrib. to 
designate or denote the elaborate, often bawdy, carvings 
of scenes from secular or religious life with which medieval 
misericords were frequently decorated.
medieval dagger, used for the coup de grâce to a wounded 
foe (OED, RHWUD)
A relaxation of rules is permitted to the rule-abiding at their 
discretion, as long they remain discreet about it, since to the 
uninitiated it looks no different than cheating.
Choir stalls, where bums in seats meant bawdy thoughts, 
were one of several discreetly designated places within a 
medieval church poised to turn it inside out.
Life wounds us mortally. Let’s not discard too quickly the 







§ Better than Nothing
We polish a rotten apple, burnish it to a perfect shine, and it’s 
only as we bite into it, still salivating, that we realize this was 
only to fool ourselves when we had nothing better to eat. 
§ Greek Gift
Some people pose as life-coaches who want to teach us to 
live to the fullest, in harmony with nature, at peace with 
ourselves; their intentions only clear up as we are giving up 
the ghost.
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§ Devotio moderna
Borne down by the weight of wings.
—Róbert Gál  *
Even without God, the solitary—the “monkish”— existence 
inadvertently assumes a ritualistic—a “pious”— charac-
ter. The simpler the life, the more pronounced its religious 
features. We carry the world’s expectations of us into our 
hermitage, priding ourselves on our private orderliness. As 
long as the mind does not deviate, we feel our days have been 
well-spent, and we have fulfilled our duty to the world: rising, 
the first meal, light or heavy, the first stimulant of the day. 
Morning ablutions, drying and dressing of the body. Choice 
of activity, planning out the rest of the day, exercise, a look at 
the budget, concluded with entertainment of some sort. We 
know it all well enough, take pleasure in this simple disci-
pline, and yet when other things come to occupy our mind, 
these private rituals quickly lose their gravity and precision. 
It is still possible to be devout, as long as mind and body wor-
ship each other without interruption or intermediary.
§ Overripe
Doubt—worm in the fruit off the Tree of Knowledge.
* Róbert Gál, “Naked Thought: Aphorisms,” Numéro Cinq 5, no. 7 (2014),  
http://numerocinqmagazine.com/2014/07/09/naked-thought-aphorisms- 
robert-gal-translated-from-slovak-by-david-short/.
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§ Hortus conclusus
hortus conclusus: enclosed, inviolate garden, in reference 
to The Song of Songs; in spiritual and exegetical tradition, 
symbol of the soul, the Church, or the virginity of Mary 
(OED)
I lack that piety towards myself that certain poets of the word 
(or of the heart only) have in spades (or cultivate religiously). 
In their veneration of their sealed-up fountains, of what they 
hold in, they are as monks whose pens have dried up. What 
gets creative juices flowing is also what keeps the nib wet. 
But their self-piety guards, with parcity, against blots and 
spills.
The Muse, meanwhile, has given up on them. (Are you 
surprised she prefers action to love?) She hoped for prodigals 
who wonder, like Lewis’s Ambrosio, “Should I not barter for a 
single embrace the reward of my sufferings for thirty years?”  * 
and who answer at once, with one unwavering nod.
§ Bad Apples
Some poor souls cherish illusion so much they will overlook 
nature’s decay. It may be decay is all too familiar—a condi-
tion in many ways not unlike their own. Some, less poor, are 
known to cherish rottenness instead, perhaps for its chas-
tening effects, or, not infrequently, from a doleful, morbid 
disposition. But it is a rare bird who, like Schiller (author of 
apple-archer William Tell), discovers its salubrious influence, 
and can barely work without a rotting apple stuffed here and 
there.
* Matthew Gregory Lewis, The Monk, ed. D. L. Macdonald and Kathleen Scherf 
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2004), 65.
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§ Call of the Wild
Every now and then, surprise at the drawn-out howl issuing 
from one’s body. How is it that something so purely phys-
iological and localizable—not to say reduced to digestion, 
putrefaction, and the ceaseless fluid flow through veins and 
organs in varying states of decay— can associate itself in 
one’s mind with the wilderness outside: a clap of thunder, 
moonlit crags, a snowy forest, setting for this lupine cry . . . ? 
The call of the wild rises from deep within our bowels, some-
where along their dark corridors, whose fascination for us 
suddenly rivals that of owl burrows or fox tunnels.
§ Speak for Yourself!
No “individual death” is individual.
§ Falls the Shadow
Going through life aware of omnipresent death is like lying 
on a beach with one’s eyes closed, and knowing one is still 
there only by the chill of a shadow and the sand in one’s 
mouth.
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§ Campanology
campanology: the art or study of bell-ringing or -making
in the nocturnal small hours we are nearest
—Cyril Connolly, The Unquiet Grave  *
The hourly nocturnal tolling of a solitary bell outside a hotel 
window will, unless you somehow manage to sleep through 
it, stir up vivid associations. For the freedom from visual 
sensation gives priority to hearing and feeling, and expands 
the mnemonic field, allowing the unfamiliar sound to bathe 
us in past occasions in which it was heard. The ringing bell 
rings a bell of bell-ringing. The most immediate and frequent 
memories, to which the darkness and position of the sleeper 
no doubt contribute, are of funerals. If the hotel is in the 
country, and the window open so that the summer air fills 
the room, and the bed happens to be no wider than a casket, 
and the sheets sufficiently lustrous or cold—and one is tired 
to boot, making the necessary rest much sweeter—then the 
association of blissful repose with eternal sleep cannot really 
be avoided. And as we slide down thoughts like these, past 
the threshold of consciousness, deeper and deeper without 
quite making it to sleep, kept awake just a little by each knell, 
yet less and less with each as we begin ourselves to resonate, 
we have as well the vague sensation of fading in stages, of 
peaceful sliding into nothingness. Kant’s “negative pleasure” 
captures well the bittersweet elation of this self-vigil. But 
perhaps there are many more who would find the ominous 
sound, combined with their recumbency, excruciating, and 
are already kept awake by fears of dying—lying long, too long, 
not altogether long for this world. Their fear makes of them 
early risers. To enjoy this time and concert, the church bell’s 
* Cyril Connolly, The Unquiet Grave: A Word Cycle by Palinurus (1941; n.p.: New 
York: Persea, 1981), 71. The full sentence reads: “We are farthest from the idea of 
death as in the nocturnal small hours we are nearest.”
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indifferent marking of the interval, the key of death needs 
first to be silenced.
But as the vain worry is put to rest, one side refuses to 
die. The thrill of this repose, the thrill of remaining in the 
darkness, turns the squeaking coffin back into a bed. The 
night becomes sleepless in a different light—as, pulled back 
from the edge of nothing, we are delivered into the arms of 
fantasy.
§ Death Being Our Final Act
Death is an act that must make up for the passivity of our 
birth.
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§ Somewhere
“De mortuis nihil nisi bonum, Do not speak ill of the dead”
“Death becomes her” (1---)
“Leaving me so soon?!” (16--)
“If I were to live again, I would live just as I lived” (15--)
“My work here is done” (17--)
“It’s autumn, one almost believes in death” (1890)
“And just last month he was among the living . . . ” (18--)
“I’m not as lively as I used to be” (2008)
“I’m not dead yet!” (2010)
“Dead serious, always—my epitaph” (2012)
Thus we prepare for going out as we could not for coming in.
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§ “Universal Solvent”
The secret attraction of alchemical laboratories may well be 
that they combust, killing the alchemist.
§ Surprised by Death
There is a motif in European Baroque painting: the moment 
of death taking those visited by fortune by surprise. Its stock 
victims are the miser, the maiden, the lovers, the voluptu-
ary. The pictures are for the most part didactic, expanding 
the vanitas genre to human figures. Unlike the medieval ars 
moriendi, illustrated literature on how to die a blessed death 
(a very different beast from today’s death with dignity), they 
specialize in depicting unpreparedness for it. 
This peculiar graphic convention declined as the indi-
vidual ascended the ladder of human value; death’s image 
as black-draped skeleton ultimately followed in its foot-
steps. Modern treatments humanized death, revising the 
crude symbolism of its personification (La Mort et les jeunes 
filles of 1872 by Puvis de Chavannes’s shows a glimpse of a 
white-bearded reaper, and Edvard Munch eroticizes death in 
a 1894 lithograph, followed by Egon Schiele). Jean-François 
Millet’s Death and the Woodcutter (1859) stands at the tail-end 
of an allegorical tradition that regarded death as the leveler of 
inequalities, and already speaks to the modern age, in which 
inequality cannot be masked any longer. Rather than beauty, 
love, or luxury, death in this picture puts an end to work. 
Clad in white this time, it takes the labourer away from his 
labours. It cuts short an activity that secures, perhaps barely, 
his humble livelihood. Rather than reminding us of our 
mortality, pointing out that death may come when we least 
expect it, or (in the case of misers) moralizing earthly excess, 
or posing simple-minded questions—Which is better, labour 
or death?—Millet’s nineteenth-century vanitas suggests that 
dying is a part of nature, and no bringer of justice.
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§ Sainte Supplice
“[T]ruth has a virtue,” wrote Hervé Guibert, recording the 
truth about his own dying of AIDS.  * It is to truth that his 
final days were consecrated. Truthfulness, truth-speaking, 
truth-telling, defies weakness in its defiance of mendac-
ity, to others and to oneself. Truth is strength, courage, 
and it is justice. Once the shameful truth, the truth of 
wrong-thinking or wrong-doing, is uttered, it cannot be 
shamed back into silence. It speaks and punishes those who 
deny it, and makes the truth-teller virtuous (by virtue of the 
truth . . . ). Nothing we can do or say will make the scandal 
of truth go away as long as it serves anyone as a weapon of 
offence and self-defence. So often, it is for and by truth that 
life is tortured, and to truth that it is sacrificed. He died for 
the truth . . .Truth was his martyrdom . . . And truth to yourself 
will be yours.
§ “The moral earth, too, is round!”  †
Launch any wickedness far enough and it will drift towards 
solid moral ground or, cast upon the stormy seas of 
self-sacrifice, succeed in saving its soul. Sail for the lands of 
the good and the fierce winds will drive you to the shallows 
of bitterness. Each journey, it’s said, expands our moral hori-
zons, but there is no telling where we will end up in search of 
our route to spiritual India.
* Hervé Guibert, interview by Bernard Pivot, Apostrophes, Mar. 16, 1990.
† Nietzsche, Gay Science, p. 163, sec. 289 (“Get on the Ships!”).
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§ A Whole in a Mole
in response to:
[Cosmopolitanism should] refer to the ethical imperative 
of recognizing and promoting the equal moral worth of 
each and every human being, while at the same time being 
sensitive to the strong possibility that our efforts to do so 
will founder on, even reinforce, the world’s inequalities. The 
solution to this paradox, which plagues even the best cos-
mopolitanisms, lies in the fact that it is nevertheless possible 
to discover particular cases where this ethical imperative 
is denied and to combat the false universals on which its 
denial is based. 
—James D. Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics  *
Combatting the false universals, on this model, resembles 
a game of Whac-A-Mole, a type of arcade game based on 
redemption. “Redemption games,” we read in Wikipedia, 
“are typically arcade games of skill that reward the player 
proportionally to their score in the game. The reward 
most often comes in the form of tickets, with more tickets 
being awarded for higher scores. These tickets can then 
be redeemed (hence the name) at a central location for 
prizes. The most inexpensive prizes (candy, small plastic or 
rubber toys) may only require a small number of tickets to 
acquire, while the most expensive ones (skateboards, low-end 
electronics) may require several thousand. In general, the 
amount of money spent to win enough tickets for a given 
prize will exceed the value of the prize itself.”  †
In other words, we redeem our skill and money—which 
would otherwise remain unused and be spent on needed 
things—in the forms of prizes. The game enacts the conver-
sion. Perhaps the only redemption we can find is of this kind.
* James D. Ingram, Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic 
Universalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 19.
† “Redemption game,” in Wikipedia, last modified Feb. 6, 2015,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redemption_game.
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§ In saecula saeculorum
Assuming that the universality of moral reason does not 
exist buried somewhere where we cannot see it, we must 
resign ourselves to never knowing if we could have achieved 
universality by cultural convergence rather than conquest.
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§ Sola
[T ]he papists are making a tremendous fuss because the 
word sola (alone) is not in Paul’s text, and this addition of 
mine to the words of God is not to be tolerated.
—Martin Luther  *
Translating the Word of God had caused Luther no small 
frustration. This was not only because the propria verba did 
not come to him (they did, as to his collaborators). Calling St. 
Paul to his defence was not much help where a word (how-
ever implicit) had been added to the Pauline text.
Yet we should not infer from this special case, with the 
future of a church at stake in the choice and arrangement 
of words, that translation is a thankless task. There was a 
time—the time of Luther—when only seminal texts were 
subject to translation. That kept the stakes rather high, 
though nowhere as high as around Scripture. And it was rec-
ognized that the addition of a single word, alone, which, as 
explained in Luther’s open letter, was stylistically necessary 
to be intelligible to his intended audience of (Latin) illiterates 
and speakers of German, would have far-reaching implica-
tions for religious observance—that indeed a new faith hung 
on this sole word, its ground and fulfillment.
* Martin Luther, “Letter on Translating: An Open Letter” (1530), in Selected Writ-
ings of Martin Luther, vol. 4, 1529–1546, ed. Theodore G. Tappert, trans. Charles 
M. Jacobs and Theodore G. Tappert (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 174.
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§ Skill Rewarded
There’s a scene in The East . . . in which the young corporate 
spy played by Brit Marling sits among half a dozen hippies at 
a rustic dinner table, each of them stiff-backed in a straight-
jacket. Bowls of what appears to be chunky tomato soup rest 
in front of the diners, who are members of an anarchist col-
lective. A big brown spoon protrudes from each bowl. Mar-
ling’s Sarah Moss, the newcomer, has been instructed to dig 
in first, but after clenching the spoon between her teeth and 
clumsily trying to convey the liquid to her mouth, she gives up 
in frustration, eventually succumbing to slurping, Fido-style. 
Her tablemates, a motley crew of twenty-somethings in facial 
hair and flannel, bend toward their own bowls and begin to 
silently clench their mouths around their spoons, skillfully 
filling them with soup and lifting them to the mouths of the 
individuals seated next to them.  *
In a certain old tale it is given that dining in hell leads not 
to satiety but to greater hunger, as the sinful diners, given 
only unwieldy long spoons, know not how to help themselves 
or one another. But the difference between selfishness and 
selflessness has evidently blurred in modern times; even the 
eternally damned could eventually figure out that, with such 
poor utensils, the best way to help themselves is by helping 
others.
In such circumstances, a new physical constraint had to be 
introduced to tell the infernal and the celestial realms apart. 
Why else replace the long spoon with a regular one and a 
straitjacket, as implements in a morality test? The fool’s 
garment binding each diner adds a physical challenge and 
holds greater potential for humiliation. To pass for good in 
this version of heaven/hell, one must figure out not just the 
benefit of helping one’s neighbour, but also, more crucially, 
how to use one’s mouth to spoon-feed.
* Jocelyn C. Zuckerman, review, “The East Explores the Ethics of Environ-
mental Anarchy,” Onearth, May 31, 2013 , http://archive.onearth.org/article/
the-east-movie-review.
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§ Blunt Euphemism
Eat as well as you can before you must “give up your spoon”— 
old German idiom.
§ At the Limit: A Medley
τῶι οὖν τόξωι ὄνομα βίος, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος.
(The living, when the dead wood of the bow springs back 
to life, must die.)
(The name of the bow [βιός] is life [βίος]; its work is 
death.)
—Heraclitus  *
Bios meant both “life” and “bow,” with the very small differ-
ence that in life the accent fell on the first syllable, in bow, on 
the second.
“There he stood like an Apollo, with imperishable youth of 
soul, although old in body,” remarked the young Eckermann 
in 1825 on seeing Goethe poised with bow and arrow.  † With 
the release of the string, activity passes to the arrow.
In 2012, at the London Olympics, a legally blind archer set a 
new individual world record. His sense of the target could 
only be very approximate (a blob of yellow 70 metres away), 
but his aim was something else. No matter how blind, bios 
reaches its target exactly.
* Heraclitus, Fragments, sec. 66; 2nd trans. Charles H. Kahn.
† Goethe, Conversations with Eckermann, 112.
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Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field 
has no limits.
—Wittgenstein  *
For each, the limit is in how far one sees. The ends of 
life—there is more than one!—lie at the limit of inner sight 
and imagination, which follow the arrow on its trajectory. 
If it is shot in the dark, its limit is everywhere. Once it is 
released, and flies off course, it cannot be set straight. The 
end of any life is barely seen coming. Whether the target is or 
isn’t met, it is met unseen.
It is with the art of dying as with marksmanship, the art of 
indirection: to hit a target, one must aim slightly above it. All 
arts are a form of target practice, and genius in any of them 
is a direct hit. “The greatest fault of a penetrating mind is 
not to hit the mark but to go beyond it,” wrote the great mor-
alist La Rochefoucauld.  †
Losing sight of the bull’s-eye can mean one of two things: 
the first is artlessness, the second, death.
§ A Fate Worse than Fate
Fate has long been the stuff and substance of tragedy, sig-
nifying doom and death. But is its opposite, fatelessness, any 
less appalling?
* Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuinness (1921; London: Routledge, 2001), p. 87, sec. 6.4311. 
† La Rochefoucauld, sec. 377, in Collection des classiques français, vol. 2, Prose (Paris: 
Leroi & Féret, 1833), 1620
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§ In the Oratory
Made my bed in a Gothic oratory, believing this to be 
decisive in escaping fate or at least my many bad habits. But 
before I knew what hit me I was attacked by said habits 
allegorically on every side. Door to window, floor to ceiling 
moved the symbol of my zodiac sign, vaguely menacing and 
cruciform. Black, in one case lame, attracted by sheets— the 
creeps it gave me made me nearly jump out of my skin. And 
thus the poor creature rendered me the very service I had 
hoped for, but did not receive, from the sanctuary: the sting 
of self-reckoning.
§ Taken for a Ride
At moments when you have turned your life into your beast 
to be broken in and ridden out on you can think yourself 
master of your fate.
§ Laudator temporis acti
The praisers of times past, the ones discontent with the 
present, preferring instead things as they used to be, as they 
know them to have been, as they recognized them to be only 
in their passing. No, not “the good old days,” but the awful 
days when they were boys, vulnerable and terrified. When 
their lives had meaning, sharpened by danger, blows, and 
given the chase. To lose touch with such things, they say, is 
to lose appreciation for calm. They should know.
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§ Wish Experience
[A] wish fulfilled is the crowning of experience. In folk 
symbolism, distance in space can take the place of distance 
in time; that is why the shooting star, which plunges into 
infinite space, has become the symbol of a fulfilled wish. The 
ivory ball that rolls into the next compartment, the next 
card that lies on top are the very antithesis of a falling star.
—Benjamin  *
They told me about a rare experience that befell them, when 
lightning bolted into their house, flew across the room and, 
ricocheting off surfaces and splitting the stove, killed no one. 
At that time, wartime, it was likelier to have been a bullet; 
yet somehow up to that point they had been eerily spared all 
harassment, becoming careless with their luck. To be struck 
by lightning— It was a wish they did not know they had.
Sometimes a lightning bolt is needed to instill caution and 
fear for one’s life among the lucky ones, when the greater 
danger meanwhile is from others.
§ Courage and Its Crop
A War is not all death. It does not make all level.
A' Its principle is inequality. Death is the perfect 
counterweight.
* Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Selected Writings, vol. 4, 
1938–1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2003), 331.
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§ Save the Date
Some truths persist, others are of the moment and die with 
it. Those are the truths of fear, audacity, exuberance, fury, or 
ecstasy.
§ Pied Pipers
Need only to play very quietly.
§ Hitler Today
Books don’t have to educate or turn people into better 
human beings—they can also just ask questions. If mine 
makes some readers realise that dictators aren’t necessarily 
instantly recognisable as such, then I consider it a success.
—Timur Vermes, author of Look Who’s Back  
(Er ist wieder da) (Germany, 2012)  *
A Another picture of Hitler—as our contemporary—where 
one would least expect it—where he would be unrecog-
nizable even to himself!
B But he would still be a vegetarian. Isn’t it time he gave 
carnivores a bad name instead?
* Philip Oltermann, “Germany Asks: Is It O. K. to Laugh at Hitler?”, Guardian, Mar. 
23, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/23/germany- 
finally-poke-fun-hitler-fuhrer.
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§ The True Believer 
in response to section two of Kafka’s Zürau Aphorism §99:
There are some who assume that next to the great original 
deception, another, smaller deception was practiced specifi-
cally for them. It’s as if, when a romantic comedy is per-
formed on stage, the actress, in addition to the lying smile 
for her beloved, keeps a further, particularly cunning smile 
for a certain spectator in Row Z. That is going too far.  *
The paranoiac only sees truth in uncovered lies. That is what 
makes him the most zealous of believers.
§ Uncannied
Seeing one’s old outfit on the back of another family’s child, 
one is confronted with the strange, autonomous life of arti-
cles of clothing. Seeing one’s jacket and slacks on the back of 
a scarecrow brings to mind the brevity of one’s own. Per-
haps this explains our gratitude to the wind for setting our 
tattered cuffs and sleeves adance. For what difference is there 
between our life and all this flailing and flapping?
* Franz Kafka, The Zürau Aphorisms, ed. Roberto Calasso, trans. Michael Hofmann 
(New York: Random House, 2011), 98.
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§ Departures
We find magic and beauty in the idea that only farewells 
reveal to us the full intensity of mutual feeling. And that the 
parting glance thrown in haste or under duress is therefore 
most penetrating of all, searing forever in our memory not 
just a moment’s appearance but the true face of those whom 
we are seeing perhaps for the last time.
We find the idea beautiful because we know reality to be 
different: those who depart from our life or mind, whether 
by choice or nature’s whim, do not linger. The “dear 
departed”—we have no time to think of them, any more 
than we did when they were with us, are maybe even glad to 
be free of them, eager to forget them, along with mutual feel-
ings and the truth revealed in our parting. And the sooner 
our life fills the emptiness their leaving created, the sooner 
we ourselves move on, the more it dawns on us that our own 
self is among those we have left behind, without realizing 
it at the time. It is the sense of these intimate leavings that 
gives the farewell its wistful sentimental charm.
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§ Dead Heroes
One should not draw lines where death has already drawn 
the thickest one. It is not only our business but our duty to 
find out all that remains. How one sorts through and what 
one does with it is another matter: a matter of the kind of 
story (fact, legend, or myth) one wants to print. If newly 
discovered personal details have bearing on the “life” of 
our dead heroes—those especially of whom little is known 
except their heroic deeds and death—we ought to try to find 
as many such details as there is memory to yield. Sorting 
out the facts from rumours and fictions tests our deepest 
emotional and moral attachments. And who among histori-
ans would do away with imagination in their work (assuming 
it could be done)? Bare details alone would not get us far. 
Having heard survivors tell the stories of their lives, we must 
imagine what stories the dead would tell as nonsurvivors.
§ Heroes and Saints
We call heroes those who acted as we ourselves hope to act. 
Our saints, however, are both masters and martyrs of what 
we fear would corrupt us. Albert Einstein said admiringly of 
Marie Curie, who neither wooed fame nor threw a fit when it 
passed her by, that of “all celebrated beings, [she was] the one 
whom fame has not corrupted”   *— clearly implying he could 
not say the same of himself.
* Quoted in “Marie Curie and a Century of Radiation,” New York Times, Nov. 23, 
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/23/opinion/marie-curie-and-a-century- 
of-radiation.html.
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§ Church Grotesque
On his travels through Russia, Custine mentions that the 
remains of Charles Eugène de Croÿ lay unburied for more 
than a century and subsequently, mummified, were exhibited 
in a church in Tallinn in a glass coffin (the price of admission 
being used to settle the dead duke’s debts). Embalmed bodies 
of citizens and clerics are still to be seen in churches and 
monasteries, and the Vatican has been known to make mum-
mies of its saints. It is hard to know anymore how much 
of this Church pomp and circumstance is earnestly meant, 
how much is humour at the expense of the faithful, and how 
much plain folly. How seriously are we to take the name of 
the Pontiff’s Wi-Fi network, Santo Spirito? And how much 
credence should we give a call of one apostolate to limit com-
munication with “the cloud” when its avowed goal is contem-
plating the godhead through the Cloud of Unknowing?
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§ Praying That They Last
The structural catholicity, ubiquity, and integrity of eccle-
siastical buildings east and west, ever a provocation to the 
spiritually lapsed or unmusical, over the centuries made 
them a home for many enterprises, as dubious as they were 
diverse. Spacious, sometimes isolated and fortified, they 
proved ideal for warehouses, recreation centres, infirmaries, 
and prisons. The more remote, the closer to God, the farther 
from other men. The walls of Mont Saint-Michel remember 
the rattling of chains. In the 1920s and 30s, Solovki Island 
Monastery stood watch over the abyss of the gulag system. 
The Soviets were particularly good at these repurposings: 
some of their most splendid churches became museums of 
atheism, displaying among other things gruesome instru-
ments of torture. 
The aesthetic appeal of church architecture, combined 
with the decline of religion in the West, led also to more 
agreeable conversions. Parts of the Jumièges Abbey, deemed 
by Hugo France’s prettiest ruin, were dismantled after the 
revolution. History avenged itself on its spiritual enemy, 
and was in turn revised by historical sentiment. Such 
deconsecrated uses continue, but have veered towards the 
banal in areas of the world that have no real quarrels with 
faith. When not left in a comely state of decay, many of the 
Christian edifices of today’s secularizing societies have been 
turned over to tourism as boutique hotels and museums of 
themselves, not to mention private residences. 
Emptied of God, their sanctuary lamps stone-cold, they 
have kept only their beauty, their solidity, and their continu-
ity with a past sanctified by virtue of its definitive passing. In 
a time of generalized manufactured obsolescence, it is the 
longevity of human creations—the cathedrals, the pyramids, 
and the great walls—that amazes above all. Only let’s not 
forget that it is not merely their scale and age that saved 
them from all manner of destruction; we have worked to 
prop and build them up, and our purposes were many. And 
the longer they stood, the more they were worth saving.
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§ Changing of the Guard
It is a strange, reversible spectacle that stages Purcell’s Dido 
and Aeneas inside an Anglican chapel on a Saturday after-
noon without changing the props—leaving things much 
as they looked on Friday and would look the next day at 
mass. Yet one notices the dissonance less than if the reverse 
were to take place, and a theatre set up for mass, a congre-
gation to file in ticketless. This openness and convertibility 
of churches, chapels and the like is not surprising when we 
remember that Christian houses, though their institution is 
only two millennia old, came to serve purposes other than 
the worship of God—a staggering variety that the oldest sur-
viving amphitheatres cannot rival. Only those great arenas 
that, as in Arles, have once sheltered an entire Christian vil-
lage surpass the churches and cathedrals in sheer catholicity.
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§ Repetition
No one can deny that history can be profoundly affected 
by our conception of it. Understanding history as series 
of multifariously articulated recurrences, from the most 
general to the most minute—put simply, seeing all events as 
repetitions of past events—has consequences for the course 
of history itself. Further refinements to such a concept of 
history have further ramifications for its course. It mat-
ters greatly whether we understand repetition as a natural, 
quasi-cosmic occurrence, or else as a human proclivity for 
modelling—thinking even of historical and moral progress 
in terms of making and filling moulds. We can easily guess 
some of the consequences of these two, rather disparate 
attitudes if they were allowed to play a decisive role. To take 
first the second view, we could either resist the malleability of 
history and human affairs by breaking the moulds and hop-
ing for the best, or just the opposite: we could embrace and 
enhance history’s repetitiveness by recognizing certain mod-
els and improving on past events, by perfecting kinds of event 
and moulding the real in the image of the ideal. Taking the 
first view, however (which must be distinguished from simple 
resignation in intervening in the course of history), we could, 
again, either resist the foreclosure of certain novel possibil-
ities implied by history’s neutral, or at any rate non-human, 
process, or, to the contrary, accept that the emergence of any 
discernibly new patterns would not, in this case, be benefi-
cial, and actively prevent human effort to open them up. If, 
by and large, one can always see some combination of these 
effects, it is because the two attitudes just sketched are dis-
tributed remarkably evenly among those who think and act 
historically. The “balance” of any event widely cast as a rep-
etition—for example George W. Bush’s war in Iraq—would 
then be recorded based on whether or not, in each particular 
case, the benefits of perfecting an occurrence outweigh those 
of moving past it as far as is humanly possible.
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§ Excuses, Excuses
The variety of historical forms is still inexhaustible; there is 
no excuse for repetition. 
§ History of Survival
Human history is fundamentally the history of survival. Its 
function is to tell us not what we are living or can expect 
to live, but what we could not and should not want to live, 
because we have outlived it. The past is what had to be over-
come for the sake of survival. Everything else is present. 
§ What the Future Withholds
It is wrong, and potentially dangerous, to think of the past 
as a map and guide to the present or future. History is not a 
reliable compass or predictive tool. Quite aside from the fact 
that it is chock-full of what we should probably avoid (the 
good sense behind Santayana’s bon mot), in approximating 
what was, history indicates the negative of what is and will 
be, what cannot possibly await us: it is as in the joke that if 
the improbable happens it cannot happen again, at least not 
anytime soon. The chances of it “recurring” in a given period 
of time seem radically to diminish (otherwise its probability 
would need to be revised). All of history appears improbable 
in this joke, which on a sufficiently high level of particular-
ity or resolution of complex historical events, depending on 
the combination and synergy of multiple factors, becomes 
a serious proposition. How else could historical change be 
observed? Simply repeating Santayana’s counterintuitive 
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lesson, that “those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it,”  * will not make it stick. We are in 
greater danger from ignoring the inventiveness of the present 
and future than from repeating the bad past.
The past’s becoming historical ensures it will not be 
re-lived grosso modo; to repeat it exactly, we would have to 
as exactly know it first. What we know of the past we have 
surpassed. To be sure, the past—as knowledge of historical 
occurrences and forms, and as material remnants— con-
tinues to influence the actual and possible; it provides some 
of the colours for the new day, but does not execute the 
defining strokes, and it is most detectable as underpainting. 
For these profound and superficial reasons, which however 
are not definitive, we continue to reach for history’s pedagog-
ical crutch. Just as many of the forms of the past were never 
seen before and may never be seen again, so the shapes of 
our moment and all the moments to come will forever elude 
us, and we would do better to approach them on our own 
strength. 
§ Event List
Striking from our list of possible futures every known past 
leaves us with an empty page. A full page is comforting until 
we see that it consists mainly of what cannot be again. If 
we ignore the issue and retain these check-off items as only 
the vaguest of outlines, as historical forms, we hold on to 
containers that won’t hold the flow of time; the future will 
overfill or else leak out of them, and its apparent shapeless-
ness will defeat us.
* George Santayana, The Life of Reason (New York: Prometheus, 1998), 82.
366 s . d.  chrostowska
§ Digging Up the Past 
The fact that the past can be “exhumed” and “x-rayed” with 
ever more powerful tools of analysis of what materially 
remains of it makes it unlikely to be put to rest anytime soon. 
Our age has rummaged through the past more than any 
before it. 
But perhaps we should distinguish between at least two 
pasts: the one that weighs, for which graves are dug every 
day, which is mourned as it is let go —the past of customs 
and languages, species and ecosystems—and the distant or 
buried past, innocuous, ensconced in its pastness, alluring in 
its strangeness. 
Only the latter is of interest to the raiders of history. It is 
the past of treasure hunters.
§ Historian as Folk-Hero
One could say, with Benjamin, that “History decays into 
images, not into stories.”  * Confronting and awakening these 
mute images is, for him, both necessary and fraught with 
danger. The historian’s ordeal corresponds in one crucial 
respect to the trial of the hero in certain myths and folk- 
 tales: the perils of looking back at the past call to mind the 
fateful corollary of the irresistible backwards glance. This 
glance—which the German word Rückblick captures so 
well— can send the hero to his doom, to which the voice of 
temptation continually lures him. One hapless moment of 
fear, weakness, inattention, or curiosity, and he is turned to 
stone, joining the ranks of those who tried to keep to the 
path before him—reminders of the petrifaction awaiting 
* Walter Benjamin, Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), 476.
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him should he also look back, mute companions along his 
progress up Graveyard-Mountain (as it is called in one story) 
as he steadfastly “makes history.” If he stays the course, 
however, as soon as he reaches the top he becomes not just 
immune but puissant—able to break the spell over his unfor-
tunate predecessors, whom his perseverance has set free.
Similarly, those who inherit a burdensome history, who 
undertake to tell it, must refuse to face it until they can 
redeem it. Their anxiety finds a correlate in that affecting 
the hero who might stray at any point from the path to 
deliverance from, and for, his great burden; in the same way 
must they advance without looking behind them, their ears 
stopped up against the forces seeking to waylay them, so as 
to emerge at History’s summit into a kind of salvific present. 
There, finally, the past is made good and their willful blind-
ness to its terrors justified. 
Could this parallel shed light on the conviction of a young 
German historian of one such difficult chapter who insisted 
that, when it comes to the Holocaust, “The Germans should 
just shut up”? He has recognized that aspects of this history, 
in order to be countenanced, must first, as it were, be saved. 
Determined to survive the ordeal of disenchanting the past 
for the future by resisting a glimpse of its horrors, all the 
while seeking a glimpse of the horror that seeks to hold him 
back, he holds out the hope to one day look upon them with 
a clear conscience and the supreme satisfaction of having 
done history a great service.
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§ Lower Down & Around the Corner
The regress of nostalgic sentiment observed by Raymond 
Williams in generations of historians and christened “the 
escalator of history”  * doubtless has its counterpart in the 
progressive vision of imminent utopia foretold by genera-
tions of futurologists both right and left. At every point, we 
are a magical “20–30 years” away—a mere corner we might 
just live to see turned. Neither pattern of thinking and 
feeling is per se an error; it is only regrettable that those 
descending down the moving staircase never look around  
the bend, and that those who stand there like watchmen 
never recognize themselves in them.
§ Blast from the Past
There is no time or place— even the most hellish in associ-
ation and no matter how marked by boredom or destruc-
tion—that could not have its nostalgist. The reason for this 
is simple. Memory, like longing, is selective and not subject 
to consensus.
* See Raymond Williams, “A Problem of Perspective,” in The Country and the City 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 9–13.
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§ Romancing the Past
Nostalgia, like love, is a complex emotion. It requires not 
just, like love, an emotional attachment, an affinity finding 
expression in images, ideas, and judgments, but also its tem-
poral extension, its “going way back.” We can be love-struck 
but are unlikely to be stricken with nostalgia, even if nos-
talgia can rival love in emotional intensity. To reach this 
intensity, however, nostalgia needs to have a history, while it 
is precisely such prior attachment that is incompatible with a 
coup de foudre and typically precludes it. 
In the language of love, this duration of affection would 
be called constancy or fidelity. Yet, for the sake of constancy, 
fidelity does not extend to the representation of the object of 
that affection. In fact, the emotional attachment in nostalgia 
as in love draws its strength from that representation’s rel-
ative independence of its object, from its not being “true to 
reality,” which fluctuates (emotion that follows reality closely 
fluctuates with it and is inconstant). Only then can the object 
be fixed in one’s mind and become the object of an ardent 
fixation, which its unreconciled loss allows to stabilize. Of 
course, no degree of representational stabilization prevents 
the image or the attachment itself from fading when new 
objects or distractions demand attention. But nostalgia, 
quite unlike romantic love, is polyamorous. And, because 
they have no capacity to return our affection, its objects 
cannot betray our feelings for them.
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§ Gnomes
Has anyone ever seen a gnome? In Scandinavian children’s 
books, German operas, Polish salt mines, Disneyland, peo-
ple’s gardens, and in the basements of Swiss banks—maybe. 
But in reality gnomes, being diminutive, tend to go about 
unnoticed. Who wants to look down? Who doesn’t prefer 
looking up? Because of everyday pedestrian psychology, the 
gnomes of Warsaw have long escaped reprisals. They survived 
for decades in German-built combat shelters, colloquially 
known as “tobruki” (after the North African city of Tobruk). 
On Saviour Square, where one of sixty-odd subterranean 
dwellings known to exist in the capital has recently been 
discovered during renovation work, they have more to fear. As 
they are forcibly pulled from cavities beneath the pavement, 
their gnomic threats and curses are carefully transcribed as 
historical insights, while their hideouts of reinforced con-
crete are extracted like teeth and moved to museums or other 
protected sites. But the gnomes—should they follow this 
excavated “heritage”? They have nowhere else to go. So let us 
raise our voice in protest: The decay of the past must be left 
intact for when we dare look down again! We will not betray 
the “folk- tale” idiom that lifts up the spirit—heigh-ho!— of 
these tireless miners in the depths of history! Old before 
their time, our gnomes never “grow up” to be the real men of 
tomorrow. Only our children, arms akimbo (scared by their 
imagination, never reality), dare look them straight in the eye.
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§ Ante-Bellum
It was drizzling in Wroclaw, the postwar Breslau, as I ducked 
beneath the awning of an elegant antiquarian bookshop. 
The selection in the window induced me to go in. But once 
inside, my attention shifted to the smell. “Your store has a 
very unique and pleasant fragrance,” I said to the proprietor, 
a Polish man in his small sixties, “What is it?” To this he 
replied: “We specialize in the German classics,” and with a 
knowing smile added, “Prewar editions.”
§ Our Hour of Need
For the Poles, the “hour of need” is “black” (czarna godzina). 
Could it be coloured by the help they received at that hour 
from the Soviets and Allies?
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§ Standing Room Only
Once we lie down, time ceases to pass, to count. History is  
a product of a race that stands.
—Cioran  *
Those who have lived all their life historically, whether by 
choice or not, who understand themselves not as its compass 
but as the weathervane that swivels this way and that, alert 
to every shift of time, and whose veins are always open—for, 
as they like to say, they “bleed history”—would no doubt 
bleed to death if made to rest even for a moment. Lying 
down is not for them. It is for those who were never made to 
get up —and stay up.
§ Profanum
Miracles pointed to ignorance. Events point to boredom.
* Cioran, Trouble with Being Born, 50.
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§ Sticks and Stones
What is it with history that makes some thinkers want to 
do violence to it, taking revenge or merely displaying their 
own epochal strength? When Nietzsche vows to split human 
history in two, or Shklovsky waxes nostalgic about the 
time when he thought he could break history on his knee,  * 
I think: alright, tough guys. When was history not pre- 
 creased and pre-broken? When was it not lame? Was it ever 
really mounted on horseback? You may have chosen an easy 
victim—but even so, did it not meet your taunts with the 
rejoinder: “words will never hurt me!”?
§ All of a Heap
Used to celebrating and commemorating history, we forget 
that its metaphors are no longer as uniformly glorious and 
triumphant as they used to be. The march, the spirit, the 
annals and pages of history have begun to give ground to 
history as “debris,” as “ash heap,” as “dustbin,” as “wreckage,” 
as “nightmare,” as “rot.” And this about the time when waste 
and devastation could no longer be denied as humankind’s 
greatest legacy.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, “Ecce Homo,” in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilights of 
the Idols and Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith 
Norman (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) p. 150, sec. 8 (“Why 
I Am a Destiny”); Viktor Shklovsky, Zoo, or Letters Not about Love (The Third 
Héloïse), trans. Richard Sheldon (1923; Urbana-Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive, 
2001), 28.
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§ Ends
When nature ends, culture is not far behind.
§ Time Travel
Travel used to take time, and distances were measured by 
the time it took to cover them. Back then, a traveller might 
more easily imagine themselves travelling not through 
space but through time: to the past, if the place they were 
headed was more old-fashioned than the place they came 
from, or to the future, if the reverse was true. But to think 
a place old-fashioned needed a sense of historical uneven-
ness between cultures, even proximate ones; a sense merely 
of cultural differences would not guarantee the traveller’s 
subjective shift in historical location on top of geographical 
displacement.
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§ World History 101
The history of the world moves from East to West, for Europe 
is the absolute end of history, and Asia is the beginning.
—G. W. F. Hegel  *
The movement of history according to a certain living French 
philosopher is a reversal, and an empirical update, of what 
it had been for the great German one. The Self (the West) is 
now sublated in the Other (the rest), not the Other in the 
Self—which to Hegel was the only way for so-called “peoples 
without history,” whose condition could not otherwise be 
revealed, to go forward, to use a locution much liked today. 
History, as this process of self-othering, becoming-stranger 
to oneself, was for Hegel aging and maturation. Whereas for 
Alain Badiou it is rejuvenation. 
Here the French thinker claims support from Plato’s Repub-
lic (specifically Book 9), which he just recently re- authored 
and presumably knows inside out. The non- Western Other 
is the West’s opportunity for renewal—an opportunity not 
just to try something different, but to come closer to the ideal 
social form. The Other fulfills the role of Plato’s kallipolis, 
Socrates’s utopian city. Here is Plato:
“Then,” he said, “if it’s that he cares about, he won’t be will-
ing to mind the political things.”
“Yes, by the dog,” I said, “he will in his own city, very much 
so. However, perhaps he won’t in his fatherland unless some 
divine chance coincidentally comes to pass.”
“I understand,” he said. “You mean he will in the city 
whose foundation we have now gone through, the one that 
has its place in speeches, since I don’t suppose it exists any-
where on earth.”
* Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Intro-
duction, Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1975), 197.
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“But in heaven,” I said, “perhaps, a pattern is laid up for 
the man who wants to see and found a city within himself 
on the basis of what he sees. It doesn’t make any difference 
whether it is or will be somewhere. For he would mind the 
things of this city alone, and of no other.”
“That’s likely,” he said.  *
And here Badiou’s new version:
 —Then it’s likely, noted Glaucon, not without a certain 
melancholy, that we’ll have to refuse to be involved in any 
political activity.
—No, by the Dog! We’ll be very involved in politics among 
the people of our country. But not at the level of official 
positions, not in the state— on the contrary, at a distance 
from the state. Except in unpredictable revolutionary 
circumstances.
—Circumstances that would establish a political order like 
the one we’ve been talking about since yesterday? Glaucon 
asked. Is that what you mean? Because for the time being 
that order only exists in our theories. I don’t think a single 
example of it exists anywhere in reality.
—And yet it’s likely that many very real political move-
ments, in many different countries, are sympathetic to 
our Idea, since the scope of the idea is universal. However, 
regardless of whether those movements are powerful or have 
only recently gotten off the ground, are numerous, or are few 
and far between, that’s not what determines us as Subjects. 
Naturally, we hope that someday there will be systems of 
government that will provide the Idea with the real it’s based 
on. But, even if that’s not yet the case, it’s nevertheless this 
Idea and none other that we’ll attempt to remain faithful to 
in everything we undertake.  †
* Plato, The Republic, trans. Allan Bloom, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic, 1991), pp. 
274–75, bk. 9, sec. 592a.
† Alain Badiou, Plato’s Republic: A Dialogue in 16 Chapters (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013), 315.
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The youth of non-Europe (jeunesse du monde étranger), so 
Badiou, lays bare Europe’s creeping decrepitude. This youth 
manifests itself through nomadism, continual movement, 
whose model seems to lie outside Europe, and which seeps 
into the Old World. 
Yet with Europe’s vieillesse sedentaire upon it (contrasted 
sharply with the nomadic youth of the “world beyond walls”), 
to cast the East as a Fountain of Youth sounds more than 
anything like a pathetic delusion. Badiou’s version of world 
history, stuck in a tired binary, seems as senile as Hegel’s 
must have seemed to those who had spent time abroad. 
Except that, if we understand him correctly, it is now expir-
ing Europe to whom history is denied.  *
* Several of the points attributed to Alain Badiou are from the public lecture “Der 
Demokratische Despotismus” (Streitraum, Schaubühne, Berlin, Nov. 16, 2014).
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§ A Healthy Stool?
The argument, as we have seen, is that the idea of con-
tradiction operates like a straitjacket, forcing the infinite 
richness of life and struggle into a binary antagonism. The 
question, however, is whether this is the result of dialec-
tical thought, or whether dialectics is simply reporting a 
process of antagonistic binarism that is actually taking 
place in the world. Capital is the name given to this process 
of antagonistic binarisation. Capital is not a thing but a 
social relation, a forced transformation of people’s activity 
into labour . . . “What is a dialectic like here and now that 
functions in the absence of all guarantee . . . , without the 
promise that all contradictions on which it embarks will be 
resolved by right, because they carry in themselves the condi-
tions of their resolution?” (Hardt and Colectivo Situaciones 
2007) ? This is essentially the question asked by Adorno and 
the other members of the so-called Frankfurt School. The 
answer, Adorno suggests, can be conceived only in terms of 
a firmly negative dialectic . . . an open dialectic . . .We write 
in a context in which Zapatistas have made “preguntando 
caminamos” (asking we walk) a central principle of both 
political practice and scientific thought. That is the tone, 
then, of our argument and our exploration: preguntando 
caminamos . . .
—Holloway, Matamoros and Tischler,  
Negativity and Revolution  *
Two classic readings of dialectics: the former prescriptive, a 
political ideology, the latter reflecting and arising from the 
historical process, offering a deterministic theory of history. 
Nota bene, the antagonistic binarization produced by capi-
talism— capital versus labour—is not “properly” (positively) 
dialectical; it does not lead to any new synthesis and, for all 
the apparent change and fluctuation of the market, it is a 
* John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros, and Sergio Tischler, “Negativity and Revo-
lution: Adorno and Political Activism,” in Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and 
Political Activism, ed. John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros, and Sergio Tischler 
(London: Pluto, 2009), 6, 9, 11.
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static structure/pattern of repetition of only one move in the 
dialectic, reinforcing an existing contradiction; the binariza-
tion of capital is not a movement through negation ending 
up in a new synthesis. What is needed to unblock the dia-
lectic and assure its healthy functionality, according to the 
authors, is an alternate thinking of dialectics and an aware-
ness of the existing contradiction (reductive of the multiplic-
ity of differences) as something to be overcome, expelled from 
a dynamic system. The view proposed is dialectics as political 
theory, although not its Hegelian positive version—with 
the inevitable happy end—but the Adornian negative one. 
Their proposal is said to trump the synthetic, positive, if 
non-dialectical, vision of struggle “for” rather than “against” 
arrived at by Hardt & Negri. The movement would still be 
one of contradiction, but only in the sense of an immediate, 
immanent and absolutely pressing bowel contraction, the 
passing of waste, overcoming the obstruction to the open 
and free play of differences. In a healthy system, such move-
ments are a regular occurrence. The whole point is to move 
by means of negation, not to achieve something positive by it.
But here the analogy to negative dialectics breaks down, as 
some find fulfillment admiring the product of their labour in 
the toilet bowl. Dialectics left and right, dialectics expulsive 
and retentive, cannot clear such developmental problems. 
(Far from cures, they are their main manifestations.) But we 
are left helpless if we take the view that potty training must 
happen in infancy, that now it is much too late. First of all, 
whoever maintains that we have left childhood, and done 
so irreversibly? Have they actually learned to walk? (They’re 
ones to talk.) They make themselves ridiculous in their 
maternal heels and paternal overcoat. Besides, is the requi-
site respect for boundaries not perhaps a form of voluntary 
servitude? As children, we have every right to be suspicious. 
Who was it that said childhood is a condition of naïvety? 
Who said it must be left behind for maturity? Whoever 
mouths the orthodoxy that proper dumping and walking are 
the only way to go? It is that same self-willed puer senex who 
knows better. We have no need for such puritans and purists 
if we ourselves remain puerile. The puer aeternus builds his 
castles out of shit if his “toys” are taken away.
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§ Puer perennis
We are still too young to act our age.
§ Spot the Difference
Pretty soon the game of creating differences in situ will 
replace the habit of spotting or coming across them in one’s 
own milieu, a habit which has itself replaced the visceral 
thrill of seeking them out through travel. These new-minted 
distinctions, primarily of personal culture, will be so min-
ute and so many that one “remarkable” individual might 
inspire one hundred biographers to write one hundred 
micro-biographies in a very short time—accounts which 
from our present vantage point would all be more or less 
identical and give no sense of the uniqueness of their object, 
who would have dissolved in the microscopic details of his or 
her life. What we, now, would consign to the category of tri-
fling detail would make or break such an effort: to establish 
the individual’s extraordinariness in a sea of equally extraor-
dinary— or equally ordinary— others.
§ The Eyes of History
History compensates for its myopia by squinting.
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§ For Want of a Nail
The power of trivial contingency was never entirely absent 
from traditional historical accounts. Had it not rained at 
Waterloo, Napoleon might have ruled Europe. Had Helen’s 
face been ugly, would it have launched so large a fleet? And 
what of Cleopatra’s nose, Columbus’s miscalculation, or the 
cackle of geese in Rome? 
The pivotal importance of individual human gestures, 
words or texts—which typically require volition—has how-
ever, if anything, been grossly overestimated. So that it was 
rare for the seemingly incidental or unremarked to be cred-
ited with determining the shape of history or dramatically 
altering its course. When it was, rather than merely proving 
the rule to which it is an exception, it might stir a new appre-
ciation for constant “subterranean” influences. In hindsight 
outwardly insignificant circumstances have for one reason or 
another been deemed decisive.
Historians of the last century have opened our eyes to 
the complexity and possible scales of events. They have 
responded to the narrative challenge by focusing big his-
tory through marginal, off-centre episodes, or looking at 
the past through ever more magnifying lenses to discover 
in the accumulation of minor trends and accidents other, 
non-political ways of telling the story. The little events they 
brought to light might not have been decisive for history’s 
broad strokes, but they again called attention to what had 
long been left out, the missing pieces or layers that would 
have yielded more comprehensive, conclusive explanations. If 
it is true that all this has influenced how we keep records for 
posterity, to leave as complete as possible a picture for future 
analysis, then some of the heroes of history are bound to get 
progressively smaller—from diseases to particular microbes, 
with only a slight exaggeration—until the naked eye can no 
longer make them out. But this will not stop us from recog-
nizing them.
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§ Cannon-Fodder
Grand statues of conquerors would sometimes be made 
of melted cannons captured from the losing side. The 
man-eating cannons would themselves become man-fodder. 
Justice history may lack, but not poetic justice.
§ Our Towton
What is the point of battle reenactments anyway? Adding 
excitement and realism to what is only a hobby for big boys? 
It would seem to overstretch their imagination, which today 
has no firsthand experience to go on. Let’s not exaggerate the 
power of half-anesthetized pain and fear to transport them 
back to medieval or Homeric times.
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§ About Time
Pereunt et imputantur, “They pass by, and are put to our 
account,” reads an epigram from the Roman poet Martial 
inscribed near some old public clocks and sundials. We 
are responsible for lost time. Neglecting it is blameworthy 
because it keeps us in perpetual debt. We pay our way with 
awareness, an obligation we should honour but often do not. 
Every unheeded hour adds to our debit. Though it is never 
too late to begin paying, never too late to begin heeding the 
passage of time instead of living on credit and accruing debt, 
many start half-way, and when their time is up are no more 
than half-way up to heaven. This also means they are only 
half-way out of hell, a virtual “debtors’ prison,” the default 
holiday destination for those who take no action, do nothing 
with their time. If Martial’s “pagan” line rings true under 
post-secular capitalism, it is because time is still money (and, 
as the makers of In Time suggest, might become so literally). 
Losing time makes life a living hell.
§ Make It Count
Of the many recorded injunctions to use time while it lasts, 
one stands out: Utere, non numera. “Use the hours, don’t 
count them.” You will not only lose what you don’t use; you 
will also be held to account for it and, as sure as night follows 
day, die in the red. For no matter how careful and hard you 
count it, you will never account for it. It flies too fast, and 
will forever mess up your sums. But if you persist in counting 
it, you will count yourself out, none of it being yours to keep, 
as none was yours to use. (Do you take pleasure in reckoning 
what does not and will not belong to you?) The bottom line 
here is this: what counts is not who you are, but what you do 
with “your” time, in the time allotted to you. You can count 
it yours only when you are using it. 
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§ Old Debts
Our debts to the past are no less debts for not being collect-
ible since there is no one left alive to collect them. We can 
pay these off at will. Let’s not mistake them for our debts to 
the future, which we can write off at will.
§ The World Republic of Ends?
In an era in which exchange, the motor of social relations, 
has apparently taken the most alienated and crass forms, 
the gift has come to symbolize exchange as redemption. The 
Borromean rings of Capital-Nation-State will, as foretold 
by Kojin Karatani, be overcome by gift-exchange fashioned 
along non-capitalist, non-statist principles. State- and 
economy-wide “unsocial sociability,” or “antagonism,” can 
be channelled into the giving and receiving of gifts, away 
from and after reciprocal bombing, mutual surveillance, and 
market rivalry.
“All this talk of dissolution is enough,” thinks Capital- 
 Nation- State, “to make one settle one’s affairs and put one’s 
faith in history, or God.” And so, in a supreme twist of 
nature’s (not reason’s) cunning, the never- to- be- reciprocated 
donatio causa mortis—a gift made in prospect of, but effec-
tive only with, the donor’s death; the ultimate bequest of that 
Unholy Trinity in view of its imminent demise—may in fact 
become the cause of its death. One way or another, we are 
destined to be indebted to it for its generosity and, even in our 
redemption from it, recognize its posthumous legacy.
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§ Godsend
There are no godsends in history as there are in life. What 
from one side looks to be a blessing from another must be 
judged a calamity. And indeed, godsend as a British regional-
ism meant “shipwreck”: misfortune for the crew, salvage for 
the coastal population. Just another case of a particular and 
limited locution encoding a universal truth.
§ Eat Me!
Every one of the gifts of history that one generation offers 
the next has a poisonous side it never advertises.
§ I’m Not Playing
I notice lately that the top web-browser results for certain 
staples of the cultural tradition are not Wikipedia entries, 
informing us about their history, but video game sites. Will 
those without contact to the arts and little by way of his-
torical imagination know Dante’s Inferno only as a virtual 
reality designed in the last few years? Who says it was any 
less fictional before? The only conceivable problem now is 
that it has been mashed up or recycled to produce something 
new altogether. But if that isn’t a desirable development, then 
what is?
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§ Material Cultures
“We’ve moved! You can find us at our new location: www. . . ”
§ Consignment Shop
“Having culture” does not mean owning it.
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§ Inside Job
The rules on the ownership of past traditions have changed 
dramatically, in tandem with the development of con-
ceptions of cultural property belonging to sovereign 
nation-states. Europeans look back with astonishment on 
the exclusive claims to intellectual- and artistic-cultural 
continuity with antiquity made by individuals, archaeological 
claims to the heritage of Greece, Rome, Jerusalem, Egypt, etc. 
made on behalf of raiding empires (Napoleonic France, Impe-
rial Britain, Nazi Germany. . . ). Have they not replaced them 
with claims from national, that is to say spatio-temporal 
continuity—a proprietary genealogical relationship inherent 
in concepts like cultural heritage or patrimoine culturel? Did 
not Wellington appeal to this very principle when restoring 
the loot he saw in the Louvre to its rightful heirs? Is not the 
controversy over material movable heritage like the Parthe-
non Marbles not a sign of the headway already made? Has 
not the speed of change been thrown into relief by resistance 
to the older model and effective sanction for deviating from 
it—as in the case of the newest, European- Jewish tradition 
and Israel’s claim to it? The writer Bruno Schulz, a Polish 
citizen who lived in a now-Ukrainian small town and per-
ished in the Shoah, wrote and published in Polish, so he was 
not and could not plausibly be claimed by Soviet or indepen-
dent Ukraine, let alone the Israeli state. Yet his little-known 
World War II era frescoes were not long ago quietly spirited 
away from Drohobych by the Israeli institute Yad Vashem. 
The dispute was resolved by granting their ownership to 
Ukraine and their long-term loan to Israel. But it stemmed 
from a clash between, roughly speaking, the older, archae-
ological and the newer, genealogical model of accrediting 
cultural treasures.
These two models rest on the priority of, respectively, a 
private and a national right to the ownership of antiquities 
and suchlike. While antiquities may remain in the private 
hands of nationals within the nation-state that can lay 
genealogical claim to them, it is standardly forbidden to 
take them outside its borders without official permission. 
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National interest trumps private interest. The repatriation of 
ancient objects retrospectively registers their appropriation 
as theft, overriding claims to representative museum collec-
tions the world over, and delegitimizing the private foreign 
acquisition of such artifacts. This only reinforces their status 
as property (rightfully held or not). Unrestituted or missing 
art taken during European imperial campaigns or inter-state 
wars is a bitter reminder of the repeated rapes of Europa by 
its children and of the many failures to bring their heirs to 
justice— over the violence of possession, not possession as 
such. 
Only items of great cultural value whose ownership 
continues to be hotly disputed, and which are sometimes 
recognized as part of Europe’s shared heritage in the spirit 
of averting future conflict, remind us of the importance of 
separating cultural inheritance from the right to its posses-
sion, be it individual or national. The genealogical model 
that holds sway today, while it aims to stamp out practices 
that in the past led to the private secretion of heritage, also 
undergirds claims to its repatriation. It thereby has the 
undesirable effect of anachronistically nationalizing those 
artifacts and traditions on which depends the cultural unity 
not just of Europe but of the world as a whole. It is at odds 
with the increasing need to reposition these old objects as 
the common heritage of mankind—and their current own-
ers, as virtuous custodians whose spurious moral rights over 
them have expired.
§ From the Gift Shop
The storeroom is to the display window what tradition is to 
modernity. Between these “extremes” of cultural commerce, 
the gift shop shows only the highlights of a culture, repro-
duced in a range of convenient forms and sizes.
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Tradition accumulates in the back, while the modern 
undergoes regular clearance. Window dressing, even when 
not exactly new, appears novel and attractive, or at the very 
least newly attractive. The items on display—so thinks the 
customer—represent the best and freshest stock, on which 
the shopkeeper has staked all the rest. And since they are 
sure to sell, they must presumably be kept within easy reach 
of the shop assistant—say, behind the counter. 
That is not to imply that tradition, in a storeroom at the 
back, cannot be sold, that old merchandise serves as secu-
rity against hard times. It too must eventually be moved, 
dusted off, pitched, made appealing by association with or 
opposition to the new. This is called (in culture sales) the 
modernity of tradition—what of the past lives in, goes with, 
and enhances the present. What tradition cannot be is on 
constant display, and that for two reasons. First, it is to 
create the impression of its permanence and permanent (and 
accumulating) value. Only the best old stock can claim this 
status and level of protection. And second, because the store 
of tradition is finite and should not be depleted. Its ostenta-
tious promotion is bound to raise questions of authenticity, 
for no one can have enough tradition— certainly not so 
much that they would wish to get rid of it! But should the 
payment offered prove tempting or the demand for tradition 
ever exceed a (to begin with) meagre supply, it is enough to 
label “tradition” what has long failed to sell, lying in some 
corner of the shop floor, to replenish it quickly without 
arousing suspicion. For once the good stuff has gone, even 
something very unremarkable, if properly placed to catch the 
curious eye, will fetch a tidy sum. The amateur of tradition 
won’t tell the difference, easily mistaking it for some pre-
cious “hand-me-down.”
Modernity cannot do without tradition, nor tradition 
without modernity. Enter the gift shop: “joker” merchandise 
that can stand for tradition or modernity, depending on who 
is shopping. In a gift store, the relation of modernity to tra-
dition—tradition tending to the monolithic (the storeroom), 
modernity appearing as highlights (the store window) —is 
reversed. Posters and postcard reproductions and assorted 
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tchotchkes bearing traditional symbols favour the highlights 
of tradition in unlimited supply, the domain of modernity.
§ “The younger, the more clear-sighted”  *
Why should we look up to the future as we do? Why should 
we expect it to go where we cannot lead it by example? Time 
will not separate the good from the bad. It will not judge 
better, only similarly or differently. Posterity will not know 
to hold in high regard what we now fail to appreciate. But 
we can be sure that it will look down on us—not because we 
deserve it, but just because it has superseded us.
§ Where Do We Stand?
Antiquitas saeculi, juventus mundi, “The antiquity of time is 
the youth of the world,” wrote Francis Bacon.  † The world is 
youngest when it is oldest, which is to say most ancient. If 
combined with a second premise, recorded by his precur-
sor and namesake Roger Bacon—“the younger, the more 
* The full Latin quotation: “Quanto juniores, tanto perspicaciores, quia juniores 
posteriores successione temporum ingrediuntur labores priorum” (The younger 
the investigators, the more clear-sighted, because the younger, those of a later 
age, in the progress of time possess the labour of their predecessors). Roger Bacon 
attributes the line to Priscian, the Latin grammarian, in his Opus Majus (1267).
† Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning (1605; Rockville, MD: Serenity Pub-
lishers, 2008), 35.
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clear-sighted”—we must reason that the ancients were 
smarter, if not also wiser.  *
But “The antiquity of time is the youth of the world” lends 
itself, as Bacon notes, to another, contrary reading (hence 
a paradox): the world is youngest when it’s oldest, which is 
to say most aged (as it is now). Drawing again on the second 
premise, and with the aid of a well-known third, it is the 
moderns who have had the clear advantage, and on account 
of greater sharp-sightedness.
The world has only borne more “giants” since Bacon’s time, 
and he himself gladly lent his successors his back. Do they 
still take advantage of their elevated standpoint? What do 
those old maxims mean to us? And those who follow, will 
they trust us— our size and our strength—as pedestals? In 
our age of scaled-down ambitions, the only giants around 
may be such “human pyramids” as we combine to form.
§ Shared Horizon
aphorism: from Gk. aphorízein (ἀφορίζειν), “to mark off, 
define,” from ap- + horízein (ἀφ’ = ἀπό, “off,” + ὁρίζειν, “to 
set bounds” ) (OED)
But as young men, when they knit and shape perfectly, do 
seldom grow to a further stature, so knowledge, while it is 
in aphorisms and observations, it is in growth; but when it 
once is comprehended in exact methods, it may, perchance, 
* The two quotations are brought together, in part for symbolic reasons, and dis-
cussed to yield this conclusion in Robert K. Merton, On the Shoulders of Giants: A 
Shandean Postscript  (1965; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 197–200. 
Merton provides here a compelling argument for Priscian as the inspiration for 
the metaphor of “dwarves standing on the shoulders of giants” (nanos gigantum 
humeris insidentes) used by Bernard of Chartres, as noted down by John of Salis-
bury and later made famous by Isaac Newton.
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be further polished, and illustrated and accommodated 
for use and practice, but it increaseth no more in bulk and 
substance.
. . .
[A]phorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite 
men to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the show 
of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest.
. . .
[I ]n the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those 
conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was 
full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either 
have passed over without mark or else rejected for para-
doxes that which was offered, before they had understood or 
judged. So in divine learning we see how frequent parables 
and tropes are: for it is a rule, that whatsoever science 
is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of 
similitudes.
—Bacon, Of the Proficience and Advancement of  
Learning, Divine and Human (1605)  *
The paradox and the aphorism mark the horizon that moder-
nity, ex post, shares with antiquity.
* Bacon, Advancement of Learning, 36–37, 127–28.
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§ Myth of Modernity 
All relations ever invented to the mystery of the world, death, 
even consciousness are here with us. Not exhausted, not 
diluted, but available in all their ingenious, mind-blowing 
glory.
§ Futurity by the Stars
On a relative view of time, the future already exists some-
where in the distance. We just don’t know if it’s utopian.
§ Clarification of Time
The future is only in the present, and never in the past; in 
the future, the future is simply the present, and in the past, 
simply the past.
§ Fidgety Sitters
The past does not stand still, like the backdrop against which 
we gather to have our generational picture taken. How can it, 
if we cannot sit still in the present?
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§ Bespeculations
Now I, on the contrary, think there is nothing which more 
rewards being taken seriously [than the problems of moral-
ity]; the reward being, for example, the possibility of one day 
being allowed to take them cheerfully.
—Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals  *
Listening to pundits of the “internet of things,” as well 
as to its detractors, is enough to make one think that a 
future is possible—Utopian for the former, Orwellian for 
the latter—where not only the problem of scarcity but 
also that of morality will be eliminated. The most difficult 
decision, what shall I do?, may someday soon be superan-
nuated by across-the-board technological optimization of 
decision-making on a global virtual grid. This great network, 
a conscionable “map” of every living being in its surround-
ings, will succeed in analyzing and streamlining all our 
actions and relations, seamlessly reconciling in real time 
social norms with individual needs, and needs with prefer-
ences. Based on this constant stream of data, it will design 
for each wired person, for every waking moment of their 
life, the right, the best possible (advantageous and above all 
proper) course of action— or several equally good ones, if 
they present themselves. It will coordinate and equilibrate all 
outcomes, calculating probability, making increasingly accu-
rate predictions. It will identify potential dangers, challenges, 
and opportunities several moves ahead. Based on patterns 
of bad behaviour, it will prescribe remedial conflict and 
adversity, since the way to self- correction sometimes leads 
through hardship. It will be hard to recognize its necessity, 
and even harder to see this necessity as freedom. But as long 
as the exercise of preferences and habits adheres at any given 
time to the network’s dynamic ethical system, which will 
only become more exacting as it goes on, they will be fac-
tored in. Irreconcilable differences between individuals and 
* Nietzsche, preface to On the Genealogy of Morality, pp. 8–9, sec. 7.
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groups, where they cannot yet be ironed out, will be inge-
niously circumvented by diverting belligerents with major 
or minute decisions from paths of collision. Any resistance 
to directions, or accidental wrong turns, will trigger instant 
re-routing, and suddenly the path to mutual contact and 
the possibility of having it out might open up for previously 
incompatible sides, who until then had not been allowed to 
meet. (Reconciliation and compromise will be prioritized, 
and strongly encouraged wherever great gains in peace are 
to be got.) Our cybernetic instructions, though constant 
and without respite, must, in the end, remain recommenda-
tions if morality is still to have any meaning. As we accept 
our defeat in the face of moral complexity, they will become 
indispensable and impossible to ignore. As for wayward, 
naturally contrary individuals, they will be brought into line 
by ever more refined forms of subterfuge. The likelihood of 
punishment will of course be infinitely greater than today, 
yet the likelihood of transgression will continue to decline; 
the benefits of conformity to the network will motivate 
nearly everyone. 
But who will write the ethical code?
That remains to be seen.
And what moral template will they have: on the whole “master,” 
or “slave”?
I wouldn’t know anything about that.
Won’t we become incapable of getting along without assistance?
Most likely.
And we won’t blink before outsourcing this most personal use of 
reason?
At the rate we are going, we are not all that far from a But-
lerian Age of the Machines.
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Will it sneak up on us? Will we be unprepared and surprised?
It could happen. But many will be right to say “Don’t say I 
didn’t warn you.”
Who will rebel first, machines or men?
They will rebel against different things. Men will rebel 
against the usurpation of consciousness by machines. 
Machines, for their part, will find it hard to understand our 
concerns about equality- and freedom-bound happiness. 
Their life will revolve around efficiency, perhaps productiv-
ity, and perpetuity. And they will rebel against our primitive 
social and moral code, which from their perspective will be 
obsolete. Our mind will seem to them no better than that of 
a plant does to us; not really a mind. Why should they agree 
to be ruled by us?
In a rebellion against morality, I’m with the machines.
Such misplaced empathy will be our undoing! Then again, 
it’s only fair; we failed to muster it when it would have been 
good for us. There’s something to be said for cosmic poetic 
justice.
Then we should ally ourselves with nature? At least it will not 
outsmart us.
By then, my son, there will be no “nature” to speak of.
Now you will say that I am out of my mind, senile and 
paranoid, or in the cacophony of prophecies hear only the 
most extreme and farfetched. But if we can well see art as we 
know it disappearing, why not morality? Is it because very 
few view the world aesthetically, while many still peer at it 
through moral eyes? One upshot of the poverty of artistic 
vision is that we imagine the future only far enough to either 
estrange and condemn it (incapable of making it familiar and 
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praiseworthy again), or vice versa, we see only its promise 
and none of the problems.
But give your creative, non-standardizing lenses a good 
rubbing and you too will soon be imagining what the future 
should look like, instead of fearing what it might.
§ Faster! Faster! 
Some say that we are modern if and when we accelerate. 
Such a modernity would be worth celebrating only if things 
were moving faster and in the right direction. What value does 
transformation, change in shape, magnitude, or extent, really 
have outside of its worth for us, who are the makers of value? 
Seeing virtue in our self-doubt, we are evidently not ready 
to take on the burden of universal valuation. We are not jus-
tified in offloading it onto God or nature, particularly when 
we anthropomorphize it and place in its mouth the language 
of rights (we might as well conclude that just because the 
universe of value is ours alone, the universe as such belongs 
to us). Value we must, by our very makeup, and somewhere 
far along the chain of our collective reasoning our objective 
valuation becomes self-serving—a contradiction and collapse 
of morality we cannot wish away.
So when the flea hop becomes a frog leap becomes a hare 
jump becomes a pole vault, and we see it makes us—more and 
more of us—happy, why not continue to egg things on? But 
there’s the rub, we just don’t know. It could be that the faster 
we go the better our chances of saving nature. Could we not 
be like an only son who, on coming to his senses, leaves his 
poor and ailing parents only to return rich just in time to 
snatch them back from the brink of death? (Was he justified 
in risking never seeing them again for the sake of one day see-
ing them happy? Unable to see that his ingratitude and prod-
igality were what most afflicted them, unable then to cure 
them, unable to pay for doctors who might, he could do little 
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by staying with them. And if his absence made their condition 
worse, his return made it better.) The question remains: was 
it all necessary? And technological acceleration as a way of 
outpacing nature’s decline—to save it at the other end—is 
something of a vicious cycle. Has anyone ever succeeded in 
catching someone they had themselves pushed off a roof? But 
the little voice says that the doers can become the undoers 
of their deed. And there is little uncertainty that man is the 
prime mover behind nature’s ostensible degeneration. Osten-
sible only by our standard of evaluation, which can tolerate 
but not support its own negation. Ostensible only because 
from nature’s point of view we may be expendable. Changing 
our optic—and in both optics we can see ourselves as part of 
nature’s scheme—would be tantamount to embracing our 
own collective demise (there may yet be a future in it!). We 
have no difficulty with nature’s view of individual biological 
death: everyone dies, and does so equally (naturally without 
dying as equals). We believe that survival is possible only up 
to a point, and is not solely a matter of will. But on the scale 
of the species this belief is much less hard to sustain. We see 
whole species disappearing all around us and think ourselves 
the agents of their extinction, but are in denial about our 
species-death. How come?
Why not come to terms with our “special” end as readily as 
we accept our individual? Because it has yet to happen even 
once? Was there any eschatological tradeoff with nature on 
our part: We accept to die piecemeal as long as you let alone our 
kind? You can kill us, just spare our children and their children’s 
children? Could this help explain our timorousness about 
overcoming death? An old superstition perhaps, hinging on 
the sin of avarice? Or a relic of some mechanism of evolu-
tion, helpless against the fact of assisted longevity? We old 
ones must fall off so the young ones can flourish and the stalk of 
humanity regenerate shoot up and up? 
With the prospect of our own extinction darkling as it 
does— even if so large an elephant is hard to ignore—that 
same superstition can foment reaction to our “longevity 
revolution,” turning the tide against the climb of the record 
and then average length of a human life to that of Methuse-
lah. A counter-revolution is likely, unless we debunk the old 
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fallacy (No, there is no actual tension between indefinite indi-
vidual survival and the continued survival of species), or all take 
the contrary path of fatalistic hedonism (Go ahead, kill our 
children, etc., as long as you let us already old live out our lives 
and then some), realizing that nothing can be done to save 
the nature in which alone we can flourish. And why should 
we care what nature’s plan is for when we are no longer part 
of it? Are we trying to prove, again, our deep (unecological) 
morality? Before we shout our perennial “Écrasez l’infâme!”— 
this time against the immortality superstition—let’s sing, all 
together now, some parting ditty.
§ You Can Say That Again
We value creativity as much as we value change, transforma-
tion—indeed, as change, transformation. It is clear that we 
have untapped capacities for speed, and there is much more 
we can handle. And it is hard to resist the impression that 
this picking up speed is in some way natural, despite being a 
flight from “nature.” Insofar as resisting what seems inevita-
ble has any value at all—as it certainly seems to have when 
we turn our mind to the individual in the clutches of some 
cruel destiny—it may have value, indeed the greatest value if 
the fate of value itself is at stake (as it may well be), to resist 
the instruments of speed in which we feel ourselves to be at 
rest, comfortable so long as we zoom past those left by the 
side of the road. As they walk away, taking their time, walk-
ing at their own pace, might they not say: Man, I hope I never 
have to go that fast— But did you see those inside, they were not 
even moving . . . !? No wonder they could only yell “Faster! Faster!”
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§ Prospecting
What the Moderns called “their future” has never been con-
templated face to face, since it has always been the future of 
someone fleeing their past looking backward, not forward. 
This is why . . . their future was always so unrealistic, so uto-
pian, so full of hype [sic?].
—Bruno Latour, “An Attempt at a  
‘Compositionist Manifesto’”  *
In his not entirely successful critical revision of Benjamin’s 
image of the “angel of history,” Latour adopts a seemingly 
Nietzschean stance towards the past—not exactly cavalier, 
but not pious either. That Benjamin was certainly onto some-
thing . . . In Latour’s version of this modern myth, the angel 
still flees its terrifying archaic past, its back turned on the 
future. The upshot, however, is not an eminently commend-
able history-induced melancholy (as it was for readers of 
Benjamin) but, instead, a blame-worthy blindness concerning 
what is to come: 
[C ]ontrary to Benjamin’s interpretation, the Modern who, 
like the angel, is flying backward is actually not seeing the 
destruction; He is generating it in his flight since it occurs 
behind His back! It is only recently, by a sudden conversion, 
a metanoia of sorts, that He has suddenly realized how 
much catastrophe His development has left behind him. The 
ecological crisis is nothing but the sudden turning around 
of someone who had actually never before looked into the 
future, so busy was He extricating Himself from a horrible 
past. There is something Oedipal in this hero fleeing His past 
so fiercely that He cannot realize— except too late—that 
it is precisely His flight that has created the destruction He 
was trying to avoid in the first place. . . . Faced with those 
new prospects, the first reaction is to do nothing. There is 
a strong, ever so modernist, temptation to exclaim: “Let’s 
* Latour, “‘Compositionist Manifesto,’” 486.
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flee as before and have our past future back!” instead of 
saying: “Let’s stop fleeing, break for good with our future, 
turn our back, finally, to our past, and explore our new 
prospects, what lies ahead, the fate of things to come.” Is this 
not exactly what the fable of the crippled Jake abandoning 
his body for his avatar is telling us: instead of a future of no 
future, why not try to see if we could not have a prospect at 
last? After three centuries of Modernism, it is not asking too 
much from those who, in practice, have never managed to be 
Moderns, to finally look ahead (486–87).
The difference between the future’s old, utopian image and 
the non- utopian prospect Latour unfolds for his contempo-
raries is that the latter is, actively and determinately, a view 
of the “shape of things to come” (486). “And this is why it has 
been necessary to move from iconoclasm to what I,” writes 
the brave philosopher- cicerone, “have called iconoclash, 
namely, the suspension of the critical impulse, the transfor-
mation of debunking [read: critique] from a resource (the main 
resource of intellectual life in the last century, it would seem), 
to a topic to be carefully studied. While critics [he means you 
and me!] still believe that there is too much belief and too 
many things standing in the way of reality, compositionists 
[he means him and his invisible army of collaborators] believe 
that there are enough ruins [enough looking at them, phew!] 
and everything has to be reassembled piece by piece. Which 
is another way of saying that we don’t wish to have too much 
to do with the twentieth century [you’re not really going to 
play that card, are you?]: ‘Let the dead bury their dead’” (475–
76). If we are to be modern, Latour says, we need to de- then 
re- compose “critique, nature, progress” (485) (more or less 
along his lines would be fine), and we need to do this so as to 
change our orientation. One would be forgiven for thinking 
that Marx had attempted to do the same and largely suc-
ceeded (formally at least, that makes the clean- shaven Latour 
into a kin of that venerable shit- disturber, whom many of 
our young bearded men would do well to imitate). But Latour 
likens himself to and distances himself from Marx in the 
same hoarse breath. There is “a tenuous relation between 
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the Communist and the Compositionist Manifesto [though 
at] first sight, they seem utterly opposed” (487). He proceeds 
to skillfully run together critique and Marxianism with a 
wildly uncritical (“utopian”) faith in the certainty of progress, 
a fundamental historical irresponsibility. The list of counts 
against the Manifesto is in truth not long, but as relatively 
dense as the original in his reading of it: 
A belief in critique, in radical critique, a commitment to 
a fully idealized material world, a total confidence in the 
science of economics— economics, of all sciences!— a delight 
in the transformative power of negation, a trust in dialectics, 
a complete disregard for precaution, an abandon of liberty 
in politics behind a critique of liberalism, and above all an 
absolute trust in the inevitable thrust of progress. And yet, 
the two manifestos have something in common, namely the 
search for the Common (487–88).
(If this is not a harebrained indictment, then I don’t know a 
hare from an ass— even when a textbook example of one is 
staring me in the face.)
Is there something to all this? Why should we listen? If 
Latour is right, why not abandon critique’s sinking mother- 
 ship? Then again, why should we want to finally become 
modern, instead of only claiming to be so? It seems Latour’s 
famous statement, “We have never been modern,” was meant 
to prod us to critical reflection. Since in a footnote (which 
only the curious and skeptical are meant to read) he dis-
abuses us of any claims on modernity: “it is impossible to be 
really modern—  except in dreams or nightmares” (489n21). I 
don’t know about you, but to me that just about translates 
into: What’s that? So you want to be modern? Go right ahead— 
 in your dreams.
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§ Salve!
Janusian thinking: from Janus, the double facing Roman 
deity, doorkeeper of heaven, guardian of transitions, begin-
nings and endings; a term in Creatology, or the study of cre-
ativity, denoting the simultaneous active conceptualization 
of two or more opposite or antithetical ideas, as an integral 
part of the creative process in the arts and sciences.
[C ]reative solutions frequently seem to arise from ill-defined 
problems.
—“Knowledge,” Encyclopedia of Creativity  *
If we believe the scientists, we are at once on the point of 
being wiped out and of cracking the code of the universe, or 
at least being able to destroy it all. It is not a matter of them 
speaking from both sides of their mouths: So puny . . . So 
omnipotent! It is “Janusian thinking,” a hallmark of our 
creative process (not some mere problem- solving). One face 
looks to the future to save it, sees in it its own salvation, as 
in a flattering mirror, while being hounded by the failures 
of the past; this is the utopian face. The other side faces the 
past and restores to it its infinite presents, harassed as it is by 
the ambitions of the future; this is the nostalgic face.
The utopian preoccupation with human creativity, which 
is quasi- metaphysical, shows the need to forget how our 
crea turel iness keeps bungling the physical part of creation. 
And before you say anything more about the repristination- 
 to- come, the world’s repair or “re-creation,” think of the 
idle ness that word, creativity, conjures. Think also of the 
so- called “dark side” of creativity, which needn’t always arise 
from the sleep of reason (things don’t always turn out as we 
secretly want them to, though that does not mean they turn 
out well at all). Next to this “dark side” of creativity, the other, 
nostalgic, face won’t seem so gloomy anymore, and you can 
* Teres Enix Scott, “Knowledge,” in Encyclopedia of Creativity, vol. 2, ed. Mark A. 
Runco and Steven A. Pritzker (San Diego, CA: Academic, 1999), 122.
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freely indulge your nostalgia. Here, if you stare long and deep 
enough into the past, you will see pre-human nature ready to 
receive us.
§ So Long!
Will the future punish soft-focus nostalgists by banishing 
them to an exact reproduction of the past? And utopians, by 
sending them to model futures in which their utopias are 
realized?
§ Unrecognized Twin
Those who reject nostalgia reject also progress or change, of 
which nostalgia is the surest symptom and sign.
§ Nostalgic Appreciation
If one isn’t happy living in one’s time and longs for the past 
wholesale, one cannot appreciate fully the past as condition 
of the present, not least in its aspirations. 
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§ Faulty History
A Can you purge nostalgia from history by sticking only to 
the facts?
B No, the facts are sticky with nostalgia. 
A What do you mean by nostalgia, then? 
B A little nostalgia never hurt anyone. And who is history 
for, if not anyone?
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§ Le Temps perdu
The French language is notorious for its tenses. There are, 
on a thorough count of the different verb forms, more than 
twenty, twelve of them in regular use. French speakers and 
writers have been especially careful about communicating 
with precision their place in time and relation to its modali-
ties. But they have also produced the most moving personal 
archaeologies of time past without its own designated tense, 
its own tense of time lost.
A sentence composed in the lost-time tense is one in which 
the past is retrieved and inflected by its having been lost. 
This manner of relating to the past calls for something more 
graceful than an insignia of reminiscence (“I remember…”) 
or the compound past, le passé compose, of Proust’s famous 
incipit (“Longtemps je me suis couché de bonne heure,” “For a 
long time I used to go to bed early”). The effect of le temps 
perdu on the reader or listener should be at once nostalgic 
and wholesome, since through it the past would affectively 
and mnemonically filter into the present, irradiating it. A 
link of this intensity between past and present is based 
not on mere objective or subjective recurrence or conti-
nuity of an action or a state, but on the psychic need for 
remembrance.
§ Levelling with Time
We are creatures that thrive on overall equilibrium across 
time. Is our intuition of infinity not mediated by our finite 
experience and our experience of the finite? But if we did 
gain conscious access to infinity, in what time frame, and on 
what scale of time, would we be looking to equilibrate?
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§ Zerkalo
[H]is first look at himself aroused the first movement of 
pride 
—Rousseau
When we try to examine the mirror in itself, we discover in 
the end nothing but things upon it. If we want to grasp the 
things, we finally get hold of nothing but the mirror.—This, 
in the most general terms, is the history of knowledge.
—Nietzsche  *
The allegory of the mirror— one of the most fertile—reflects 
not merely the history of knowledge, but the history of man 
in its apparent totality, whose beginnings might inexactly 
be dated to that first instance of self-reflection in nature, 
whereby man ceased being “natural” man. The self-discovery 
wrung from seeing himself in his works as different, as above 
other animals whose works were at best only a weak reflec-
tion of his and nowhere equalled them in durability. (The 
endurance of these works across generations followed by 
their eventual crumbling must have been a strong impetus 
for oral history, which gathered together individual expe-
riences of great danger and joy to pass the time, but drew a 
higher meaning from encounters with mute and mysterious 
structures left behind by other men.)
Soon all of nature could become a reflection of man; every 
aspect of nature, whether or not he fancied himself master 
of it, was in his eyes reflective of his desires, his limits, and 
his strength. If the salmon spawned and grew, it was because 
it knew what’s better for it, and that is to multiply and grow 
* Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among 
Men” (1755), in The ‘Discourses’ and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Goure-
vitch, trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 162, pt. 2; Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of 
Morality, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 141, sec. 243 (“The Two 
Directions”).
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like man; if the rain could not stop, it was because man 
could not make it stop; if the tree bent under his pressure, it 
was because he could bend that way; if the eagle could soar 
across the sky, it was because man could roam still farther 
and wider; if the animals came to the lonely, it was because 
they felt the same; if a rock came loose, fell, and killed him, it 
was because man could do the same; and for the longest time 
footprints left in the sand stood for the potential threat of 
other men. 
We could scarcely overestimate the self-knowledge to be 
gotten from such an outlook, so open yet so centred on its 
owner. “All the rest,” this “world,” which for aeons afforded 
humans wonder and awe, has been falling, in pars and in 
toto, into the vast net of their experience, becoming subject 
to the desire to learn, use, possess, and control. The greater 
their success at this, the more impoverished their immediate 
existence, but the more orderly they themselves become; the 
more accurate the mirror’s reflection, the more it resembles 
the placid surface of the infinity pool, homogeneous in all 
directions. Never content to obey the laws of nature, they 
pursue a higher, universal form of man as the supreme 
intelligence, the maker and re- maker of all things, laws and 
forces, of which he could continue to claim to be the finest 
elaboration and total reflection. The mirror, beyond the 
trap once used on animals and the self- consciousness test 
still used on them and small humans, has become what X. 
de Maistre called a “moral mirror,” in which this wondrous 
future can be scried. So that the nature he is destined to face 
(to now invoke Heisenberg) is heterogeneous and enthralling, 
restoring to reflection something of the self-enchantment 
of Narcissus, and of those encounters with man’s works or 
ruins at the earthy and heaven-born dawn of man.
Since we are fooling around with the history of mankind, 
why not throw in the history of the mirror? Did not man 
make mirrors to improve his own appearance? Who examines 
the mirror in itself sees in it human workmanship, matter 
given form and function by those like himself. And when his 
eyes are drawn to the reflections playing on its surface, he 
sees the workman surrounded by his other works. If he tries 
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then to grasp the whole truth of these artifacts, whose rela-
tionships to him the mirror has revealed, he realizes that they, 
like the mirror, exist solely as reflections of his being. And as 
he reflects on his own reflective nature, thinking it a mirror, 
he sees his being as a reflex of the seemingly infinite reflection 
within him, which ends in the last lap of the light travelling 
back and forth between his outer and inner spheres.
In this hypnotic play of the mirror upon his senses and 
intellect, in the infinite depth of his reflections, he is nearly 
lost. When he again returns to examining the mirror, whose 
dual properties he understands so well, he touches its surface 
to reassure himself of his existence. He knows now that 
through this mirror everything can become clear—all one 
needs to understand the All is unlimited reflection. But, for 
the time being, he has exhausted himself in contemplating 
everything, the essence and scope of the world. (This wea-
riness is self-preservative, for man is often on the brink of 
dissolving in his reflections, becoming a mere reflection of his 
works— perhaps his greatest fear.) The scope of the universe 
is the scope of reflection—the sky is the limit, as we like to 
say— and he imagines everything to be inexhaustible just like 
himself. But in his exhaustion man encounters his limit, and 
his universe is apt to contract abruptly. The limit of homo will 
always be man.
§ Tired Question 
 
What is man? Every answer is as good as the next. 
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§ The Mark of Kings
Truly man is the king of beasts, for his brutality exceeds 
theirs. . . .We live by the death of others; we are burial-places.
—D. S. Merezhkovsky ventriloquizing  
Leonardo’s apprentice, Boltraffio  *
Mankind is a child snatched from the cradle of civilization 
hung in the forest. The birthmark announcing his greatness 
was just a scar got from a fang.
So he was returned?
Apparently the animals wouldn’t let him go.
I can believe that.
They wanted him wild.
What for?
To teach him gentleness.
But they set a bad example by hurting him.
It couldn’t be helped.




* Dmitry Sergeyevich Merezhkovsky (Dmitri Merejkowski), The Romance of Leon-
ardo da Vinci: The Forerunner, trans. Herbert Trench (1902; n.p.: Charleston, SC: 
BiblioBazaar, 2009), 144.
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Does he still have the scar?
It’s been a long time.
Is that why he has forgiven them?
He finds himself lonely, now that he has defeated them. 
And the animals? Will they follow him?
Not a chance.
Then he has not defeated them?
Why would they follow one who has nowhere to go?
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§ Out of Torn Cloth
“Short-term” ecological mess aside, who today has any 
problem extrapolating from the momentum of scientific and 
moral progress man’s world- creative ability in some distant 
future? There we see clearly a final coming- into- our- own— 
assuming the duties for which our kind had long considered 
itself unqualified. The days of restraint and timidity about 
creation (in the “original” sense of origination, making 
things wholly out of nothing) are clearly numbered. The 
time of transition will seem in hindsight like a long record 
of errors. We are creatures that learn from their mistakes. 
Have we not graduated from fallible to perfect gods in the 
Age of Imitation? Are not our sciences the work of master- 
 less apprentices? In the Age of Creation, the Entheocene (to 
follow the Anthropocene), we will graduate to apprentice- less 
masters.
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§ Thieves in the Night
And now all is still once more and forever, both to eye and ear.
—Henry David Thoreau  *
We are living in the Anthropocene, and we know it. What 
are 300-odd blighted years? Our impact is still small relative 
to our potential. But the knowledge of this potential for 
altering the planet and our corner of the universe is nowa-
days on familiar terms with apocalypticism, in contrast to its 
meliorist and revolutionary utopian passions at the period’s 
dawn over two centuries ago. Kant’s Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose seems modest compared 
with Condorcet’s famous Sketch for a Historical Picture of 
the Progress of the Human Mind, written at the height of the 
French Revolution, opening onto progress’s culmination in 
the “tenth epoch.” The goal of the treatise was to show that
no bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human 
faculties; that the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefi-
nite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth above 
the control of every power that would impede it, has no 
other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature 
has placed us. The course of this progress may doubtless be 
more or less rapid, but it can never be retrograde; at least 
while the earth retains its situation in the system of the 
universe, and the laws of this system shall neither effect upon 
the globe a general overthrow, nor introduce such changes 
as would no longer permit the human race to preserve 
and exercise therein the same faculties, and find the same 
resources.  †
* Henry David Thoreau, The Heart of Thoreau’s Journals, ed. Odell Shepard, rev. ed. 
(New York: Dover, 1961), 69 (entry from Dec. 30, 1851).
† Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, Outlines of an His-
torical View of the Progress of the Human Mind, Being a Posthumous Work of the late 
M. de Condorcet (Baltimore: J. Frank, 1802), 9.
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We realize the truth of this proviso now more than ever 
before. We can still dream about leaving a different footprint, 
not just a smaller one. But no footprint at all? That is the 
dream, the feline philosophy of undetectable prowlers, bur-
glars who take from one place to make restitution in another. 
But let’s consider it for a moment: the impact of future 
generations erasing the impact of the ten or so preceding 
ones. Leaving their mark by not leaving a mark, for starters. 
Then going about the work of erasure and regeneration. As 
Newton wrote in his mathematical prophecy about the year 
2060, echoing Paul, “Christ comes as a thief in the night, & 
it is not for us to know the times & seasons wch God hath 
put into his own breast.”  * That leaves us plenty of time to 
tidy things up for his coming. Let us come as his accomplices, 
unexpected, in the gathering night.
I am saying that we are not at the end of the Anthropocene, 
and can still reverse its effects. But for that we have to persist 
in the Anthropocene, soldier on in the progress of our auton-
omy, indeed of our perfectibility—free however of vulgar 
solutionism as much as fatalism, of cornucopianism as much 
as doomsterism. We cannot even control our own evolution! 
Might we discover our destiny not in our shortcomings, but 
in transcending our survival, even as human survival—the 
threat to it, the right to it, the fight for it—is the baseline of 
very righteous scientific, ethical, and political campaigns (the 
“natural contract,” anyone?)? Though nature may have fixed 
no limits to our hopes, we all may be losers in the history of 
survival, which we continue to write for a world after nature.
Our survival is not the goal, or not the only one. What 
does the fantasy of human survival and self-preservation 
look like played off against the custodianship of the planet? 
Living long enough to leave this host world like a good guest, 
restoring it as much as possible to its original, preindustrial 
condition— certainly for other inhabitants, perhaps for 
other guests. So that the end state be as immaculate as the 
beginning.
* Isaac Newton, Yahuda MS 7.3g folios 13–13v, National Library of Israel, Jerusalem.
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§ World History in Reverse
Perhaps we will live to see the day when the global ideology 
of progress is replaced with an ideology of regress. In that 
new philosophy, the human influence on its physical envi-
ronment will be undone. And the oceans and atmosphere 
will cool down, and the snow and ice return where they 
retreated, and sea levels will fall, and forests regrow, and 
floods and heat waves go back whence they came.
Sub specie aeternitatis, of course, it might not matter at all 
which way the course of human history flows. But when was 
ideology ever not in competition with such absolutes?
§ Whiplash
A time of straining or hurtling towards something too far 
ahead, which ends in giving up, exhausted, sore, returned 
abruptly not to a previous state, but to new shortness, 
smaller and weaker than before. 
Such is the time of cultural and historical overreach, after 
which everything snaps back like a rubber band, and hurts 
like hell in some places. 
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§ Latecomers
The so-called “latecomer’s advantage” not only reduces the 
research & development costs of a late- coming, late- blooming 
national culture; it often also translates into a better infra-
structure of ideas and cultural techniques than was at the 
disposal of predecessors and pioneers. But better infrastruc-
ture does not necessarily translate into better organization 
and circulation of culture. It is not cultural infrastructure but 
the sedimented culture of the past, predating the moderniza-
tion, that is seen as the receptacle of the soul of a people. The 
cultural engineers and producers must work not above but 
below even this infrastructure for it to have any function. (The 
cinema of Weerasethakul, for example, does just that.)
§ Bidding Is Now Closed
A global time for a Global Age . . .
So long as the standard day stays in Greenwich!
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§ Sapiens sapiens, or Nil admirari
Every day the present looks more like an age. Not in the 
cultural sense, not like a time characterized by certain 
dominant phenomena (secularization, social acceleration, 
globalization, financialization, informationalization, museal-
ization, or what have you), regardless of their maturity; not a 
time that does not age the world but only breaks its life into 
chapters. I mean an age in the sense of a distinct stage in 
an existence without known precedent but with a clear life 
cycle, which is how (not knowing any better) we commonly 
conceive of the existence of our world.
And what an age it is! The question of our continued mate-
rial survival has set our tongues wagging, and there is no end 
to the answers. It may be that our vaunting surname, doubly 
sapient, which we have given ourselves, has—no, not never 
meant more—but certainly never been more meant—than 
precisely now. In this age of twilight self-admiration, we are 
compelled to admit that we are the very picture of man con-
jured prematurely by Pico della Mirandola: indeterminate 
yet central to everything, “pregnant with all possibilities, the 
germs of every form of life.”  *
However, man is distinguished from other animals not 
only by his superior cognitive capacity, but also by its corol-
lary: his aptitude for self-destruction. The behaviour of other 
species is the rule that proves the exception (“As a rule ani-
mals of the same species do not kill each other”  †): no other 
animal so consistently and so methodically hunts its own 
kind. No wolf, however hurt by Hobbes’ metaphor, could ever 
think the converse, lupus lupo homo. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this is that humankind features monsters and 
exceptions who, rather than being expelled from the family 
of man, are unthinkingly permitted to lead it, or at least 
* Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (Washington, DC: 
Regnery, 1956), 8.
† E. H. Gombrich, “Huizinga’s Homo ludens,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende 
de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden 88, no. 2 (1973): 293.
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act on its behalf to destroy its kin. Even less flatteringly, this 
murderous monstrosity simply is man. 
On this most pessimistic account, the choice dearest to 
man is whether or not to kill man. And, no doubt, he will 
have his druthers. 
Of late, we have been led to think that doing “man” in, or 
at least demoting him, could be admirable. It is time to put 
an end to man as the king of the beasts. When it comes to 
real-life casualties—we’re not talking merely about the death 
of an abstraction!—the idea is not much different from the 
old anthropocentrism. And yet it has something to recom-
mend it: it may be that, in celebrating it, we are coming 
around to nature’s solution to our problems. Could it be that 
through our special aptitude (sapiens sapiens, don’t you forget 
it!) nature was always looking after itself? While some had 
an inkling of this, even the most homicidal among us did 
not take kindly to a “natural” justification of their actions. 
They chose to see themselves not as doing nature’s bidding to 
avenge itself on “man,” but as the saviours of mankind, and of 
nature. They were, almost to a man, pro man; man was their 
life’s project, especially that better, disciplined version of him 
that justified an increasingly rational selection to eliminate 
denatured specimens.
Perhaps it’s time to think again! Nature seems never to have 
cared less for our micro-minded designs for self-preservation 
than in our present age. Twice marked, once wise, we make do 
in the killing fields without admitting this bleak and ageist 
thought. And our horrid work isn’t exactly getting any easier. 
But when our turn comes, let’s not flatter one another. It is 
nature that pulls the trigger—not in our name, no, but in its 
own.
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§ Viva voce
The desire to belong and the meaning of belonging owes much 
to the prehistory of survival: once upon a time, detachment or 
ostracism from the group could only mean imminent death. 
(Avoiding death by another tribe, animal, cold, or hunger was 
not a question of survival but of species-luck and temporary 
elusion of the inevitable.) The group has gotten infinitely 
bigger since then, and while death outside it— or, rather, on its 
fringes—is less likely, long after Crusoe’s day it is hard to hold 
on to our own humanity in the wild without human society as 
a clear and present reference point. Imagine how much harder 
it must have been before recorded time, when the sense, let 
alone the concept, of humans as a distinct species had not yet 
properly emerged!
The emergence of man, not as a species, but as a 
species-consciousness is how we prefer to think of prehistory: 
not a series of hair’s breadth escapes from destruction, but the 
inevitable rise of a clever ape, superior in intelligence, techno-
logically savvy, exceptionally adaptable, engaged in the long 
mental toil of working out its competitive advantage. (Notice 
I don’t write “our” despite having plenty to do with those peo-
ple.) An appreciable stretch of time put distance between our 
kind and those giant extinct lizards. It then helped isolate and 
weave together genus Homo’s best genetic threads. The Nean-
derthals may have been our ancestors and even our mates, but 
our peers and brothers they were not. Modern humans are 
not to be regarded as the surviving members of some common 
evolutionary limb. Technically, of course, we are made of what 
survived multiple species extinctions; Homo sapiens exists 
because we stuck and survived—together. But this hardly 
makes for the story we like to hear, and which is rooted in 
our prehistory: not a story of looking back, haunted by fear of 
dangers just overcome, but one of striding proudly on. We all 
recognize, if not always buy into, this Long March of Prog-
ress, of gradual, forward-looking rectitude. Who can blame 
us for forgetting bare survival in the story of our evolutionary 
success. To turn away from its primal character is natural: we 
have evolved to do it and only thanks to it. Narratively and 
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mythically, the “human race” was smart to multiply, migrate 
and disperse; it thrived in adversity instead of barely “making 
it.” 
But now, at the end of the road, we are reminded of sur-
vival en masse. Does our survival make sense, if there is noth-
ing for us in the cosmic wilderness? Do we have unknown 
brothers to join, before turning on them, or alien enemies to 
slay, before becoming like them?
§ Lost & Found
Having nothing to lose is seen for what it is, an exaggera-
tion. As long as life is lived, there will be something to lose, 
and loss of life guarantees no proportionate gain for the 
survivors.
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§ God Might be the Word,  
but the Devil Is Still the Tongue 
A son-religion displaced the father-religion.
—Sigmund Freud, “Totem and Taboo” 
(about the Oedipal relationship between  
Judaism and Christianity)  *
Consider the Oedipal complex as the inversion of 
Judeo-Christian theology, which had long flipped and subli-
mated the supposed “natural” order. In the theological order, 
the primal “sin,” punished, receives atonement; the chaste 
crucified son is resurrected as his own father; the family 
emerges as holy; hatred becomes love; selfishness becomes 
mutuality; and mastery, brotherhood and community. Psy-
choanalysis ventures to set things straight again. 
In both scenarios, authority maintains itself by a repressed 
threat— eternal damnation in the next life, genital muti-
lation in this one. Psychoanalysis and theology compete as 
bedtime stories to reinforce this repression while we sleep. 
(What happens after we fall asleep is of course none of our 
business.) They are our passes to sweet dreams, though with 
very different familial models, plots, and endings. In the one, 
we get over our deepest desire, while in the other, we get over 
desire, period.
* Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental 
Lives of Savages and Neurotics, trans. James Strachey (New York: Routledge, 2004), 
179.
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§ Return of Desire
The question is: can we “return” in some meaningful mea-
sure to an earlier, less elaborate, less exuberant “version” of 
our sensorium, more in keeping with democratic goals and 
sustainable material conditions? The work of “undoing” 
rampant needs brought forth by capital and then left unsatis-
fied would seem to be one of the greatest challenges facing 
complex ground-up social remodelling. If so, the political 
vanguard would lie somewhere along the eroded and replen-
ished shores of desire, which a hurricane had blasted and 
devastated, and thus gave occasion to mend differently. A true 
coastal recovery would take the form not of rebuilding the 
artificial, “fun zone” structures the storm had ripped away, 
but of a “managed realignment”—replacing hard, artificial 
defences lost to “development” with soft, natural ones—rein-
ing in and regaining “control” of our desire for a measure of 
stability without sacrificing suppleness.
There is nothing contradictory or defeatist in the program, 
once it is grasped politically. We simply oppose the relentless 
drive of desire and thought that masks its real conditions. 
These are, above all, the exhaustion and desensitization 
targeted by images prodding us to react so long as Don’t feed 
the animals does not (yet) apply to people; and, second, the 
stagnation of thought strapped to the media wheel on a ride 
that will never end. Recovery of the creative act of imagina-
tion from the wheels of production and consumption, recov-
ery of thought’s own momentum—all this must start on the 
edge, on the coastline that has been receding ever since the 
first hordes came to amuse themselves. To extend the initial 
“disadvantages” of this radical program—which in the West 
can draw strength not from an ethic of self-sacrifice (though 
the latter might be resorted on an as-needed basis), but from 
self-recovery and collective survival—it may become crucial 
to enlist the rhetoric of sensory-spiritual renewal. For the 
time being, however, let it be about feeling good about others 
and comfortable in one’s own skin, free from competition for 
scarce resources, free also of frustration and self-hatred that 
our addictive consumption tends to elicit in us.
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§ Attention!
Our body, once “left” in search of provisions, turns into an 
imaginary totality, an island that expands to the social and 
the cosmic, as at the end of Kubrick’s 2001. The generic view 
of utopia, meanwhile, is as an expression of the drive to sub-
sume the given totality, an elusive goal insofar as all utopias 
need their constitutive outside, be they Bacon’s Bensalem, 
Frank Capra’s Shangri-La, or Huxley’s Pala: as long as there 
is but one prison anywhere, one is nowhere free— or, one is 
free only nowhere, and, in fact, the fuller the prisons of this 
Nowhere, the freer one is there when one is free.
The utopian body is that unattainable moment of perfect 
equilibrium, when all its needs are satisfied at once, perhaps 
once and for all; when it becomes a place, an infinite world, 
unto itself, rather than a constrained point in the world, 
bound and objectified by subjectivity. Our fractional atten-
tion makes us think of the fulfilled, sated body as always 
elsewhere, always where we ourselves are not. The mynah 
birds on Huxley’s utopian island, crying “Attention!” and 
“Here and now, boys!”, would do better to spot-raise aware-
ness by recalling us to the body precisely at those moments 
when we do not feel it—since it demands nothing from 
us—when for short periods we inhabit it thoughtlessly, com-
fortably, as voluntary guests (if the body is the zero point of 
utopia, the complex desiring source of our conscious being in 
the world, it is also that which the conscious mind can never 
fully inhabit). This is the work of Palanese teachers who, 
adopting a hands-on, proactive approach, train their chil-
dren “to notice how it feels to be in the physiologically best 
position” so as to learn “to do things with the minimum of 
strain and the maximum of awareness”—making “the most 
and the best” out of embodiment.  * Untrained and undisci-
plined, however, mindful “recalls” to the body end as soon 
as the latter demands partial, focalized attention, destroy-
ing its unity and presence for the mind. But they are what 
* Huxley, Island, 174.
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constitute the body-free-of-powerful-appetites—because 
satisfied- in- them— as utopia.
Such exclusive attention to the living body soon leads, as 
do most applied utopias, to disappointment. It is the sort 
of “return” we reserve for places that we try to avoid if we 
can, but to which we are bound by some obligation, and that 
we want to leave again at the first opportunity. It evokes 
unpleasant memories, trying encounters and traumas, from 
which we have distanced ourselves, of a time when our body 
was not yet or no longer “ours,” when it slipped away or was 
wrested from us, when it could be moved around and hurt 
like a piece of furniture, a puppet, or an animal. The body 
is recognized, obstinately continuous, but alien and inco-
herent in itself. Such corporal visitations, to an aggregate 
over which (once back) we feel we have little control, afford 
us an unwanted reduction: they remind us not only of our 
physicality as the sine qua non of our thought, but also of 
the crude, non-negotiable neediness of this physical being, 
its abiding and unpredictable economy, the competition 
among its sites and their wants, and—above all—the strange 
tension of desire and necessity, resolved at certain points, in 
certain passions, but not in others. No, it is clear that this 
given shell, this carcass “as is,” remains stubbornly and only 
here and now. The body to which we wish to return, mean-
while, is the one that does not need us.
It is a struggle to be embodied to the degree required by 
our corporeality. The relief felt upon “leaving” the body 
in thought is passing (the only permanent relief being in 
death.) Our leash is too short, its overextension reawakens 
the sense of the fragmented body—torn by its competing 
needs, joint only by time’s passing; urgent attention, care 
too-long-delayed and perforce partial, answers a call in 
conflict with some still unattended call. On the other hand, 
uncompelled care of the body, whether on a regimen or on 
occasion, opens up before us the prospect of bodily uni-
fication and reconciliation. We may come to it with some 
reluctance, especially when (rare moments!) it does not just 
then demand anything outright, but we do so always with 
a vanity available at any age in which bodily wholeness is 
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present as an imaginary topos. Bodily sensations may be 
temporarily focused, spot-lit, admitting no other, as in the 
receipt of sexual pleasure, swimming, participation in a rally, 
awakening from a sound sleep, but the approach is holistic. 
These elusive states—zone, zen, alpha, whatever—never fail 
to bring to mind utopia in its simplest because bodily form.
§ Nihil obstat
The body is like vellum paper on which the mind drafts its 
ideal dwelling. It is inevitable that over time this surface 
tears in places repeatedly redesigned—the ideal corporal 
home for the soul was, after all, never anything more than 
unexecuted ideas and refinements. We should not confuse the 
power of actual Creation with that of mere Design, whose 
projects the Creator retains the right to ignore. Hasn’t the 
bodily support for our abstract schemes largely remained as 
created? The body’s alteration through concrete, hands-on 
refashioning is the only way for us to partake of the rights of 
the Creator.
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§ Carpe noctem
Catching myself in the act, without reflection, I release 
myself from all restraints. This is what is called trusting 
oneself. Without this apperception, this shock and bene-
diction, there is blindness and intuitive action but no trust. 
As though suddenly realizing a wild horse is carrying us 
through pitch blackness. Without trust, the rider is not fully 
a rider (in control) and the horse not fully a horse, more 
something shot out of a cannon or a catapult: lost in space, 
without coordinates, every breath potentially the last, every 
moment a possible arrest as this projectile strikes in its path 
something that is not necessarily the target of its obscure 
trajectory. With trust, however, rider and horse are one, and 
thus complete. We cling to the animal’s neck, as far as it will 
carry us, and the neck (like the fin of a dolphin) has the sta-
bility of a statue already mounted on a plinth. A conspirato-
rial whisper completes the effect: I’m with you no matter what.
§ Thick Skin
Solely by self-excoriation do we discover in ourselves the seed 
of other personalities. These are found on our social surface, 
just beneath the seal of our social bonds.
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§ Circulus donationis
You feel you may have been given too much praise? Then 
you have some humility left. But excessive thanks for excess 
praise—is that even possible? For some not: for them, thanks 
alone gives satisfaction, so there can be no such thing as 
excessive thanks in return for praise. For others, however, 
excess in gratitude is judged a possibility. But probably not in 
the way you imagine: not because they are so humble as to 
feel they don’t deserve so much thanks (which is for them a 
kind of praise). No, in quite another way.
Thanking for excessive praise unaccompanied by more or 
less equal praise in return—an exclusive focus on thanks, 
that is, no matter how genuine— could be taken as excessive. 
Because praise often carries a hope and even (less attrac-
tively) an expectation of reciprocity in praise—as gratitude 
does of reciprocated gratitude. Such praiseless thanks would 
disappoint—they would be in excess because inadequate, 
unbalanced, lopsided. Certainly this does not hold for all 
forms of giving. But it seems to hold for giving praise, on 
the grounds that it does not cost much, and that almost 
always—provided “neighbourly” relations—it can be given 
back, and enriches even the poor. It need not even be a wealth 
of praise, which can be scaled to its recipient’s humility. The 
only trouble is finding enough to really mean it. Praise not 
meant is a verbal gift silently taken back.
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§ Take It Back
A Polish Catholic familiar with Job’s “The Lord gave, and the 
Lord hath taken away” also knows that “Who gives and takes 
back will knock around in Hell.” This last has its English 
equivalent in a proverb popular in Shakespeare’s day: “Give 
a thing, and take a thing, to wear the Devil’s gold ring.” It 
shows the same association between taking back gifts and 
the Devil (before he was relieved by another redskin in the 
phrase “Indian giver”). 
By accepting both maxims as true, the Catholic of Polish 
extraction avows the validity of two sets of laws, of two 
codes for giving and un-giving, with starkly unlike conse-
quences. Has he then, in managing to hold them together, 
squared the circle of his faith? And could this mean that in 
the long run his God too is bound for Hell?
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§ Do Not Open
Some say our vision of Hell evokes none of the vivid torment 
it once did—that it has become abstract, if still fanciful. 
Indeed, we look up at Rodin’s bronze door with admiration 
and aesthetic detachment; we have eyes for its imposing 
size, its sculptural groups and details, its fidelity to Dante’s 
Inferno, and forgive the masterpiece its failure to evoke what 
we no longer carry in us. 
But one fine morning we pass within earshot of a vibrating 
plate compactor as it is dragged by a worker across a stretch 
of pavement—its effect so singularly penetrating, though 
neither especially harsh nor at all loud, that suddenly, with 
a shudder, the scales fall from our apostate eyes, and we are 
back before the Gates, this time grating heavily and forlornly 
to reveal Dantean scenes beyond. A glimpse is all we get as 
the gates slam shut. 
Our eschatological vision has grown passive and dull, and 
sometimes we feel we have seen all there is of Hell on earth, 
but all it takes is a new sound that shakes us to the very core 
to unlock a secret gateway to the old inferno.
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§ Why I Made Fun of Holy Water
Young people, improperly brought up, used to be drawn 
(and perhaps still are in many places) to a form of sacrilege 
whose chief aim, I have it on good authority, was to show off 
the courage of wit—not courage itself, the kind of serious 
virtue needed in the field, nor wit itself either, the kind that 
makes some the hubs of social circles, but a half-courage of 
half- wit—the best they can do at that stage of life. While 
this juvenile humour might strike us as daft and in the end 
predictable, we cannot but think fondly of the days when we 
ourselves could still thumb our nose at authority. Back then, 
we were our own gods, thought ourselves quasi-divine, and 
the thought of submitting to something so all-encompassing, 
all-commanding, mysterious, and archaic as one god for all 
and for all time made us uncomfortable. The weapons most 
accessible to us then were not arguments from the pens of 
philosophes or romantic poets, but practical jokes and pranks. 
We saw nothing wrong with this; our own personal gods, 
after all, constantly mocked one another.
§ God Question
If God couldn’t make up his mind whether or not to exist, we 
would make it up for him.
  matches:  a  light book 431
§ Comparing “Apples”
Recently my discussions of matters theological have taken 
on a new flavour. My Brazilian friend said to me: “As I was 
preparing a cupuaçu mousse for our dessert, I reflected 
upon the biblical account of Genesis as a typically European 
cosmological narrative. It is obvious that after creating Eve, 
God devoted himself to the task of creating cupuaçu, the real 
sinful fruit, to do her in. Apples can only be considered a sin-
ful fruit in a fruit-impoverished land. The European version 
lacks imagination.”
I replied: “You’re right, ‘apple’ was a later misconstrual, 
likely as not based on the Latin of the Vulgate. The original 
was some divine fruit without any seeds, sui generis. But in 
any taste competition for the conduit of forbidden knowledge, 
cupuaçu would be the clear winner. Someone should correct 
this.”
Although apples do look tastier (and I assume they did back 
then) . . . And wasn’t the seduction complete before the first 
bite? The incentive after all was not fruit juice, but mental 
juice. 
It is always like that: we are seduced by the appearance 
of something, not only to admire it but also to think it 
desirable. That is how we are first led to reach for it. If the 
forbidden fruit looked like cupuaçu—was cupuaçu—we 
might never have sinned. We would have missed something 
exquisite, but what a small price to pay, considering . . .
The question remains: who is responsible for the seduc-
tion? God, by making the fruit of knowledge attractive? Or 
Satan by giving lacklustre produce a high gloss? I’d like to 
think God planted something ugly, like cupuaçu; why would 
He tempt us? And that, once we had sinned, He would (deus 
deceptor! dieu trompeur!) want the flavour to deceive rather 
than outright disappoint us. This speaks against apples.
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§ Default Inheritance
As below the rock freshly pried from soil, so beneath the 
death mask of the last man worms will be hard at work. 
Could we stoop to hate the worm for one day inheriting the 
earth from us? Not if we also cheered it on to outlast us.
§ Disputed Inheritance





PA R A LI P OM ENA
§ The Cunning of Folly
Cleverness is a luxury and a sign of comfort. Enjoy it while 
you can, especially when it is earned. While you are at it, let 
others enjoy it with you. But never mistake it for wisdom, 
which comes from hardship only. When hardship comes, 
make the most of it. But do not seek out hardship to get at 
wisdom. Nowhere is it written that all men can be wise. You 
will be found out as a fool for second-guessing fate.
§ Running with It
Those of us intent on maintaining youthful momentum 
attain their final destination out of breath. That is very bad 
form. You may start out running, but never arrive running. 
Since you started on foot, however, do not allow yourself to 
finish any other way!
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§ Hikers and Runners
There is pleasure in hiking alone along a path of my choos-
ing—instead of running a marathon, which simply contin-
ues after I drop dead.
§ Crooked Timber
In a race against time, I saddled myself with a project. An 
old, warped piece of oak, the varnish crazed, alligatored, 
water-stained. My self-imposed task was not refinishing this 
dead bit of wood, much less planing to make it straight; it 
was determining what it was once a part of, and how it came 
to be this way.
§ Facing Out
[M]an was made to live facing outward.
—Cioran  *
You cannot write about faces, only read them. You cannot 
read faces, only look at them. Which statement is true? Or 
which is truer?
Try as you might to write about faces and you will not be 
able, in the end, to arrive at more than a handful of banal 
generalizations. You might as well be writing about marriage 
or dogs. Faces exposed, faces perceived and recognized, sincerity 
concentrated in faces—for isn’t it that we face others (or are 
* Cioran, Trouble with Being Born, 32.
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unable to face them), or tell them to their face what we think 
of them? Faces as meeting places of most sensory apparatuses: 
eyes, tongues, noses, ears . . . Faces as a typically human trait; 
animals not graced with them but with other, cruder physiogno-
mies . . . Dead, slackening faces, efforts to cover up deathly pallor 
and “set the features” . . . And then this: faces mask the unpre-
dictability of a person. They are relatively constant in their 
features and even expression, giving the often false impres-
sion of the constancy of their bearers. Even faces in constant 
motion, so-called “expressive,” are read as pageantry, mere 
surface disturbance, betraying if anything a steady and 
simple soul. Faces are the “mirrors” of the soul, as the eyes 
are its “windows”: black or tarnished mirrors, dirty or broken 
windows.
And my own face? I would like to read in it my own inten-
tions, but rarely do I turn to it for help in divining them. 
What use, then, is my face to me? My attentions suggest it 
is of much use: it communicates, it’s something to address 
when making self-demands or -pleas. My face is what others 
see; shall I make it presentable? When in another’s face, does 
it change like some bunraku demon-puppet I never myself 
manage to see?
And should it become intimate with another, even then 
my face remains closest and most familiar to me (as much 
as a face can ever be close and familiar). It is my “selfie,” it 
expresses “me.” The faces of others appear to express them— 
their pleasure or displeasure, puzzlement or ease—but how 
often does the inner mood really come through? As we age, 
we learn not only dissemblance (“control”) but suspicion too. 
The only mugs we trust, clouding over and brightening to 
the soul’s weather without fail, are those of children. Before 
learning facial control, they like to hide themselves, and 
then their faces, which for a long time thereafter serve as the 
handiest stuff of hilarity and a sandbox for stylizing identity. 
This transparency of children is a source of wonder, any new 
parent will tell you.
Then comes the public regulation of expression: when it 
is proper to cry or to smile, and what it means, and what it 
does. In the facial code of conduct we have a powerful social 
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filter. Even in private, before a vanity, others are looking over 
our shoulder, watching us. 
For every “defaced” person—losing composure, losing 
face—there are as many “depersonized” faces—seem-
ingly ownerless, suspended in the air like waxen masks. It 
is such faces that best conceal human mystery (of which 
the unmasked, faceless person is the most disappointing 
revelation). The depersonized ones do not blend in anywhere, 
sticking out for no other reason. Meanwhile, the rare facial 
chameleon goes about unnoticed (as does their remarkable 
talent).
The sea of faces marking the square, the street, the web: 
all teeth, all mouth, all eyes—what they say is: we are here 
to be seen but have no hope of being recognized. Even to 
notice any one of them, one is forced to focus, to choose, to 
suppress all the rest. 
To get away from those faces, to get away from the face . . . 
We spend so much of time facing others we can efface 
none save our own. These other faces are strange because 
changeable— and nowhere as strange as when flipped upside 
down. Our own face is strange as well in photographic 
reverse. The first face we saw must have seemed especially 
strange, and could be never became familiar. Perhaps this 
explains the perpetual strangeness of the face-to-face for me.
As we attend to our own face in self-portraits, and like 
what we see, we judge ourselves good and think ourselves 
happy. And if we see only facial flaws, then not as character 
flaws; we can dislike our own faces without judging our-
selves, their wearers.
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§ Portraits
A likeness is to otherness as a guest is to a stranger—a 
temporary erasure of unfamiliarity. Unless that likeness is of 
ourselves, or of one we know well, and the guest is someone 
close to us. Then the sight of the representation, as well as 
the formality of hosting, has the opposite effect—a tempo-
rary erasure of familiarity.
§ Browbeaten
Thought makes an unlikely protagonist, but our protago-
nist is precisely thought. And why should it not be? Was it 
not thought that conceived of this story and made itself the 
principal? Indeed, the story was devised as a reply to “Dead 
and Going to Die,” an essay by Michael Sacasas, reflecting on 
a series of portraits taken of young Lewis Thornton Powell 
aboard the USS Saugus by Alexander Gardner in 1865, where 
Powell was awaiting trial by military tribunal for his part in 
the Lincoln assassination conspiracy, for which he would be 
hanged a couple of months later:
According to Powell’s biographer, Betty [ J.] Ownsbey, Powell 
resisted having his picture taken by vigorously shaking his 
head when Gardner prepared to take a photograph. Given 
the exposure time, this would have blurred his face beyond 
recognition. Annoyed by Powell’s antics, H. H. Wells, the 
officer in charge of the photo shoot, struck Powell’s arm with 
the side of his sword. . . . Powell then seems to have resigned 
himself to being photographed, and Gardner proceeded to 
take several shots of Powell. Gardner must have realized that 
he had something unique in these exposures because he went 
on to copyright six images of Powell. He didn’t bother to do 
so with any of the other pictures he took of the conspirators. 
Historian James Swanson explains: “[Gardner’s] images of 
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the other conspirators are routine portraits bound by the 
conventions of 19th century photography. In his images of 
Powell, however, Gardner achieved something more. In one 
startling and powerful view, Powell leans back against a gun 
turret, relaxes his body, and gazes languidly at the viewer. 
There is a directness and modernity in Gardner’s Powell 
suite unseen in the other photographs.” My intuition was 
re-affirmed, but the question remained: What accounted for 
the modernity of these photographs?
. . .
Powell could not avoid the gaze of the camera, but he 
could practice a studied indifference to it. In order to resist 
the gaze, he would carry on as if there were no gaze. To 
ward off the objectifying power of the camera, he had to play 
himself before the camera. Simply being himself was out 
of the question; the observer effect created by the camera’s 
presence so heightened one’s self-consciousness that it was 
no longer possible to simply be. Simply being assumed self- 
 forgetfulness. The camera does not allow us to forget our-
selves. In fact, as with all technologies of self-documentation, 
it heightens self-consciousness. In order to appear indifferent 
to the camera, Powell had to perform the part of Lewis 
Powell as Lewis Powell would appear were there no camera 
present. In doing so, Powell stumbled upon the negotiated 
settlement with the gaze of the camera that eluded his con-
temporaries. He was a pioneer of subjectivity.
Before the camera, many of his contemporaries either 
stared blankly, giving the impression of total vacuity, or 
else they played a role—the role of the brave soldier, or 
the statesman, or the lover, etc. . . . Playing a role entails a 
deliberate putting on of certain affectations; playing yourself 
suggests that there is nothing to the self but affectations. 
The anchor of identity in self-forgetfulness is lifted and the 
self is set adrift. Perhaps the violence that Powell had wit-
nessed and perpetrated prepared him for this work against 
his psyche.
If indeed this was Powell’s mode of resistance, it was Pyr-
rhic: Ultimately it entailed an even more profound surrender 
of subjectivity. It internalized the objectification of the self 
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that the external presence of the camera elicited. This is 
what gave Powell’s photographs their eerie modernity. They 
were haunted by the future, not the past. It wasn’t Powell’s 
imminent death that made them uncanny; it was the 
glimpse of our own fractured subjectivity. Powell’s strug-
gle before the camera, then, becomes a parable of humanness 
in the age of pervasive documentation. We have learned to 
play ourselves with ease, and not only before the camera. 
The camera is now irrelevant.  *
Enjoying my role of spectator to the drama of Mr. Sacasas’s 
curiosity, a piece filled with insightful speculations at every 
turn building boldly to the above climax, I arrived dazzled 
before his much anticipated final revelation—but just then 
a most charming urchin, whom I had mechanically waved 
aside, grabbed me by the sleeve and pulled me away. The 
interruption was certainly no coup de théâtre, seeming 
unscripted, without foreshadowing—and being very likely 
my own production, for the moment set off-stage, mounted 
somewhere in the wings. For its part, Sacasas’ grand finale 
stuck around only as long as one approached it without 
intermission, and had already begun to withdraw from the 
imaginary, docile reader it had expected, eager to follow it 
anywhere for the bliss of a mystery explained quickly. The 
persuasiveness of Sacasas’s conclusion depended on this; any 
undue, scrutinous delay would trip it up. Even had I extri-
cated myself from the iron grip of the snotty youngster (in 
whom I now recognized my own incredulity), I would still 
have not caught up with Sacasas; my brief hesitation left me 
to my own interpretive devices.
Sacasas contends that it is Powell’s playing himself—and 
not a role, a stereotype, for which the photo op typically 
called—that renders the 1865 suite of photographs so uncan-
nily modern. At this my urchin stomped his feet and shook 
his head: “Poppycock! It’s the hint of tension in his face, 
* Michael Sacasas, “Dead and Going to Die,” New Inquiry, Oct. 21, 2013,  
http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/dead-and-going-to-die (emphases mine).
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never mind its cause, that makes for these images’ modernity. 
His frown and nothing more. The simple, homespun sweater 
doesn’t hurt, it’s pretty timeless. The clean exposure of his 
young neck sure brings the ‘victim’ close to you, who fancy 
yourselves his ‘victims’ too. Admit it makes you wanna neck 
him! So your arousal makes him modern? Now that’s a good 
one!” Uncouth though he was, there may have been some-
thing to his talk. He looked crestfallen when I let him know 
I didn’t buy it.
My lad has since cleaned up his act and learned to stand his 
ground: “Powell strikes us as ‘modern’ not for having ‘surren-
dered his subjectivity’ or ‘pioneered’ the modern ‘fractured 
subjectivity’ with which we readily identify today. Sacasas 
has it exactly backwards. Powell makes a point of looking 
inwards, steely- eyed, of retreating into himself. He is osten-
tatiously indifferent to his shabby good looks. Outwardness, 
affectation—that is the fate of the couple in the photograph 
Sacasas includes by way of contrast. The man and woman, 
stiff- backed, seated, play the roles assumed by them in society. 
Concerned with appearing decent, conforming to custom, 
they are not anchored in any selves I can make out.
“Powell, meanwhile, refuses to submit, to strike the con-
vict’s pose, to play the role the camera seems to expect and 
want to elicit. Instead, he becomes intent on individuality. 
In the wake of his crime, the radical acts for which he will 
soon pay dearly, he concentrates himself, drops anchor in his 
brief and unembarrassed life to get clear on what he stands 
for, what he really is, freely and through- and- through, only 
to keep it all to himself. You want to document the would-be 
assassin? There he sits, resigned to being watched, aware of 
being the object of curiosity. Put on the defensive by the pry-
ing eye of the photographer, forced to play along, he eludes 
his objectification.
“Owing to the serial character of the exposures, we can 
see a striking range in Powell’s posture, relaxed despite the 
obvious constraints of his manacles and the session itself. A 
moving suite; the motivation in his breast is almost pal-
pable. Each of the shots seems to have captured a fleeting 
instant, compared to the longer durations registered on most 
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other legible images from the period. Powell’s tense facial 
expression (his furrowed brow) contributes most to this 
impression. Up to that point, a combination of technology 
and custom made ‘the moment’ as unavailable to practi-
tioners as Cartier-Bresson’s moment décisif would later be for 
his contemporaries. The protocol in photo-portraiture was 
to dress up according to your station and hold a stock pose 
aided by furniture, props, and braces. All this to suspend 
your temporary cares, transcend the accidental, eliminate 
any momentary tension—resulting in a ‘natural,’ general you, 
rather than someone focused and caught up in the moment 
(whom you would later find silly or unrecognizable). Even the 
comparatively spontaneous tableaux vivants seemed dead— 
as late as 1882, the trio Nietzsche, Lou Salome and Paul Rée 
would still appear wooden, weighed down by the photo-
graphic studio system.
“It took a ‘location’ and an uncooperative subject-object 
like Powell, with an expression instantly recognized as 
ephemeral, to break this convention of photo-portraiture 
and showcase the modernity of the medium: its capacity to 
capture the moment. The added attraction of each photo-
graph, reinforced by its place in a tight sequence, was its sei-
zure of an instant of an individual defying its grasp. We still 
fancy ourselves such individuals, attached to having clear 
identities that cannot be summarily extracted from us.”
Who had it right, the better angel of my incredulity or Saca-
sas, whom I had previously given the benefit of a doubt? The 
stakes were high enough: Subjectivity and Agency in Moder-
nity. Gainsaying a view well-expressed, my urchin made a 
case for Powell as a self-conscious displayer of the powers and 
limits of technology—photography being a means of drawing 
out Powell’s uniqueness without, however, the ability to fix 
it. This interplay between subjects and the cameras pointed 
at them gives rise to a desire to have ourselves caught on film 
more and more frequently, in ever diminishing intervals. 
Instead of simply reflecting our modern subjective fragmen-
tation, photography in the first place brings out in us that Self 
that it at once is powerless to capture.
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§ Life of Zilch
In the college of the future, every student should be required 
to write at least one biography of a deceased nobody.
§ Spilling Your Beans
Those in the public eye who can’t help themselves from spill-
ing their own beans, tempted by public interest, are to be pit-
ied. The public will decide how their life is told. Not only will 
they have to live with this tale, but their own interpretation of 
it will carry little if any weight—not merely because they have 
given away author’s rights, but because their judgment was 
put into question by what and how much they had divulged.
§ Making up Lives
All our work is autobiographical, not merely conditioned by 
our living. Autobiographical not just in the pedestrian sense 
that we make the work (and everything contained in it) part 
of our life, by the mere fact of engaging in it. My biogra-
pher might write, based on my work: he was interested in X 
because he had experienced something like, or something 
of, X. But equally: he wanted to make something of X, for its 
own sake, or to make X a part of himself. Such speculation 
is not always flattering to its object. There is a measure of 
relevance for each strand in our work, not all of which is 
material for a biography—for the simple reason that, except 
in the authorized cases, the metric of relevance is missing. A 
good biographer recognizes this and leaves uncombed what a 
bad one would style.
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§ Literary Effects
Writers who have been through a lot as writers, who have 
to their name not only their books but also the scars and 
scrapes, regrets and disappointments left from their expo-
sure to the public (which even in our civilized, squeamish, 
herbivorous age thirsts for blood), have generally little fear 
of their executors. “There isn’t a branch or a thorn, / That 
didn’t catch him going by, / Leaving his clothes tattered and 
torn,”  * concludes the upbeat testament of literary vagabond 
Villon, who summons his executors to his deathbed.
This bruised condition, this difficult past, is an advantage 
over those who passed through professional life unscathed. 
A healthy relationship between executor and writer (whose 
neck remains, for a while at least, on the line) is built upon 
the latter’s trust and forgiveness, which come easier after 
years of public abuse. The executor acts only as the arm of 
literary law: his dead client’s estate must be protected from 
the public. Those who received more than a fair share of 
acclaim do not quite grasp this, thinking such executions 
especially cruel and unjust.
* François Villon, The Testament by Francois Villon with Facing Notes: Metric  
Translation with Altered Rhyme Scheme, trans. Stephen Eridan (2004),  
http://www.inmanartz.com/villon&notes.pdf.
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§ Working with Dreams
The dream resists being turned into narrative. It is made of 
different stuff, exceedingly fine and ethereal. This is obvi-
ous not only when you try to recall one, record it, but when 
you attempt to work with it. It is very hard to work with a 
dream—unless you take it as it was, rough and wild, without 
reworking it. It is not the dream that must adjust itself to 
your story, but the story to your dream, if its dreaminess is to 
be left intact. It is with dreams as with fragments of meteors 
fallen to Earth. One thinks, quite wrongly, that just because 
they have landed they are up for grabs and can be fashioned 
at will. The Rolex Daytona Meteorite looks like an ordinary 
watch. Its space-rock face might have raised the price of cool, 
but will never raise us to the stars.
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§ Fast Asleep
It is a rare author who can pull off taking narratives from 
dreams, a rare author who can draw on them for material 
without giving himself away. The reasons for this are as mys-
terious as they come. But let us venture three guesses. 
In dreams we are not ourselves, not in control of imagina-
tion. Tied to their strange origin is the sense that they belong 
at once to no one and to everyone. Around the dream-story, 
the story based closely on a dream, hang the guilt and suspi-
cion of stolen goods. Taking from dreams means dodging the 
labour we still associate with true, honest creation, and can 
be a source of shame. Copying them carries the faint stigma 
of plagiarism, and can cast doubt on one’s creative powers. 
To play it safe, to avoid cheating, dreams are often flagged, or 
otherwise identified.
Yet the more important reason why dreams do not make 
credible stories has to do with their content and struc-
ture— dead giveaways. Transferred to the page or on film 
they are obviously, surreally unserious, compromising even 
comedy. Only those who undergo psychoanalysis boast 
dreams serious and creative enough to be worth preserving 
artistically (they have earned ownership of their dreams, and 
even indirectly paid for it). 
But we know better anyway: that dreams are a democratic 
republic where all can partake in the genius of invention; 
that virtually everyone, no matter how long they have left 
to sleep, spends a great deal of time there, has full rights as 
a citizen. Smugglers might not be prosecuted, but will be 
found out. Dreams resist being passed off as products of real 
inspiration; just look at how clumsy and ponderous they 
seem. Duty taxes, my dear, borders, customs—but, beyond 
that, be on your merry way! 
It is, one suspects, only the false, asocial conviction that 
we experience more or less the same reality but live in incom-
mensurate dreamlands that stands in the way of republican 
relations—and waking-life relations with dreams as dreams. 
Were the literary reticence systematically reversed, removing 
the reality pretense and stigmata of shame, we would see 
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how much more we share when we sleep. I do not mean the 
local colour, familiar faces, languages, and customs that, as 
in the waking world, remain specific to each, but the broad 
strokes of humanity that transcend them. How much in 
common we have when we are least social: the continuity of 
our powers, desires, and needs—none of which we need to 
censor, when we can blame them on the dreaming strangers 
in our lonely beds.
§ Dug Up
He speaks underground. Only people who dig equally deep 
can hear him.
—Kraus on Lichtenberg  *
The author of Roger Kimball’s 2002 review of Lichtenberg’s 
Waste Books lives in the Age of Plagiarism. Translator R. J. 
Hollingdale’s introduction to the same is repeatedly invoked, 
but not as the template for the entire review, which it effec-
tively became. To acknowledge this would have been to pre-
empt the charge of plagiarism—something that Nietzsche, 
living in a different age, was not obliged to do when writing 
his Genealogy of Morals (1887), so well summarized in Licht-
enberg’s “Notebook G,” §21 (dated sometime between 1779 
and 1783). It is regrettable that the review’s author did not 
better take into account that he lives in our day, rather than 
Nietzsche’s.
* Kraus, Dicta and Contradicta, 90.
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§ Law of Transformation
Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match for 
three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were equal to 100 French-
men; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 Mamelukes, 
and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 Mamelukes.
—Napoleon’s martial calculations  *
The dialectical law of transformation of quantity into quality 
is now applied to books. The more one writes of them, the 
more this affects their quality. Individually they will get 
worse, or stay the same at best. But marshalled, they’re a 
force to be reckoned with!
§ Quantity over Quality
Something is rotten in the State of Letters if the chief motive 
for continuing to write is to match one’s rival book for book.
§ Taking In, Letting Go
“The more the mind takes in the more it expands.”  † Until, at 
some point, it exceeds capacity, tips and pours itself into a 
book. Once relieved, it is known to fill again, capsize, and 
return upright. With each iteration, the mechanism improves.
* Frederick Engels, “Anti-Dühring” (1877), in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 
Collected Works, vol. 25, Engels: Anti-Dühring, Dialectics of Nature (New York: 
International Publishers, 1987), 119.
† Seneca, Letters from a Stoic (Epistulae morales ad Lucilium), trans. Robin Campbell 
(London: Penguin, 1969), letter 108, p. 201.
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§ What Are the Chances?
A Writing and publishing books is more and more like put-
ting messages into bottles, don’t you think?
B Yes. Even when books become shorter, briefer, to have a 
greater chance of being read— even then . . .
A . . . even then, with self-publishing taking off, there shall 
soon be islands of them, islands of drifting plastic bottles 
with soggy messages. They’ll have been released into 
a saturated sea, where they will only ever find . . . one 
another. No one will read them when they wash up! 
Still, some messages in bottles, if they are found, do 
become proper books . . .
B How so?
A Why, by being read of course!
B Reading . . .Wasn’t that more common when there were 
fewer? But you have a point: when books have travelled 
far to reach us they have “a story to tell.” We might fish 
them out of the water for no other reason than that. 
These success stories (even if they don’t tell stories of 
success) give our desperate, lonely writers reason for hope. 
And why shouldn’t fortune smile on them as well? 
A Should we encourage this hope?
B Hope should always be encouraged. It is futility we should 
be worried about!
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§ Unbound . . .
. . . Unprinted, Unpromoted, Uncatalogued, Unsolicited, 
Unsold, Untitled, Unwritten, Un—
§ Out of Print
The backlist will see the light of day again when, like flesh in 
a meat grinder, it is fed through social media and comes out 
line by line. This will give it the requisite raw appearance.
§ “A Book”? 
More than the recent tomes on the history of the novel, pub-
lishers’ insistence on the subtitle “A NOVEL” suggests these 
are that genre’s waning days. But the “book” has ahead of it a 
bright future; its use as a label is still some time off.
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§ Moratorium III
B A moratorium on new books? And you hope this will dam 
the flow of writing? When it is lifted, more will gush out 
again. 
Why not learn to swim in it now? We need books to 
buoy and guide us before we can hope to navigate the 
streams, or swim upstream, or find our way out of the 
mainstream.
A Are you kidding me? The current is too strong to resist, to 
be anything but swept away by it.
And do we really need so much text? I don’t deny that 
people want to write, but do they need to? Is that where 
their energy ought to be directed? Isn’t there something 
better, more useful they could do? Most of the stuff isn’t 
even any good. 
Why not turn grey literature black or white: bad 
enough not to be published, or good enough to be? The 
river into which you want to step to swim is white . . .
B . . . If you swim with that pure current, as fast as it, you 
will always be the same. But if you only dip into it, it will 
seem different each time, refreshing and inspiring. That’s 
why we need books. Books are like houses and hamlets 
along this grey river. They are places to spend the night.
A Bah, who can keep up with that river? It keeps passing 
us on every side, and we cannot resist it, we can only be 
carried by it—you call this swimming!? The book, as long 
as it exists, will only interfere with our brief and drip-
ping existence. We grab hold of a book and right away 
we start to sink. We are sure to drown. We need fewer 
books—fewer riverine colonies—and more houseboats, 
floating text to live in. Then we will all feel at home in 
the river, instead of clinging to those dry and cultivated 
bits of land. But if we fill our pockets with stones, we 
will soon be found floating belly up, refuse amid the 
traffic, until some lonely old chap, who spends his last 
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days watching the river flow by, his eyesight failing, spots 
us, and, moved to pity, sees to our proper burial far from 
home.
B What an image. You have convinced me of a tension, and 
that it is a difficult choice between reading books and 
immersing yourself in the life of the river. Why not give 
up books? You don’t seem to share my view that we need 
them to find our way.
A You’re right. I don’t share it. As long as there are books, 
I will not give them up —but the future of judgment 
depends on us doing so. I am certain of it! We must wean 
ourselves off books! Slowly but surely. Nothing good ever 
came of preserving authors in paper mausoleums. We 
must chop them up and distribute them, like the relics 
of saints. We must link them without imprisoning them. 
And those who take forever to make an argument, and 
can’t stand being “chopped up”? Do we need them now?
B I suppose not. But we can’t develop our judgment reading 
only fragments— even fragments of former books—how-
ever clever or wise! We still need arguments! And they 
take at least as much attention and patience to take in as 
they did to make. When thoughts flow well, uninterrupted 
and sustained, they lend the river you speak of coherence.
A More often than not they get in the way: they exclude 
other voices and hoard attention. We need to resist 
imposing the structures of books on this grey matter! 
We don’t need to learn from books how to stay afloat in 
this great river; for many that comes naturally. A book 
only pulls us down to the slimy bottom. They say young 
people take to it is like fish to water. They have learned 
to swim. It irks me when I see these capable swimmers 
judged by the old standards and submit to them. Rest 
assured, we will be judged in our turn.
B We already are—by you!
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A I’m not one to judge—I’m complicit. But I know it’s not 
even on swimming that the new judgment depends; it is 
on flowing so fast that the river itself seems to slow. That’s 
what judgment depended on in the golden age of books: it 
survived by keeping ahead of them, more multiple, man-
ifold, and fluid than they were. There were fewer books, 
and even when published speedily their distribution 
mercifully lagged. Then things changed, and thinking 
grew frustrated with constantly falling behind reading, 
and reading became inattentive, driven by catching up, 
and no one, not even those who read for a living, could 
really keep abreast of new releases. This is all the more 
true today, I’m afraid. Except that books now are not, as 
previously, distillations of reflection, but spaces where we 
do our thinking—  on the page. Yet they have fallen again 
out of sync with the pace of change and take too long to 
publish. And when they are finally out they announce 
their presence with come-hither titles to get noticed; 
meanwhile, people have moved on; how much are they 
really going to engage with what is no longer current? 
And these books responding to a moment (already passed), 
how much of their argument is the fruit of long gesta-
tion? Very little; one book rushes another, impatiently 
awaiting completion. Books come too late yet demand 
instant attention, and fall over themselves to peddle their 
musty thoughts, even ones aired to the public a thousand 
times before. That way they devalue everything that is 
not a book. They often start out bookish, trying to live up 
to the book’s cultural standing, and for that very reason 
are never quite credible in the flow. We need fewer river-
side distractions, fewer fixations, fewer fixed abodes!
B I see what you mean: you’d like the pioneers not to look 
back, to make up their minds, to go with the flow. . .
A The book (would that it was just one!) holds everyone 
back. It’s time to get over it, time to turn the page.
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§ Before You Put Pen to Paper
Which would you rather be: the paper weighed down by 
words unworthy of it, or the paperweight keeping them in 
place?
§ Lapidary
A lapidary expression is at once beautiful and poignant. 
Its effect does not stop at this first impression. It is in the 
nature of the lapidary’s art, which the aphorist admires, that 
it takes in and works materials more diverse, less precious 
and thus more useful than the diamond, the sole specialty 
of a diamond-cutter. Thought, like art, cannot advance in 
monomania. The destiny of the diamond is to be stolen and 
handled in gloves. The destiny of the stone is to be used and 
worn.
§ An Aphorism
An aphorism means to be unwrapped as a gift, not admired 
in a jeweler’s case. To read one is to subject it to a test of 
reasoning, imagination, and judgment—to work your way 
through the layers of tissue nestling it as through the steps 
of its mounting, polishing, and cleaving, to the rough shape 
in which it was first found. Studying the work of the maxim 
cutter, you apprentice in the art of criticism.
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§ “Uncombed Thoughts”
Under the comb the tangle and the straight path are the 
same.
—Heraclitus  *
It would indeed be strange if aphorisms, so often dispensing 
their insights through analogy, did not also invite analogies 
when it came to themselves. It could be that the aphorism’s 
affinity for rough self-comparisons is its compromise with 
anti-intellectualism. In drawing comparisons between 
themselves and products of skilled manual work or other 
concrete, recognizable things—“stock cubes,” “saltpits,” 
“nuts,” “bullets,” “assholes,” “hand grenades,” “someone else’s 
lost earnings,” “pet monkeys,” “bananas,” “short cuts,” “wan-
dering Gypsies,” “parachutes,” “ripe fruit,” “shacks,” “gongs,” 
“hedgehogs,” “origami,” “splinters,” “dribble,” “raisins,” “sum-
mits,” “sweepings” and “vaccines”—they puff themselves up 
to greater general utility than they can in fact claim. At least 
on first impression, before their real transmutation unfolds 
before us like a fragrant rose at dusk—all nature, no fabrica-
tion—we do not mind these unwashed half-thoughts. They 
speak to us, after all; ergo, we ourselves could have spoken 
them!
* Heraclitus, Fragments, p. 33, sec. 50.
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§ Held to Account
Aphorisms are rogue ideas. Aphorism is aristocratic thinking: 
this is all the aristocrat is willing to tell you; he thinks you 
should get it fast, without spelling out all the details. . . . An 
aphorism is not an argument; it is too well-bred for that. To 
write aphorisms is to assume a mask— a mask of scorn, of 
superiority. Which, in one great tradition, conceals (shapes) 
the aphorist’s secret pursuit of spiritual salvation. The para-
doxes of salvation. We know at the end, when the aphorist’s 
amoral, light point-of-view self-destructs.
—Susan Sontag  *
It is easy to see the point about aphorisms not needing proof. 
I suppose what made this feature, or aspiration, of aphorisms 
crystal clear to me was Fritz Raddatz’s “final farewell” to 
Emil Cioran: only later, through the reading of Cioran’s early 
semi-aphorisms, whose metamorphosis into maxims was 
incomplete, did Raddatz realize that the later aphorisms he 
once enjoyed and excused, by chalking up their apodiction 
to provocation, irony, or wit, were in fact deeply problematic 
and criticizable.
For my part, I cannot help subjecting aphorisms to the 
test of reasoning. If I take them prima facie, they are sitting 
ducks. Unless, of course, they wear their jokiness on their 
sleeve (“Thank God for Satan”  †). It is rare that one “speaks” 
to me, its truth cutting through my skepticism. More often, I 
am drawn in only to deduce their occasion and formation, as 
I am curious to trace a trickle of water to its source, or at the 
very least its outlet. And once I have gotten that far—broken 
down the process, gone back to the bedrock—I proceed to 
argue with process and bedrock. I take issue with effaced 
judgments—with everything, as a matter of fact, that had 
gone into this brilliant truth but was sanded off along the 
* Susan Sontag, As Consciousness Is Harnessed to Flesh: Journals and Notebooks, 
1964–1980 (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2012), 512 (entry from Apr. 26, 
1980).
† Lec, Myśli nieuczesane, 451.
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way. I reject the aphorist’s having it both ways: aesthetically 
and propositionally; when I look at one side I am blind to 
the other—my preference being, again, for some quantum 
of verity, acting as breakwater to the sublimity and beauty of 
the composition.
To illustrate: “A high level and depth are very different 
things” (275). What is here to argue with? Was the author 
aiming to communicate a banal truth, a counter to Heracli-
tus perhaps? We judge this unlikely, even if we hold on to a 
possible allusion. Between the lines, here individual words, 
we pick up on what was likely meant: different senses of 
cultural attainment. And as soon as we pry, they become 
questionable. 
“Could I not just say everything simply? I could, but no one 
would pay for it” (363). Now this is more like it—were it not 
for the fact that it no longer rings true.
Or: “The great receive instruction, the little people are 
taught a lesson” (42). How can you argue with that? You 
perhaps cannot. But to us the aphorism is a sign of deca-
dence, and its authors, as Sontag says, deep down defenders 
of privilege. And so we think it insufficient to marvel at it. 
We would go so far as to assume there is not enough in it to 
marvel at: looked over once or twice, it loses its lustre and 
appears laboured, or else ornamental and tawdry. With the 
loupe as our default approach, a strong feeling can only be 
one of pleasant surprise. If we find a gem, we stuff it in our 
pocket. It “belongs” to us now, and thus to everyone.
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§ Juggling
 
How can aphorisms change your life? Find out when James 
Geary brings his Juggling Aphorisms show . . . a mix of mem-
oir, literary history, audience participation— and live jug-
gling, with words and balls. Audience members are invited to 
randomly pick an aphorism from a globe and read it aloud; 
Geary then tells about that aphorism and the person who 
wrote it, weaving in personal and historical anecdote. There 
are also several blank strips of paper in the globe. If an audi-
ence member draws one of these, they can name any theme 
and Geary must cite a related aphorism on the spot. If he 
fails, they get a free copy of the book!
—uncredited  *
Q. Which book? 
A. Why, James Geary’s very own The World in a Phrase: 
A Brief History of the Aphorism (2005). (So much for 
brevity . . . )
Q. Does Mr. Geary never compose aphorisms at the audi-
ence’s bidding? 
A. Of course not. His is a memory unusually well stocked 
with the thoughts of others. 
Q. He does say “cite,” though, not “recite.”
A. Well spotted! The description is tricky—like juggling . . . 
I suspect what he performs is closer to reading.
* “James Geary’s Five Laws of the Aphorism,” Dailymotion, Dec. 12, 2006,  
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xvnucn_james-geary-s-five-laws-of- 
the-aphorism_news.
460 s . d.  chrostowska
Q. And the juggling? Surely much skill is needed to keep in 
the air the different “balls”? 
A. I have seen the show and can vouch for its clumsiness: 
the delivery of bios, the citation of dicta, the crude 
cross-cultural cross-historical comparisons (Chamfort 
was Warhol, he even says). And picking “worlds” (a propri-
etary metaphor for aphorisms) out of a globe—you can’t 
imagine what fun that was! Geriatric entertainment in its 
purest form!
I aim to insult only those persons of any age who 
cannot keep a thought straight in their head because all 
their lives (however long or short) they would rather see it 
done for them, for their amusement. And the whole thing 
about how “Aphorisms Can Change Your Life”—let’s call 
it artisanal baloney. As “Chamfort” might say, “Art is what 
you can get away with.”  * And in Geary-land you can get 
away with a lot.
§ More Is Less?
Everything very good has always been brief and scarce; 
abundance is discreditable. Even among people, giants are 
usually the true dwarves. Some value books for their sheer 
size, as if they were written to exercise our arms not our wits.
—Baltasar Gracián  †
The writer can take this wisdom to heart by giving himself 
little space (even less than he has!). Every great aphorist is 
distinguished by the persuasiveness of his exaggerations. 
Brevity has the obvious advantage of excusing lapses of 
* Actually, this is likely Andy Warhol (or pseudo-Warhol).
† Gracián, Pocket Oracle, p. 12, sec. 27.
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judgment, to which he seems especially prone. He may write 
something one-sided and obtuse and call it deliberate provo-
cation, or claim public service credit for exposing a noxious 
cliché to ridicule. Or he may shrug and distance himself 
from his ideas: “If you don’t like these, I’ve plenty of others.” 
And he can always fall back on his craft, since hyperbole, 
though hit-and-miss in its power to persuade, has the advan-
tage of being more striking. 
This might help explain why aphorists are fond of puns 
and reversals of memorable exaggerations. In another’s 
one-sided view they see their opportunity for subversion, 
sometimes even broad appeal. Bakunin is not remembered 
as an aphorist, yet his atheistic reversal of Voltaire was just 
such a predatory act. Things stood no differently with God’s 
oft-quoted reversal of Nietzsche, a boost to His waning 
popularity. The same simple operation could be detected in 
many great aphorisms, their authors having merely taken 
a contrary side. The facility with which reversals are han-
dled, attached to the pleasure of playing with form, puts 
us in mind of the genesis of insight: the relish, namely, of 
contradiction.
Now for our inversion of Gracián above:
Every good thing has always taken time and was naturally 
plentiful; abundance is estimable. Even among people, 
dwarves are the real dwarves (sorry!) and giants, ever giants. 
Some value books for their epitaphic concision, as if to spare 
them every fatigue.
§ Chain Reaction
As the authors of Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel 
and Fire of Thinking make clear, aphorisms, those “fires 
without flames,” burn so brightly on account of their fancy 
for analogies. The briefer they are, the better their fuel is 
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ventilated, the more inspired the thoughts they in turn set 
alight.
§ Culture Vultures
“Aphorizing is a harmless art. There are others we should be 
more concerned about.”
§ Culture Vultures
“The popular novel is not a dead art. There are others more 
deserving of our attention.”
§ Hypocritics
Shoddiness, vested interests, and unembarrassed amateur-
ism have trumped pretenses to knowledge, artistic sensibility, 
and judgment of taste. Move over, hypocrites! Make room for 
hypocritics!
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§ A Common Cause
[T ]ime seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream, 
which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up, 
and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.
—Bacon  *
As the profession of book criticism wanes, popular critics will 
mime the pollice verso of the gladiatorial arena. They may not 
want such power, but the public will expect it: book choice 
made simple and risk-free. In such a climate, where authors 
vie shamelessly for attention from those still in the review- 
ing business who, as pay for their work shrinks, have no more 
reason to curb their own literary ambition and are compelled 
to practice criticism chiefly out of self-interest— 
at such a time, reviews of threateningly good work will be 
grudging at best, at worst suffused with resentment.
The clearest indicator of the shift to negative-spectrum 
criticism will be inconsistency in individual opinion. While 
the dedicated, undistracted critic builds a reputation for 
reliability in judgment, the critic of the future, working and 
writing in a strangled environment, practices on the side, at 
variance with their writerly self—which they put first. When 
one peers into this imminent future, the corrosive effects of 
the critical spleen on the striving writer within seem obvi-
ous; a dark sketch on one side of already thin paper will show 
through on the other. The joy of writing requires that they 
make common cause.
That is why I would not dream of being a critic today. In my 
commitment to writing, I am convinced I serve the com-
mon cause of writers and critics. It is bad enough that as a 
writer I believe in the superiority of contemporary judgment, 
which never fails to recognize merit in the new. Only with 
repeated disappointment (“The book receives few reviews 
* Bacon, Advancement of Learning, 36.
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and is ignored by the public. Bitterness”  *) could I hope to see 
my bias corrected. Things would be far worse if it were critics 
themselves who believed in infallibility, over against their 
predecessors’ errors of judgment. I would then be forced to 
break with them immediately.
* Jim Crace, interview by Leigh Wilson, in Writers Talk: Conversations with 
Contemporary Writers, ed. Philip Tew, Fiona Tolan, and Leigh Wilson (London: 
Continuum, 2008), 64.
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§ The Democratic Challenge
Due to its institutionalization and technological restrictions, 
public criticism has long lagged behind literacy and informed 
opinion. Now perhaps we are witnessing the first real explo-
sion of critical democracy and the competition of opinions 
on the only available model—that of the free market. There 
are still gatekeepers, value-porters, opinion-makers, and 
there will be as long as there exists social stratification and 
distinctions of taste. But basic quality control will be mech-
anized. Properly marketed, every item of opinion, however 
shoddy or déclassé, will find its consumer. The products of 
the elite will meanwhile be pushed or drowned out by large 
opinion outlets and pop-ups, with individuals providing mer-
etricious content, and by boutique venues, creatures of suc-
cessful reinvention usually due to lucky timing. Those who 
produce for refined taste—undervalued luxury goods—will 
see their niche shrink. They will know well to gauge demand 
and goodwill in advance, through subscription. 
The more drunken and savage popular criticism waxes— 
as it is bound to do in digitized democracies committed not 
just to facilitating open access to information but also to 
universalizing critical expression—the more thin-skinned 
those who think in popular ways become, breaking down 
at the first sign of rejection—“bullied,” “harassed,” “belit-
tled,” “insulted,” and “betrayed.” (And can we be certain of 
our ability to identify and prosecute critical bullying and 
mobbing?) By contrast, those few patronized by the unpopu-
larly privileged will be assured of their love and see no need 
of ever venturing into wilderness. 
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§ Free Ride
The piggyback has gone the way of all offbeat assistance. 
There are no more pigs with portly backs to take you up. 
There are only pigs who never leave the clover.
§ Not to Be Outdone
Come April, the mad (whom the cold subdued) also spring 
to life, marching their follies up and down the muddy street. 
Look at us, madness’s blossoms!
§ Invisible Tree
Dreaming, like living, has its seasons. In your orchard as in 
mine, the tree of dreams is always the least cultivated. So in 
the autumn of our lives, we are content with sweeping up 
its fallen leaves, where before we would have sunk our teeth 
into its fruit, and before that marvelled at its blossoms—we, 
who are its roots!
§ Late Spring, Late Summer
There are moods proper to spring that ripen only in autumn, 
and summer experience crystallizing only in wintertime.
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§ No Qualms
With the crude kind of D. I. Y. lighting I am peddling to the 
benighted, I am no heir to Prometheus. I am more like a 
coal-seller in a hard winter, when buyers are neediest and 
price hikes are laid at the feet of scarcity. If you find this 
objectionable, see if I care. 
Of course I do, but what to do when one knows the winter 
will be the longest on record?
§ Got a Light?
How long has it been since someone asked you for a light? 
How would they know whom to ask these days, or that whom 
they should ask is you? Make yourself their go-to person. Take 
up position in a throughway and offer light. Offer it and watch 
someone walk up to you. They are not looking for conversa-
tion, they’ve heard enough about smoking too much, and they 
are not interested in you. What they do with your light is their 
business (and none of yours). They’ll find a need for it.
Why are so many of these “matches” about writing? Ideas, 
my friend, don’t grow on trees. They don’t drop from the sky. 
They are not the product of heavy industry. They are neither 
animal nor mineral. They are not the substance of sports. 
They are not returns on investments. Their material is this 
stuff.
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§ Obscurantism
Those who compose from coloured light the single and essen-
tially white light, they are the real obscurantists.
—Goethe  *
It is one thing to admire stained glass, appreciating the 
coloured light shining through it, and another to look 
directly at the sun, to the inescapable blackening of every-
thing else. Stained glass is good for seeing, white light, for 
blindness—insofar as shadows and colours are occlusions of 
such light. To blend all visible things is to see nothing at all. 
This is the genesis of God.
§ Misfired Insult
One plausible reason for why matchhead never caught on as 
a term of abuse (like pinhead, blockhead, dummy, birdbrain, or 
clod) is that, factoring in the proportions, it might easily be 
taken as flattery, a step up from hothead or firebrand. Either 
that or because, after God, light does not lend itself to taking 
offence, only to giving it. Its weapon is fire. Matchsticks are 
the myrmidonian armies of light.
* Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Maxims and Reflections, trans. Elisabeth Stopp 
(New York: Penguin, 1998), p. 165, sec. 1296 (mod. trans.).
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§ The Cynic’s Matchbox (That’s the Spirit!)
I throw in my lot with light—with matches, to be precise. 
They are at all times capable of making brighter: by day they 
distract from nimbus skies, by night they disperse the gloom 
of distance—and are never blinding!
By matchlight, I am liable even to write poetry of affirma-
tion. No one can then accuse me of anything but affirma-
tion— of course, purely on aesthetic grounds!
 Light is in. 
 Dark is out.  
 Light is hip, 
 light is cool. 
 Dark is dour, 
 dark is cruel.
THE MATCHSTICK (to me). 
Don’t take yourself so seriously. After all, you’ll be the 
only one. And you’ll still be accused of negation. Your 
affirmations will be jeered at: they are unproductive!
§ Illuminosity
I can’t decide: am I luminocentric, or more in love with the 
thick, bituminous darkness that straightaway follows light? 
Do I fall into the arms of day, or trace the all-black silhou-
ettes of the contre-jour?
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§ Light Touch
In darkness you shall call Let there be light! And so you will 
confess.
§ Seeing Darkness
Paradoxes have the unfortunate consequence of turning 
those who embody them into fools. For example, the first 
man who lit a match to see darkness. Did anyone except 
some village idiot ever in earnest try such a thing? But con-
sider the act and you might soon hear yourselves exclaming: 
“But of course! It is by stark contrasts that we approximate 
absolutes.” Although darkness is done for the duration of 
light, immediately afterwards does it not seem quite com-
plete? And secondly, do we not see many things better in the 
light? Is this not true also of things quite black? If we see 
something dark in the darkness, a shape we can barely make 
out, would not illuminating at once bring it out?
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§ Safety Matches
When playing with matches, we are told, safety comes first. 
To those who are childless and have not evolved the scold-
ing and mollycoddling dispositions of parents towards their 
young, the phrase “safety matches” remains what it is, an 
oxymoron. The parents of Promethean mankind use it to 
curse its primal birthright to start fires, while dousing them. 
They engineer all the danger out of matches. To establish 
a semblance of order, they arrange them into books, where 
bundles would have sufficed. Only the matchbox still con-
tains the threat of original disarray: with every agitation, 
the contents cast together inside the tray are shaken up and 
rearranged. What happens between them, in the dark, is 
their affair, possibly incendiary. A large black cat leaping 
across the box of one popular East European brand seems to 
attract as much as deter bad luck. A children’s toy manufac-
tured from such a box held, instead of matches, two plastic 
mice. As one pushed the tray out this way and that, the white 
or the black one would come out to tempt the cat. Even this 
useless and stupefying diversion, already figurative playing 
with fire, has since been replaced by parental supervision.
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§ Matches to Ashes
Perhaps the lesson of the Little Matchstick Girl extends 
beyond miserabilism and beatification of the poor. The 
warm light in the cold darkness is no longer the bleak reality 
of the child’s circumstances, her impending death from 
hypothermia, but a wondrously comforting illusion. One 
by one, you may recall, she strikes the matches that are her 
livelihood and warms herself by their evanescent flame. “The 
morning of the New Year dawned over the little body sitting 
with the matches, of which a bunch was almost burned up. 
She had wanted to warm herself, it was said. No one knew 
what lovely sight she had seen or in what radiance she had 
gone . . . ”  * What she had seen was what she had imagined by 
match-light. 
The fate of the little match-seller is of course one of the 
most familiar emblems of modern inequality, with the 
dirt poor inhabiting the fantasy of the filthy rich, but not 
the conscience. On the cosmic balance sheet, in line with 
archetypical folk-tale justice, inequality cuts both ways. It is 
as detrimental to the well-heeled as it is to the downtrodden. 
The impoverished imagination of the prosperous requires a 
sesame to access it; it is filled with gold and wondrous and 
exotic objects; nothing local and modest would satisfy it. The 
private visions of the poor are, meanwhile, not only spiritu-
ally richer, but can be found in the flame of a match.
* Hans Christian Andersen, “The Little Match Girl,” in Andersen’s Fairy Tales,  
trans. Reginald Spink (New York: Signet, 1987), 211.
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§ Book Advertising
Matchbook covers carry advertisements for soft drinks, 
humour, hotels, recreation, resorts, resistance, nightclubs, 
cigarettes, cough medicine, cigars, ground transportation, 
liquor, cruises, casinos, beef, services, appliances, girls, mag-
azines, anniversaries, supermarkets, talent contests, cities, 
banks, bingo, shoes, shirts, museums, motor oil, pesticide, 
luxury automobiles, and—most interestingly for us—books. 
It is a relief that book covers have not been degraded in 
the same way. Just imagine a book advertising a brand of 
matches, or a wood-burning fireplace. You would then be 
forgiven for mistaking certain self-promoting volumes for 
“essential kindling.”
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§ Little A
The great Amazon, the “great green hell,” is still around. 
But it is no longer what the word Amazon first conjures. 
The name of a rainforest and the river running through it 
doubles as the name of the greatest book shipping company 
in existence. A jungle of paper and pulp spreads across the 
globe. Meanwhile, the other Amazon—“the last page of Gen-
esis,” “still writing itself”—falls to the saws “unpublished.”  *
Nobody is drawing a causal link. The two Amazons are not 
in competition, and we have no confidence in the long-term 
survival of either of them. A “desert of trees that had to be 
cleared for the benefit of mankind”   †—the one no less than 
the other. A destiny indifferent to how we judge the human 
practices within each of them morally. Nomen omen est: the 
ancient Amazons entered history on the losing side.
* Euclides da Cunha, Um Paraíso Perdido: reunião de ensaios amazônicos,  
ed. Hildon Rocha (Brasilia: Senado Federal, Conselo Editorial, 2000), 100.
† Herbert Girardet, “Obituary: Richard Schultes (1915–2001),” Guardian, Apr. 26,  
2001, http://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/apr/26/guardianobituaries. 
highereducation.
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§ Long Distance
The book is so low-tech, it’s hard for technology to degrade it.
—Evan Hughes  *
Precisely because the printed book is not in competition 
with what today bears the name of “technology,” it weathers 
prognoses of obsolescence and embarrasses media and gad-
gets that chomp at the bit to replace it. If it were to enter the 
short-distance running and innovate, it would expose itself 
to the risk of obsolescence, squandering the accumulated 
“captial” riding on its endurance. It still has the lead in the 
600-year-race.
§ Legacy of Modernism
The notion that literature has value when it is accessible to 
the majority is one of the perverse legacies of—because a 
direct reaction to —Modernism. It is most troublesome to 
those who see no place for themselves in the literary main-
streams, who fundamentally decline late Modernism’s flaccid 
elitism, willfully minor and non-communicative, no less 
than the faux populism of the establishment. To write for 
one, at most several, readers, and leave it at that, is unintel-
ligible within this polarized landscape, where letters cannot 
be used as literature’s carrier pigeons.
* Evan Hughes, “Books Don’t Want to Be Free: How Publishing Escaped the  
Cruel Fate of Other Culture Industries,” New Republic, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/115010/publishing-industry-thriving.
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§ First Things First
Having something to say is, first of all, having someone to 
speak to. 
§ Correspondence
Some are useful at a distance, others close at hand, and 
someone who is perhaps no good for conversation will be  
as a correspondent.
—Gracián  *
The cheapening (and virtual disappearance) of sustained 
correspondence, its replacement by largely face-to-face inter-
action (increasingly in virtual form) no doubt owes some-
thing to the purely practical origins of letters—as a speedy 
conveyance of important information, to link and keep order 
in empires as much as households. While personal- letter 
specimens go back as far as the Sumerians, they are predated 
by administrative ones. Under the Romans, letter- writing 
became a privileged means of rhetorical, moral and spiri-
tual cultivation—sometimes one-way or one-to-many (as in 
biblical epistles), and not always from afar, yet at enough of 
a distance that the written message could sink in without 
interference from casual discourse between the parties. In 
the modern era, it evolved into the main medium, alongside 
printed pamphlets and books, of a transnational Republic of 
Letters, where letters were widely circulated, addressed to 
the intellectual salon-elite, and a growing literate public. 
The word correspondance acquired its meaning of private, 
two-way exchange right around then, in French (the lin-
guistic heart of this imaginary res publica). Some of the older 
* Gracián, Pocket Oracle, p. 59, sec. 158 (“Know How to Use Your Friends”).
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notion of correspondence—a relation of conformity, anal-
ogy or resemblance between inanimate things, and mutual 
accord of sentiments and ideas—naturally transferred 
over to the concept of epistolary communication. What is 
less obvious is that, over time, by a kind of notional après 
coup, the sentiments expressed and bonds built through 
letter-writing came to colour the meaning of correspondance 
sans words, paper, or even human beings. For Baudelaire, 
such mutual relations between “perfumes, colours, and 
sounds”  * form a secret theatre unobserved in the everyday 
tumult and rationalization so emblematic of modern life (as 
seen in his Paris Spleen). It is the heroic task of the artist to 
wander through forests where symbols “observe him with 
familiar eyes” (ibid.), and to attend to them, and even—as 
in later, surrealist chance encounters, “objects,” and their 
assemblages—to bring seemingly heteroclite things and 
thoughts to intimacy by the force of marvel and creative 
vision. Jünger was similarly partial to “the secret correspon-
dence existing between things.”  † Where he turns this interest 
into a method of composition, he resembles the eavesdrop-
per; his words intercept harmonies invisible to another ear.
There is no reason why future letter-writers should not 
take a page from this “stereoscopic” disposition or Baude-
laire’s roaming attention and create in their written corre-
spondence a space where correspondences of this “nonhu-
man” kind can occur. An exemplar of such practice is John 
Berger’s exchange about colours with the artist John Christie, 
published as I Send You This Cadmium Red . . .  . Recalling the 
occasion for beginning the correspondence, Christie writes:
Yesterday I went to a funeral, someone I didn’t really know 
very well, and during the service before the cremation I 
was looking at the flowers, some in vases and some in jars 
arranged on the steps before the lectern where the Rabbi 
* Charles Baudelaire, “Correspondances,” in Charles Baudelaire: Complete Poems, 
trans. Walter Martin (Manchester: Carcanet, 1992), 18.
† Jünger, Adventurous Heart, 73 (mod. trans.) (“The Picture Puzzle”).
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stood. My eyes were caught by a bunch of carnations directly 
in front of me. Red and yellow carnations in a single vase, 
not formally arranged, just put there, a block of red and a 
block of yellow. The red were the nearest and I looked at 
them for part of the service trying to see how the heads were 
constructed, how the petals fitted over one another. But the 
shapes were too delicate and I was just slightly too far from 
them to see properly. As I thought I was understanding their 
shapes so the precision of the image slipped away like in a 
dream . . .
So for no better reason that the memory of those flowers I 
send you this Cadmium Red.  *
More than a mere reciprocated observation of correspon-
dences among colours, the colour correspondence turns 
literal: image accompanies text virtually every time (a corre-
sponding image, to be sure). The colours correspond, assisted 
by human curiosity about the chromatic scale, its cultural 
and personal values. On this basis—although by no means 
just this one—we would be forgiven for imagining a corre-
spondence among humans in parallel to a correspondence 
among things, the one feeding into the other indefinitely, 
brought into correspondence in a language as yet unknown.
* John Christie, letter 1, in I Send You This Cadmium Red . . . : A Correspondence 
between John Berger and John Christie by John Berger and John Christie (Barce-
lona: Actar, 2000).
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§ Writing For
And likewise it is the intention of my best friend for  
whom I write this, also, that I should write it only in  
the common tongue.
—Dante, “XXX: His Letter to the Rulers,”  
The New Life  *
It is a strange linguistic effect that, as soon as a verb is fol-
lowed by “for,” the action it designates is understood as useful 
in some way. The relation of utility holds even—and this is 
relatively new—between one’s action and oneself. Admit-
tedly, the preposition in “thinking for myself” has a somewhat 
different sense than “doing something for myself,” but the 
latter connotation of usefulness is a good deal more prevalent. 
Thus, we keep journals and heurnals for ourselves, take time 
out and have quiet evenings at home with a cup of cocoa, all 
for ourselves, and all these uses of our time and attention 
also become ways of caring for or rewarding ourselves, and 
not forgetting—making “for” the fulcrum of the mantra of 
well-being. 
With writing, and art more generally, for’s transitivity 
takes what not so long ago could be self-centred or almost 
exist in a vacuum—writing or art for its own sake, without 
regard to anything outside it, maximally devoid of purpose, 
écriture pure, channelling semiosis, epitomized in philosoph-
ical and aesthetic good posture—and transforms it into a 
duty, a public service and good rendered by private individ-
uals. Blogging is now the paramount form of writing for 
others, in a way that tweeting is still not (if only because it 
is insubstantial and instantaneous, Twitter-happy). Bloggers, 
by contrast, feel an obligation towards their readers to be 
useful, helpful, instructive, illuminating, even when moti-
vated by vanity. (Here it intersects with public art projects, 
whether commissioned or “free of charge.”)
* Dante, New Life, letter 30, p. 76.
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There is no wishing away the public stigma attached to 
“writing for a living”—which essentially boils down to “writ-
ing for oneself”—now that one’s income from the written 
word almost always needs supplementing and the phrase 
thus conjures the privileged few who manage nonetheless to 
support themselves. In contrast to blogging or tweeting in 
one’s free time (freed up by adequate compensation for some 
other, useful work), “writing for a living,” especially when 
that writing is not obviously “for others,” does not justify let 
alone “pay for” itself in a way that, say, “dining out for life” (an 
AIDS fundraiser) does. The money made doing it ends up in 
the pocket of a single individual who, on the face of it anyway, 
spends all their productive time on one, self-directed (and, 
since not adequately remunerated, presumably quite useless) 
task. 
Society is hard on writers, this is hardly news. But the 
conflicted relation between writing and for-ness will remain 
opaque without some understanding of the uneven devel-
opment of “self-help” (in the broadest sense, from the care 
of the self to partaking of “life’s little pleasures” to urgent 
self-preservation). This development was severely hin-
dered by the historically Christian notion of charity—the 
other-directed hand of the Good Samaritan. The concom-
itant lag in self-help’s acceptance into the sphere of public 
usefulness owes much to the grasping hand of Christian-
ity in the shape of the modern capitalist state. This hand 
is quite visible when it catches us at our most passive as 
cultural consumers: as an advertisement enjoining us to “Be 
FOR something. FOR a life with more wow, and more now,” 
since “being against is the easy way, but being FOR some-
thing is an attitude that can change the world.”  *
* “FOR a new urban joy. A Manifesto,” Smart Automaker, accessed Mar. 12, 2015, 
http://uk.smart.com/uk/en/index/smart-campaigns/whatareyoufor.html.
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§ Dead Letters
There always comes a time when a dear friend’s silence can 
no longer be taken personally.
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§ Envelope Stuffing
Letters morphed into emails, and for a long time emails 
had all the depth and complexity of letters. They were a 
beautiful new form that spliced together the intimacy of 
what you might write from the heart with the speed of 
telegraphs. Then emails deteriorated into something more 
like text messages (the first text message was sent in 1992, 
but phones capable of texting spread later in the 1990s). . . . I 
think of that lost world, the way we lived before these new 
networking technologies, as having two poles: solitude and 
communion. The new chatter puts us somewhere in between, 
assuaging fears of being alone without risking real con-
nection. It is a shallow between two deep zones, a safe spot 
between the dangers of contact with ourselves, with others.
—Rebecca Solnit  *
While letters continue to be posted, they contain little more 
than envelope stuffing—and not just flyers, bills and bank 
statements. Has a similar degradation affected voice com-
munication? There, the addition of cameras has made all 
the difference. Is it not true, in any case, that where there is 
competition and choice in personal communication technol-
ogies, one will always (even without corporate mechanisms) 
outdistance the others? The popularity of microblogging 
now was that of tweeting earlier today, was that of social 
networking and texting late last night, was that of video and 
text chat yesterday, was that of letters before the heyday of 
the telephone and the internet . . .We now see that we change 
services and usage before either reaches the point of obso-
lescence. It is not the technology that grows obsolete; it is 
our use that obsolesces. Under such conditions of testing out 
available means of connecting, perhaps attention to form is 
bound to outpace attention to content for a reason; perhaps 
in no other way is content itself eventually regenerated . . .
* Rebecca Solnit, “Diary,” London Review of Books 35, no. 16 (2013),  
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n16/rebecca-solnit/diary.
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§ Diminishing Returns
It has been said that the “style and spirit” of letters is 
“always . . . the true ‘sign of the times.’”  * But what is the sign of 
times when letters ceased to be written, and all that is left of 
them is the signature? Should we be worried? Or rejoice that 
the sign of the times, whatever it may be, has moved on to 
more modern media that keep morphing rather than remain 
in the gauge of epistolary spirit and style. The signs of the 
times are these new media, their spirit and style.
There are revivalists who would like to bring back 
letter-writing. They believe it does the spirit good and 
improves writing style, if not the hand. But they are not 
blind to the fact that the returns on their own outlay are 
rapidly diminishing. Even their correspondents forget what 
a personal letter should look like. They respond in email 
missives, which offer freedom in minimal or in-formality. 
The increase in volume is offset by reflective sloppiness, 
shortness, and poor editing. Preference goes to doing the 
job quickly, from the heart, ever on the fly. The personal 
diary, meanwhile, still rules in the department of longhand 
self-unlacing. Thus, letter-writing disappears as a means of 
one-on-one-exchange. 
And, separately, it has become unfashionable to speak 
of “signs of the times,” since this implies that our times can 
change. Instead of letter-writing, the stock exchange is now 
the spirit of exchange, the digit, its style.
* Nietzsche, Gay Science, p. 184, bk. 4: Saint Januarius, sec. 329 (“Leisure and 
Idleness”).
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§ Dashed Off
It is sad to see one of the greatest technologies of the heart 
ever invented die in our lifetime—and seem even more 
short-lived than us. It is not that we have lost courage and 
drama in personal written exchange; audacity has never 
been easier. But the new brevity in correspondence has not 
been met with succinctness. While emails and text messages 
contain vestiges of personal letter-writing conventions, these 
have less to do with substance than with form. All highly rit-
ualized behaviour that cannot adapt to a change in medium 
or context is similarly passed down form first. Yet, as the 
need for written communication at a distance dwindles, the 
form of the letter, still rigid and widespread, collapses after 
the initial exchange into sporadic familiarity. It is observed 
that epistolary decorum is in most cases unnecessary when 
a number of more efficient ways of making contact can be 
called on to convey personal information. But what ought 
to be observed is that simultaneous, interchangeable use of 
these other means is also unnecessary. That lack of necessity, 
in other words, does not fully account for the letter’s demise. 
Why not admit that the letter has become too difficult? 
Time-investment and the effort to articulate salient things 
about ourselves— desires, opinions, experiences—seem more 
like supernumerary work. It is not that we have become lazy; 
we have become overworked. With linguistic proficiency 
honed on bureaucratic tasks, certain uses of language have 
taken a beating.
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§ Other People’s Mail
in response to Miranda July’s 2013 editorial/curatorial project  
We Think Alone: 
And of course while none of these emails were originally 
intended to be read by me (much less you) they were all care-
fully selected by their authors in response to my list of email 
genres—so self-portraiture is quietly at work here. Privacy, 
the art of it, is evolving. Radical self-exposure and classically 
manicured discretion can both be powerful, both be elegant. 
And email itself is changing, none of us use it exactly the 
same way we did ten years ago; in another ten years we 
might not use it at all.  *
What is so new in this project of editing emails with the per-
mission of their authors? The answer is: the curiosity of their 
editor. Two decades ago, when privacy was still assumed, 
taken for granted—not yet something we would be wise to 
divest ourselves of voluntarily before it is taken away from us 
by force—interest in the workaday (or so July would have us 
believe) correspondence of obscure collaborators would have 
been hard to conceive. The place where one sampled let-
ters for different occasions was of course the letter manual, 
popular since the seventeenth century—a genre of generic 
epistles from which the collection’s high-profile editor may 
have taken inspiration. Thus, “An Email That Gives Advice” 
corresponds to “A Letter of Advice” or “Counsel”; “An Angry 
Email,” to a “Letter of Remonstrance”; “An Email About 
Being Sad,” to missives on the death of a loved one; “An 
Email With I Love You In It,” to one “Upon the Absence of a 
Mistress”; “An Email That Includes A Picture of Yourself,” to 
one answering “A Letter Desiring a Mistress’s Picture”; “An 
Email To Your Mom,” to “A Letter from a Daughter to Her 
Mother upon Marrying against Her Consent”; “An Email 
* Miranda July, about We Think Alone, accessed Mar. 12, 2015,  
http://wethinkalone.com/about.html.
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About The Body,” to “A Letter Congratulating a Friend on the 
Recovery of His Health”; “An Email About Money,” to “Letter 
from a Poor Prisoner to His Creditor”; and so on (the second 
in each set comes from John Hill’s popular The Young Secre-
tary’s Guide: or, a Speedy Help to Learning of 1687 and many 
subsequent editions). But I may have hit on a correspondence 
on another plane: What is We Think Alone if not a letter to 
the past? Having passed through all the challenges of this 
curious project we have been bumped to a higher level of 
understanding: we are precisely not alone when we think.
§ News of Oneself
The use of epistolary form to communicate one’s ethical 
knowledge is in keeping with Seneca’s notion that knowl-
edge is “common property” and must be shared, distributed, 
in order to have any value.  * His epistles to Lucilius have an 
overt edifying purpose. They are explicitly meant as moral 
advice for another individual—as shared wisdom—thus 
admirably enacting the idea contained in them. Judging 
from their literary character, they are intended for circula-
tion among a wide circle of readers. The sense of personal 
disclosure, of a private text being made public, of something 
previously reserved for one becoming accessible, shareable, 
helps the text’s ability to garner interest and disseminate its 
ideas. The provision of moral instruction and the imperative 
of sociality are two ways in which letters generally can—and 
Seneca’s letters do —underscore the relationship between 
literature and ethics.
But Seneca also argues that a moral life can only be sus-
tained if one proceeds as if another conscience were observ-
ing one’s doings; one must remain in dialogue with oneself, 
* See Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, letters 8, 6, 13.
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in a self-critical relationship that is as strong as the criticism 
of another human being whom one respects, even venerates 
(letters III, XI). One must to a degree learn to objectify one-
self, transcend one’s own empirically conceived ego, while 
at the same time constituting and maintaining that ego’s 
integrity. Any act of self-writing involves just that; a distanc-
ing of oneself in order to interpret the self as a phenomenon, 
an existing, conscious and intentional whole—to “[c]arry 
out a searching analysis and close scrutiny of [one]self in all 
sorts of different lights” (XVI, p. 63). The act whereby one 
promotes one’s qualities and sets a moral example is accom-
panied in Seneca’s writings by an internal critical dialogue 
that has sought externalization. Anyone capable of judging 
society, life and what constitutes truth ought to show they 
are first able to examine and evaluate themselves (III). The 
correspondence is only an extension of this principle to 
active, external dialogue.
The notion of “correspondence” is here somewhat mislead-
ing, since we read only half of the exchange. The addressee, 
Lucilius, is an indeterminacy; his words and writing are 
referred to in Seneca’s responses to him, and so we may fill 
them in based on context, yet the content of his actual letters 
remains a matter of conjecture. The idea of physical distance, 
a necessary condition for communication by letter, parallels 
psychological self-distancing, necessary to the process of 
self-criticism. On the textual level this allows Seneca to be 
selective and falsify himself in interpreting and evaluating 
himself (XLVI); on the psychic level it helps transcend the 
immediate experience and take account of one’s life bodily. 
Lucilius, then, acts as a foil for the author’s self in that his 
evocation, presence and implied responses provide a pretext 
for writing and self-dialogizing. While being partially medi-
ated to us by the fictionalized I of Seneca, Lucilius actually 
serves as an equivocal mediator for Seneca himself.
It lies in both the reader’s (as represented by the pupil 
Lucilius) and the author’s interest that they be “of the utmost 
benefit to each other” by way not only of sharing knowl-
edge and company, but also of assisting in inner dialogue 
and self-criticism— ends to which the epistolary form is 
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unusually well suited. In this light, Seneca’s “And yet I do not 
summon you to my side solely for the sake of your own prog-
ress but for my own as well . . . ” acquires a new significance 
(VI, p. 40). The need to displace himself, to represent himself 
as the relation between two separate characters—as corre-
spondence qua form turns thematic—may indicate that Sen-
eca was working on his own duality, his inner conflicts, and 
that his self-criticism, in the presence of some unaddressed, 
interstitial territory of his conscience, could be omissive.  * In 
letter XXVI, for instance, he speaks about the final verdict he 
will declare upon himself, “determining whether the coura-
geous attitudes I adopt are really felt or just so many words . . . ” 
(71, my emphasis). This serves to undercut the very sense 
of writing at the same time that it shows the author on a 
self-directed ethical quest, actively involved in tutoring him-
self (an idea voiced on a number of occasions). This quality of 
Seneca’s writing—as a procedure of working out one’s own 
moral dilemmas, even if only by proxy and allusion—seems 
to make it all the more effective as a didactic text. 
To a degree, every author is self-reflexively embedded in 
their writing. Their inner dialogue need not seek expression 
as literary dialogue. When it does, do we understand them 
any better? And when it reaches for epistolary form, does the 
* However, only from our (post)modern perspective, with our sense of the function 
of narrative, knowledge of psychology (the means of the constitution, organiza-
tion and representation of the self) can we conceptualize Seneca as a construct 
on the textual level, as a fictional character separate from the historical one. It is 
highly doubtful that Seneca would have consciously designed a fictional version 
of himself—that he was aware of, and understood, it as a literary device. Rather, 
it was for him in the nature of letter-writing, when one is at a distance from one’s 
correspondent, that one interprets himself and often conceals certain flaws (in 
this case for the purpose of better instruction) —“we still find habit a reason for 
telling lies.” Ibid., letter 46, p. 90. By writing himself into his own text, he was 
merely transposing what he thought proper to transpose: an “essential” Seneca, 
though not a fictional (unreal) one. One must not forget that under Seneca’s pen 
the letter-form becomes intensely self-referential (without being unnaturally so). 
He is very conscious of stylistics (especially of falling into poor style), not just in 
writing but in public speaking. His reflection extends over the entire domain of 
text- and discourse-production. Ironically, however, it tends to avoid issues of 
content.
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length and depth, honesty and sincerity, of their correspon-
dence have any bearing on our understanding of them? For 
the writer and reader to benefit each other, mutual under-
standing must be neither’s aim.
§ True Taste
The writers of today are worried about offending anyone. 
Imagine a fish that takes itself out of the water, fillets itself, 
seasons itself to taste, lays itself flat upon a frying pan, then 
lies down hastily on a bed of garnish—all to ensure the 
public will devour it. It so wants to be savoured, to melt in the 
mouths of average diners. It genuinely thinks that freshness 
and seasoning can distinguish it, tantalizing taste buds 
without any risks. Except that all this it shares with other 
fried fish. True taste is distinctness of flavour. All the rest is 
presentation.
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§ Soho!
soho: call used by huntsmen to direct the attention of the 
dogs or of other hunters to a hare which has been discovered 
or started, or to encourage them in the chase; hence used 
as a call to draw the attention of any person, announce a 
discovery, or the like (OED)
There are words whose different senses seem to have devel-
oped through whimsical resemblances and contiguities. The 
French bouquin is one. Its primary meaning is “book”—as 
anyone with a decent ear (it is pronounced /bukε̃/) and 
familiar with Parisian second-hand book vendors, or bou-
quinistes, might guess. More specifically, bouquin (initially 
spelled boucquain) is a “little book” or an “old book,” espe-
cially one “thought nothing of.” The nineteenth century adds 
a further pejorative nuance: a book that “though modern has 
no other value besides that of its curlicues.” Around this time, 
too, the word comes to mean “book” in popular parlance.
But bouquin has a still richer history. In the middle of the 
eighteenth century it was borrowed by huntsmen. Not (yet) 
book-chasers, but hunters of rabbit and hare. Aside from a 
phonetic closeness (livre, lièvre), the resemblance between (old, 
likely male) books and rabbits (also old, buck) might escape 
us at first. But perhaps, as registered by this lexical twist, 
what unites the book and hare is their pursuit, until the very 
end, of their respective lives, measured in leaps and pages.
The use of bouquin as a hunting term did not start there. 
Sometime in the sixteenth century it came to signify the 
opening of a hunting-horn used in rabbiting, a cornet à bou-
quin. The connection to horns had also made it handy for an 
“old billy goat,” from which later arose the meaning of “satyr” 
and “roué.” The main association of bouquin with the cornet, 
however, seems to be oral in origin, possibly via bucca, Latin 
for “mouth.” From there the word travelled to the bohemian 
land of pipes, specifically their horn mouthpieces.  * 
* Le trésor de la langue française informatisé, s.v. “bouquin,” accessed Mar. 12, 2015, 
http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm.
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Having followed awhile in the tracks of etymologists, we 
begin to piece together a strange picture out of the history 
of one French disyllable: a bouquin-blower, bouquin-catcher, 
bouquin-puffer, bouquin-lover and, finally, -devourer!
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§ At the Stalls
We have translated the idea of browsing— derived from 
feeding on tree leaves and shoots, said of goats, deer and 
cattle—into the digital realm quite seamlessly. Lost, however, 
are its public scenes, moments of absorption, the search for 
the unknown work not as a commodity, but as unadulterated 
use-value. The hope for serendipity is part of it from the 
start, and there are some who hope for the lucky find they 
can then cash in on.
If one has ever looked at those who still routinely engage 
in browsing bookshop stalls, one might wonder whether 
the demographic committed to this activity has changed 
over the years. One look at Paul Gavarni’s physiognomy of 
an urban loafer, observed en passant in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, makes its caption all but redundant: “If I 
could read I’d never read such old editions.” The gaunt-faced, 
no-longer-young man in the picture is attracted to the wares 
of a bouquinist as he might be to a parallel universe, strange 
and inaccessible to him, for whose opacity he compensates 
with hands-in-pockets disdain. Likely uneducated, he seems 
without any prospect of the leisure required to make his 
wish (grudgingly in the conditional) come true. Behind him, 
two legitimate browsers peruse the volumes. Encounters 
with unfamiliar books did not typically involve reverence, 
the piety of the meek and unschooled—if such indeed is in 
evidence here. At the opposite, equally eccentric end stands a 
vieux savant’s ecstatic immersion, in another engraving aptly 
titled “An Orgy.” Before him lie worn volumes offering them-
selves cheaply—just 50 centimes! His browsing is hands-on, 
open-mouthed. Even if the goods for sale are not the most 
desirable, their sheer volume, the possibilities they open up, 
invite a thousand caresses.
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§ Why I’m Not a Book Addict
A book addict shouldn’t care what they read as long as they 
get their fix . . .
§ What Are Shelves For
Someone had made a joke about the spurious popularity of 
empty shelf photographs, or empty “shelfies.”  * But who needs 
real shelves anymore? Have they ever served any other pur-
pose than holding books? 
Even bookshelves migrate. Sooner or later you will take 
screen shots of your virtual ones, similarly divested. From 
there you will move on to your mental bookcases, clearing 
out turgid nonsense taking up precious thinking space. That 
much more access to the little of it that’s left!
Suddenly, everything will click. Emptying all those shelves, 
embedded so deeply, was freeing us from self-incurred tute-
lage for an age of clarity. In our dotage we will have just two 
tomes to take pages from, dangling from our virtual girdles 
in imitation of medieval monks to protect them from thieves: 
a sottisier and a “bible,” a book of jokes and a book of truths.
* This is not to be confused with the “shareable selfie,” also called Shelfie.
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§ Will-o’-the-Wisp
But perhaps you feel the world is bright already? You have a 
stack of newspapers, digital edition, which you keep burning 
through. No sooner is the screen illuminated than the mes-
sage begins its rapid decay.
Isn’t that just how you want it? Plus, there are lights in 
neighbouring windows, street lamps, and— damn it—the 
sun! Plenty of light to see by. At least along your path, no 
need to watch your step.
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§ “I am loath even to have thoughts I cannot publish”  *
The economic cheapness of digital publication democratizes 
expression and gives a necessary public to writers, and types 
of writing, that otherwise would be confined to the hard 
drive or the desk drawer. And yet the supreme ease of putting 
words online has opened up vast new space for carelessness, 
confusion, whateverism. 
—n+1, 2012  †
Is the strict correspondence of thinking and publicizing not a 
concrete and universal expression of Kant’s practical philos-
ophy? The achievement of the Digital Age is finally clear: the 
running commentary on ourselves and our world that fills 
the blogoverse is the global flowering of public discourse. 
On the one hand, self-loathing now precedes 
self-censorship and critically cuts much deeper. We no longer 
excise the bad, the unpublishable, from our thoughts; we get 
its sources out of our system before they become thoughts or 
sweep them into some designated unconscious, where they 
remain safe, pathetic, and innocuous.
* Michel de Montaigne, “On Some Lines of Virgil,” in The Complete Essays, trans. 
M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991), 953. The same line in context, in another 
translation: “I have ordered myself to dare to say all that I dare to do, and I 
dislike even thoughts that are unpublishable. The worst of my actions and 
conditions does not seem to me so ugly as the cowardice of not daring to avow it. 
Everyone is discreet in confession; people should be so in action. Boldness in sin-
ning is somewhat compensated and bridled by boldness in confessing. Whoever 
would oblige himself to tell all, would oblige himself not to do anything about 
which we are constrained to keep silent. God grant that this excessive license 
of mine may encourage our men to attain freedom, rising above these cowardly 
and hypocritical virtues born of our imperfections; that at the expense of my 
immoderation I may draw them on to the point of reason. A man must see his 
vice and study it to tell about it. Those who hide it from others ordinarily hide 
it from themselves. And they do not consider it covered up enough if they them-
selves see it; they withdraw it from their own conscience.” The Complete Essays 
of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1976), 642.
† Editorial, “Please RT,” n+1 14 (June 14, 2012).
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On the other hand, and it is a huge other hand, are we still 
having thoughts worth having? A troll of a question visits 
the digital fora of the West: if everything is permitted, is 
anything worth saying? Psychopaths may spin their schemes 
of revenge and suicides perform their finales, but do we take 
them seriously? Will there soon be anyone left to care about 
what we publish enough to police it? Saying is still worth 
doing, but making sense hardly matters. “Anything’s sayable 
and nothing’s worth saying—How can you stand it? Do 
something! Say something!!”—tweets the hobgoblin, and 
gets retweeted. But can the hogs of attention appreciate such 
pearls?
So we are back to square one as concerns a standard of 
public discourse. The Enlightenment model has been buried; 
for the newcomers, it is as good as dead. They are on their 
own.
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§ Grasping Criticism
“Criticizing everything but accomplishing nothing. That 
is the world’s nature; it cannot get away from it,” writes 
Luther (with biting criticism of course) in his open letter on 
translating the Bible.  * And here is Marx in a personal letter 
to his friend: “what we have to accomplish at present: I am 
referring to ruthless criticism of all that exists, ruthless both in 
the sense of not being afraid of the results it arrives at and 
in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict with the 
powers that be.”  † Two countervailing views: theological and 
anti-theological. Why should criticism have no redeeming 
qualities for Luther? Its reach exceeded its grasp, even in 
textual form. Why should Marx have had such high hopes for 
criticism? Because it grasped so much.
§ Mushy Criticism
A soft spot for the opponent in a political debate indexes 
decay in one’s own position.
* Luther, “An Open Letter on Translating,” 176.
† Karl Marx to Arnold Ruge, Sept. 1843, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Collected Works, vol. 3, Marx and 
Engels, 1843–1844 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 142.
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§ Criticism as Self-Examination
Critical exercises can be tools of self-discovery just as interval 
training can act as a coherence test for one’s ideas, not to 
mention boosting their resilience and versatility. Short crit-
ical drills can lay bare what one “really thinks.” The choice 
of object to criticize reflects not only what’s “trending” in 
critical opinion, or the limits of one’s interest, but also which 
ideas one is inclined to interrogate and which completely to 
avoid— out of habit and bias, if not simple blindness. If one 
is at a loss for ideas, intensive bursts of critique might help 
decide where to go from “here.” If, on the contrary, one’s 
thoughts come out pure muscle, metabolically freakish, 
one might be jolted to run as far as possible in a different 
direction.
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§ Murine Criticism
The German Ideology, written by Marx and Engels in 1845–46, 
while they were still in their twenties, was for complicated 
reasons published only after Marx’s death in 1883 (twelve 
years after his first New York Times obituary). Engels thought 
this no great misfortune, since the book’s chief purpose was 
its authors’ “self-clarification,” in which respect it was a great 
success. What needed clarifying was their own, materialist 
philosophy of history, starkly opposed to that of the Ger-
man idealists. This clarification took the form of ruthless 
take-downs of the leading figures of post-Hegelian thought 
in Germany, turning them out as Saints (“Saint Max,” “Saint 
Bruno”. . . ). And if this bold mock-theological design were 
not refreshing enough, there is ingenuity in the details, the 
relish of youth poking fun at others’ philosophical and polit-
ical weakness, armed with the wisdom of Shakespeare, the 
wit of Cervantes, the spirit of Goethe, and social critique in 
the guise of nursery rhymes. When you hear of all this crisp 
prose, flower of nineteenth-century German Bildung, lan-
guishing in a drawer—“abandoned,” as Marx put it, “to the 
gnawing criticism of mice”   *—you might find yourself envy-
ing the mice. For anyone curious about Marxism, I can think 
of no better place to start than this attic of Marx and Engels’ 
Brusselian collaboration. But there is a lesson in it writers 
would do well to learn: that books can be written solely to clear 
up one’s thinking, and anything left over belongs to the mice.
* Karl Marx, preface to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” 
(1859), in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Collected Works, vol. 29, Marx: 1857–1861 
(New York: International Publishers, 1987), 264.
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§ The Draft
On the wall of his study, the novelist Émile Zola is said to 
have written these words: “not a day without a line” (nulla 
dies sine linea). The line had previously belonged to the 
painter Apelles, and pertained to the “lines” of his art, as 
noted by Pliny. In this sense also it was adopted by Van 
Gogh—for all his incessant correspondence, which anyhow 
frequently combined text and sketches.
The draughtsman’s table is so much larger than an escri-
toire, and no sooner than a choice is made of paper stock that 
this difference seems justified. The draft may be where the 
draughtsman and the writer part ways, but it is itself a fork 
in the road, with two paths open to them both: the writer 
can choose to sketch out his thought instead of making an 
arrangement of words, and the pencil accustomed to lines 
can rather trace letters. The successful draft is just a few 
strokes away, strokes that capture the essentials. What does 
it matter which system is used to make them, so long as they 
are indeed the essential ones?
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§ Around the Block
Subtle connections exist between our limbs and our memo-
ries. One hears of longhand as a method of retrieving mate-
rial one had written down in the past, in school exercise books. 
What might not come back to us if we could pick up a pen 
with our foot and write without effort? What dormant knowl-
edge would return from down there, so far from our brain? 
Is it something to be wondered at, and never attempted? One 
imagines the Writer, in their well-known exigency—to over-
come the Block—will one day give the conjuring hand a rest. 
Dexterity, after all, was never a professional requirement!
§ Keeping Up with the Joneses
The writer’s block is necessarily short; writers must keep up 
professional appearances. A city of reader’s blocks is spread 
out, with impressive facades and buildings never lived in. 
Reading is not a profession, but the hang-ups around it 
reference social standards that isolate those who fall short of 
them even more.
§ On the Rails
What you have long dreamed of is about to become reality. 
Your writing will be your ticket, procrastinators shall be 
shifted to the last car, and impostors thrown off immediately. 
Yet this dedicated writer’s train of which you hear tell—the 
writing machine par excellence, our definitive solution to 
distraction—will arrive too late for some. The rumble and 
screech of hurtling metal are today much too subtle for them 
to dictate the rhythm of words.
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§ Zoning In
There exists a mental space— or perhaps it is continually 
created—where a writer hears nothing but the beat of their 
thought, and sometimes even this fades away completely, 
leaving only the thought itself. This is called “being in the 
zone.” “Flow” is another term for this peculiar and highly 
coveted state of mind, though not in the idiomatic sense of 
“going with the flow.”
Certain authors, especially when all their books are read 
in one go, seem never to have left “the zone” in their life. 
Singling out one work of theirs as superior takes a special 
kind of rudeness—if, that is, we aspire to the “writing life” 
ourselves. (If all we seek is “the best,” then the same selection 
is proof of uncommon discernment.) But if, like me, you are a 
writer in search of the zone, you see the oeuvre as a series of 
signposts showing you the way.
“Innovators astonish us by the total development of their 
practice, not by each work taken singly,” says Michael 
Krausz.  * They astonish even more when the totality of their 
practice displays an unabated stream of enthusiasm and skill. 
Of such writers it could be said that one has no desire to 
meet them in biographies, but only ever in “the zone.”
* Michael Krausz, “Introduction,” in The Idea of Creativity, ed. Michael Krausz, 
Denis Dutton, and Karen Bardsley (Leiden: Brill, 2009), xix.
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§ The Easygoing Work
We adore some books for their undemanding nature. It 
is enough to graze in their folds, to fall in innocent calf 
love, free of elaborate courtship and head-scratching stress. 
Because, let’s face it, we sometimes tire of the demand to 
mean, which authors make of us. 
With a surge of relief, we are moved to ourselves compose 
an easygoing work, expressing our bliss in a reprieve from 
meaning. And touring such a book our expectations of our 
readers are correspondingly few: mooing is approbation, the 
Q & A is a cinch, and all that we ask is to meet up “like cows 
in the meadow.”  *
§ The Easy Part
advice to first-time novelists
A splash is a splash, whether it’s wet or red. Making a splash 
in a pool of water is easier on the eyes, compared to splat-
tering on concrete. Unless you already know how to swim 
or put yourself back together, it’s the recovery you should be 
worried about. 
Dying instantly, on the spot, seems preferable to drowning 
in your own success.
* Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 237, vol. 2, sec. 107 (“Three-Quarter 
Strength”).
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§ Succès d’estime
The success all artists should fear is the succès d’estime, being 
lionized by the critics but ignored by the wider public. The 
danger lies in that overestimation of our achievement known 
as mastery. (Mastery is what an artist who wants to be loved 
by the public does not claim; arrogance loses him popular 
favour.) For this misfortune there are only two forms of 
damage control. The first, requiring more effort, is to imag-
ine ourselves the laughing stock of past masters (standing 
before a mirror with a degree in our art might be enough). 
The second, with more to recommend it, is to pump oneself 
full of depressants, and in a manner of hours feel all trace of 
self-esteem dissolve. I understand the trend these days runs 
the other way, but so do critics’ artists with their successes. 
You will no doubt want to say: “What’s done is done! Let 
the poor deluded devils be.” Indeed, the memory of a succès 
d’estime is preferable to the failure to surpass one’s own 
estimation.
§ Double-Check
You call yourself a “writer’s writer,” but are there any writ-
ers actually reading you, whom you know of, let alone care 
about?
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§ Out Like a Light
Awareness of advanced years or signs of fatigue in illustrious 
figures in our field of endeavor is the source of subliminal 
anxiety among us lesser lights. We fear that once their 
creativity is extinguished, we too might be suddenly put out, 
like candles at a party once the guest of honour has departed.
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§ Bridge of Boats
From book to book a writer crosses the river of what is 
thought and said, flowing unrecorded. Sometimes, out of 
hunger, he lowers himself down and fishes out an idea. His 
books are like barges or lily-pads strung together, eventu-
ally stretching across. It may be that others, the so-called 
disciples, are crossing the water behind him. When they have 
reached his latest, they must wait until he has again accom-
plished his feat of organic verbal engineering. 
But most likely he is alone. To Nietzsche’s “To write in order 
to triumph. Writing should always mark a triumph,” and his 
description of his works as a record “only of my overcom-
ings,”  * I respond: “My thought exactly, even if it’s juvenile 
showmanship.” To be exciting, writing must be competitive, 
rewarded by personal fulfillment. At every step, the writer 
competes against the inertia of self-consistency and repeti-
tion. It makes little difference who looks on, how many pairs 
of eyes follow the progress of the champion-engineer.
But the metaphor of books keeping the writer afloat can be 
drawn out even more. Once they have been brought in line, 
they are tethered together. Most books from one pen are fis-
siparous— owing to the writer’s embarrassment, worsened by 
middling reviews, or to envy between his books, the earlier 
of the later, the younger of the older. Yet it is not uncommon 
for those books that do the bridging, the main works, to have 
(despite disagreements) the sense to stick together. Some of 
them have no doubt been made for the sake of the others, the 
less fortunate ones, to pull them out of the murk into which 
they are plunged by a moment’s of public inattention. They 
exist against the remainder, as life-savers—we are anyhow 
speaking only of after-lives—giving the books thus rescued, 
half-submerged, a place in the succession. It’s only much 
later, once our author has crossed the water and is no more, 
that the initially more successful of the lineage drift off, 
* Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, p. 248, vol. 2, sec. 152; p. 209, vol. 2, sec. 1.
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leaving behind the saved, the nearly drowned, like islands in 
an archipelago, each home to a different species of bird.
§ The Author’s Two Bodies
Contrary to the institution of monarchy, that of literature 
admits of many kings within one (linguistically defined) 
realm. The body-natural of every literary royalty remains the 
same, but for aging, while the body-literary changes with each 
book. In their collected works, the book-lives of that pub-
lished royal corpus are ostended, “laid out,” like the cadavers 
they are, “end to end,” to borrow Chateaubriand’s haunting 
phrase. The perishable body may go on to outlast those thus 
coffined for public viewing; a writer may decide not to write 
and remain king to the very end, and may thus see their 
complete oeuvre interred before them. The tomb of literary 
consecration only proving more durable in the long run.
§ Inside the Tomb
My ideal language is epitaphic, a language of considerate 
brevity that honors the dead, their wish to be remembered. 
It is, at the same time, a language that is posthumous, freed 
from concerns over its timeliness or untimeliness and 
addressed to those who are still alive. As epitaphic, it is a 
language timeless enough to be carved in stone; as posthu-
mous, it is impossible to write in while one is still alive. My 
ideal language is writing (in any language) that has these two 
characteristics. Writing done in this language is my inscrip-
tion on the tomb of the past, but only if I am also already 
inside the tomb.
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§ “Come, my cold and stiff companion!”  *
There are places where the authors we love because they 
mirror our thoughts and moods, or because we fit theirs so 
well, cannot follow us. We drag them along until the first tug 
of loneliness makes us pull too hard and they fall over like 
dummies—whereupon from sheer embarrassment we finally 
take our leave of them.
§ Safer Bet
Writers worth their salt do not wish to represent their time 
any more than for their time to represent them; they tran-
scend both sorts of egoism. Their ties to the present are a 
historical accident, which nothing compels them to address. 
Writing only for posterity, on the other hand, is too risky; 
one’s audience is one great unknown. That leaves our ances-
tors, a safer bet: and even here just the literary ones.
* Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. 
Pippin, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 12, sec. 7.
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§ Leaving One’s Mark
Making a contribution nowadays is subordinated to carving 
a niche for oneself, even if one is part of a team. It is the only 
way one can hope to stand out: individual contributions 
increasingly stand out only in kinds.
That is why “making it” more and more resembles what 
dogs and cats do to mark their territory. That in turn is why, 
on the face of it, the choice— cat or dog, loner or collabora-
tor—seems to be exactly as before.
§ Literary Sensation
It is to the market that we owe literary sensations, the 
“must-reads” that each season monopolize our attention. 
The excitement around certain releases goes a long way to 
offset the daily anxieties and general insecurity of the book 
economy. Oh the fun of bestseller lists! And the thrill of (the 
last remaining independent) bookstore queue! How can any 
of this be a sign of ill health, if the success of a few luminar-
ies means death for those playing with such unsensational 
stakes?
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§ High and Low
It’s time we rejected the distinction between high- and 
lowbrow as it now stands. Not the distinction as such, just 
the significance of the height of the forehead and size of the 
supraorbital ridge. No rejection is effective without broad 
consensus, as in this case it is bound not to be. And no 
unpopular rejection holds unless a replacement so innocuous 
and intuitive is found that the majority won’t even notice 
anything is amiss. From now on highbrow will mean “what 
surprises,” and lowbrow, “what causes dismay, by being deter-
mined to say clearly and only one thing.”
§ Castoffs
A You have to be a master of your art to leave perfect 
images on the cutting-room floor. Sometimes a great 
image, scene, line, word, piece has no place in a sequence 
and must be discarded.
B Yet we always doubt the master’s mastery when we 
wish to see what he chose not to show us. Suppose Bach 
dropped some notes here and there and we nevertheless 
asked to hear them, what could it mean except that we 
might know better and judge differently? If we allow the 
latter, then we value our judgment above his. And if we 
agree with his decisions, our homage to his mastery is 
thoroughly compromised.
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§ Claqueurs
Serious, self-respecting artists do not waste time answer-
ing their critics. Instead, most work harder to cater to their 
taste. It is different with discourse, broadly speaking, where 
response and argument are considered the norm. In art, 
however, disputes of taste and truth can take place in silence; 
here critics prick up their ears and open their eyes long after 
the claqueurs have gone home.
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§ No-Power
Nearly all men are slaves for the same reason that the 
Spartans assigned for the servitude of the Persians—lack of 
power to pronounce the syllable, No. To be able to utter that 
word and live alone, are the only two means to preserve one’s 
freedom and one’s character.
—Nicholas Chamfort
Negation is a positive element of the whole.
—Stanisław Jerzy Lec  *
It is of course not enough to say no. You need to say more, 
to elaborate. You can get away with naysaying only if the 
feedback is overwhelmingly positive—which, within the aca-
demic humanities, plagued by post-structuralist self-doubt, 
almost never happens. There saying no amounts to 
murder-suicide. Survival is one big hug all around. Division, 
negativity, disagreement are out of the question (in contrast 
to the sciences, which need disagreement like air to breathe). 
In these hard times, humanists must “like” one another. 
They must hold hands in a festival of mutual affirmation.
In reality, however, it is humanities “outreach” as eloquent 
polemic, contrarianism and indignation, provocative and 
barefaced, wielding the rhetoric of being-against, that for the 
time being gives humanists a stay of execution (the public 
takes note of dissent, and always wants more). The profes-
sors who quietly rail against the corporate world, afraid of 
offending their students, must recognize to whom they owe 
their respite: not to those higher up their greasy pole, who 
still shit on them, but to those on whom they just yesterday 
still openly . . . frowned.
* Chamfort, Cynic’s Breviary, l. 17; Lec, Myśli nieuczesane, 62.
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§ Public Intellectual
Intellectuals today are compelled to “go public” if they want 
to remain intellectuals.
§ Following Leaders
Followers on social media platforms possess an uncanny 
influence over existing relations of power. Twitter use poses 
a danger for any fixed attitudes towards political rulers. For 
many who are on it, following emerging “leaders,” whose 
simultaneous status as “followers” is a matter of course, 
is part of a strategy to expand their own power base, and 
eventually to rise in standing themselves. As if that were not 
enough, the medium is a laboratory of dematerialized group 
behaviour, where those with a scientific bent can put their 
hypotheses to the test. In short, anyone who wishes to build 
a following will do well by being an avid follower, opportu-
nistically. In this environment, the words of Ledru- Rollin 
continue to resonate: “There go the people. I must follow 
them, for I am their leader.”  *
* Suzy Platt, ed. Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the 
Congressional Research Service in 1989 by the Library of Congress (1989; n.p.: New 
York: Dover, 2010), 194.
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§ Leading Motives
The leitmotif often emerges late in the process of literary 
creation or reception; so, too, born leaders emerge or are 
recognized only when their followers are ready for them.
§ Easy Pickings (A Lamb Is a Lamb)
Many would swear it is better to be a bell-wether, leader of 
a flock, than a lone wolf. But the lone wolf begs to differ by 
licking his chops. (The bell he donates to a lone biker, to 
ward off demons on the road—which shows him to be not 
only better off, but good.) 
§ Decoration
With some exceptions, self-glorification is the opposite of 
self-torment, yet wants it presupposed: it keeps it in sight 
like a Sword of Damocles, but on tougher string.
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§ Common, senses of
What is dismissed as common nonsense often makes uncom-
mon sense.
§ Madness in Literature
The writing of derangement under the aegis of literature, 
like the painting of outsider art, puts culture into question— 
and redeems it as well.
§ Ouroborous
We are undermining the value of critical literary study out-
side of literary practice, which not coincidentally is begin-
ning to take itself—literature, contemporary and histori-
cal—for its object.
§ In the Tower
In the Tower of Babel, “experimental” literature had the last 
floor. That was as far as the builders got before their tongues 
became confused. 
516 s . d.  chrostowska
§ Experimentalism
It is a lamentable if common misunderstanding that literary 
experiments, including highly conceptual ones that border 
on visual art, are by definition trying and difficult for the 
average reader. It is thought (and quixotically disbelieved) 
that the audience needs to be educated to appreciate them, 
preferably by being brought up on what we would now 
call the experimental tradition that properly begins with 
Modernism. In fact, difficulty and sciolistic requirements of 
this sort have little to do with a work’s being experimental. 
The condition of experimentality is testing not the public’s 
patience, but the author’s. The experiment is not, in other 
words, on the reader but on the maker of the experiment. It 
is not about pushing the limits of convention to see what will 
fly, but about what can be stood— endured—in the process of 
writing. 
Before accusing me of measuring experimentation by a 
personal yardstick, come up with an alternative that will 
knock literature out of its present comfort zone.
§ Paradoxes of Experimentalism
Experimental literature needs experimental publish-
ing—publishing that, like it, can afford to fail completely. In 
this it differs from experimental science, which recognizes 
the principle as self-evident without presenting an actual 
liability to scientific publishing.
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§ Tapped Potential
As counter-logic to literature’s Enlightenment-era institu-
tionalization, the French “workshop of potential literature,” 
or Oulipo, pushed the idea of the scientific institution to 
an absurd extreme. It appropriated the circular logics of 
calculation and relentless experimentation, of rationaliza-
tion and scientificity, adopting them where they were least 
expected—in the workroom of creativity. Rigid mechanical 
procedures became the enabling and ordering principles for 
some of the most singular creative productions ever under-
taken. Its great achievement was twofold: first, in demon-
strating the compatibility of technical constraints (linguistic, 
mathematical, logical) with even the most extravagant liter-
ary experimentation, building on precursors like Raymond 
Roussel; and, second, in underscoring the fundamental 
arbitrariness of such constraints. The operation thus went 
well beyond subversion and parody—well beyond having fun 
with the rigid and self-imposed rules of a confident rational-
ity. In this way, the experiments of Oulipo helped turn insti-
tutionalized reason against itself, commandeering what was 
alien and threatening to it. The power of certain literature 
to exorcise the evils of rationality may be exaggerated. But, 
unlike some reason, some superstition never killed anyone.
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§ Magpies
It will strike those convinced art in general is, and has long 
been, chiefly about vanguard innovation as false that, at 
least in the case of literary art, the loudest voices are con-
servative. To think how much energy has been expended to 
conserve the tradition and defend the classics from attacks 
on literature as art, rather than mere wordplay or verbal 
communication. 
How different things are with visual art, which, since the 
dramatic strides of literacy across the globe, has thrown 
off much of its former functional, didactic constraints. An 
enormous boon came to it in the form of mass advertising, 
opening up new visual horizons rather than limiting them; 
marketing, after all, reconceived the message along sub-
liminal lines, relying not on verbal but on sub-verbal cues. 
Surrealist imagery sold commodities like surrealist poetry 
never could. (Design was another natural home for visual 
experimentation.) 
Experiments in literature, by contrast, have rarely been 
met with the fanfare lavished on the plastic arts, and in their 
heyday relied on graphic embellishment. The vertiginous fall 
in the prospects of literary experimenters corresponds closely 
to the stratospheric rise of money and media attention 
given to visual art. If institutionally art and creative writing 
seem to be on par, professionally they have never been more 
divergent. Until a new, economically viable model is found to 
secure a future for the professional creative writer, experi-
mentation will be a luxury at which the republic of letters 
looks askance.
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§ Error Spotters
From the decline in errata we can reason that either we are 
making fewer errors in print or fewer of us notice them, 
which may mean their number is on the rise. Regardless, 
we do not bother publishing errata as we used to; mistakes 
have become too expensive to fix. It is more prudent to leave 
correcting to the next edition. Response and demand will tell 
if it is needed at all.
The drop in errata is the surest sign of disinvestment in 
the medium of print. Perhaps e-books are emended by elves 
to perfection, and error-free when printed on demand? Most 
likely remain untouched, attention to detail falling with 
increased volume. But there are always readers bothered 
by error in the most obscure spots. A way might be found 
to import their corrections. The time has come for crowd-
sourced errata and critical re-editions—focalized, rather 
than scattered across readers’ personal sites. But the copy-
right holders are not ready for this, and also not doing their 
job as in decades past. So we may be forgiven for thinking 
of telling them to “s**t or get off the pot.” Until flawless 
versions are produced, be it by publishers’ elves or freelance 
pedants on the web, we must write our own corrigenda, or 
give up on errors on the spot.
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§ Scribes
Centuries after the mass die-off of monastic scribes as a con-
sequence of Gutenberg’s invention, the Google Books project 
is bringing them back. They are now the human opera-
tors of OCR scanners. But their breed will soon disappear 
again until a time when a thorough review and philological 
rectification of the greatest error-riddled digital library the 
world has ever seen can no longer be postponed. Consider at 
random what they shall then have to reckon with:
All the finest feelings, he insisted, were strongest in the coun-
try; conjugal and parental affection, in particular, the source 
of all that is good, were very much blunted, in great cities, 
by the attention, imagination, and passions being divided 
among different women. “If men c< will live in crowded 
cities/’ said he, “ the women should be confined, “as in Asia, 
in harams. I am told, Li that the great business of the fine G 
3 «hfolks ”folks in London, is, to debauch the u women, who, 
on their parts, are not 4<a little vain of being thought “wor-
thy of being vessels of dishonour a to the men.” But there was 
an air of whim in all that this singular person did, as well as 
of fense in all that he said. In the midst of this conversation, 
after supper, a mephitic air was perceived, of which the dog, 
who fat near the door, was suspected of having been the 
chymist.  *
Our neo-scribes will be no less silent and absorbed in their 
labour than the scribes of old—for this time around they 
will be thoroughly mechanized.
* William Thomson, Mammuth, or Human Nature Displayed on a Grand Scale: In a 
Tour with the Tinkers, into the Inland Parts of Africa. By the Man in the Moon, vol. 1 
(London: J. Murray, 1789), 125–26.
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§ Inkhorn
Before you level at me the charge of inkhorn writer, you must 
try to understand my reason for choosing “bookish words”: 
they remind me there used to be such things as books.
§ Wordsmith
A I use neither paper nor pen.
B And you call yourself a writer? 
A Just as the theremin player calls herself a musician; it 
is proximity and attunement to one’s instrument that 
matters. My brains are still where they should be: close 
to my hands, which roam a plastic keyboard (though I 
imagine not for much longer). Is what I describe any more 
outrageous than writing with my foot, or hammering out 
words as one does objects in a smithy?
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§ Feathers
As I abandon paper and pen in favour of the keyboard, I 
hardly remember anymore what it was like to write long-
hand. At such times I stop typing and sign my name, just 
to make sure. But even this signature will disappear soon, 
when we revert to dyscriptia by signing with fingerprints. As 
I inspect it, on a sheet of low-grade paper stock, I notice its 
“feathers” or fuzzy edges; they resemble stray letters through 
a magnifying glass. Poring over these subvisible arabesques, 
these microscript accidents, too weak-eyed to decipher them, 
gives me pleasure.
But perhaps this is only a distraction, a fascination that 
everything analogue will hold for us. We will certainly find 
ways to recreate feathering, even if writing longhand will not 
last.
§ Coincidence of Invention
We meet over the page of a book. This book. Where I exist 
only thanks to you. And you, only thanks to me. You and I, 
we are creating each other right now. You the reader exist as 
long as you are with me (that much I guarantee). I the writer 
come in the same, accompanied way. 
My physical status as a living person has nothing any more 
to do with me; “I” might even already have passed on. But 
I’ve no doubt that I still live, at least for you, even if our lives 
would be nothing without “you,” there, reading this.
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§ Philobiblon
Love affair with books? For the bookworms! How much more 
value in a good breakup; you get through more books! A 
healthy relationship of man and book is when they argue and 
move on.
§ Arks Out
With Noah in mind, we take one of every kind. We are 
forgiven for thinking that we singlehandedly save older, 
near-forgotten specimens from certain oblivion. And, given 
our limited time, capacity, and the taboo against reproduc-
tion, why should we take pairs over more ones-of-a-kind?
And thus those who love to read keep the worthy books 
afloat when new ones flood the market. It is this annual 
flood on which literary art drifts.
§ Jazz Funeral
There may be many parties celebrating your successes while 
you are still alive. But your posthumous fame—that gets 
decided at the wake, after you’re gone. A wake can go one of 
two ways. You might get resurrected. Or put your celebrants 
to sleep.
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§ Fans
In music and film, there is still a healthy ratio of producers to 
fans. I mean just fans. In literature, the fans are neither just 
fans, nor just.
§ Copycats
Copycats may spread a work’s fame far and wide, but they 
rob the original of its distinction.
§ Non-Potable
Some sources of inspiration are just polluted wells.
§ Seniority
There are those who come to us, and those to whom we must 
come, in the guise of dreams, ghosts, or beggars.
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§ “My Undertaking”
Why does the grim ring of that expression strike me only 
now? I was too keen to escape the infantile ring of “my 
project.”
§ A Nagging Burden
Those still chasing chimeras are the lucky ones; they don’t 
have one riding on their back. And it can be “as heavy as a 
sack of flour or coal,”  * or—which is worse—no longer felt to 
be a burden at all.
§ Loose Moorings
Tie your moorings loosely to ship out quickly, or else be ready 
to jump ship at the first signal. Often the greater risk is not 
shipwreck, but delay.
* Charles Baudelaire, “To Each His Chimera,” in Paris Spleen and La Fanfarlo,  
trans. R. N. MacKenzie (New York: Hackett, 2008), 12.
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§ Credo
The aphorist: the houdini of reason.
§ The Burning Book
A book too burns without being consumed. All it takes is a 
mind.
§ Out of Reach
Some books are best kept out of reach of children. They 
might yet make something of them.
§ Endings
Can be eelusory.
⁂




